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INTRODUCTION 
The Council of Commerce established in 1700 played an important 
role in the economic history of France until its dissolution in 1791. 
It was unique in the Old Regime because it consisted of govern­
ment officials as well as merchant representatives from the more 
important French commercial cities. Although many historians 
have acknowledged the importance of this council, few have given 
it the attention it deserves.1 
The study of the Council of Commerce provides one with a fresh 
vantage point for the study of that group of economic policies 
commonly referred to as mercantilism. Most works on this subject 
concentrate exclusively on such topics as the trading companies, 
the growth and regulation of French manufactures, tariffs, and so 
on. The present work, however, will deal primarily with the actual 
decision-making process within the upper levels of the govern­
ment. By studying the Council of Commerce, one can better 
understand the bureaucratic machinery that enforced royal laws 
and ministerial orders, and one can see more clearly the relation­
ship between the crown and the business community. The council's 
activities demonstrate that there was a far higher degree of co­
operation and agreement between merchants and the crown than 
has heretofore been realized. 
This book will treat the period dating from the council's creation 
up to the death of Louis XIV. These fifteen years form a discrete 
period in the history of France, comprising the Sun King's final 
years as well as the War of the Spanish Succession. They also form 
a distinct phase in the history of the Council of Commerce. The 
problems with which it dealt and the organization of the council 
made these years different from subsequent ones. After the king's 
death, this council was reorganized along with all the other royal 
councils. Although it survived in various forms and remained im­
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portant until the end of the Old Regime, it never regained all the 
influence that it had had under Louis XIV. 
Despite the many discussions that have arisen over the meaning 
and usefulness of the term mercantilism, I have intentionally placed 
that word in the title of this book. Some scholars argue that one 
should not use the word, since it did not even exist at the time for 
which it is meant to apply. But if historians were to limit themselves 
to the words existing during the epochs about which they write, 
their vocabulary would be sadly diminished. Furthermore, such an 
argument seems to deny one of the essential functions of the his­
torian: namely, the tracing of ideas and patterns that might not 
have been evident to contemporaries. Others who dislike the word 
mercantilism assert that by creating an "ism" historians are estab­
lishing an artificial coherence that does not conform to the facts.2 
I agree that mercantilism in France and elsewhere was largely 
empirical rather than theoretical. The great Swedish historian Eli 
F. Heckscher thus, for example, went too far in trying to make a 
unified system out of it.3 But the vast majority of scholars dealing 
with early modern European history still employ the term, and I 
believe that this is justifiable. Although mercantilist statesmen and 
writers often contradicted themselves or each other, nevertheless 
they generally did follow a fairly uniform set of tendencies. These 
included the building up of colonial empires, the protection and 
encouragement of manufactures, the search for a favorable bal­
ance of trade, the creation of privileged trading companies, and 
the fostering of a nation's navy and merchant marine. Underlying 
these policies were a set of existing conditions and presuppositions: 
the growth and bureaucratization of the modern nation state, a 
basically hard-money economy, and a static view of the world's 
economy (which inevitably led to the conclusion that what helped 
one state must hurt another). 
Among historians who agree that there was such a thing as mer­
cantilism, the major debate has concerned the question of its goals. 
Over the past century, scholars such as Gustav Schmoller, William 
Cunningham, Eli F. Heckscher, Lionel Rothkrug, and D. C. Cole­
man have tended to argue that the basic aim of the mercantile 
system was state-building. Related to this is the argument of 
Herbert Heaton and Gabriel Ardant that mercantilism was at heart 
merely a fiscal instrument—that is, a means by which the state 
could increase its own wealth and power at the expense of the 
general economy.4 In opposition to that point of view, other 
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scholars have asserted that the goal of mercantilism was both power 
and plenty.5 In other words, mercantilist statesmen and writers 
realized that the welfare of the state and the prosperity of the 
people went hand in hand because, as Martin Wolfe has said, the 
state could benefit only if the number of taxable transactions rose.6 
As will become clear in the following pages, I believe that the 
latter interpretation is the one that most closely conforms to the 
story of the French Council of Commerce early in the eighteenth 
century. This is not to say that there was never any contention 
between the public and private sectors—far from it. But it does 
mean that there was no fundamental, theoretical contradiction be­
tween their needs and views. 
For those readers who are still troubled by my use of the word 
mercantilism, let me say that for the purposes of this book mercan­
tilism can be identified as Colbertism—that is, royal economic and 
financial policies from the 1660s through the 1680s, along with the 
various official and unofficial writings that supported them.7 The 
Council of Commerce has almost always been described by his­
torians as being part of a growing movement of opposition against 
Colbert's ideas. The following pages will assess this interpretation. 
1. There exist several brief descriptions of the organization and work of the 
council. A good, short summary is in Louis de Rouvroy, due de Saint-Simon, 
Memoires, ed. A. de Boislisle, 7:415-33. Bernard Wybo's Le Conseil de commerce et le 
commerce interieur de la France treats the entire eighteenth century, but is slender (113 
pages) and was not based on any archival research. More substantive is Leon 
Biollay's Etudes economiques sur le XVIII siecle: le pacte de famine; Vadministration du 
commerce. Also useful is Germai n Martin's La grande industrie sous le regne de Louis 
XIV, pp. 262-73. There have been two historians who intended to produce major 
works on the Council of Commerce, but each, unfortunately, died before he could 
complete his project. One was Pierre Bonnassieux, a late nineteenth-century archi­
vist at the Archives Nationales. Bonnassieux and Eugene Lelong did, however, edit 
the extremely valuable Conseil de commerce et Bureau du commerce, 1700-1791: in­
ventaire analytique des proces-verbaux. The introduction and appendixes of this work 
provide a short history of the council and brief biographies of its members. I have 
had the good fortune to consult Bonnassieux's personal notes and papers, which are 
still conserved at the Archives Nationales. The second man who commenced a 
major study of this council was Warren Scoville. The only published fruits of his 
research are a section in his book The Persecution of Huguenots and French Economic 
Development, 1680-1720, chapter 11, and his article "The French Economy in 1700­
1701: An Appraisal by the Deputies of Trade." 
2. Scholars who would prefer to avoid using the term mercantilism or who have 
argued against attributing too much meaning to it have included Herbert Heaton, 
A. V. Judges, Raymond de Roover, E. A. J. Johnson, T. W. Hutchison, John F. 
Bosher and D. C. Coleman. Ralph Davis has managed to write the economic history 
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of early modern Europe without using the word (The Rise of the Atlantic Economies). 
The views of these historians and those who will be mentioned below are discussed 
in several books that treat this subject. See Walter E. Minchinton (ed.), Mercantilism: 
System or Expediency?; D. C. Coleman (ed.), Revisions in Mercantilism; Pierre Deyon, Le 
Mercantilisme; Fritz Blaich, Die Epoche des Merkantilismus; Jan Hajek, Comparative 
Research into Mercantilists Theories in Europe of the 16th and 17th Centuries; Immanuel 
Wallerstein, The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the 
European World-Economy, 1600-1750. 
3. Eli F. Heckscher, Mercantilism. 
4. See note 2 above and Lionel Rothkrug, Opposition to Louis XIV: The Political and 
Social Origins of the French Enlightenment. 
5. These include Jacob Viner, Jacob van Klaveren, Ingomar Bog, Charles H. 
Wilson, William Grampp, and Martin Wolfe. See note 2 above. 
6. Martin Wolfe, "French Views on Wealth and Taxes from the Middle Ages to 
the Old Regime," in Coleman, Revisions, p. 204. 
7. This working definition is borrowed from Wolfe, ibid., p. 196. 
PART ONE 
THE COUNCIL AND ITS PLACE 
IN THE GOVERNMENT 

THE CREATION OF THE COUNCIL 
Historians have devoted more attention to the creation of the 
Council of Commerce in 1700 than to its subsequent ninety-one 
years of activity. This is not without some justification. The forma­
tion of the council fits into a general debate concerning the second 
half of the reign of Louis XIV. The more traditional view holds 
that the latter part of the reign (variously dated as beginning any­
where from 1679 to 1688) represented a decline—replete with 
economic and military disasters, an aging king, a mediocre, if not 
incompetent, corps of royal ministers, and the virtual bankruptcy 
of the state.1 In recent years, however, several historians have 
viewed the second half of the reign more positively.2 They have 
noted that Louis XIV's foreign policy, like the king himself, be­
came more subdued and that several royal ministers and bureau­
crats of this period were quite competent, imaginative, and eager to 
grapple with the difficulties besetting the government. 
The creation of the Council of Commerce has been cited as 
evidence for the former point of view. Numerous historians have 
related the founding of this council to growing unrest over nettle­
some regulations imposed on the economy by an increasingly reac­
tionary government.3 The strongest recent advocate of this posi­
tion has been Lionel Rothkrug. In his influential book Opposition to 
Louis XIV, Rothkrug asserts that the French royal government after 
the deaths of the great Colbert in 1683 and war minister Louvois in 
1691 faced "a crisis of confidence, existing in the highest circles of 
government and paralyzing the exercise of political authority."4 
Royal power was "rapidly declining,"5 owing in part, to "the spec­
tacle of ministerial uncertainty."6 The successors of Colbert and 
Louvois sought futilely to remedy the economic depression of 
1693-94 and meet the costs of the War of the League of Augsburg. 
In contrast to the sorry state of the government, Rothkrug portrays 
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the French merchant community as growing in wealth and asser­
tiveness in the 1690s. Merchants, who were "intoxicated with 
recently acquired wealth and exasperated at mercantilist restric-
tions,"7 formed an "onslaught"8 against the government, using 
"liberty of trade" as their "battle cry."9 As a result, the government 
was "plunged into confusion,"10 and overcome by "fatal indeci-
sions."11 After the conclusion of the War of the League of Augs­
burg in 1697, discontented nobles and merchants compelled the 
government, with "almost unseemly haste,"12 to repeal the capita­
tion and to grant trading concessions to the Dutch.13 Royal minis­
ters, who lacked Colbert's "supreme self-assurance," were for the 
first time asking businessmen for advice on commercial matters.14 
Merchants took advantage of this opportunity and "clamored for 
institutional reforms designed to give them an official voice in 
directing the economic affairs of the realm."15 The government, 
"unable either to appease or to control the business community," 
established the Council of Commerce, "from which merchants 
publicly unleashed a torrent of pent-up criticism."16 
This widely accepted interpretation of the events needs recon­
sideration. Three basic points should be acknowledged: first, that 
the idea of a Council of Commerce and of royal consultations with 
the merchant community was far from new in 1700; second, that 
there is little or no solid evidence of merchant demands for a 
Council of Commerce; third, that the government itself took the 
initiative in forming it. 
PRECEDENTS FOR THE COUNCIL 
To demonstrate the first point, one needs only to look at the 
several precedents for such a council. During the seventeenth cen­
tury, there were at least six councils or commissions of commerce, 
established for varying lengths of time.17 Henri IV, Marie de 
Medici, Cardinal Richelieu, Cardinal Mazarin, and Superintendant 
of Finances Fouquet all had assembled bodies of goverment offi­
cials to advise them on commercial matters. The most significant 
seventeenth-century effort to establish a permanent body to super­
vise trade, however, occurred under Colbert. In 1664 Colbert cre­
ated a Council of Commerce that, unlike the earlier endeavors, had 
authority to issue arrets on business and commercial affairs. At­
tached to this new council as advisers were three businessmen,18 
chosen by the king from nominations presented to him by the 
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merchants and manufacturers of the eighteen major commercial 
and industrial cities of France. 
For varying reasons, some not yet clarified by historians, none of 
these commissions or councils of commerce lasted more than a few 
years; but their very existence proves that since early in the seven­
teenth century the crown had sought a way to administer trade and 
industry more knowledgeably and efficiently. 
Th e assemblies representatives du commerce constituted another 
precedent for the council established in 1700. Colbert created these 
local assemblies in his famous manufacturing ordinance of August 
1669. They were to meet periodically in all the major cities in 
France and were to be composed of municipal officials and repre­
sentatives of local merchants and manufacturers. The members 
were expected to examine industrial and commercial problems and 
to recommend new regulations if they were considered necessary. 
Although Colbert repeatedly urged the larger cities to establish 
these assemblies, few were formed until the eighteenth century; 
but they offer further testimony of the crown's efforts to involve 
the business sector in goverment decisions.19 
Quite frequently prior to 1700, the crown also turned to individ­
ual mechants for advice.20 When Louis XI in 1470 met with mer­
chants in the city of Tours to confer with them on ways to encour­
age trade, he established a precedent for royal or ministerial con­
sultations with business groups.21 Another of the many examples 
that one could cite involves Cardinal Richelieu's consultation on 
economic matters with Theophraste Renaudot's Bureau d'Adresse 
in the 1630s and early 1640s.22 The papers of Colbert and his 
successors provide literally countless instances of the government 
asking merchants for their opinions on such issues as tariffs, textile 
regulations, and the general economic picture.23 If the royal min­
isters of the 1690s relied on merchants for advice, they were there­
fore only continuing a tradition that had been followed by Colbert 
himself. One of Colbert's chief assistants was in fact a merchant, 
Jacques Savary. In addition to writing Le parfait negociant, a hand­
book for businessmen, Savary was the principal author of Colbert's 
commercial code, sometimes called the Code Savary.24 
Royal concern for the business community was also evidenced 
late in the seventeenth century by the government's growing inter­
est in obtaining accurate estimates of the condition of the economy 
as a whole. Colbert and his successors bombarded the provincial 
intendants, tax farmers, and inspectors of manufactures with de­
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mands for surveys and statistics on French manufactures, agricul­
ture, trade, population, and the personnel in merchant and craft 
guilds.25 Occasionally the government sent bureaucrats from Paris 
to report on the situation in the provinces, the most famous ex­
ample of this being the inquest of 1687.26 This royal concern for 
the gathering of information climaxed in the last two years of the 
century with the celebrated series of memoirs by the provincial 
intendants written for the instruction of the duke of Burgundy.27 
The reasons for all this activity were threefold: the realization that 
in order to govern efficiently the government needed accurate 
information about all aspects of the people and their activities, a 
genuine humanitarian concern for the welfare of Frenchmen,28 
and the belief that the good of the state depends upon the prosper­
ity of the nation.29 
This is not, of course, to deny that fiscal and military exigencies 
often led the government to disregard the economic needs of the 
country; but on the whole, French royal ministers acknowledged 
that helping trade and manufactures would increase the number of 
taxable transactions, thereby helping the goverment itself. 
THE THESIS OF MERCHANT OPPOSITION 
If one accepts then the notion that a council of commerce was 
not inherently an invasion of the prerogatives of an absoute mon­
arch and that the crown had on many occasions in the past con­
sulted the business community, the question still remains, Who was 
responsible for the creation of the new Council of Commerce in 
1700? The argument that merchants or other supposedly anti-
mercantilist forces somehow pressured the government into form­
ing it proves, upon close examination, to be less than convincing. 
No exponent of this argument up to the present moment has pre­
sented any examples of a merchant or a group of merchants asking 
for a council of commerce or for any other sort of official forum in 
which their grievances could be voiced. The records of the secre­
tary of state for the navy and of the controller general for the 1690s 
provide only one document that might support this argument.30 
On 16 February 1700, the officers of the juridiction consulaire of La 
Rochelle wrote to the new controller general, Michel ChamiHart, to 
complain that Chamillart's predecessors had not listened to 
them.ai They requested that several towns be permitted to send 
deputies to Paris so that commercial interests could be heard. Even 
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this letter, however, does not totally conform to the thesis of a 
merchant opposition, for the officers clearly note that Chamillart 
had first let it be known that he wanted to hear from the merchant 
community.32 
The archival records do present many examples from the 1690s 
of merchant complaints about various manufacturing regulations, 
tariff policies, and the farmers general (fermiers generaux). In this 
respect the 1690s were no different from preceding or succeeding 
decades: it is the nature of the correspondence of any government 
that most incoming letters deal with the problems and grievances 
of individual parties. It would be virtually impossible to analyze 
quantitatively the complaints, given the haphazard and incomplete 
nature of the archives of the Old Regime, but there seems to be no 
quantitative evidence of a deluge of unprecedented criticism by 
businessmen in the 1690s. The correspondence of that time does 
not show that merchants somehow felt themselves to be the masters 
of the situation. It is true that several merchants and bankers 
amassed great fortunes during the War of the League of Augs­
burg, but such profiteering occurred in all the wars of the Old 
Regime. Furthermore, there are no signs of ministerial panic or 
indecision resulting from the complaints received. If there was any 
period of the personal reign of Louis XIV when the crown was 
gravely threatened by a rising tide of opposition, it was the early 
part—not the later. The most serious popular revolts occurred in 
the 1660s and early 1670s. The number of political tracts raising 
complaints may also have been higher during this period than in 
subsequent years.33 
There is no evidence that the goverment was aware of any sort of 
rising wave of discontent. Lionel Rothkrug, nevertheless, asserts 
that the crown felt the need to commission books supporting tradi­
tional mercantilist principles against mounting opposition. He cites 
as evidence the case of Gatien Courtilz de Sandras, a hack writer 
who supposedly was paid by the government to defend royal poli-
cies.34 Rothkrug attributes two books to Courtilz de Sandras: Testa­
ment politique de messire Jean Baptiste Colbert, published in 1693,35 
and Testament politique du marquis de Louvois, published in 1695.36 
There is no evidence, however, that anyone in the government 
hired someone to write them. Furthermore, though the two works 
ostensibly defend royal policies, a casual perusal of them reveals 
that actually they are clever satires of the ministries of Colbert and 
Louvois, intended to criticize the government; and it is unlikely 
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that Courtilz de Sandras was responsible for them: the authorship 
of both works is contested.37 Also, Courtilz de Sandras's irreverent 
prose led the crown to imprison him in the Bastille from 1693 to 
1699, at the very time when it is said to have engaged his services.38 
One possible reason why there is only scant evidence of mer­
chants demanding more influence in decisions made by the gov­
ernment of Louis XIV is that they were already well represented at 
Paris and Versailles. Provincial estates, large cities, and many im­
portant business and craft guilds already had permanent agents, or 
syndics, at the court to lobby for their interests.39 And if these 
agents were not sufficient to do the job, special deputies were sent 
to deal with particular issues.40 These private lobbyists used their 
skills of persuasion and the ever-present pot-de-vin in working to 
convince the royal ministers and their commis ("clerks") of the 
justice of their claims. The local interest groups for whom these 
various agents worked seem to have been quite content to continue 
this traditional manner of representing their grievances to the gov-
ernment.41 
Those historians who have espoused the thesis of merchant un­
rest in the 1690s have generally had in mind the great shipowners 
and overseas traders. The government depended on these men 
during the War of the League of Augsburg to bring much-needed 
food supplies and naval stores to France. Also, during this war, the 
government gradually abandoned its big-fleet strategy and turned 
to a guerre de course.*2 Thus the crown came to rely more and more 
on the help of individual privateers for attacks on enemy shipping. 
Recently Geoffrey Symcox and Lionel Rothkrug have asserted that 
late in the 1690s these traders and privateers became increasingly 
dissatisfied with government regulations that prevented them from 
pursuing their business as they desired. This supposedly caused 
them to lead the merchant opposition that resulted in the assem­
bling of the Council of Commerce.43 
It is difficult to accept this interpretation: the very fact that these 
men were becoming wealthy as a result of their wartime enterprises 
is inconsistent with the picture of a beleaguered, discontented 
merchant community. Symcox himself demonstrates that in the 
years 1694-95 French privateers were highly successful in having 
their grievances settled by the government.44 Furthermore, the 
investment of royal officials in privateering ventures seems to dis­
count the fissure painted between privateers and the govern-
ment.45 
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Even though there is little or no proof of merchants clamoring 
for a council of commerce, there were, nevertheless, at least three 
individuals who in the 1690s called for the creation of such a coun­
cil. In 1692 an obscure noble by the name of Charles Paul Hurault 
de l'Hospital, seigneur de Belesbat,46 presented to the king a series 
of memoirs in which he advocated a host of economic and admin­
istrative reforms, including the creation of a council of com­
47merce.  Some historians include Belesbat among the leaders of 
the antimercantilist movement because of his espousal of certain 
free-trade ideas.48 They fail to demonstrate, however, that any of 
the others in this "movement" ever read or knew Belesbat,49 and 
they neglect to point out that Belesbat was among the staunchest 
supporters of royal absolutism. Furthermore, Belesbat specifically 
excluded merchant deputies from membership in his council of 
commerce. Jean Pottier de la Hestroye, a former admiralty officer 
at Dunkirk, wrote a series of memoirs in the late 1690s in which he 
discussed various means of improving French trade.50 He sug­
gested that a council of commerce be established, but, like Belesbat, 
he urged that merchants be excluded from it. Moreover, de la 
Hestroye did not submit his memoirs to the government until late 
in the year 1700, by which time the council was already in ex-
istence.51 Marshal Vauban, France's great military engineer, like­
wise in his Description geographique de ['election de Vezelay and in his 
Dixme royale, mentions a chamber of commerce as one of several 
possible remedies for the economic depression in France.52 But 
Vauban does not elaborate his ideas about the form and responsi­
bilities of such a chamber, and one could hardly include Vauban 
among the leadership of antimercantilist opposition to Louis XIV. 
It is thus highly unlikely that the ideas of these three men had any 
great bearing on the establishment of the Council of Commerce. 
ROYAL INITIATIVE 
The most convincing explanation for the creation of the council 
in 1700 is that the government itself took the initiative in forming 
it. There were three basic reasons for the government's decision: 
the return of peace, bureaucratic necessity, and the recent division 
of control over commercial affairs. With the signing of the Treaty 
of Ryswick in 1697, France was once again at peace, and the gov­
ernment used this opportunity to turn its attention back to the needs 
of the economy. That the entire nation expected a return to eco­
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nomic prosperity is reflected in an engraving preserved in the 
Collection Hennin in the cabinet d'estampes of the Bibliotheque 
Nationale in Paris.53 The engraving, dating from 1698, is entitled 
"Les heureux fruits de la paix, par le retablissemment du com­
merce universel." Pictured in it are ships being unloaded, stacks of 
barrels and packages ready for shipment, and several groups of 
French merchants carrying on their business affairs. The arret of 
29 June 1700 that created the council affirms that the king of 
France had always been aware of the importance of trade for the 
good of the state.54 It goes on to note that the return of peace 
would enable the king to testify once again to his esteem for busi­
nessmen and to give trade the protection it deserves. The arret 
makes no mention of merchant complaints as a motive for forming 
the council. Lest one suspect that the government intentionally 
omitted acknowledging such pressure, it should be pointed out that 
most, if not all, royal laws that were issued in response to protests 
or grievances by one group of Frenchmen or another freely ad­
mitted it.55 It was, after all, good publicity for the government to 
show that it was responsive to the just complaints of the people. 
The second factor leading to the creation of the Council of Com­
merce was bureaucratic necessity. One of the trademarks of the 
development of a sophisticated, "modern" bureaucracy, as outlined 
by Max Weber and others, is an increasing division of responsibili­
ties, the assigning of narrower and more specific tasks to individ­
uals and to councils.56 This process was occurring in other areas of 
Louis XIV's government,57 and the need for it was felt in com­
merce also. The arret of 29 June 1700 states clearly that the best 
way for the government to help commerce is to establish a special 
council to deal with it. 
Since the dissolution of Colbert's Council of Commerce in the 
1670s, there had been no group of officials charged specifically 
with such matters, and long before 1700 government was aware of 
this lack. In this regard one should note a memoir composed in 
1690 by a secretary in the naval ministry.58 The memoir, intended 
for the new secretary of state for the navy, Louis de Pontchartrain, 
describes the various bureaus within the ministry. It informs 
Pontchartrain that the supervision of all French overseas trade is in 
the hands of a single man. This man was Jean-Baptiste de Lagny. 
and he held the title of director general of commerce.59 The 
memoir describes de Lagny's vast responsibilities within the naval 
ministry and notes that it is impossible for any one man to have all 
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the experience and special knowledge needed to supervise French 
external commerce. The memoir then notes that discussions have 
been going on for some time concerning the possible establishment 
of a chamber of commerce in Paris, to be composed of retired 
businessmen who could share their experience with the secretary 
of state and the director general of commerce.60 It is not known 
why immediate action was not taken on this proposal; perhaps the 
War of the League of Augsburg prevented any ideas of administra­
tive reform from being put into effect.61 
The need for a council of commerce was compensated for in the 
1690s by a unique set of circumstances. Traditionally, French in­
ternal commerce and manufactures had been in the hand of the 
controller general of finances, and external commerce was the 
province of the secretary of state for the navy. This distinction was 
blurred, however, from 1690 to 1699, when both of these offices 
were held by the same person, Louis de Pontchartrain. To adminis­
ter commerce, Pontchartrain relied on two men. As mentioned 
above, de Lagny dealt with the French colonies, the merchant 
marine, and foreign trade. For internal trade and manufactures, 
Pontchartrain relied on his cousin, Henri Daguesseau, a conseiller 
d'etat and a member of the Council of Finances.62 Daguesseau 
supervised internal trade and industries, corresponding with busi­
nessmen, tax farmers, provincial intendants, and manufacturers.63 
De Lagny and Daguesseau were men of exceptional talent, and 
between them they offset, at least temporarily, the need for a better 
institutional arrangement.64 
Late in 1699, however, the situation changed. In September of 
that year, the chancellor of France, Louis Boucherat, died, and 
Louis de Pontchartrain was appointed to succeed him. This meant 
that control over commerce would be divided once again—between 
the new controller general, Michel Chamillart, and the new secre­
tary of state for the navy, Je'rome de Pontchartrain, son of Louis. 
This was the third factor leading to the Council of Commerce in 
1700. 
Louis de Pontchartrain sought to prevent a recurrence of the 
problems that had plagued the administration of commerce from 
1683 to 1691. Colbert had held simultaneously the offices of con­
troller general, secretary of state for the navy, and superintendent 
of buildings—the latter office having charge over French manufac­
turers. On Colbert's death these three offices were divided between 
Le Peletier (controller general, 1683-89), Colbert's son Seignelay 
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(secretary of state for the navy, 1683-90) and Louvois (superin­
tendent of buildings, 1683-91). Late in the 1680s, these three men 
quarreled over the jurisdictions of their respective ministries. Ad­
ministrative unity returned in the 1690s, when Louis de Pontchar­
train assumed control over both internal and external commerce as 
well as over manufactures.65 Early in 1699, even before the death 
of Boucherat, Pontchartrain sought to find a solution that would 
prevent the disputes of the 1680s from repeating themselves. In 
May of that year, he presented a memoir to the king in which he 
meticulously outlined the respective powers of the controller gen­
eral and the secretary of state for the navy over commercial af-
fairs.66 Pontchartrain suggested the creation of a council of com­
merce as a means of preventing future conflicts between these two 
officials. He believed that such a council would give a central, 
united direction to trade. It would also constitute a standing body 
from which both the controller general and the naval secretary 
could get expert advice. This memoir is also noteworthy because in 
it Pontchartrain recalled that the king himself had originally re­
quested him to reflect on the problem and to submit his sugges-
tions.67 
Although the primary impetus for the new Council of Com­
merce thus came from Louis de Pontchartrain, some historians 
have insisted that Controller General Chamillart inspired it.68 This 
contention rests on the fact that the arret of 29 June 1700 states that 
the king established the council upon the report of Chamillart; it 
does not mention either of the Pontchartrains. The explanation for 
this is simple: the council that most properly should have issued 
this arret was the Council of Finances.69 None of the other councils 
dealt with commercial matters as a general rule, except in cases 
involving foreign relations or legal disputes. The arret was thus 
issued as an arret en finance, and as such had to be signed by the 
controller general. The form of the arret is thus as should have 
been expected. 
Far from creating the Council of Commerce, Chamillart actually 
disliked the institution. In 1707 he addressed a memoir to the king 
in which he contended that all commerce should be under the 
authority of the controller general. He argued that the sharing of 
power with a council and with the secretary of state for the navy 
was an encroachment on his own powers.70 Chamillart's feeling 
toward the council did not, as will be demonstrated, prevent him 
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from working with it, but it is highly unlikely that he would have 
contributed to its formation. 
Even though the initial push for the Council of Commerce came 
from Louis de Pontchartrain, one should not ignore the assistance 
that he received from men working under him, including his son 
Jerome, who succeeded him as secretary of state for the navy and 
who carried through to completion the plans begun by his father. 
The papers of the controller general and the secretary of state for 
the navy contain more than a dozen memoirs and letters written by 
royal officials or commis in 1698-1700 that discuss the possible 
duties and membership of a council of commerce.71 Most of these 
documents are undated and unsigned. They are clearly aide­
memoires and rough drafts of position papers that were to be pre­
sented to Louis de Pontchartrain or to his son. All of them speak of 
a need for such a council, and most of them stress the importance 
of getting advice from the business community by having merchant 
deputies sit on the council. Some of these documents note that such 
a council could help settle disputes between businessmen and tax 
farmers. But there is no mention in the documents of pressure 
from merchants or from anyone else.72 
Louis de Pontchartrain's principal collaborator on this project 
was Henri Daguesseau.73 In May of 1699, he asked Daguesseau for 
his opinions concerning such a council. Pontchartrain himself 
favored a council similar to the one established by Colbert, but 
Daguesseau object to this.74 As a member of the Pontchartrain clan, 
Daguesseau naturally favored the interests of the new secretary of 
state for the navy, Jerome de Pontchartrain. Daguesseau told the 
elder Pontchartrain that a council such as Colbert's might eventu­
ally become the tool of the controller general. Daguesseau sug­
gested that the new council be more of an advisory body, and he 
also urged that business interests be accorded more representation 
than they had had in Colbert's council. That these proposals were 
largely accepted is shown by the final shape that the council took. 
To conclude, the Council of Commerce that was created in 1700 
followed in a long tradition of royal consultation with the French 
merchant community. It was not the product of any movement of 
opposition to the crown. Historians should recognize the council 
for what it was: an enlightened reform by the government of Louis 
XIV. 
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THE ORGANIZATION AND 
FUNCTIONING OF THE COUNCIL 
Before approaching the major problems on which the Council of 
Commerce worked during its first fifteen years, one must under­
stand how the council operated. This chapter will therefore de­
scribe the organization and the workings of the council and its 
relations with the controller general and the secretary of state for 
the navy. It will also assess in general the role that the council 
played in French economic policies during this period. 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COUNCIL 
Although the arret establishing the council was issued on 29 June 
1700, the council did not first assemble until 24 November 1700. 
Few of the commentators of the day mentioned it. In July 1700 the 
marquis de Dangeau briefly noted the creation of a "chambre pour 
le commerce,"1 but the semiofficial Almanack royal did not start to 
list it among the royal councils until the year 1703.2 This rather 
unspectacular beginning was reflective of the subsequent history of 
the council, for it always wielded more behind-the-scenes power 
and influence than the public generally recognized. 
The council met at the home of its president, Henri Daguesseau, 
on the rue Pavee, in the Marais quarter of Paris. As prescribed by 
the founding arret, the council was composed of six commissaires, 
who were officers of the crown, as well as thirteen deputies from 
the major cities of France.3 Daguesseau, as the senior conseiller 
d'etat, presided over the meetings. The other commissaires, in order 
of seniority, were Controller General Michel Chamillart, Secretary 
of State for the Navy Jerome de Pontchartrain, conseiller d'etat 
Michel Jean Amelot de Gournay, and two maitres des requetes, 
Francois-Joseph d'Ernothon and Nicolas-Prosper Bauyn d'Anger-
villiers.4 The deputies of commerce were to be "persons of recog­
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nized probity, ability, and experience in trade."5 With the excep­
tion of the two Parisian deputies, who were chosen by the king, all 
the deputies were to be elected at town meetings composed of local 
municipal officers, consular officials, and prominent business 
leaders. The deputies who assembled on 24 November 1700 in­
cluded Samuel Bernard and Antoine Peletyer (Paris), Nicolas 
Mesnager (Rouen), Le'on de Rol (Bayonne), Jean-Baptiste Fenellon 
(Bordeaux), Noe Piecourt (Dunkirk), Francois-Eustache Taviel 
(Lille), (?) Mourgues (Languedoc), Jean Anisson (Lyons), Joseph 
Fabre (Marseilles), Joachim Descasaux du Hallay (Nantes), Antoine 
Heron (La Rochelle), and Alain de La Motte-Gaillard (Saint-
Malo).6 
The Council of Commerce also included two farmers general, 
who were summoned to meetings whenever an affair concerned 
their interests. The two tax farmers who served on the council 
during the reign of Louis XIV were Charles de Poyrel de Grandval 
and Jean-Remy Henault.7 The last member of the council was the 
secretary, Jean de Valossiere.8 The secretary's duties, which were 
gradually expanded, included keeping the official minutes of the 
meetings.9 
The Council of Commerce differed markedly from the other 
royal councils. Its chief task, as noted in the founding arret, was that 
of advising the controller general of finances and the secretary of 
state for the navy on all matters concerning French manufactures 
and commerce (both external and internal). Unlike other councils, 
therefore, the Council of Commerce had no administrative func­
tions of its own; nor could it issue arrets or any other sort of law or 
directive. The Council of Commerce was also of lesser authority 
because it lacked the royal presence. In all the other royal councils, 
either the king presided or he was at least counted as present by the 
empty armchair reserved for him at the head of the table; there 
was, however, no hint of royal presence at the Council of Com­
merce. This council is therefore noticeably different from Colbert's 
Council of Commerce, which was headed by the king and which 
did have the power to issue arrets and other orders that were bind­
ing on provincial officials.10 The fact that the Council of Com­
merce kept official minutes of its meetings further distinguished it 
from other royal councils. Part of the mystery of divine-right king­
ship consisted in the secrecy of all that occurred in the conseil du rot, 
the council to which all other councils were judged to belong.'' 
This accounts for the absence of any proces-verbaux for the meetings 
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of the conseil d'en haut, the Council of Finances, and the other royal 
councils.12 The Council of Commerce was also peculiar because of 
the nonparticipation of royal ministers in its work. Although the 
controller general and the secretary of state for the navy were 
always counted as members of the Council of Commerce, they 
rarely attended its meetings. During the first fifteen years of the 
council's existence, these two officials attended only three times: 
the opening session of 24 November 1700 and the meetings of 23 
June and 15 September 1701.13 This was due not to the relative 
unimportance of the council but rather to an agreement made 
between Chamillart and Jerome de Pontchartrain not to attend.l4 
The purpose of this arrangement was to prevent one man or the 
other from gaining undue influence over the proceedings of the 
council. The two men further agreed that they would send to the 
council all matters that concerned commerce in general. This 
would keep each of them informed of the actions of the other. 
All these considerations lead one to infer that the Council of 
Commerce was really more like a bureau or a permanent commis­
sion rather than a true royal council. Beginning in 1715, in fact, the 
Almanach royal classified it as the Bureau pour le Conseil de Commerce 
and listed it among the "Bureaux de Messieurs les commissaires du 
Conseil pour les commissions ordinaires et extraordinaires de Fi-
nances."15 
The organization of the Council of Commerce underwent sev­
eral modifications during the period under study. In 1701 two 
offices of directors of finances were created to serve the controller 
general. These two officials had the right of entry into all royal 
councils, including the Council of Commerce. The first two di­
rectors were Hilaire Rouille' du Coudray and Joseph-Jean Baptiste 
Fleuriau d'Armenonville.16 In October 1703 the former was re­
placed by Nicolas Desmaretz, who attended the council regularly 
until he became controller general in February 1708.l7 Beginning 
in January 1705, the lieutenant general of police of Paris, the 
marquis d'Argenson, began to sit on the council.18 He was given 
entrance to the council because of his control of trade and manu­
factures in the French capital. Early in 1708 the two offices of 
directors of finances were abolished, and the two persons who held 
these positions were replaced in the council by six newly created 
intendants of commerce.19 The commissions of these six men were 
attached to six new positions of maitre des requetes, which offices 
were sold for 200,000 livres each.20 The intendants of commerce 
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were each given a department, consisting of several French pro­
vinces as well as certain parts of French foreign trade.21 Whenever 
a matter was brought to the Council of Commerce, it went to the 
intendant in whose department it lay, and this individual was 
charged with studying the matter and reporting on it. In June 1708 
another new commissaire was added to the council: Louis Bechameil 
de Nointel, brother-in-law of Nicolas Desmaretz. The arret appoint­
ing him said that the other commissaires were so busy on various 
affairs that they needed help in the Council of Commerce.22 For 
this same reason, yet another commissaire, Jean-Baptiste Desmaretz 
de Vaubourg, younger brother of the controller general, joined the 
council in June 1715.23 
During this period there were also two other members of the 
Council of Commerce, although one can seriously doubt that they 
ever actively participated in its work. In June 1700 the famous 
Rouen trader Thomas Le Gendre was given the title of inspector 
general of commerce. Along with this office went an annual pen­
sion of 12,000 livres and the freedom to attend the Council of 
Commerce whenever he wished.24 The post that Le Gendre was 
given, however, seems to have been more honorific than substan­
tial, and there is no evidence that Le Gendre ever attended the 
Council of Commerce.25 The second rather shadowy member of 
the Council of Commerce was Philippe Millieu, who held one of 
the two offices of directeur general des vivres, Stapes, fourrages et lits des 
hopitaux des arme'es et garnisons du roi, which were created by edict in 
November 1703. By virtue of this office, he assumed a seat on the 
Council of Commerce on 16 January 1704,26 but there is no fur­
ther mention of him in any of the records or correspondence of the 
council.27 
The paragraphs above describe the contours of the Council of 
Commerce up to the death of Louis XIV. The council was divided 
basically into two groups: the commissaires (including the six intend­
ants of commerce), who sat in armchairs on one side of the table, 
and the deputies, farmers general, and secretary, who sat in arm­
less chairs on the other side. The commissaires were the only ones 
who had the right to vote on matters being discussed at the meet­
ings. It would be inaccurate, however, to conclude, as one historian 
has done,28 that the deputies and farmers general were mere 
"auxiliaries" and not full members. As will become clear below, the 
commissaires depended upon the other members to do much of the 
work, and rarely did they fail to consider carefully the opinions of 
all the members of the council. 
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HOW THE COUNCIL FUNCTIONED 
Generally the council met on Friday afternoon in the home of 
Henri Daguesseau.29 If Daguesseau was ill or otherwise unable to 
attend, it met in the home of the second-ranking conseiller d'etat. In 
the late summer and fall of each year, the commissaires followed the 
king to Fontainebleau, and the council was usually recessed for 
several weeks. This gave the deputies a chance to return to their 
homes and to conduct their own personal affairs. 
At the meetings the deputies were allowed to speak only when 
called upon, although this happened frequently. At the opening of 
the council on 24 November 1700, it was decided that the deputies 
would need to meet on their own each week, apart from the council 
itself. This would permit them to have a full discussion of the 
matters introduced in the council. Chamillart proposed to ask the 
king for a pension for the secretary of the council, who would use it 
to rent a house where the deputies could meet and where all the 
records of the council could be stored.30 Shortly thereafter the 
secretary was accorded an annual pension of 10,700 livres, and the 
deputies began to assemble at his home on Monday and Friday 
mornings.31 If an urgent matter was being discussed, the deputies 
convened on other days as well. The secretary drew up a written 
avis of the deputies' opinions on each issue submitted to them and 
presented these avis at the next meeting of the council. 
The affairs about which the controller general and the secretary 
of state sought the advice of the Council of Commerce had numer­
ous origins. As a general rule, the ministers forwarded to the 
council the letters and petitions that they received from provincial 
intendants, inspectors of manufactures, traders, and manufac­
turers if the matters needed study and pertained to commerce. If 
the commissaires or deputies themselves wished to introduce a ques­
tion to the council, they first had to have it approved by one minis­
ter or the other.32 
The person who usually received the materials remitted by the 
controller general or the secretary of state for the navy was the 
secretary of the council, Jean de Valossiere. Preserved in series G7 
and F12 of the Archives Nationales are hundreds of letters and 
requests addressed to the controller general on which are added at 
the top "a M. Valossiere." The secretary recorded every document 
he received in a register, and at the next meeting of the council he 
distributed these papers to the commissaires who would be charged 
with studying them. The controller general or the secretary of state 
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could also choose, however, to present a matter directly to a com­
missaire, either in person or by letter. The commissaires, as conseillers 
d'etat or maitres des requetes, generally served in several royal councils 
or commissions, and thus had frequent contacts with the two minis­
ters. 
With regard to the assignment of matters to the various commis­
saires, one must distinguish the period 1700-1707 from the period 
beginning with the creation of the intendants of commerce in May 
1708. During the council's first seven years, there was no clear 
division of responsibilities among the commissaires. This left the 
door open for Amelot, capable and ambitious, to assume a leading 
role in the council's affairs. The records of the council clearly 
demonstrate that Amelot conducted a majority of the affairs 
treated in the council and that he was the chief link between the 
council and both Chamillart and Jerome de Pontchartrain. In 
March 1705, however, Amelot was appointed ambassador to Spain, 
where he served until 1709.33 During his long absence, his work in 
the council was taken over by the other commissaires—chiefly Henri 
Daguesseau, who remained surprisingly active in spite of his ad­
vanced age and frequent illnesses. The creation of the six intend­
ants of commerce in 1708, however, regularized the procedures of 
the council and clearly distinguished the departments of the six 
new commissaires. Henceforth all of the investigations and reports 
were handled by these six men. The other commissaires still attended 
the meetings and participated in the debates and the voting, but 
they now had more time to devote to their other governmental 
responsibilities. The intendants of commerce, meanwhile, became 
"in effect the bureau chiefs of commercial affairs."34 They had 
their own commis and as they accumulated correspondence and 
other papers, their own archives came to rival those kept by the 
secretary of the Council of Commerce as a documentary record of 
French economic developments.35 
Once a matter had been introduced at a meeting and assigned to 
a commissaire, one of several things might happen to it. If the matter 
was simple and required no study, it was quickly voted on and 
reported back to the minister who had sent it. If the matter was 
complex or if additional information was required, it was dis­
patched to a provincial intendant, to an admiralty official, or to 
some other royal agent for study.36 If the question concerned the 
king's revenues or the tax farmers, it might be sent to the farmers 
general, or the two farmers general assigned to the Council of 
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Commerce could be summoned to appear at the council.37 After 
the royal officials or the farmers general had replied to the coun-
cil's queries, the entire matter was then sent to the deputies. Most 
frequently, however, the affairs introduced at a meeting were re­
ferred immediately to the deputies, who discussed them at their 
next assembly in the home of the secretary. The avis of the deputies 
on each issue was then presented to the council by the secretary at 
the next meeting. If the deputies were divided on an issue, the 
views of each side were noted in the avis. Often, especially on 
controversial issues, the deputies drew up individual memoirs stat­
ing their particular views. These memoirs were then also presented 
to the commissaires. The secretary gave an oral report of the depu­
ties' opinions, and occasionally the deputies themselves were called 
on to explain further their views. 
Once the commissaires had heard the views of the deputies, they 
could decide to send the matter (along with the deputies' avis) to a 
provincial intendant or to some other royal official for his opinion. 
The council might also send the matter back to the deputies' 
assembly for more study. But most often the council decided to 
proceed with the debate and to vote on the matter. In extremely 
complicated and important issues, such as the question of French 
tariff policies, the whole process of seeking advice from experts, 
getting the opinion of the deputies, and discussing the matter in 
the council could be repeated numerous times over several months. 
But in the great majority of cases, the Council of Commerce re­
quired only two to three weeks to reply to the controller general or 
the secretary of state. 
It is impossible to analyze quantitatively the voting patterns of 
the commissaires or the deputies on the affairs decided in the coun­
cil. The proces-verbaux do not report which members were present 
at each meeting, much less how they voted. One can gather from 
memoirs of the deputies how they felt about certain issues, but 
there are only scraps of external evidence concerning how the 
commissaires voted. A plurality of voices carried an issue, and it was 
then generally presented to the royal ministers as the unanimous 
decision of the council. In some cases the commissaires did not vote, 
but merely forwarded to the ministers the opinions of the deputies. 
The avis produced in the deputies' assemblies thus served as the 
indispensable foundation for virtually all work done by the Council 
of Commerce. The lawyers and bureaucrats who made up the vot­
ing half of the council depended heavily on the wide experience 
TABLE 1 
TH E PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE COUNCIL 
The following diagram describes, in a general way, the course that was followed 
by most of the questions submitted to the council. The intendants of commerce, 
whose offices were created in 1708, are included here. Prior to that date one of the 
other commissaires acted as rapporteur. As noted in the text, a question could follow 
any of several paths through the council. Sometimes steps 2, 3, or 7 were elimi­
nated. Step 7 often preceded step 6. Steps 6, 7, and 8 were occasionally repeated. 
1. Request or complaint submitted by 
private individual, provincial intend- Origin of problem 
ant, or other royal official. 
/ \ 
2. Decision by royal minister to seek Controller Secretary 
advice of council. general of of state finances for the navy 
3. Reception of the matter by secretary \ / 
of the council. Secretary 
4. Presentation of the matter to the in­
tendant of commerce into whose 
department it fell. He directs the sub- Intendant of Commerce 
sequent handling of the question. 
5. Brief discussion of the matter in the Commissaires 
council as a whole. Deputies 
6. Deliberation of the question in the 
deputies' assembly at the home of the 
secretary. The secretary drafts a writ­
ten summary of the deputies' views. T7. Solicitation of additional information 
or evidence from interested parties or Additional 
royal officials. information 
requested 
8. Final discussion in the council as a 
whole. Vote by the commissaires. The Commissaires 
two farmers general attached to the 
council may be asked to attend and Deputies 
partake in the discussion if the subject Farmers general 
pertains to the king's revenues. 
9. Final report to the royal ministers. / \ 
This was done in person (by an in- Controller Secretary 
tendant of commerce or other commis- general of of state 
saire) and in writing (by the secretary). finances for the navy 
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that the deputies had in trade and manufactures, the problems 
faced by the merchant marine, and the disputes that often erupted 
between merchants and tax farmers. 
Out of the thousands of affairs discussed in the Council of 
Commerce during this fifteen-year period, I have uncovered only 
ten instances in which the commissaires rejected an avis that had the 
unanimous support of the deputies.38 Most of these instances in­
volved only minor points or procedural matters. It would be im­
possible to see in them an unsuccessful campaign by the deputies to 
defend the rights of free trade and unhampered private enterprise 
against encroachments of the royal government. In at least two of 
the cases, the commissaires, in fact, were the ones who defended the 
cause of free trade against the proposals of the deputies. One such 
case involved the plague that was ravaging much of Europe in the 
winter of 1711-12. The deputies pushed for stronger, more severe 
safeguards, including the cutting off of all trade with Baltic cities 
for three months. The commissaires felt that such an action would 
unduly harm French commerce, and they decided that the less 
drastic safety measures already enacted in French ports on orders 
from Jerome de Ponchartrain were sufficient.39 In another case 
the commissaires decided in July 1708 to permit French merchants 
to import fits de dentelle (lace thread) from Holland because it was 
needed for French manufactures. The deputies of commerce, on 
the other hand, had hoped that prohibiting its import would con­
tribute to the destruction of Dutch trade.40 
The differences between the deputies and the commissaires were 
thus extremely few in number, and none involved broad, funda­
mental disagreements over royal economic policies. The general 
harmony between the deputies and the representatives of the gov­
ernment in the Council of Commerce thus further discounts the 
notion that this council was a forum for protest against the crown. 
In later chapters when it is noted that the Council of Commerce 
took a stand on a particular issue, this should be understood to 
include both the commissaires and the deputies, unless otherwise 
noted. 
Even though the deputies formed an integral, indispensable part 
of the council, the commissaires occasionally assembled apart from 
them. The minutes of the council record twenty-three occasions in 
the period under study when the commissaires met alone or when 
the deputies were asked to retire from a meeting so that the com­
missaires could discuss something in private. It should be pointed 
out, however, that the minutes are careful not to refer to these 
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sessions as the Council of Commerce. On these occasions simply a 
"committee" was meeting. 
Why did the commissaires feel the need to meet apart from, or to 
exclude, the deputies from some discussions? On two occasions the 
explanation is simple: the commissaires assembled to discuss some 
unfinished business while at Fontainebleau during the autumn 
recess in the council's schedule.41 The things that they discussed 
there were fairly routine, and the deputies had already expressed 
their views on them. Thirteen of the other twenty-one special meet­
ings involved highly charged, controversial issues on which the 
deputies were sharply divided. These issues included disputes be­
tween Marseilles and the Atlantic ports concerning Marseilles's 
privilege as a free port and its advantages in the Levant trade, a 
debate between Dunkirk and La Rochelle concerning Dunkirk's 
request to be able to trade directly with the French West Indies, 
and the rivalry between sugar refiners in La Rochelle and Bor-
deaux.42 In each of these cases, the council weighed the opinions 
of both sides, and then the commissaires decided to have the depu­
ties leave the room so that they could debate the matter in a calm, 
dispassionate manner. On the eight other occasions when the 
commissaires met alone, it is not clear why they felt the need to 
discuss matters apart from the deputies. In two cases the proces­
verbaux report only that the commissaires assembled to examine an 
"extraordinary document" sent by the king.43 In the six remaining 
instances, the matters discussed do not appear to have been un­
usual or any more crucial than the host of other subjects for which 
the deputies were permitted to remain present. For example, the 
deputies retired from the meeting of 18 June 1704 so that the 
commissaires could privately consider a proposal drawn up by sev­
eral deputies for a new arret relating to French privateers.44 The 
commissaires agreed with the definitions drawn up by the deputies 
on the questions of what constituted neutral commerce and of what 
ships could be legally seized as prizes by French corsaires. The 
commissaires decided to forward the proposal to Jerome de Pont­
chartrain, and it was eventually issued as an arret on 23 July 1704. 
On this occasion, as well as on several others, the proces-verbaux do 
not explain why the deputies were not permitted to witness the 
commissaires' debate. What is clear, however, is that the twenty-three 
occasions on which the deputies were not present were rare 
breaches in the ordinary operating procedure of the Council of 
Commerce. 
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Once a decision was made on an issue, the council reported it 
("rendre compte" was the phrase continually used) to the two royal 
ministers. Regardless of which one sent the matter to the council, 
both the controller general and the secretary of state for the navy 
received reports on all matters decided by it. This "rendering ac­
count" to the government took place in two ways. First, the secre­
tary to the council, Valossiere, was charged with keeping both 
ministers informed of the activities of the council. He sent a weekly 
summary of the council's meeting to each of the two ministers. In 
addition, he often wrote letters to them on particular issues. Almost 
invariably he included with his letters and his reports a copy of the 
avis of the deputies.45 The reports and letters sent by the secretary 
to the controller general became even more numerous and more 
detailed starting in 1708. This was another of the changes brought 
to the Council of Commerce by Desmaretz, who wanted to keep 
closer control over its workings.46 Desmaretz was also primarily 
responsible for the reglement of 9 October 1708,47 which made 
more explicit the procedures to be followed by the council in exam­
ining and reporting the matters sent to it. 
After 1709 Valossiere's reports to the two ministers became less 
detailed, and fewer of them can be found in the archives. One 
reason for this was, perhaps, that there was a second manner in 
which the ministers kept abreast of the activities of the council. 
From the council's inception in 1700, the commissaires were also 
important links between it and the two royal ministers. Daguesseau 
and Amelot in particular worked closely with Chamillart and Pont­
chartrain, and they reported to them on the activities of the coun­
cil. This practice was formalized with the creation of the six intend­
ants of commerce in 1708: these new members were charged with 
informing the two ministers on all the affairs that concerned their 
individual departments. The archives of the controller general and 
of the secretary of state for the navy contain hundreds of letters 
both to and from the intendants of commerce, but it is impossible 
to gauge the full depth of the contacts between the commissaires and 
the ministers because the commissaires usually made their reports in 
person. Letters from the intendants of commerce to the royal 
ministers (or to their premiers commis) frequently allude to their 
weekly discussions about matters examined in the council.48 That 
the two ministers met in person virtually each week with these 
representatives of the council further reflects the value that the 
crown attached to the work that the council was performing. 
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THE COUNCIL'S IMPORTANCE 
The Subjects Discussed 
The wide spectrum of subjects treated in the council is certainly 
one measure of its importance.49 In the realm of commercial insti­
tutions, the council dealt with provincial chambers of commerce, 
consular tribunals (juridictions consulaires), guilds and merchant as­
sociations, trading companies, banks, bourses, and royal monetary 
manipulations. With regard to internal commerce, the council 
studied matters relating to such topics as fairs, internal customs 
duties and tolls, roads and navigable rivers, public transportation, 
the postal system, and confrontations between merchants and 
commis of the farmers general. In the area of foreign trade, the 
council examined questions on fisheries, tariffs, the rights of 
enemy and neutral shipping, free ports, French consulates, French 
colonies, imports, exports, and the grain trade. On the subject of 
French manufactures, the council considered the general state of 
the French economy, the inspectors of manufactures, textile regu­
lations, privileges and monopolies for manufactures, and dangers 
from foreign competition. In addition, the council considered such 
diverse problems as the frequent fires aboard ships in the port of 
Saint-Malo,50 the replenishing of French forests, 51 and the possi­
ble dangers to health caused by the use of oxblood in the sugar-
refining process in La Rochelle.52 
This work will not endeavor to treat of all the thousands of 
affairs introduced in the council from 1700 to 1715; rather, it will 
concentrate on those subjects to which the council devoted the 
greater part of its time.53 
Its Personnel 
One can also appreciate the council's importance by looking at its 
personnel. From the council's inception in 1700 until the year 
1744, the man who held the post of director of commerce in the 
controller general's ministry was always a member of the Council of 
Commerce.54 From 1691 to 1699 this position had been filled by 
Henri Daguesseau. In 1699 Daguesseau stepped down from it in 
order to permit his nephew, Michel Amelot, to assume it.55 Amelot 
held this post until his death in 1724, with Daguesseau substituting 
for him during his ambassadorship to Spain. Thus during the 
period under study here, the man who was charged by the con­
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troller general with supervising all internal trade and industry was 
also, conveniently, a leading member of the Council of Commerce. 
Daguesseau and Amelot were responsible for corresponding with 
provincial officials and the farmers general, as well as for the draft­
ing of arrets and edicts on all matters of trade and industry. They 
were thus in a unique position to see that the advice of the Council 
of Commerce was carried through to execution. In the letters, 
orders, and arrets concerning trade and industry that Daguesseau 
and Amelot sent out each week, one can find concrete evidence of 
the direct impact of the Council of Commerce on government 
decisions. A summary of each piece of correspondence was pre­
served in the controller general's office; at the bottom of virtually 
every item, a notation was made stating that the subject had been 
decided "on the advice of the Council of Commerce."56 If such a 
notation is absent, a glance at the proces-verbaux of the council usu­
ally confirms that the matter had indeed been discussed there. 
The director of commerce was not the only influential govern­
ment official to sit in the council. As mentioned earlier, the two 
directors of finances sat on the council from 1701 until the dissolu­
tion of their offices in 1708. These two men were charged by 
Chamillart with directing the finances of the realm, and their at­
tendance at the council gave added luster to that body. Nicolas 
Desmaretz held one of these offices from 1703 until his appoint­
ment as controller general, and we have every indication that he 
took seriously his work on the council. The archives reveal numer­
ous letters addressed to him from Valossiere and others concern­
ing his work in the meetings of the council.57 After Desmaretz 
assumed the controller generalship and thus stopped attending the 
council in person, he maintained his personal contacts with it by 
appointing two of his relatives to it: his brother-in-law Bechameil 
de Nointel in June 1708 and his younger brother Desmaretz de 
Vaubourg in June 1715. Jerome de Pontchartrain already had 
familial ties with the council in the persons of Daguesseau and 
Amelot, who were both related by marriage to the Pontchartrain 
clan.58 
Each of the commissaires in the council was either a maitre des 
requetes or a conseiller d'etat, which offices afforded access to several 
of the royal councils and their bureaus. Of the seventeen indi­
viduals who at one time or another served as a commissaire in the 
council during this period, four had served earlier as royal provin­
cial intendants, and four became intendants upon leaving the 
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council.59 One intendant of commerce (Machault) went on to suc­
ceed d'Argenson as lieutenant general of police in Paris. Two 
commissaires were later appointed garde des sceaux (d'Argenson, 
Fleuriau d'Armenonville). One commissaire eventually became con­
troller general of finances (Desmaretz); a second became secretary 
of state for war (Bauyn d'Angervilliers). The Council of Commerce 
was thus not staffed with nonentities.60 Rather, its membership 
included some of the ablest and most influential servants of the 
crown. 
The Services Rendered by the Council 
Throughout the period under study here, the controller general 
and the secretary of state for the navy demanded and received 
from the council a steady stream of advice on economic matters. 
Each minister required that the council keep him fully informed on 
all its activities. Pontchartrain in particular continually bombarded 
secretary Valossiere with requests for more details on decisions 
made by the council.61 One of the first things that Desmaretz did as 
controller general in 1708 was to ask that Valossiere draw up and 
present to him a copy of the minutes of all the meetings of the 
council held since its establishment.62 Desmaretz also, it will be 
recalled, in 1708 created the six intendants of commerce in an 
effort to expedite the conduct of affairs in the council.63 
To what extent did Chamillart, Desmaretz, and Jerome de Pont­
chartrain follow the advice that they so keenly sought from the 
Council of Commerce? The records are clear: the council played a 
decisive, and often central, role in the vast majority of decisions 
made concerning trade and industry during this period. Most of 
the arrets, edicts, and ordinances concerning French manufactures, 
French overseas trade, and other areas of the economy were in fact 
drafted in the council itself. 
The ministers also relied on the council as a storehouse of in­
formation. The archives of the secretary of the council and the files 
kept by the intendants of commerce were the most extensive 
record of past decisions and laws that the royal ministers had at 
their disposal. One can gather some idea of the size of these ar­
chives by looking at the lists of letters and documents sent to the 
secretary each week. The Archives Nationales possess, for the 
period of Desmaretz's ministry, a nearly complete set of the lists of 
remissions to Valossiere.64 
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On the basis of these documents, it is calculated that the average 
number of distinct items being sent to Valossiere from the con­
troller general each week was nearly fifteen.65 Judging from Pont-
chartrain's correspondence and the proces-verbaux of the council, it 
appears safe to assume that the secretary of state for the navy sent 
approximately an equal number of items each week to the council. 
This means that altogether Valossiere received about thirty items 
every week from the royal ministers; these papers were either 
stored in the secretary's own files or distributed to the various 
commissaires at the next meeting. Included in these papers were 
such standard items as the monthly reports that the controller gen­
eral received from the inspectors of manufactures. The controller 
general had these forwarded immediately to the Council of 
Commerce, where the intendants of commerce retained them and 
used them as a basis to judge matters that came before the council. 
In addition to papers sent by the royal ministers, the secretary of 
the council received one hundred copies of every arret issued on 
commercial matters.66 He kept some for his own files, gave some to 
his colleagues in the council, and dispatched the remainder to in­
dividuals, cities, or provinces affected by the legislation. 
The result of all this stockpiling of data was that the Council of 
Commerce became the government's library of information on all 
commercial affairs. When Desmaretz, in 1714, wanted a descrip­
tion of the functions and the mode of payment of the inspectors of 
manufactures, he discovered that his own ministry was unable to 
provide this information, and he therefore had to turn to the 
Council of Commerce for help.67 Jerome de Pontchartrain re­
peatedly asked Valossiere to keep him informed, not only of de­
cisions reached in the council itself, but of all papers, letters, and 
other documents that he received.68 Pontchartrain also ordered 
Valossiere to send him periodically a register of all arrets, ordi­
nances, and edicts that were issued on the advice of the council.69 
The secretary of the council eventually compiled an alphabetized 
listing of all the various subjects introduced in the council.70 This 
catalog permitted the council to review quickly all past laws and 
decisions concerning any particular topic. The controller general 
was thus, for example, able to depend on the Council of Commerce 
to keep track of the dozens of arrets and ministerial decisions made 
concerning the many merchandises that different enemy and neu­
tral nations were permitted to introduce into France during the 
War of the Spanish Succession. 
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In addition to using the Council of Commerce as an adviser, as a 
drafter of laws, and as an archive, the controller general and the 
secretary of state for the navy frequently empowered it to act as a 
court. Some of the original proposals for a council of commerce 
had, in fact, suggested that its major function be that of an arbi­
trator, judging disputes among merchants or between merchants 
and tax farmers.71 A contemporary engraving, still preserved in 
the Bibliotheque Nationale, celebrated the opening of the council 
and pictured it as a place where merchants could enter and seek 
redress of their grievances.72 Although this is not how the council 
normally operated, nevertheless it happened on dozens of occa­
sions during the period being considered here. Usually it occurred 
in particularly complex or touchy legal suits involving merchants, 
trading companies, or the farmers general. In each such case, an 
arret of evocation was issued that lifted the case from the ordinary 
jurisdiction (e.g., an admiralty court) and brought it to the Council 
of Commerce. This might be done for several reasons: to eliminate 
the red tape and delays of the ordinary courts; to save private 
individuals the financial burden of pursuing a case in the normal 
channels because the case involved "the general good," or because 
the Council of Commerce was believed to be less partial. On these 
occasions the council met as usual, with the deputies attending and 
presenting their written avis, and with the commissaires alone judg­
ing. The individuals involved in a dispute appeared in person to 
argue their cases. The decision of the council was, as a general rule, 
not open to appeal.73 
Limits on Its Powers 
Although the importance of the Council of Commerce to the 
administration of Louis XIV cannot be disputed, one must ac­
knowledge that there were definite limits on its powers. As noted 
earlier, the council could discuss only such matters as were sub­
mitted to it by the controller general or the secretary of state for the 
navy. On several occasions Jerome de Pontchartrain reminded 
Daguesseau or Valossiere of this rule and gently reprimanded the 
council for having discussed an issue or an incident that had not 
been sent to it by one of the two ministers.74 Although it appears 
that an overwhelming majority of all matters concerning trade and 
manufactures were referred to the council for deliberation, there 
was nothing that obligated a minister to forward something to it. 
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This fact is clearly revealed in the correspondence of the Chamber 
of Commerce of Bordeaux with its deputy in Paris. The chamber 
frequently sent grievances and requests to the two royal ministers 
whenever it felt that Bordeaux's trade was suffering from an in­
justice. The city's deputy, Fenellon, continually had to remind the 
chamber, however, that he could not defend the city's interests in 
the Council of Commerce until the items in question were for­
warded to it by one minister or the other. And, as Fenellon noted, 
there was never any guarantee that a minister would do so.75 
In some areas this discretionary prerogative of the ministers be­
came very evident over the years. A look at the chart in the ap­
pendix reveals several topics about which the voice of the Council 
of Commerce was seldom heard. The administration of the privi­
leged trading companies, for example, was generally kept under 
the close supervision of the royal ministers, and the council usually 
dealt with these corporations only in questions concerning exports 
or imports. The economic life of the French colonies was another 
question seldom introduced into the council. Colonial commerce 
lay entirely under the authority of the secretary of state for the 
navy, and Jerome de Pontchartrain jealously guarded his private 
control of it as much as possible. Thus questions concerning the 
colonies were never introduced in the council more than a handful 
of times a year. A memoir written by the Council of Commerce in 
September 1717 bitterly accused Pontchartrain of having decided 
too many commercial matters on his own.76 As the memoir pointed 
out, this was contrary to the spirit of the Council of Commerce, 
which had been intended to act as a centralizing force, giving 
united direction to all French trade. It was also against the reglement 
of 1701 signed between the controller general and the secretary of 
state for the navy, in which the two ministers vowed to keep each 
other fully informed of all important commercial affairs that lay 
within their respective jurisdictions. Pontchartrain's reluctance to 
communicate colonial affairs to the Council of Commerce was in 
marked contrast to his eagerness to share with it all other matters 
that fell into his department. 
The Council of Commerce was further limited by the fact that 
the ministers were in no way obliged to follow the advice that they 
so avidly sought from it. Some historians have suggested, to vary­
ing degrees, that the council had very little influence on govern­
ment policies.77 Other historians have asserted, however, that the 
government seldom departed from the will of the council.78 The 
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truth lies somewhere in between these two positions, though cer­
tainly much closer to the latter than to the former. The ministers as 
a general rule did accept the views of the council, but they were 
sometimes compelled by fiscal, military, or other exigencies to dis­
agree with it. In some of these instances, a minister flatly rejected 
the will of the council, but in others the council was able to prevail 
and have its own view accepted. Sometimes a compromise solution 
was worked out. 
During the fifteen years under consideration here, there oc­
curred approximately three dozen examples of ministerial disa­
greement with the Council of Commerce.79 Most of these involved 
small incidents in which a minister wished to make an exception to 
a rule or a law that the council wished to enforce. Other cases were 
broader. In the fall of 1710, Desmaretz and Pontchartrain, in an 
attempt to bring the Dutch to their knees, cut off all trade with 
Holland despite the objection of the Council of Commerce that 
France desperately needed Dutch trade.80 In 1709 Pontchartrain 
granted passports to Dutch vessels to carry food supplies to the 
starving French Caribbean islanders; he thereby overrode the 
council's opposition to the entry of foreign traders into French 
colonies.81 
In other cases, however, the Council of Commerce prevailed. As 
mentioned previously, the council's protests helped force the 
crown in 1704 to abolish the newly created offices of inspectors and 
controller-visitors of manufactures. In another instance Jerome de 
Pontchartrain, for altruistic reasons, proposed in 1711 that ship­
owners be obliged to provide financial assistance to the families of 
sailors on merchant vessels that were away on cruises of a year or 
longer. The deputies to the Council of Commerce, most of whom 
were wealthy, conservative armateurs, objected that this would un­
duly burden traders such as themselves.82 Despite Pontchartrain's 
insistence on the issue, he was unable to overcome the opposition 
of the council, and no action was taken on the matter. 
R. B. Grassby has lucidly described a good example of the kind 
of give-and-take that often occurred between the crown and the 
Council of Commerce in the process of working out the details of a 
controversial decision.83 One of the proposals that the deputies of 
commerce campaigned hard for in the first two years of the coun-
cil's existence was a higher social status for the profession of mer­
chant. They envisaged a noblesse commergante. The edict of August 
1669 had already exempted from derogation any nobles engaging 
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in overseas trade, but the deputies now wished that nobles should 
be able to partake in any type of wholesale trade (commerce en gros) 
without loss of status. In addition, they complained of the disdain­
ful ways in which merchants were treated by the commis of the 
farmers general. In April 1701 the deputies drafted a general 
memoir in which they listed twenty-one specific demands.84 They 
argued, among other things, that there should be a legal distinction 
between great overseas and wholesale traders on the one hand and 
small shopkeepers and peddlers on the other; henceforth the word 
negociant should be reserved solely for the former, and marchand 
for the latter. Certain municipal offices should be reserved for 
important merchants, who should also be granted exemptions 
from such obligations as the ban and the arriere ban (if they owned 
noble land) and from billeting, watch, and guard. The deputies 
asked that they themselves be granted the title of conseiller du roi. 
Finally, they requested that hereditary nobility be granted auto­
matically to any man whose family had been engaged in wholesale 
trade for four successive generations. The lack of such marks of 
recognition, asserted the deputies, was leading thousands of mer­
chants each year to buy offices, lands, and rentes and to abandon 
their business careers. 
Grassby traces the developments and modifications in the depu­
ties' program as the commissaires in the council, the crown, and even 
some cities and provincial merchants voiced objections to various 
aspects of it. The commissaires basically supported the clauses pro­
tecting nobles from derogation but opposed many of the sugges­
tions for privileges and exemptions for merchants. 
The edict that the crown finally issued on 30 December 1701 was 
remarkable for its good will but also for its blandness.85 Previous 
edicts honoring trade and protecting nobles from derogration 
were confirmed and broadened. Wholesale trade within France 
was now opened to nobles. The edict gave firm, though vague, 
promises that the king would grant nobility and other favors to 
merchants as the opportunities presented themselves. But the 
noblesse de robe was still excluded from all trade, and the edict said 
nothing of the deputies' suggestion that nobles' sons be appren­
ticed to merchants to learn the profession. No official distinction 
was made between negociant and marchand. There was to be no 
automatic granting of nobility to fourth-generation wholesale-trad-
ing families. In short, the document was a compromise. Even 
though the deputies failed to obtain many of their specific de­
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mands, the government did begin increasingly to protect mer­
chants from harassment by tax collectors and to grant nobility to 
merchants—including several of the deputies themselves. 
Contributions by Individual Members 
There was yet one other way in which the council helped the 
crown. The personnel of the council, more knowledgeable in 
matters of trade and industry than any other group of men in 
France, often served the controller general and the secretary of 
state in a private capacity. Several of the commissaires and deputies 
worked as personal advisers, special agents, or diplomatic envoys 
for Chamillart, Desmaretz, and Pontchartrain. Since they per­
formed this work apart from the council itself, it is only tangential 
to the present study. But it was the Council of Commerce that 
provided these men with much of their expertise and brought 
them to the attention of the ministers, and for this reason note 
should be made here of these activities. 
Why did the controller general and the secretary of state for the 
navy frequently turn to individuals rather than to the council as a 
whole? There are several answers. Some issues were so delicate or 
secret that the crown did not wish an open debate on them in a 
council. At times a minister required an answer in a hurry and 
could not wait for a council to examine an affair.86 At other times a 
minister needed to dispatch a special representative to study a 
commercial problem outside of Paris. Thus the controller general 
frequently had individual members of the council examine such 
subjects as manufactures87 or trade with the enemy.88 Many times 
the royal ministers honored individual deputies by inviting them to 
Marly or Fontainebleau, where they worked with the ministers on 
special projects.89 On several occasions Je'rome de Pontchartrain 
issued arrets appointing deputies of commerce to judge disputes 
between individual merchants.90 Several deputies—Anisson and 
He'ron in particular—were called to meet privately with the 
farmers general concerning revisions of the general tariffs.91 
Finally, the ministers also turned to the commissaires and deputies to 
serve on diplomatic missions in other countries.92 
Of all the deputies, Anisson of Lyons and Mesnager of Rouen 
were the two who were closest to the royal ministers.m They owed 
their privileged status to their native abilities, their personal con­
tacts at court, and their longevity in the council. Mesnager was an 
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old acquaintance of Chamillart; the two had met early in the 1690s 
when Chamillart served as intendant in Rouen. Anisson was on 
intimate terms with Desmaretz's premier commis Clautrier.94 The 
latter was the premier commis who worked most closely with the 
controller general and determined who was to gain an audience 
with him.95 Both Mesnager and Anisson were at liberty to share 
with the ministers their opinions on virtually all important eco­
nomic and financial matters.96 
From all the above, it should be clear that, in one way or another, 
the Council of Commerce rendered an invaluable service to the 
government of Louis XIV. It operated as a regular part of the 
decision-making process in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy. 
The royal ministers could, and did, draw upon it as a source of 
counsel, of information, and of experienced men who could serve 
as economic troubleshooters. 
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29. This was not, however, a strict rule. The council frequently changed its meet­
ing to other days of the week, due to illnesses, the pressure of important business, or 
other reasons. 
30. AN, F12 51, fol. 4v. 
31. Bonnassieux and Lelong, Conseil de commerce, p. lxii. Valossiere was paid regu­
larly from the tresor royal until 1712. In 1715 he complained that he had not been 
paid for the past three years. See AN, G7 1704, piece 152. 
32. The term minister is used here in a very general sense. Technically speaking, 
only those who were called to sit in the conseil d'en haut were ministres. Jerome de 
Pontchartrain did not sit in this council, but, nevertheless, contemporaries often 
referred to him as a minister. 
33. On Amelot in Spain, see Chapter 8. 
34. Bonnassieux and Lelong, Conseil de commerce, p. xviii. 
35. Much of the F12 series at the Archives Nationales is composed of the remains 
of the depots of the intendants of commerce. Some information on the organization 
of these papers at the time of the French Revolution is provided by the "Memoire 
concernant les bureaux de l'ancienne administration du commerce, et les differens 
papiers qui y sont deposes" (F12 725). I thank Pierre H. Boulle for bringing this 
memoir to my attention. 
36. The Council of Commerce did not correspond with these officials in its own 
name. Rather, a commissaire would draft a letter and have either the controller 
general or the secretary of state for the navy sign it. It would then be returned to the 
commissaire to send out. 
37. On the farmers general and the tax farms in general, see Chapter 7. 
38. There were many cases in which the deputies were divided. On these oc­
casions, of course, the commissaires had to reject the views of one group and side with 
the views of the other. 
39. Meeting of 17 January 1712, AN, F  " 58, fols. 3v-4. 
40. Meeting of 20 July 1708, AN, F12 54, fol. 235v. Also see AN, GT 1691, piece 
276. 
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41. Meetings of 26 October 1701 (AN, F12 51, fol. 73v.) and 25 August 1712 (F12 
58, fol. 74). 
42. These disputes will be discussed in Chapter 4, below. 
43. Meetings of 3 December 1706 (AN, F12 51, fol. 466v.), and 22 July 1707 (Fu 
54, fol. 85). 
44. AN, F12 51, fols. 267v-268v. 
45. Valossiere's correspondence with the controller general is preserved in the 
papers on commerce located in AN, G7 1686-1704. The naval archives, although as 
a general rule much better preserved than the financial archives, do not contain 
these weekly reports or the voluminous correspondence between Pontchartrain and 
Valossiere; but the letters between the two men that we do possess frequently allude 
to Valossiere's weekly reports to Pontchartrain. See, for example, Mar., B2 230, 
p. 459, Pontchartrain to Amelot, 8 June 1712, which refers to Valossiere's reports; 
and B2 187, fol. 115v, Pontchartrain to Valossiere, 13 January 1706. 
46. The increased tempo of contacts between the controller general and the 
Council of Commerce in the period 1708-9 is reflected in AN, G7 1692-94. It is 
impossible to measure such a phenomenon in the naval archives because of the 
circumstances explained in note 45. The fact that even before 1708 Jerome de 
Pontchartrain's letters referred to the detailed weekly reports and to his consider­
able correspondence with Valossiere suggests that he did not need to request more 
extensive accounts on the council's doings. 
47. A copy can be found in the unnumbered pages at the front of AN, F12 55. 
48. For example, AN, G7 1702, piece 27, de Machault to Clautrier, 21 February 
1714; G7 1695, piece 85, d'Orsay to Desmaretz, 2 May 1710; G7 1696, piece 166, 
Landivisiau to Desmaretz, 5 July 1711. 
49. Anyone doing research on French trade and manufactures in the eighteenth 
century will likely find that the Council (later, Bureau) of Commerce at one time or 
another dealt with his topic. The alphabetical index presented by Bonnassieux and 
Lelong should be consulted for an extensive (but not complete) list of topics in­
troduced in the council. 
50. Meeting of 10 March 1702, AN, F12 51, fol. 104. 
51. Meeting of 10 June 1701, AN, F12 51, fol. 43, and on several other occasions 
in 1701 and 1702. 
52. AN, F12 55, fols, 2v-3; AN, G7 1694, fols. 65, 82. 
53. The chart in the Appendix gives a more graphic impression of the variety of 
the topics discussed in the council. 
54. As noted above (Chapter 1, n. 63) there was, officially, no title accompanying 
this position. Contemporaries referred to the person exercising it variously as the 
directeur du commerce, the directeur general du commerce, or the surintendant du commerce. 
The position generally went to someone close to the controller general, usually a 
conseiller d'etat or an intendant of finances. The directors of commerce in the 
eighteenth century are briefly discussed in Bonnassieux and Lelong, Conseil de com­
merce, p. xvii. The director of commerce under the controller general should not be 
confused with the director general of commerce in the naval ministry (see above, 
p. 10). 
55. See Dangeau, Journal, 7:155. An inscription added to the frontispiece of a 
memoir submitted to the controller general early in the eighteenth century says that 
Chamillart forwarded it to "M. Amelot, conseiller d'etat, surintendant du com­
merce" (Bibliotheque Mazarine, MS. 2762). The only study of Amelot is Roger 
Gaucheron, "Etude sur Michel Amelot et l'administration du commerce (1699­
1724)," an unpublished thesis at the Ecole des Chartes (1913). Unfortunately, no 
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copies of this work can be located. It is summarized, however, in Ecole des Chartes. 
Positions des theses (Paris, 1913), pp. 41^49. 
56. The director of commerce met once a week with the controller general and 
had the latter sign all the correspondence that had been drafted that week. The 
director then dispatched the letters and arrets to the various provincial officials 
concerned. Each week's correspondence was summarized in an "Etat des Expedi­
tions concernant le commerce et les manufactures." Many of these have been pre­
served in AN, F12 662-70; G7 1691, pieces 100, 282-95; G7 1692, pieces 242-55. 
57. AN, G7 1687, Valossiere to Desmaretz, 15 June 1705, and 12 May 1707; G7 
552, Mayet to Desmaretz, 13 March 1705. 
58. Consult the genealogical tables in BN, pieces originates, 14; dossiers bleus, 16; 
nouveau d'Hozier, 264. 
59. These 17 do not include Chamillart and Jerome de Pontchartrain, who were 
official members of the council but never really participated in its work. Desmaretz 
is included because he did serve on the council for five years as a director of 
finances. 
60. One might also consider the offspring of the commissaires. For example, the 
sons of Daguesseau, Amelot de Chaillou, and de Machault became, respectively, 
chancellor, secretary of state for foreign affairs, and controller general of finances. 
One son of d'Argenson later served as secretary of state for foreign affairs, and 
another held the position of secretray of state for war. 
61. For illustrations, see Mar., B2 154, fol. 44 lv, Pontchartrain to Valossiere, 18 
May 1701; B2 176, fols. 480v-81, Pontchartrain to Valossiere, 20 August 1704. 
62. AN, G7 1695, piece 176, Valossiere to Desmaretz, 13 August 1710. 
63. Biollay (among others) has suggested that Desmaretz created the six intend­
ants of commerce in a move to decrease the power of Amelot in the Council of 
Commerce {Etudes economiques, pp. 313-14). Amelot at the time, of course, was in 
Spain. But we know from contemporary accounts that he was well respected by 
Louis XIV and that several royal ministers and other high officials were jealous of 
him. His successes at the court of Philip V were well known at Paris and Versailles. 
The marquis de Sourches says that Amelot "avoit toujours ete Tame du conseil du 
roi Philippe V" (Memoires, 11:336). In speaking of Amelot after his return to France 
in 1709, Marshall Villars states that "apres avoir regne en effet en Espagne il fait 
trembler tous les ministres" (Saint-Simon, Memoires, 6:494 n. 8). Biollay's conjecture 
is plausible. The presence of six intendants of commerce, who were henceforth 
charged with giving all reports in the council and who had their own bureaus, 
certainly prevented Amelot from dominating the council as he had prior to his 
departure for Spain. It is also true that Amelot was in a mild form of disgrace after 
his return to France, as a result of rumors that he had Jansenist sympathies. The 
king did not grant him a place on the Council of Finances as he had earlier prom­
ised him. But the reasons for the creation of the six intendants of commerce would 
seem to lie elsewhere. They were truly needed in the council to augment the num­
ber of commissaires there. With Amelot absent, Daguesseau frequently ill, and the 
other commissaires occupied with other government duties, the affairs of the council 
often went slowly. Also, one should not overlook a fiscal motive for creating the six 
positions. The six offices of maitre des requetes to which the six intendants were 
attached were sold for 200,000 livres apiece. I have found no evidence of personal 
rivalry between Desmaretz and Amelot. They frequently corresponded on com­
mercial and other matters after Amelot's return from Spain. 
64. This weekly record of items sent to the Council of Commerce was entitled 
"Propositions, lettres et memoires renvoyez au Conseil de Commerce," after which 
was written the date. Two hundred sixty-eight of these, dating from 14 November 
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1708 to 13 September 1715, are located in AN, G7 1693. These communications are 
also recorded in the "Registre des renvois faits a M. de Valossiere, secretaire general 
du commerce," located in G7 736. 
65. The 268 weekly summaries list 4,010 items that Desmaretz sent to the Council 
of Commerce; if all the weekly lists from Desmaretz's ministry were preserved, the 
total would probably be over 5,000. Dividing 4,010 by 268, one arrives at a weekly 
average of 14.96. 
66. This is mentioned in AN, G7 1696, piece 4, Mesnager to de la Garde, 2 
January 1711. 
67. AN, G7 1703, piece 6, Valossiere to de la Garde, 18 July 1714; piece 195, 
untitled note by de la Garde. 
68. See for example, Mar., B2 226, p. 169, Pontchartrain to Valossiere, 14 Jan­
uary 1711; also B2 176, fols. 545v-46, same to same, 27 August 1704. 
69. Mar., B2 176, fols. 405-5v, Pontchartrain to Valossiere, 13 August 1704; BJ 
217, p. 500, Pontchartrain to Valossiere, 30 October 1709; B2 220, p. 427, Pontchar­
train to Valossiere, 29 January 1710; B2 241, p. 134, Pontchartrain to Valossiere, 23 
January 1715. 
70. AN, F12 671 A, 67IB, 672A, 672B, "Deliberations du Conseil de Commerce, 
1700-1740." These cartons contain thick packets, each devoted to a single letter. 
Each packet is divided into all the subjects beginning with that letter. The packet for 
"I," therefore, includes folders on the Indes espagnoles, the Indes orientates, the inspec­
teurs des manufactures, Irlande, etc. Below each topic are subtopics and the dates when 
they were discussed in the Council of Commerce. These records were begun early in 
the eighteenth century and then augmented each year as more things were dis­
cussed. It is not known why this catalog ends in 1740. See also F  " 662-70, "In­
ventaire des propositions et memoires examinez au Conseil de Commerce estably 
suivant l'arrest du Conseil d'Etat du 29 juin 1700, depuis le 24 novembre 1700 jour 
de la premiere seance jusqu'a la fin de 1706," and in the same carton, the "In­
ventaire des Papiers de Mr de la Vigne." De la Vigne was Amelot's secretary, in the 
latter's capacity as director of commerce. De la Vigne worked hand in hand with the 
Council of Commerce on many commercial problems. 
72. BN, Collection Hennin, no. 6492. 
73. See Bonassieux and Lelong, Conseil de commerce, p. xxxi. Judging by the cor­
respondence that has been preserved, it appears that Jerome de Pontchartrain used 
the Council of Commerce as a court much more often than did Chamillart or 
Desmaretz. He sent the council hundreds of cases involving merchants and ship­
owners or the trading companies. Pontchartrain did all that he could to encourage 
the merchant marine and overseas commerce, and he felt that the Council of 
Commerce could judge these cases more quickly and inexpensively. Few of these 
cases appear in the actual minutes of the meetings of the council. Affairs such as 
these, which were of the same nature and therefore repetitive, were usually in­
cluded in the "diverses autres choses" that the proces-verbaux say were discussed at 
many meetings. For an illustration of such a case, see Mar., B2 216, pp. 542-43, 
Pontchartrain to Daguesseau, 24 July 1709. 
74. For example, Col., B 33, p. 294, Pontchartrain to Daguesseau, 17 October 
1708; Mar., B2 217, p. 693, Pontchartrain to Daguesseau, 6 November 1709; B1221, 
pp. 194-95, Pontchartrain to Anisson, 9 April 1710. 
75. In AD, Gironde, C 4301, see Fe'nellon to Chamber of Commerce, piece 25, 
15 June 1709; piece 30, 20 September 1709; piece 47. 7 August 1710. 
76. AN, F11 14, pp. 156-57, "Memoire du Conseil de Commerce tendant a faire 
voire qu'il seroit a propos qu'il y eut au moins un de Mrs les conseillers de ce conseil 
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qui assistat au Conseil de Marine, afin que la connoissance reciproque de ce qui se 
passe, et se resout, dans l'un, et dans l'autre de ces deux conseils fuss un nouveau 
moyen de consiliation," dated September 1717. 
77. Scoville, "The French Economy," pp. 249-52; Francois Dumas, La Regie-
mentation industrielle apres Colbert, pp. 50 ff.; Pierre Clement, Histoire du systeme pro­
tecteur en France depuis le ministere de Colbert jusqu'd la revolution de 1848, pp. 56-58; 
Lafon, Les Deputes du commerce, pp. 2, 9. 
78. Bonnassieux and Lelong, Conseil de commerce, p. xxx; Paul Masson, Histoire du 
commerce francais dans le Levant au XVIIIe siecle, p. 44; Laurence B. Packard, "Some 
Antecedents of the Conseil du Commerce of 1700," 1:280. 
79. Lack of information on some cases and various ambiguities or other problems 
with the documents prevent me from giving an exact number. Also, if the Council 
of Commerce was itself divided on an issue, then the royal ministers had to disagree 
with at least some of its members when making a decision. 
80. See Chapter 5. 
81. See Chapter 8. 
82. AN, F12 55, fols. 253-54v, meeting of 24 April 1711; ibid., fol. 278, meeting 
of 12 June 1711. 
83. Grassby, "Social Status and Commercial Enterprise under Louis XIV," 
pp. 19-38. 
84. AN, F12 51, fols. 30-32, "Memoire sur les veiies que le Roy a d'exciter ses 
sujets au Commerce et a la Navigation," meeting of 22 April 1701. 
85. A copy can be found in Isambert et al. (eds.), Recueil general des anciennes lots 
francaises, 20:400-402. 
86. On several occasions Pontchartrain complained of the slowness of the Coun­
cil of Commerce. See Mar., B2 241, p. 672, Pontchartrain to Daguesseau, 29 May 
1715; B2 242, pp. 27-28, Pontchartrain to de Landivisiau, 3 July 1715. 
87. See AN, G7 1695, piece 70, Mesnager to Desmaretz, 7 April 1710. 
88. Out of many examples, see AN, G7 1696, piece 101, Mesnager to Desmaretz, 
21 April 1711; ibid., piece 203, Anisson to Desmaretz, 15 August 1711; G7 577, 
Anisson to Desmaretz, 18 June 1705. 
89. Mar., B2 208, p. 542, Pontchartrain to Daguesseau, 1 August 1708; B2 239, 
p. 151, Pontchartrain to Amelot, 20 October 1714; AN, G7 1696, piece 157, Anisson 
to Clautrier, 2 July 1711. 
90. See Col., B 24, fols, 445-46, arret of 16 August 1702 naming Mesnager to 
help judge a dispute involving the costs of outfitting a ship owned by the Chevalier 
Damon; see also ibid., fol. 470v., Pontchartrain to He'ron and Mesnager, 10 Sep­
tember 1702, which concerns a similar case. 
91. See AN, G7 1695, piece 129, notes for a letter to be sent from Desmaretz to 
the echevins of La Rochelle concerning the important work that their deputy is doing 
in Paris (July 1710); see also AN, F12 51, fol. 42v; AN, G7 1694, piece 91, Anisson to 
Desmaretz, 30 March 1709; Bosher, The Single Duty Project, p. 36. 
92. See Chapter 8. 
93. One must also acknowledge the close relations that Samuel Bernard had with 
the royal ministers. Bernard, however, owed most of his influence to his position as 
banker and financier. 
94. AN, G7 1696, piece 157, Anisson to Clautrier, 2 July 1711, and passim. 
95. The workings of the controller general's office remain the least known of any 
of the ministries of the royal government. The three most important premiers commis 
used by Chamillart and Desmaretz were Clautrier, Le Cousturier, and de la Garde. 
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Clautrier worked as a sort of personal aide to the controller general. Although de la 
Garde handled a majority of the dealings with the Council of Commerce, there was 
not a precise division of responsibility between the bureaus of the three men—at 
least as regards the Council of Commerce. Each handled questions of trade, manu­
factures, and finance. For an account of the organization and the archives of the 
finance ministry, see Boislisle, Correspondance des controleurs generaux, l:iii-xlvii; and 
Gary McCollim, "The Formation of Fiscal Policy in the Reign of Louis XIV: The 
Example of Nicolas Desmaretz, Controller General of Finances (1708-1715)," 
pp. 178-97. 
96. See AN, G7 1696, piece 270, Anisson to Desmaretz, 9 November 1711. The 
letter begins: "I use the liberty that you gave me to share with you everything that I 
learn concerning matters of trade; if I abuse your kindness, then tell me to stop. But 
I assure you that I have nothing in view but the general good, which I know you 
desire. At the same time I want to help you in a portion of your department, which 
contains an infinite number of details, whose good results are not always evident." 
THE DEPUTIES OF TRADE AND 
THEIR GENERAL MEMOIRS 
The factor that gave the Council of Commerce its uniqueness was 
the presence on it of merchants representing various local and 
regional interests in France. This chapter will examine the back­
ground of the deputies, and analyze the series of general memoirs 
that they presented to the council shortly after its establishment. 
THE DEPUTIES OF TRADE 
Before the Council of Commerce was formed, the government 
feared that no prominent, knowledgeable merchants would give 
up their business interests in order to move to Paris to work in such 
a body,1 but the fear proved to be groundless. The deputies of 
trade were, invariably, among the wealthiest and most important 
members of their communities. Rich businessmen eagerly sought 
election to the position: not only was it a great honor to be chosen 
to represent one's city in the capital, but it could put one in a 
position to cultivate friendships with government ministers and 
their commis. Nor did serving as a deputy in any way force an 
individual to neglect his private concerns. Francoise Giteau has 
aptly described the office of deputy as "the highest level of the 
cursus honorum that a businessman could attain."2 
The arret of 29 June 1700 declared that the deputies should be 
replaced each year in a new election held by local assemblies or 
chambers of commerce, but this practice never came about. Gen­
erally, the government was very satisfied with the caliber of the 
men elected and asked the local bodies to retain them in office 
indefinitely. Thus when a deputy left the council, it was usually 
through his voluntary retirement. Only three of the original depu­
ties served until 1715 or beyond: Anisson, of Lyons (to 1721), 
Fenellon, of Bordeaux (to 1718), and Bernard, of Paris (to 1720). 
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During the period 1700-1715, thirty-three different men served as 
deputies. 
Virtually nothing is known of the personal background of eight 
of them, but there is enough information available on the twenty-
five others to give a composite picture of this group.3 The over­
whelming majority were prominent merchants, usually with exten­
sive interests in overseas trade. Two deputies also were involved 
directly in manufacturing: Joseph Fabre owned a silk factory in 
Marseilles, and Simon Gilly, of Languedoc, operated a sugar re­
finery in Sete. The only deputies who appear not to have been 
personally involved in trade or manufacturing were Anisson 
(Lyons), Francois Philip (selected deputy of Marseilles in 1714), 
and the syndics generaux who represented Languedoc from 1703 to 
1709. Anisson's family was important in the publishing industry in 
Lyons, and in 1691 he himself was appointed director of the 1m­
primerie royale in Paris. Although Anisson was succeeded in that 
post by his brother-in-law Rigaud in 1702, he remained active in 
publishing throughout the rest of his life.4 Despite the fact that he 
was not a merchant himself, he was knowledgeable in trade and in 
affairs of state. Even before the creation of the Council of Com­
merce, the crown employed him to work with the farmers general 
on tariff questions and on disputes arising between merchants and 
tax farmers.5 Philip likewise had no personal experience in trade; 
but he had served as an archivist in the Chamber of Commerce in 
Marseilles, and this had provided him with much expertise in busi­
ness affairs. There were six syndics generaux who served, each for 
one year, as deputies from Languedoc during the period 1703-9. 
The syndic general was a man elected annually by the Estates of 
Languedoc to represent that province's interests in Paris. Very little 
is known of these men, and thus their experience in trade cannot at 
present be ascertained. 
Of the twenty-five men about whom we do have information, 
over half held some sort of appointive or elective office in their 
respective cities prior to entering the Council of Commerce. 
Fenellon, for example, had been a jurat in Bordeaux, Mathieu 
Fabre an echevin in Marseilles, and La Motte-Gaillard the maire of 
Saint-Malo. Mesnager had served as a quartenier6 in Rouen and 
Chauvin as an echevin in Paris. Nine of the deputies had served as 
either juge or consul in a local juridiction consulaire. 
Joseph Fabre, at 66, was the oldest of the deputies in 1700, and 
already he had enjoyed a long and illustrious career. He had been 
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Marseilles's official representative in Paris in 1660, when his city 
sought forgiveness for the role it had played in the Frondes. From 
that time through the 1680s, he had worked as an agent of Colbert 
and Seignelay in Marseilles. In the mid-1680s, he had become the 
director of French consulates in the Mediterranean. As part of his 
duties in that post, he had traveled to the Levant and opened up 
French commerce with several areas—most notably Salonika. In 
the 1670s and 1680s, he also had invested in the Levant Company 
and the Mediterranean Company. At one point he had held the 
office of tresorier de la marine in Marseilles.7 
Several of the deputies had distinguished themselves in yet other 
ways. Peletyer, of Paris, had served capably as one of the three 
French negotiators of the 1699 tariff with the Dutch Republic.8 
When the council first met in 1700, two of the deputies (Bernard 
and Peletyer) were directors of the East India Company, and 
Bernard was the principal director of the royal tobacco monopoly 
(the parti du tabac). In 1701 Mesnager, of Rouen, became a director 
of the Asiento Company. Seven of the deputies had acquired no­
bility prior to joining the council through lettres patentes from the 
king or by purchase of the office of secretaire du roi, and at least two 
of them were granted letters of nobility directly as a result of their 
service on the council (Fenellon and Piou). Three others were re­
warded for their work in the council with the coveted title of 
chevalier and membership in the exclusive ordre de Saint-Michel 
(Bernard, Moreau, Mesnager). After leaving their posts as depu­
ties, two men later became farmers general (Piou and Godeheu), 
and four (Piou, Descasaux du Hallay, Mouchard, Godeheu) be­
came directors of the East India Company. Three also later became 
directors of John Law's Company of the Occident (Piou, Moreau, 
Mouchard). All of this presents a curious paradox if one argues 
that the deputies were ardent foes of tax farmers and exclusive 
companies. 
As noted above, serving on the Council of Commerce in no way 
prevented the deputies from keeping up with their personal busi­
ness activities. The special knowledge to which they were privy in 
the council and their close contacts with ministerial officials were, 
in fact, a definite aid in helping them enhance their private affairs. 
Descasaux du Hallay, of Nantes, was probably the only one during 
this period who resigned because of his need to devote more time 
to his business pursuits. But even in his case, the Council of Com­
merce proved helpful: during his two years in Paris, he lived in the 
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Hotel d'Orleans on the rue d'Orle'ans (near the present-day Palais 
Royal, the quarter where most royal ministers and other top of­
ficials resided).9 In Paris he befriended Chamillart, Desmaretz, and 
Jerome de Pontchartrain, and after his return to Nantes, he was 
able frequently to request favors from them. These included spe­
cial permissions for trade with the mer du Sud (the Pacific coast 
along Peru and Chile) and with Holland. He also asked the minis­
ters to intervene on his behalf in disputes he was having with other 
merchants or with the commis of various tax farmers.10 But 
Descasaux du Hallay's closest contact in Paris was his friend and 
associate Samuel Bernard, who used his position on the Council of 
Commerce and at court to obtain privileges and exemptions for his 
partner in Nantes.11 
Descasaux du Hallay was not alone in his commercial enter­
prises. Fenellon, Heron, Piecourt, and Piou (deputy of Nantes, 
1705-19) also were important armateurs. Their correspondence in 
the marine and financial archives reveals again and again that their 
trading ventures did not suffer as a result of their having to reside 
in Paris. They were all involved in the lucrative, but officially pro­
scribed, trade with the mer du Sud and with the Spanish West 
Indies.12 In the Mediterranean, Joseph Fabre kept up his vast 
trading operations and continued to serve as a fournisseur de la 
marine.13 In 1709 the government loaned him royal ships so that he 
could bring badly needed grains from Italy and the Levant to 
France.14 Nicolas Mesnager used his diplomatic forays into 
Holland as opportunities for some profitable horse-trading.10 
Finally, the commercial and banking activities of Samuel Bernard 
during his two decades as a deputy are too well documented to 
require description here.16 The royal ministers did all that they 
could to ensure that the deputies' work in the Council of Com­
merce interfered as little as possible with their personal affairs. If a 
deputy needed to return home on urgent business, they generally 
granted him a short leave of absence.17 
The personal relationships that several deputies had with the 
royal ministers have already been mentioned. Some of them fre­
quently were called to Fontainebleau or to Marly to advise the 
ministers, and on at least a few occasions some of the deputies were 
invited to the country estates of Chamillart and Desmaretz.18 
Joseph Fabre, of Marseilles, was close enough to Jerome de 
Pontchartrain to visit him virtually every time that the secretary of 
state was in Paris.l9 Each of the deputies at one time or another felt 
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close enough to the ministers to request favors for himself or for a 
friend. Anisson in particular was guilty of this; he repeatedly asked 
the controller general to have all arrets en finance printed at the 
Imprimerie royale rather than at other publishing houses.20 
Judging from the above, one can infer that the men who served 
as deputies in Paris were well qualified to evaluate commercial 
problems and to transmit the opinions of their localities to the 
central government. Soon after the council began to meet, they 
were given a splendid opportunity to do this. 
THE GENERAL MEMOIRS OF THE DEPUTIES 
Perhaps the best way to approach the study of the deputies and 
the issues that they discussed in the Council of Commerce from 
1700 to 1715 is to begin with a look at the series of general memoirs 
written by the deputies in the winter of 1700-1701. When the 
council assembled on 24 November 1700, the first official action 
taken by President Daguesseau was to ask that each deputy submit 
"a memoir on the general state of trade."21 Over the next several 
months, the deputies composed their memoirs and presented them 
individually to the council. This was one of the rare occasions22 
when the deputies were asked to consider the economy as a whole 
and were not restricted to commenting on a unique problem re­
ferred to them by the commissaires. The memoirs therefore offer a 
valuable appraisal of the French economy at the turn of the cen­
tury, and they also reveal a great deal about merchants' expecta­
tions concerning the Council of Commerce. 
These memoirs have, in fact, attained such notoriety that a dis­
cussion of them is indispensable. Historians have devoted an in­
ordinate amount of attention to them, often neglecting the coun-
cil's subsequent ninety-one years of activity.23 The reasons for this 
attention are easy to explain. The memoirs were written by experi­
enced businessmen, and they do offer a valuable analysis of the 
French economy at a critical moment.24 Furthermore, the memoirs 
are attractive because they were part of a new and unique type of 
royal council, one in which the governed themselves had an impor­
tant voice. But the principal cause for all the interest in the mem­
oirs is that historians have tended to see in them evidence of 
merchant opposition to the mercantilist policies of the crown. 
Authorities as diverse as Philippe Sagnac, Jean Meuvret, and Pierre 
Goubert have portrayed the deputies as harbingers of the physio­
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crats and of laissez-faire economics.25 Lionel Rothkrug asserts that 
the deputies "argued vehemently and eloquently against the estab­
lished doctrines of political economy."26 Claude-Frederic Levy 
declares that they presented "a manifesto of Physiocratic liberal-
ism."27 These historians have fondly quoted the anguished cries of 
the deputies, for "liberte' du commerce," for "liberte gene'rale," and 
for "entiere liberte." Such phrases, which the deputies did indeed 
use in their general memoirs, have been taken as post hoc evidence 
of the collective merchant unrest that supposedly compelled the 
government to establish the Council of Commerce. 
Although it is true that the deputies did catalog a long list of 
merchant grievances, the standard interpretation of these memoirs 
is in need of sharp revision. The deputies spoke of liberty of trade 
and of more freedom from government restrictions, but their 
liberte was much closer to Colbertisme than to the twentieth-century 
conception of laissez-faire. 
Before looking at the ideas contained in the memoirs, one should 
first consider how they were composed. Charles Woolsey Cole says 
that the deputies "could scarcely wait" to write their memoirs and 
that "it was as if a dam had burst,."28 If this was true, then Cole had 
in mind a very slow dam. The first memoir was submitted by 
Mesnager on 3 December 1700, but over the next several months, 
Daguesseau repeatedly had to solicit the other deputies to finish 
their memoirs and submit them.29 The final ones were not pre­
sented to the council until 8 April 1701.30 There were twelve such 
memoirs in all; Samuel Bernard did not write one. They varied in 
length from six folio pages (Mesnager) to sixty-nine (Descasaux du 
Hallay). A few of the deputies supplemented their principal mem­
oirs with additional ones on specific topics. 
We know little about how the memoirs were composed. The 
deputies of Lille and Dunkirk probably collaborated on theirs; the 
two memoirs are remarkably similar in style and phraseology. Most 
of the deputies had received written instructions from their local 
electors to guide them. The Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles, 
for example, presented their new deputy (Joseph Fabre) with a list 
of instructions 445 pages long!31 The departmental archives for 
Nantes contain several rough drafts, extracts, and copies of the 
memoir that Descasaux du Hallay submitted to the council in April 
1701.32 It is clear that the municipal officials and important mer­
chants in Nantes participated in instructing their deputy and per­
haps in composing his memoir. 
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There are several manuscript copies of the memoirs located in 
Parisian depositories, which leads one to suppose that they attained 
a high degree of attention early in the eighteenth century. The 
only reliable and complete collection is in the Bibliotheque Na­
tionale, MSS. fr., 8038.33 Incomplete manuscript copies of them 
can likewise be found at the Bibliotheque Nationale, as well as at 
the Bibliotheque de 1'Arsenal and the Archives Nationales.34 
The memoirs, though varying in length, organization, and style, 
were nevertheless fairly similar. There was, one must admit, much 
evidence in them of opposition to restrictive royal policies. All but 
one of the deputies (Mesnager) made repeated calls for greater 
liberty for the merchant. Descasaux du Hallay eloquently declared 
that "liberty is the soul and body of commerce"35 and that "all of 
France aspires for this liberty,"36 "a liberty without limits."37 La 
Motte-Gaillard, of Saint-Malo, vowed that his city's economy would 
revive only through "a complete freedom of trade."38 Taviel, of 
Lille, affirmed that two prerequisites for a flourishing economy 
were "peace and freedom."39 Several deputies pointed admiringly 
to the example set by Holland, where much greater liberty existed. 
They lamented that perhaps trade could prosper only in republics, 
for monarchies were far too prone to war.40 
According to the deputies, what were the chief obstacles to the 
freedom so necesssary for commerce? The deputies were virtually 
unanimous in their criticism of privileged trading companies.41 
The monopolies enjoyed by these companies profited a small 
clique of private directors who, the deputies asserted, cared little 
for "the general good." Descasaux du Hallay admitted that at one 
time these companies had perhaps been needed to open up new 
areas of trade, but he argued that this was no longer true.42 The 
China, East India, Senegal, Canada, and tobacco companies each 
had exclusive privileges in its respective area of trade; and this, 
according to the deputies, prevented free and open competition. 
Piecourt, of Dunkirk, complained that if the number of monopo­
lies in France continued to grow, one would have to purchase from 
the government the right to enter into any kind of trade what­
43ever.  The deputies accused the companies of purposefully keep­
ing the volume of trade low in order to keep prices up and of not 
developing French colonies. They further charged that the Guinea 
and Senegal companies failed to honor their commitment to supply 
the French colonies with an adequate number of slaves. Pie'court 
alleged that these companies would rather send 1,500 slaves a year 
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to the colonies, selling them for 400 to 450 livres apiece, than send 
4,500 yearly and be able to get only 200 to 250 livres each.44 The 
deputies decried the East India Company for its failure to supply 
France with enough spices; as a result Frenchmen had to purchase 
great quantities from the Dutch. The French company preferred 
to bring to France, in fraud, large quantities of Indian calicos (toiles 
peintes), which did considerable harm to the nation's textile in­
dustry. The deputies also castigated the tobacco company for pre­
ferring to buy tobacco from the Dutch rather than cultivate it in 
Saint-Domingue. They argued that if all these trades were opened 
to everyone, then French commerce and the French colonies would 
prosper, and that the coffers of the king would grow as a result of 
the increased number of imports and exports. At the very least, the 
deputies pleaded, these companies should be deprived of their 
exclusive monopolies, so that individuals could buy passports from 
them to partake in these areas of trade.45 
Another obstacle to the freedom of trade, in the eyes of the 
deputies, was the high tariffs on imports and exports adopted by 
the French government in the decades preceding the creation of 
the Council of Commerce. The deputies, with the exception of 
Mesnager, argued that French tariffs were exorbitant and that they 
were cutting off trade with foreigners. In addition, high tariffs 
actually decreased rather than augmented the revenues of the 
king, for they encouraged frauds.46 The deputies sang paeans to 
the beauty, richness, and productivity of France; but they all real­
ized that autarky was impossible: France needed foreign trade. 
Fenellon, of Bordeaux, moralized that 
God has distributed his gifts in such a way as to make men love one 
another. He did not wish for the same things to be produced every­
where on earth because he wanted men to seek the help of each other by 
a mutual exchange of the goods they possess.47 
Thus it was unrealistic for France to hope to produce all the 
manufactures and other goods it needed. Even if the country were 
self-sufficient, it would still require foreign trade. Many provinces, 
noted the deputies, depended on the sale to foreigners not only of 
their manufactures but also of their agricultural products. Virtu­
ally every year such things as wine, brandy, salt, and honey were 
produced in superfluity in France, and the economic prosperity of 
much of the country depended on their export to other nations. 
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High tariffs, however, were rebuffing foreigners and leading to 
reprisals against French exports. If other countries could not easily 
sell their products in France, then they would not willingly buy 
French merchandise. 
Several of the deputies argued that French textiles were overpro­
tected and that French viniculture, "our precious treasure,"48 was 
much more in need of help. Already the English were adapting 
themselves to the taste of Portuguese and Spanish wines. Descas­
aux du Hallay contended that French textiles needed few laws to 
protect them. French styles were always the vogue in Europe, he 
said, and therefore the nation's textiles would always have a brisk 
market.49 
Anisson, of Lyons, perhaps expressed the will of all the deputies 
when he said, "It is necessary to reject the maxim of Colbert which 
claimed that France could do without the rest of the world and 
which wanted to oblige foreigners to buy from us."50 This was 
against nature and against divine providence, he claimed. The 
fruits of the earth were distributed in such a way as to force people 
to partake in "a reciprocal trade." It would not be reciprocal, he 
noted, if France wished to sell its manufactures to foreigners only 
in return for their gold and silver. 
The deputies further deplored the multitudinous internal duties 
and tolls that had to be paid on goods traveling between cities and 
provinces within France. Descasaux du Hallay estimated that the 
river tolls collected on goods traveling on the Loire River from 
Nantes to Orleans amounted to 15 pecent of their total value, not 
to mention the costly delays encountered at each collection point.51 
Two deputies ventured to recommend a complete reformation of 
the internal tariff structure.52 They suggested that all regional 
tariffs be superseded by a uniform tariff wall on the frontiers of 
France. This would remove the internal impediments to the free 
flow of goods and help unite France. 
Another object of the deputies' scorn was the favors and privi­
leges that certain cities possessed to the exclusion of others. All the 
deputies from the Atlantic ports, for example, attacked Marseilles's 
virtual monopoly of trade with the Levant.53 Marseilles was one of 
only three cities that could trade directly with that area; but the 
other two, Rouen and Dunkirk, had to pay a 20 percent duty on all 
Levantine goods, whereas Marseilles was a free port. This meant 
that all other French cities were virtually compelled to purchase 
their Levantine goods through the merchants of Marseilles, and 
58 The French Council of Commerce, 1700-1715 
they were thus forced to pay whatever prices Marseilles was asking 
for them. 
Most of the deputies were equally severe in their opposition to 
Lyons's unique position in the silk trade. All raw silk coming from 
Italy and the Mediterranean had to enter France through Mar­
seilles or Pont-de-Beauvoisin and from there pass through Lyons. 
Silk was thus subject to a host of local customs duties and extra 
transportation costs before it reached manufacturing towns such as 
Tours and Nimes. Several deputies charged that this arrangement 
had already caused the number of silk looms in Tours to drop from 
12,000 to fewer than l,200.54 To remedy this they asked that all 
French cities be permitted to import silks directly from their 
sources of origin. 
The deputies also had a number of other grievances or requests. 
La Motte-Gaillard, of Saint-Malo, urged, for instance, that the 
number of free ports be increased to include other cities besides 
just Dunkirk and Marseilles.55 Naturally he hoped that one of 
these additional free ports would be his own city. Together with the 
deputy of Dunkirk, La Motte-Gaillard likewise objected to the fact 
that direct trade with the French West Indies was open only to 
Rouen, Dieppe, Nantes, Bordeaux, La Rochelle, and Marseilles.56 
This, according to the two deputies, was an unfair restriction of the 
trade that should be open to all French ports. In a like spirit, 
several deputies criticized the granting of various manufacturing 
monopolies to private individuals or to friends of the court; these 
were viewed as pernicious constraints on the enterprising spirit of 
all Frenchmen.57 Another practice deplored by the deputies was 
the continual monetary instability caused by an increase or de­
crease in the value of metallic currency with respect to the livre (the 
money of account.)58 The government's tinkering with the money 
supply made foreign merchants reluctant to trade with French­
men. Other complaints by the deputies concerned the growing 
shortages of wood and coal in France,59 the delays and excessive 
fees incurred in commercial legal suits,60 the exorbitant prices 
being charged by the tax farmers operating the postal system,61 
and the growing wealth of the clergy.62 Also, the deputies be­
moaned the sad effects of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.61 
Although they did not openly criticize it, they did note that it had 
caused many Huguenots to flee to England and Holland, taking 
their skills with them. The deputies hoped that the government 
might induce many of these refugees to return to France. 
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One last point on which the deputies agreed, and on which they 
expounded at great length, was the need to honor commerce and 
to grant marks of distinction to merchants. The outcome of these 
demands has already been mentioned above. The deputies de­
clared that unless the low status of trade was rectified, the sons of 
merchants would continue in increasing numbers to leave the pro­
fession, and France would thus lose all of its experienced traders. 
One of the chief obstacles to treating them with the respect they 
deserved was the behavior of the commis of the tax farmers. These 
clerks were "burning with insatiable desire for personal profit" and 
had "ready-made pretexts for irritating merchants." They caused 
innumerable delays at the check points where merchandise was 
unloaded and appraised, and often an honest merchant had to 
bribe them in order to get his goods through. But what was hardest 
to tolerate was the disdain and the hauteur with which the commis 
treated merchants.65 
These then were the opinions of the deputies that many histo­
rians have viewed as a frontal assault on that vast body of economic 
policies brought to maturity by Colbert that we now call mercantil­
ism. If one examines the memoirs more closely, however, one can 
see that there is little in them with which Colbert would have dis­
agreed. Several historians have already noted the traditional or 
mercantilist nature of parts of the memoirs and have attributed this 
to the transitional nature of the memoirs or to the deputies' hesi­
tancy in voicing new ideas.66 The fact is, however, that the deputies 
were more Colbertian than historians have heretofore been willing 
to admit. 
In calling for greater freedom of trade, the deputies were no 
different from Colbert himself. The historians who quote 
Descasaux du Hallay's proud cry that "freedom is the soul and 
body of trade" could also cite Colbert's letter to the intendant 
d'Herbigny in 1671, in which Colbert opposed restraints on "this 
freedom which is the soul of trade."67 Colbert's correspondence is 
filled with such references to freedom of trade.68 One might pro­
test that Colbert's definition of liberty differed from that of the 
deputies. After all, Colbert certainly did regulate, inspect, and limit 
trade as he considered it necessary. In actuality, however, Colbert's 
conceptions were not far removed from the "complete freedom" 
desired by the deputies. This "freedom" of which they spoke was, 
in practice, far from complete. 
On the question of French tariff policies, for example, the depu­
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ties were in reality very close to Colbert's position. Anisson, of 
Lyons, argued that the country must abandon the "maxim" of 
Colbert that France was self-sufficient and could survive without 
importing things from other countries. Actually, Colbert never said 
anything of the sort. To the contrary, he realized that France 
needed to export its superfluous goods and that it could not do 
without foreign imports. In addition, since France had no gold or 
silver mines, foreign trade was the only means by which she could 
build up stocks of these precious metals. Colbert's general tariffs of 
1664 and 1667 were certainly protective of French industries, but 
Colbert did not wish to drive away foreign trade. His tariffs en­
couraged the import of foodstuffs and raw materials and the ex­
port of French manufactures.69 The deputies of commerce in 
1700-1701 were in complete agreement with this aim, and several 
of them actually praised Colbert's tariff policies. They merely 
asked that the duties added to the tariffs since 1683 be lowered.70 
Despite the claims of a few of the deputies that the wine industry 
was more important to France than were its textiles, all the deputies 
agreed that French manufactures required some protection against 
foreign competition. Fabre, of Marseilles, proclaimed that "manu­
factures are the soul of trade," and that as such they deserved 
important consideration.71 Even Descasaux du Hallay admitted 
that it was necessary to protect "our useful establishments."72 
Taviel, of Lille, suggested that duties of 12 to 15 percent on foreign 
manufactures should suffice to protect those in France; any French 
manufacturer who demanded more than this was "a man who 
wants to enrich himself at public expense."73 Several deputies 
urged that the bans on the importation and use of Indian calicos be 
continued; otherwise, they asserted, French manufactures would 
surely be ruined.74 They also argued that the export of raw mate­
rials needed for French manufactures should be prohibited 
and that French workers should be discouraged from settling 
abroad.75 The deputies castigated those small merchants 
{detailleurs, boutiquiers) who heedlessly imported huge quantities of 
foreign merchandise and made no attempt to export French prod­
ucts in return.76 Several deputies lamented the imperfections that 
were developing in French textiles and urged that the regulations 
established by Colbert and his successors be enforced and even 
increased in number and in severity.77 Mourges, of Languedoc, for 
example, proposed the creation of eight new inspectors and assist­
ant inspectors in every province to police the silk and woolens 
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industries; he also wanted new laws to guarantee the quality of 
these products. In addition, he asked the government to force 
Frenchmen to plant mulberry trees so that silkworms could be 
raised in France. Finally, he urged that the crown protect the wool 
supply by restricting the slaughter of lambs for food and by pro­
hibiting the growing of crops in sheep pastures.78 Anisson recom­
mended that fines be levied on all persons wearing certain foreign 
cloths. He likewise suggested that the new king of Spain, Louis 
XIV's grandson Philip V, compel Spaniards to dress a lafrangaise 
and to stop purchasing English woolens.79 
On the question of money, the deputies were every bit as bul­
lionist as Colbert had been. Gold and silver were, according to 
Anisson, "without contradiction the sole nerve of states."80 In con­
trast to Descasaux du Hallay's claim that liberty was the soul of 
trade, Rol, of Bayonne, exclaimed that "money is the soul and fuel 
of trade."81 One of the deputies' chief objections to the East India 
Company and to Marseilles's trade with the Levant was that they 
were sending much specie out of France. The deputies did not wish 
to prohibit completely the export of precious metals, but they did 
seek some means of compelling merchants to sell more to foreign­
ers than they purchased from them. Several of the deputies ex­
pounded on ways to establish a balance of commerce that would 
protect France's stores of bullion.82 Descasaux du Hallay, usually 
cited as the most liberal of the deputies, proposed that every mer­
chant who imported things from the Dutch be forced to export to 
Holland an amount of goods equal or greater in value.83 Most of 
the deputies recommended new sumptuary laws to supplement 
those of Colbert; these would greatly restrict the amount of gold 
and silver that could be used in clothing, jewelry, and tableware 
and prevent the use of foreign luxury fabrics.84 
There was, at least on the surface, a difference between Colbert 
and the deputies on the question of granting special privileges or 
exemptions to individuals or to cities. As noted earlier, the deputies 
all opposed such favoritism—in theory at any rate. If one considers 
each memoir more closely, however, one can see that in reality each 
deputy was pleading for the special interests of his own region. 
Joseph Fabre agreed that special favors granted to one city always 
hurt others, but almost within the same breath he defended 
Marseilles's monopoly of the Levant trade.85 La Motte-Gaillard 
pleaded for the opening of the West Indies trade to all French 
cities, but when he requested that Saint-Malo's status as a free port 
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be reestblished, it was clear that he did not want the privilege to be 
shared by every city.86 The deputies of La Rochelle, Bordeaux, 
Rouen, and Nantes railed against the privileges of Marseilles and 
Lyons, but never once did they suggest that their own cities sur­
render their monopoly of trade with the West Indies and thus open 
it to Bayonne, Dunkirk, and other ports. In short, the deputies 
were rather hypermetropic, seeing clearly the abuses and privileges 
of other cities but overlooking or even defending the favors and 
monopolies of their own localities. The excuse was always that it 
was in the interest of the common good: each deputy's city or 
region was so well-endowed or conveniently located for a particular 
trade that it merited special consideration. 
Concerning internal duties and tolls, Colbert would have been in 
complete accord with the sentiments of the deputies. Colbert had 
worked diligently throughout his ministry to diminish the number 
of customs barriers and privately owned tolls within France. His 
1664 tariff had been designed originally for the frontiers of 
France, but the resistance to it by several outlying provinces had led 
to the failure of the plan. The result was that France was divided 
fiscally into three basic regions: the cinq grosses fermes, the provinces 
reputees etrangeres, and the provinces de VStranger effecti/?1 Similar 
resistance by local and private interests had prevented Colbert 
from abolishing all internal tolls. Colbert would thus have been 
sympathetic to the deputies' complaints about the host of taxes 
encountered on French rivers, canals, and roads. In fact, Colbert 
was even more liberal in this respect than some of the deputies. 
Descasaux du Hallay, for example, bemoaned the excessive num­
ber of tolls on the Loire River, yet Nantes became the most vehe­
ment opponent in the Council of Commerce of the proposal to 
establish a uniform tariff wall around the borders of France.88 The 
city did not want to relinquish the fiscal privileges it enjoyed as part 
of a province reputee etrangere. 
The deputies' criticisms of the commis of the tax farmers were not 
so much an attack on the system itself as on the abuses of the 
personnel who ran it. Descasaux du Hallay made clear that he was 
not criticizing the tax farmers; he said they were probably unaware 
of the misconduct of their employees.89 But the crown did not 
need the Council of Commerce in order to find out about the 
abuses present in the tax-collection machinery. Throughout the 
seventeenth century, the government had received complaints 
similar to those of the deputies; often these came from the royal 
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provincial intendants.90 During the period under consideration 
here, Secretary of State for the Navy Je'rome de Pontchartrain was 
himself one of the most vocal critics of the commis of the farmers 
general. He frequently informed the controller general of the 
vexations and delays that these commis were causing the shipments 
of goods destined for the navy.91 Whenever possible the controller 
general took steps to correct the abuses—whether by the launching 
of investigations92 or by the firing of miscreant commis.9^ To find 
fault with the tax-gathering machinery in France thus did not 
necessarily mean that one was an antimercantilist or a leader of 
opposition to the government. 
Historians have generally agreed that one of the most serious 
flaws in Colbert's economic policies was that they contributed, 
logically and inevitably, to war. This flaw was likewise shared by the 
deputies of commerce. Colbert's static view of the world's resources 
is well-documented. He believed that one nation could prosper 
only at the expense of others, and he argued that Holland was 
doing just that, to the detriment of France. In his famous 1669 
memoir, he estimated the total number of ships in the world to be 
twenty thousand; of these, he noted enviously, the Dutch owned 
fifteen to sixteen thousand, whereas France, with a population ten 
times larger than Holland's, possessed only five to six hundred.94 
Although recent research has shown that Colbert may not have 
actively supported the Dutch War at its commencement,95 soon 
thereafter he did become one of its strongest proponents. Even 
before the war broke out, Colbert had acknowledged that at some 
point France would have to take drastic steps to overcome the 
predominance of the Dutch merchant marine. It is, of course, 
ironic that the Dutch War actually helped undercut all of Colbert's 
financial and commercial achievements. 
The deputies of commerce were every bit as hostile to the Dutch 
as Colbert had been, and they agreed with him that trade was only 
war in a different guise. Although they admired the commercial 
know-how of the Dutch, they loathed their "pernicious designs"96 
for reducing France to dependency on Holland. The Dutch had 
demanded and received in the Treaty of Ryswick concessions that, 
according to the deputies, enabled them to dominate French trade. 
That treaty, for example, had exempted Dutch vessels from the 
duty of 50 sous per ton that had been collected since 1659 on all 
foreign ships entering French ports. The deputies urged that this 
duty be totally abolished so that the ships of other nations might 
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successfully compete with the Dutch.97 They also recommended 
that the crown induce French shippers to engage in direct trade 
with the Baltic, thereby eliminating the Dutch middlemen. Piecourt 
(Dunkirk) affirmed that the only way to humiliate the Dutch and to 
destroy their commerce would be to prohibit them from bringing 
to France anything but their own goods and manufactures.98 This 
would certainly destroy the Dutch carrying trade, and it would not 
hurt France, since, as Piecourt assured the council, the Dutch 
would still need to buy French products for their commerce. At the 
very least, he continued, France should put Dutch trade back on 
the same footing it had had prior to the concessions granted at 
Ryswick. In brief, the deputies fully adhered to Colbert's chauvin­
istic resentment of Holland. 
There was perhaps only one area of genuine difference between 
the deputies and Colbert: the deputies' opposition to exclusive 
trading companies and to monopolistic privileges of any kind. Yet 
even here the disagreement is not so great as it might atfirst seem. 
Neither Colbert nor any of his successors was unalterably com­
mitted to the principle of exclusive privilege. Colbert had with­
drawn such monopolistic favors whenever he considered them to 
be unnecessary or detrimental to the common good—thus the re­
moval of the exclusive rights of the West Indies Company in 
1671.99 In fact, the government often seems to have resorted to 
such monopolies only as a last resort, when it became clear that 
individual initiative alone was not sufficient to develop a trade or 
an industry. In this regard Charles Frostin has shown that Jerome 
de Pontchartrain preferred private enterprise for developing the 
French colonies but was forced by lack of this to turn to trading 
companies. 10° The deputies of commerce did not wish to abolish 
these companies or to end all privileges for manufactures; they 
merely wanted to remove their exclusiveness. In their general 
memoirs, for example, they admitted that the Senegal Company 
deserved certain exemptions and favors because of its vast ex­
penses in maintaining forts on the African coast and in transport­
ing slaves to the colonies. The deputies asked only that private 
individuals be able to enter into such areas of trade if they desired 
to do so. 
If there was so little basic disagreement then between Colbertian 
policies and the ideas of the deputies, one might then ask why the 
deputies presented so many grievances in these memoirs. This can 
be explained in several ways. First, no general policy ever suits all 
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parties; and regardless of how prosperous a country is, some special 
interest groups or localities will always have complaints or believe 
that another city or area has an unfair advantage. Second, France 
had recently emerged from a long and relatively unsuccessful war 
and from several years of poor harvests. Although the economy as 
a whole was not suffering as badly as many scholars have asserted, 
nevertheless the return of peace led many people to call for more 
governmental attention to trade and industry. Third, the very 
nature of the memoirs lent itself to the airing of grievances. As 
noted earlier, the deputies did not so much seek to offer a dispas­
sionate analysis of the economy as a whole as to present a series of 
cahiers de doleances on behalf of their regional interests. 
A fourth possible explanation lies in the fact that the deputies 
were complaining not about Colbertism but about the practices of 
Colbert's successors—Le Peletier, Seignelay, Louvois, and Louis de 
Pontchar,train. French historians have labeled the economic poli­
cies of the late seventeenth century as Colbertisme a outrance or 
protectionisme a outrance—that is, taken to its extreme.101 Charles 
Woolsey Cole has devoted an entire book to this period, detailing 
the rigidification, the over regulation, the lack of imagination, and 
the higher tariff duties that crept into the administration of trade 
and industry during these years.102 This interpretation of the work 
of Colbert's successors is in some ways just, although it is not totally 
convincing. The commercial and financial policies of Le Peletier 
and Louis de Pontchartrain (the controllers general of these years) 
are sorely in need of thorough research; and until it is completed, 
no definite judgment can be made. 
Often the royal ministers themselves were not to be blamed for 
the higher tariffs. The increased import duties on foreign woolens 
of 1687, for instance, resulted from pressure by manufacturers 
who demanded more protection against foreign competition.103 
Most of the higher tariffs and import restrictions on enemy and 
neutral commerce during the 1690s had the full support of French 
armateurs, whose privateering vessels preyed upon the trade of 
other nations. Ironically, and somewhat inconsistently, many of 
these same armateurs, several of whom became deputies of com­
merce in 1700, reversed their position upon the return of peace 
and called for greater freedom of trade. Concerning manufac­
tures, the increasing severity of laws regulating French textiles dur­
ing this period were not thrust on an unwilling merchant com­
munity by an overbearing government, but rather were usually 
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requested by the merchants themselves in order to stop the grow­
ing abuses that were damaging the reputation abroad of French 
cloths.104 
Nevertheless, the deputies of commerce in 1700 did criticize 
what they considered to be the excessive tariffs and the lack of 
flexibility of Colbert's successors. Time and again the deputies ack­
nowledged that protection was necessary—but in moderation. 
There was thus no difference between the liberte of Colbert and 
that of the deputies. No one wished to eliminate all controls. What 
the deputies wanted, rather, was a system of reasonable govern­
ment regulations and moderate, though protective, tariffs. Even 
Descasaux du Hallay, who called for a "freedom without limits," 
admitted in other places that this was not practicable. Just after he 
saluted liberty as the soul of trade, he conceded: "One must admit, 
however, that it is sometimes necessary to place restrictions on this 
general freedom. . . ."105 
Three of the deputies (Mesnager, Rol, and Fabre) actually went 
out of their way to praise Colbert, speaking of him as "enlightened" 
and imbued with "penetration" and "insights,"106 As a whole the 
deputies shared the same Weltanschauung as Colbert, and one must 
scrupulously avoid making them appear too liberal. If one seeks to 
find in the late seventeenth century early signs of classical eco­
nomic thought, one must turn to England. In the 1680s and 1690s, 
English writers such as Dudley North, Nicholas Barbon, Dalby 
Thomas, and others were abandoning such mercantilist standbys as 
bullionism, the balance of trade, the static view of a nation's eco­
nomy, and protective tariffs.107 In comparison with these men, the 
French deputies were still thoroughly traditional. This fact will 
become clearer as one examines more closely the work of the 
Council of Commerce in the years following 1700. 
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THE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE 
AND LOCAL PRIVILEGES 
Even though the government called upon them to work for le bien 
public, one must remember that the deputies of trade were elected 
by local bodies and that they were expected to uphold the particu­
lar interests of their constituents. Who were these constituents? 
The arret of 29 June 1700 stipulated that the nomination of the 
deputies was to be done "without intrigue" by assemblies consisting 
of the city magistrates and the prominent merchants in each of the 
cities to be represented. Such an assembly elected the first deputies 
in all but three of the selected cities. The two Parisian deputies 
(Bernard and Peletyer) were chosen personally by the king.1 In 
Dunkirk and Marseilles, the local chambers of commerce did the 
electing; these were the only two cities with such bodies in 1700. 
Soon after the Council of Commerce was created, several of the 
deputies called for the establishment of chambers in other cities.2 
According to the deputies, these chambers would do on a local level 
what the council was doing nationally: that is, listen to the com­
plaints of merchants and advise the government on whatever was 
needed to promote commerce. Also, the chambers could corre­
spond with the council in Paris, and they could elect the deputies 
who went there. After discussing the possible creation of chambers 
of commerce in numerous meetings throughout the early months 
of 1701, the council finally decided to ask that they be formed.3 Its 
decision was ratified by an arret issued on 30 August 1701.4 This 
arret called for the establishment of a chamber of commerce in each 
of the following cities: Lille, Rouen, Bordeaux, La Rochelle, 
Nantes, Saint-Malo, Bayonne, and one city in Languedoc (to be 
chosen by the provincial estates). The form of each chamber was 
left up to the cities themselves. 
For one reason or another, however, there were delays in estab­
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lishing these chambers. Those created by the time of Louis XIV's 
death were, in order of formation: Lyons, 20 July 1702; Rouen, 19 
June 1703; Toulouse, 29 December 1703; Montpellier, 15 January 
1704; Bordeaux, 26 May 1705; and Lille, 31 July 1714. 
Up until the time that a city formed a chamber of commerce, it 
elected its deputies in the manner laid down in the arret of 29 June 
1700. Every time that a new election had to be held, the city magis­
trates and the juge and consuls of the juridiction consulaire called 
together a group of former juges and consuls as well as a number of 
prominent local businessmen. Together they nominated a list of 
candidates for the position of deputy, and then they voted. The 
man with a plurality of votes won. 
The person elected was in a real sense the representative of his 
locality, but it was a very elite group that actually elected him. The 
records of a handful of the special town meetings in which deputies 
were elected have been preserved. We have, for example, the 
transcript of the meeting in Rouen of 4 August 1700 that elected 
Nicolas Mesnager.5 The premier echevin of the city presided, and 
the assembly consisted of representatives of the wholesale mer­
chants' guilds. With "a uniform voice," Mesnager was elected. At 
the end of the manuscript are the signatures of all the "marchands 
negotiants" who participated: 44 men in all. Similarly, one could 
cite the election held in Nantes on 5 October 1702 to choose a 
successor to Descasaux du Hallay.6 The man elected was a former 
consul in the juridiction consulaire, Germain Laurencin. There were 
a total of 79 electors, all either former members of the juridiction 
consulaire or prominent businessmen.7 
Because some cities lacked chambers of commerce, and because 
the chambers of commerce varied in organization, there was no 
uniform pattern followed for the election and control of deputies 
to the Council of Commerce. Virtually the only thing that every 
locality had in common was royal supervision. From the very be­
ginning, the controller general and the secretary of state for the 
navy rigorously supervised the operations of the chambers of 
commerce and the elections of the deputies of trade. The royal 
provincial intendants were authorized to preside over the local 
bodies whenever they wished, and it was up to them to ensure that 
qualified persons were chosen to attend the council in Paris. The 
crown did not impose its own choices on the localities,8 but it did 
reserve the right to reject a candidate if it found him unsuitable.9 
Each prospective deputy had to get the personal approval of the 
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controller general and, if he were from a port city, from the secre­
tary of state for the navy.10 
CITIES WITHOUT CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE 
Four of the cities named in the arret of 30 August 1701 did not 
form chambers of commerce during the years under consideration 
here. La Rochelle did not establish one until 1719, and Bayonne 
not until 1726. Nantes and Saint-Malo did not have any at all in the 
eighteenth century. Paris was not named in the 1701 arret, and so it 
likewise did not have a chamber. Bayonne did not form one simply 
because it could not afford one. Its trade was damaged by Louis 
XIV's final two wars, and perhaps even more by competition from 
the city's larger rivals—Saint-Malo, Bordeaux, Nantes, and La 
Rochelle. For most of this period, in fact, Bayonne did not have a 
deputy of trade. When its first deputy, Leon de Rol, left the council 
in September 1702, Bayonne obtained permission temporarily to 
withdraw its deputation from the council. From 1703 to 1711, 
therefore, the city had no representative. In 1711 Bayonne was 
allowed to elect a Parisian merchant, Gerard Heusch de Janvry. 
This saved the city the expense of sending a man from Bayonne 
and supporting him in the capital.11 
Several factors prevented Saint-Malo and Nantes from forming 
chambers, even though both cities initially showed interest in hav­
ing one. In 1702 the Council of Commerce sent out a circular letter 
to all cities with deputies of trade; the letter concerned the possible 
shape that the new chambers would take. Both Saint-Malo and 
Nantes responded favorably to the letter, adding their own ideas 
for their respective chambers.12 Financial considerations, however, 
proved to be a major stumbling block. Every city that formed a 
chamber of commerce feared that it would cost too much, espe­
cially in wartime. Plans in Saint-Malo and Nantes were also stymied 
by the question of how these chambers would be organized. The 
intendant of Brittany and the deputies of the Council of Com­
merce objected that the proposed forms of the chambers in the two 
cities were unworkable.13 Saint-Malo and Nantes also seem to have 
feared that if they complied with the arret of 30 August 1701 and 
established chambers of commerce, somehow the cities would lose 
some of their provincial autonomy and be subjected to "a vexing 
and despotic surveillance" by royal agents.14 In Saint-Malo the 
powerful Magon family, which directed much of that city's trade, 
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feared that a chamber would vie with it for control of the city's 
commercial affairs.15 In both cities, therefore, the juridictions con­
sulaires assumed the duties of a chamber of commerce and super­
vised the cities' deputies in Paris. A document preserved in the 
departmental archives in Nantes describes the commanding role 
which that city's juridiction consulaire exercised in the election of 
deputies throughout the first half of the eighteenth century.16 Not 
only did the juridiction consulaire (conjointly with the maire and 
echevins) convoke the special electoral assemblies but it drew up the 
lists of nominees from which deputies were chosen. These lists 
consisted almost exclusively of former juges and consuls of the juri-
diction consulaire. 
Like Saint-Malo and Nantes, La Rochelle initially showed an 
early interest in forming a chamber of commerce. On 23 Septem­
ber 1701 the juge and consuls met with the principal merchants of 
the city to draw up a plan for such a body. This assembly sent a 
proposal to the local intendant, who forwarded it to Chamillart. 
The latter in turn referred it to the Council of Commerce. The 
deputies of trade thereupon rejected it. They noted that it failed to 
describe, among other things, how the members would be chosen, 
how the chamber would be funded, and when it would meet.l7 
The whole question therefore was sent back to La Rochelle, 
where for the next eight years a series of local squabbles prevented 
the merchants there from coming up with a suitable plan. The 
business community, ever status-conscious, engaged in seemingly 
endless debates concerning membership and rank in the proposed 
chamber. Would the juridiction consulaire automatically sit in it? 
Would former juges and consuls outrank ordinary merchants? 
Would merchants who had nobility outrank former consular of­
ficials? Could marchands en detail (retail merchants) be elected to the 
chamber? Who would sit closest to the head of the table when the 
body met? Wrangling over such questions prevented any decisions 
from being made until 21 October 1710, when an arret was issued 
creating a chamber of commerce.18 
This chamber, however, never came into being: the war helped 
divert attention to other matters, and the only building where the 
chamber could have met (the hall of the juridiction consulaire) had 
burned down in 1705.19 La Rochelle did not finally get its Cham­
ber of Commerce until 15 July 1719, when a second arret was 
issued.20 Up until that time the juges and consuls largely controlled 
the deputy in the Council of Commerce, as they did in Bayonne, 
Saint-Malo, and Nantes. 
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Paris likewise had no chamber of commerce. Since it was the 
home of the Council of Commerce, it was believed that the capital 
had no need of a separate such body. As noted above, the king 
appointed the first two Parisian deputies. Samuel Bernard sat in 
the council until he retired in 1720. After his departure he was not 
replaced, and thereafter Paris had only one deputy. Antoine 
Peletyer retired in January 1702, and his successors were hence­
forth chosen by the gardes of the six corps des marchands of Paris.21 
This body controlled the deputy, paid him, and corresponded with 
the Council of Commerce. 
THE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE 
Now that we have considered how deputies were elected in towns 
or provinces that did not have chambers of commerce, we can 
briefly look at the places that did have such bodies.22 By reason of 
its age and its extensive powers, the Chamber of Commerce of 
Marseilles stood apart from all the others. This chamber was cre­
ated in 1650.23 Although theoretically it was distinct from the 
conseil de ville, in practice it was not. The city's five principal magis­
trates sat in the chamber, and they selected its other members— 
four deputies and eight councillors. In addition to its members, the 
chamber employed a secretary, an archivist, and dozens of treas­
urers and tax collectors. 
The chamber was charged with a host of administrative duties. 
Its major responsibility was that of supervising and regulating 
Marseilles's trade with the Levant. It administered the city's port, 
and it controlled the French consulates that were scattered 
throughout the Mediterranean. Among other things, the chamber 
also was charged with protecting French shipping from the Bar­
bary pirates and with paying the salary of the French ambassador 
in Constantinople (16,000 livres annually). The chamber's ex­
penditures averaged more than 150,000 livres per year. To meet 
these expenses, it collected a variety of taxes on goods and ships 
entering and leaving Marseilles and various eastern Mediterranean 
ports.2 4 
Dunkirk was the other city that had a Chamber of Commerce 
prior to the establishment of the Council of Commerce. This 
chamber was instituted by an edict issued in February 1700.-"' Its 
creation was part of the same governmental drive to revive the 
economy at the end of the War of the League of Augsburg that 
contributed to the creation of the council later in that year. The 
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principal event that led to the formation of the chamber in Dun­
kirk was the signing of a new Franco-Dutch tariff in December 
1699 that gave Dutch shippers extensive trading privileges in 
France. It also reaffirmed the severe restrictions placed on the 
kinds of Dutch goods that could pass through French Flanders into 
the rest of France. These provisions dashed Dunkirk's hopes for 
becoming a middleman between the United Provinces and France. 
Soon after the publication of this agreement, Dunkirk merchants 
barraged the government with complaints and demanded favors of 
some sort to help the city recover from the war.26 The result was 
the edict of February 1700, which created both a juridiction consu­
laire and a chamber of commerce. The edict was rather vague 
concerning the organization of the chamber. It was to consist of six 
persons: a president, four deputies (two current and two former 
echevins), and one pensionnaire, whose function was to prepare 
reports on the various matters brought to the chamber. It was to 
meet twice weekly. Its ordinary sources of revenue were a series of 
small duties placed on various goods (especially fish) passing 
through Dunkirk's port; these sufficed to pay the salary of the 
deputy in Paris, plus three to four thousand livres a year for the 
expenses of the chamber. Everything else was left to the discretion 
of the provincial intendant, who selected the members, supervised 
the raising of funds, and directed its work. 
During the War of the Spanish Succession, the chamber's reve­
nues were augmented so that it could arm frigates to protect the 
coast from enemy corsaires.27 Otherwise, the chamber appears to 
have led a rather somnolent existence—certainly it did not meet 
twice a week as had been prescribed by the founding edict. In 1715, 
when Dunkirk's commerce was ruined by the destruction of its 
port, the chamber requested permission to withdraw its deputation 
from the Council of Commerce.28 Permission was granted, and 
Dunkirk was not again represented in the council until 1781. 
There were six chambers of commerce formed between 1701 
and 17 ID.29 Even for those cities that were eager to have one, 
various obstacles hindered immediate compliance with the arret of 
30 August 1701. Many of the same problems that delayed or pre­
vented the creation of chambers in Bayonne, La Rochelle, Nantes, 
and Saint-Malo also arose in other cities. Disputes about funding, 
organization, and rank occurred in virtually every city. The War of 
the Spanish Succession also served to deflect attention and money 
to other matters. In Languedoc difficulties appeared when the 
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provincial estates tried to decide which city should have the cham­
ber of commerce prescribed by the arret of 1701. Nimes, Car­
cassonne, Toulouse, and Montpellier all vied for it. In the end the 
estates received permission to establish two chambers, in the latter 
two cities.30 
Albeit some of the delays in forming chambers of commerce 
were unavoidable, a perusal of the materials available gives one the 
distinct impression that most cities were not overly anxious to com­
ply with the arret of 1701. They often chose to procrastinate rather 
than to appropriate the several thousand livres that a chamber 
would cost each year. This brings one back to the questions posed 
in the first chapter. Were commercial centers actively campaigning 
at the turn of the century for greater representation before the 
central government? Or did the crown take the initiative with re­
gard to the chambers of commerce just as it did with the Council of 
Commerce? Although several of the deputies called for local 
chambers in their general memoirs of 1700-1701, government 
officials had already begun laying plans for them in the 1690s.31 
After the arret of 30 August 1701 was issued the central govern­
ment was the force that constantly pushed the cities to pursue their 
plans for such bodies. The Council of Commerce and the royal 
provincial intendants supervised every step in their creation.3- If it 
had not been for this royal prodding and continued support, it is 
likely that few chambers of commerce would have been created in 
the eighteenth century and that most of those established would 
soon have slipped into desuetude. 
Little needs to be said here about the actual organization of the 
chambers established in Rouen, Lyons, Bordeaux, Lille, Toulouse, 
and Montpellier. They consisted of from five (Lille) to nine 
(Rouen) members, who called themselves either deputies, syndics, 
or directors of commerce. Generally they assembled once a week in 
the hotel de ville or in the maison consulaire. Lyons's chamber was the 
only one that, like those in Dunkirk and Marseilles, included mem­
bers of the magistracy; its chamber was presided over by the pre'vot 
des marchands and one echevin. In Rouen, Bordeaux, Toulouse, and 
Montpellier, the chambers were presided over by the three mem­
bers of the local juridiction consulaire. Lille's chamber was the only 
one that was completely separate from both the city magistrates 
and the juridiction consulaire; it was headed by a merchant of the 
town. Each chamber included four or five merchants, who could 
debate and vote on all issues discussed in the meetings. In addition, 
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each group employed a secretary, who kept the archives and 
handled correspondence. The provincial intendants were free to 
attend (and preside over) the chambers whenever they wished, 
though this did not occur often. 
The members of the chambers were usually chosen through a 
system of co-optation. The electors consisted of present and 
former member of each chamber; in some cases former consular 
officials and a handful of important merchants also could partici­
pate. The members served for two years, with the possibility of 
being reelected for an additional two years. They served without 
pay, although in Lille, Toulouse, Montpellier, and Rouen, mem­
bers received two silver jetons (tokens) worth from six to ten deniers 
for each meeting they attended and a gold medal equivalent to five 
louis d'or when they left office. 
The chambers were funded in a variety of ways. The one in 
Lyons received 13,000 livres annually from the city treasury— 
8,000 for its deputy to the Council of Commerce and 5,000 for the 
chamber's expenses. The bodies in Toulouse and Montpellier had 
to subsist on a meager yearly stipend of 600 livres each, which they 
received from the Estates of Languedoc. The chamber in Bor­
deaux was given funds by the city and by the receveur general of the 
generalite: 6,000 livres for its deputy and 4,086 for the chamber 
itself. Rouen's institution collected its own duties on foreign goods 
entering the city; these produced a yearly income of about 12,000 
livres, 8,000 of which was for the deputy in Paris. 
The chambers served four main functions. First, they received 
memoirs from local businessmen and debated commercial afairs; 
they then sent these matters to the provincial intendant, the con­
troller general, or the secretary of state for the navy. Second, they 
elected and supervised the work of their deputies in Paris.33 Third, 
the chambers approved all pareres before they could be introduced 
into their respective cities.34 Fourth, the chambers of commerce 
provided the royal ministers and the Council of Commerce with a 
standing body of local economic experts from whom they could 
quickly obtain advice or information. 
The valuable service provided in this final respect was exempli­
fied in the debate that erupted throughout France in 1713 con­
cerning the importation of foreign-made silks by the East India 
Company. Controller General Desmaretz asked all the provincial 
intendants to find out how local businessmen felt about the ques­
tion. Those intendants who could turn to chambers of commerce 
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for advice were able to respond swiftly,35 but the intendant of 
Dauphine had to apologize to the controller general for his tardy 
reply.36 Dauphine' had no chamber of commerce, he said, and it 
therefore took him much longer to survey the opinions of that 
area's traders and manufacturers. 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DEPUTIES AND THEIR CONSTITUENTS 
The primary way in which the chambers of commerce (and in 
cities without chambers, the juridictions consulaires) made themselves 
heard by the central government was through their deputies in 
Paris. This posed a vexing problem for the deputies. On the one 
hand, they had an obligation to represent the interests of their 
localities; but on the other hand, they were constantly urged by the 
royal ministers and the commissaires in the Council of Commerce to 
work for le bien public. The crown wished to divest gradually the 
deputies of selfish local interests that contradicted the general wel­
fare. This was why the government usually asked the cities repre­
sented in the council to reelect their deputies indefinitely: in this 
way the deputies would not be subject to recall by their constituents 
if they did not defend local causes fervently enough. To a limited 
extent the government succeeded in its aim. Deputies such as Mes­
nager, Piecourt, Fenellon, and Anisson were sufficiently imbued 
with an allegience to the general good that they could be entrusted 
with sensitive diplomatic missions; but even these men worked 
hard to defend vital regional interests. 
Each of the deputies maintained a lengthy correspondence with 
his local chamber of commerce or juridiction consulaire. These 
bodies insisted that they be kept well informed of all the activities of 
the Council of Commerce. The deputies took great pains to assure 
their constituents that they were working assiduously to uphold the 
rights and privileges of their respective provinces, but the cham­
bers of commerce and consular officials never hesitated to bom­
bard their deputies with lengthy instructions or with complaints 
about real or imagined threats to local prerogatives.37 
The blatant partisanship of the cities represented in Paris cannot 
be doubted. What Ernest Pariset has said concerning the Chamber 
of Commerce of Lyons can be applied to all of its counterparts: "In 
all of its deliberations one sees that the chamber of commerce had 
only one goal: the interests of Lyons."38 Occasionally the deputies 
in Paris gathered enough courage to reprove their constituents for 
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their selfish desires. In May 1708 Fenellon responded to a pas­
sionate, one-sided memoir sent to him by the chamber in Bordeaux 
by reminding it that "one can go a little too far."39 Generally, 
however, the deputies were loathe to offend their electors, and 
their desire to please local interests sometimes led to lamentable 
excesses. Andre de Joubert, the syndic general of Languedoc who sat 
in the Council of Commerce in 1704 and again in 1707, so irritated 
the king with his intemperate demands on behalf of his province 
that Louis XIV sent Intendant Basville a lettre de cachet for Joubert's 
arrest, but the intendant never used it.40 
No deputies of trade worked harder for the concerns of their 
localities than did the Fabre brothers (Joseph and Mathieu), who 
represented Marseilles in succession fron 1700 to 1714. Although 
each man spouted slogans concerning the general good, they both 
toiled endlessly to protect Marseilles's privileges, and all their work 
was done in close conjunction with the chamber in Marseilles. 
Joseph Fabre served in the council less than three years, but during 
that time he wrote 257 letters to his chamber of commerce—an 
average of about two a week.41 This is even more impressive in 
view of the great length of many of the letters. Fabre's campaign in 
defense of Marseilles's privileges began on the day that he arrived 
in Paris in January 1701. As soon as he reached the capital, he 
outfitted his valet in Marseilles's colors and decorated his carriage 
with his city's coat of arms. Complaining of how hard he labored, 
he once wrote to Chamillart: "Remember that I have much work 
and will continue to have it and that I will have only Sundays free; 
and on that day I have to write more than St. Augustine."42 
Mathieu Fabre was no less an upholder of Marseilies's interests. 
Not to be outdone in classical allusions by his brother, he boasted to 
his chamber: "My strategy is to imitate Horace, that great Roman, 
who, in withdrawing, was able to fight his enemies one after the 
other."43 
But despite the services rendered by all the deputies in Paris, 
their cities were rarely content with their accomplishments. The 
mutual jealousies of the cities led them each to believe that the 
others were benefiting more from the Council of Commerce than 
they themselves were. This helps explain why most of the cities 
represented in the council were at one time or another reluctant to 
pay the salaries of their deputies.44 Time and again one deputy or 
another was forced to inform the controller general that he had not 
been reimbursed for his services. On each occasion the minister 
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either wrote to a provincial intendant to see that the matter was 
taken care of or issued an arret ordering that the deputy be paid. 
In some cases the disenchantment of the local merchants is 
understandable. Rouen, for example, complained of the fact that it 
had to pay Nicolas Mesnager's salary of 8,000 livres a year even 
though the deputy spent almost as much time on diplomatic mis­
sions in Spain, Holland, and England as he did in Paris.45 To make 
matters worse, while Mesnager was absent from the council the job 
of safeguarding Rouen's interests was assigned, at different times, 
to the deputies of Lyons, La Rochelle, and Saint-Malo—cities 
whose interests sometimes directly opposed those of Rouen. 
La Rochelle's unhappiness with its deputy (Heron) was, however, 
less excusable. In 1703 and again in 1708 and in 1710, the mer­
chants of that city wrote to the controller general and to the secre­
tary of state for the navy requesting permission to replace Heron 
with someone else or to withdraw their deputation from the council 
altogether.46 They claimed that the 6,000 livres paid him each year 
was an undue burden on the municipal treasury; but they also 
bemoaned the fact that Heron seemed to be more concerned about 
the good of France in general than the good of La Rochelle in 
particular. They accused him of negligence and cited several 
commercial conflicts in which La Rochelle's rights were suffering 
due to advantages won by other cities. In view of these factors, the 
city wished to remove "an unfruitful deputation." On each oc­
casion, however, the royal ministers demanded that Heron be con­
tinued as deputy; he was working on several important projects, 
they said, especially the reform of French tariffs.47 
Even the Fabres encountered difficulties in being paid by their 
chamber of commerce. This was caused not so much by dissatisfac­
tion with the work they performed in Paris as by the tangled affairs 
of the municipality and the chamber of commerce. Both Joseph 
and Mathieu Fabre were embroiled in the cabals and political fac­
tions that divided Marseilles at that time.48 Neither man remained 
untainted by the seamy corruption infesting the city, and each one 
had acquired a long list of enemies. They managed to win election 
as deputies to the Council of Commerce largely because they were 
known to have powerful friends at court. But immediately upon 
becoming deputy, each man encountered opposition in the cham­
ber in Marseilles; and as early as December 1700, that body delayed 
in paying Joseph Fabre's salary.49 According to the Fabres, their 
enemies in the city council and in the chamber continually spread 
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malicious lies about them.50 Neither man ever succeeded in being 
fully remunerated for his services in the capital. When Joseph 
Fabre left office late in 1703, he presented the chamber with a bill 
for 4,897 livres still due him for his salary and expenses.51 
Mathieu Fabre in particular had bad luck with the Chamber of 
Commerce. Not only did he fail to collect all the money that he 
claimed was owed him, but after 1710 his role as Marseilles's 
representative in Paris lost any real importance.52 In 1710 the 
Chamber of Commerce sent to Paris its assistant archivist, Francois 
Philip. He took with him many of the chamber's account books, 
which he was charged with presenting to the royal commission then 
examining the affairs of Marseilles in general.53 Philip remained in 
Paris for several years, representing Marseilles before the commis­
sion. During this time the Chamber of Commerce began to rely on 
him rather than on Mathieu Fabre to manage its affairs. Philip 
gradually came to the attention of Controller General Desmaretz, 
who was favorably impressed by his abilities. In August 1714 
Desmaretz asked the chamber to replace Fabre with Philip.54 The 
chamber soon after complied, but the minister's request sparked an 
abrupt reversal in the chamber's attitude toward Philip. Up to this 
time it had had a cordial rapport with him, but the chamber bitterly 
detested the fact that Philip had been virtually imposed upon them 
by the crown. This was felt to be a grave encroachment on the 
chamber's right to select independently its own candidates, and a 
blow to Marseilles's privileges in general. Philip's term as deputy 
thus was even less pleasant than those of the Fabres had been. 
DEFENSE OF LOCAL PRIVILEGES 
Given the highly self-centered attitudes of all the cities repre­
sented in the Council of Commerce, it is no surprise to learn that 
interregional rivalries occupied a good deal of the council's time 
during this period. The very first topic ever introduced in the 
council gives an indication of this tendency. In December 1700 the 
Chamber of Commerce of Dunkirk asked that an exclusive whaling 
company be established in that city.55 Such a company would have 
seriously harmed such cities as Saint-Malo and Bayonne, whose 
fishing fleets derived,great profits from their whaling expeditions. 
It was perhaps for this reason that nothing ever came of the pro­
posal. 
The general memoirs written by the deputies in 1700-1701 
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abounded with attacks on the privileges of other cities and with 
requests for the granting of privileges to one's own city or province. 
These same sorts of conflicts continued during the subsequent 
fifteen years. Although it would be misleading to portray the 
Council of Commerce as merely a forum for intercity and inter­
regional debates, these rivalries reflected the ways in which pro­
vincial businessmen often viewed the council and its usefulness to 
them. 
The deputies defended local interests in several ways. They 
wrote memoirs and debated their colleagues in the council. They 
also pleaded for their cities' interests during their many private 
work sessions with the royal ministers or the commissaires. In a letter 
to the Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce in September 1710, 
Fenellon revealed one of the parliamentary tactics that could be 
used to further one's argument.56 He noted that he was clearly 
outnumbered by the commissaires and the other deputies on the 
question of permitting the export of linseed (graine de lin) from the 
country. Bordeaux, which had an oversupply of it, wanted permis­
sion to sell it to other nations. Most of the members of the council, 
however, wanted to prevent it from leaving France, where it was 
needed for the preparation of textiles. In order to postpone a vote 
on the issue—which Bordeaux would surely lose—Fenellon was 
able to get the question sent to Guienne's intendant, de Courson, 
who could be expected to defend Bordeaux's interests. Through 
this maneuver Fenellon managed to win time and to fortify his 
position with testimony from a royal official. Such ploys were often 
used by the deputies.57 
Yet another means of furthering one's local interests was the 
pot-de-vin, which could range from an apparently innocent gift to 
outright bribery. All the deputies seem to have used it at one time 
or another. The recipients of these gratifications, presents, and 
pensions were fellow deputies, commissaires, commis in the royal 
ministries, and ministers themselves.58 Some of these gifts were 
relatively simple. Fenellon often asked his Chamber of Commerce 
to send him Gascony hams and Bordeaux wines, which were as 
prized in the Paris of that period as they are today. Fe'nellon 
laconically explained: "I can have them distributed; it will not do 
any harm."59 In December 1707 Mathieu Fabre complained to the 
chamber in Marseilles that, because he had not received all the 
money due him for his expenses in Paris, he would not be able to 
dispense 300 to 400 livres worth of gifts to the commissaires of the 
60
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Council of Commerce as was expected on the occasion of a new 
year.  He pointed out that the other deputies would be presenting 
gifts to them, so in order to save face he would have to feign illness 
and stay at home. 
These practices seem to have been customary, if not exactly 
laudable, but there were more serious cases that approached pure 
bribery. Moreau, of Saint-Malo, for example, was suspected of 
offering money to naval officials in return for the granting of 
passports to Malouin merchants who wished to send ships to the 
mer du Sud—which trade was off-limits for Frenchmen.61 The six 
corps des marchands of Paris on at least one occasion presented a gift 
of twenty louis d'or to de la Vigne, commis of Amelot, in return for 
"the cares he will have for preserving the interests of these corpora-
tions."62 
None of the other cities, however, came close to matching the 
"generosity" of Marseilles. It is impossible to document fully the 
gifts and bribes that the chamber and the city council distributed in 
Paris during these years. Much of this money was included in the 
hundreds of thousands of livres that royal investigators reported 
were unaccountably missing from the treasuries of the two 
bodies.63 One of the reasons why Joseph and Mathieu Fabre were 
always in debt was the presents and pensions that they doled out to 
"secret agents" in Paris. In his report of 1703 to the Chamber of 
Commerce, Joseph Fabre recorded that during his three years as 
deputy he had distributed 23,500 livres to private agents and 
"important personages."64 Although this sum was considerable in 
itself, other testimony shows that it only skims the surface of the 
largesse that Marseilles showered on royal officials during this 
period. The money and the gifts of fine cloths and Mediterranean 
fruits probably amounted to well over 100,000 livres during the 
period under consideration here. The Marseilles deputies were 
aided in the distribution of these gratifications by the city's chief 
agent in the government, Frangois Blondel, a premier commis of the 
secretary of state for foreign affairs, the marquis de Torcy. Blondel 
and the deputies of trade gave regular pensions or periodic gifts to 
persons in every ministry and at every level—from doormen to 
royal ministers. There can be no doubt about the fact that these 
gratifications were essential for the preservation and enhancement 
of Marseilles's privileges.65 
The Council of Commerce also was not untouched by the Fi­
nancial influence of Marseilles. When Joseph Fabre tallied up his 
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expenses at the end of his three years in Paris, he included among 
them 
gifts to diverse persons, including the Seigneurs of the Royal Council of 
Commerce, as well as Messieurs the Farmers General who had been so 
against us, as well as all the deputies, in order to lessen a little the 
haughtiness with which they handled things contrary to Marseilles.66 
In 1703 the Chamber of Commerce ordered Fabre to give up to 
100 louis d'or to Rouille du Coudray, the commissaire who most 
vehemently criticized the city's privileges.67 The secretary of the 
council, Valossiere, frequently received free supplies of cloth and 
food from Marseilles.68 
Royal ministers likewise appear to have been swayed by the city's 
generosity. Although the foreign minister, Torcy, appears to have 
been the only one to accept a regular pension, all of them received 
sizable gifts on a periodic basis. In 1715, for example, the Chamber 
of Commerce sent Jerome de Pontchartrain a shipment of thirteen 
crates of various foods weighing a total of 1,880 pounds.69 
Not even Louis XIV himself was free from the influence of 
Marseilles's lobbyists. Somehow the city managed to win the sympa­
thies of the king's Jesuit confessors, Pere La Chaise and Pere 
Fleuriau. Gaston Rambert avers that through "spiritual means" 
these two priests apparently succeeded in impressing both the king 
and his grandson, the duke of Burgundy, with the justice of many 
of the city's claims.70 
THE PRIVILEGES OF MARSEILLES 
In view of the above, it is not surprising to learn that Marseilles's 
deputies had great success in defending that city's privileges 
against attacks by other cities. Marseilles was helped by the fact that 
Joseph Fabre had managed to win the two major figures in the 
Council of Commerce (Daguesseau and Amelot) over to his side.71 
But the city's chief support came from Jerome de Pontchartrain, 
who came to be regarded as its protector. Whether his friendly 
attitude toward Marseilles resulted from his patriotic desire to see 
France dominate Europe's trade with the Levant or from the gifts 
that he received from the city, or both, is open to conjecture. The 
Marseilles Chamber of Commerce or its deputy frequently asked 
the minister to intercede with commissaires of the Council of Com­
merce on its behalf. Both Joseph and Mathieu Fabre had easy 
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access to Pontchartrain, and they saw him often.72 When Joseph 
arrived in Paris in January 1701, Pontchartrain obtained for him 
an audience with the king—an honor bestowed on no other 
deputy.73 And when he retired from the council in 1703, Pont­
chartrain presented him with a portrait of the king.74 
With such help as this, the Fabre brothers were able to protect 
and to bolster Marseilles's two principal commercial privileges: its 
status as a free port and its virtual monopoly of the Levant trade. 
The city had obtained these two advantages through the edict of 
March 1669.75 This edict withdrew all royal tax farmers from the 
city and placed them around its borders. Merchandise entering 
Marseilles for local consumption or for transshipment elsewhere 
henceforth was not subject to royal taxes of any kind; customs 
duties were collected only on goods transported inland to other 
areas of France. The edict also gave Marseilles what amounted to a 
monopoly on trade with the Levant. Every other French port, 
whether on the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, in the future had to 
pay a 20 percent duty on all Levant goods that it did not get from 
Marseilles.76 These measures were designed to compel the rest of 
France to purchase Levant goods at Marseilles rather than at their 
places of origin. 
Colbert's reasons for granting Marseilles these privileges are easy 
to understand: he hoped that by favoring this city he could drive 
the English and the Dutch out of the Levant trade. He wanted 
Marseilles to become a great entrepot, where French, Italian, 
English, and even Dutch ships would come to exchange goods. 
Finally, Marseilles's trade with the Levant would provide a sure 
outlet for the woolens manufactures that Colbert was establishing 
in Languedoc, Provence, and Dauphine. 
During the final decades of the seventeenth century, Marseilles's 
status as a free port suffered various infringements. Financial 
needs forced the crown to levy taxes on all goods entering and 
leaving the port,77 and various tax farmers set up bureaus within 
the city to supervise the collection of these duties. Special entrepots 
were established for tobacco as well as for Brazilian sugars and 
coffee.78 In 1691 the crown prohibited the entry into Marseilles of 
any toiles peintes (printed calicos) and similar light printed fabrics 
from the East; these items posed a threat to France's own textiles. 
Late in the century, Marseilles also suffered from the frauds 
perpetrated by merchants in the various Atlantic ports. Rather 
than purchase Levant goods in Marseilles, these traders often 
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preferred to smuggle them into France from England or Holland. 
Not only did this practice foster the commerce of France's competi­
tors, but it reduced the demand for Marseilles's supply of Levant 
goods. 
Despite all these infringements on its privileges, however, Mar-
seilles's position in the Levant trade remained preponderant. As 
mentioned earlier, the deputies of trade from the Atlantic ports 
and from Languedoc unleashed a bitter assault on the city's privi­
leges in their general memoirs of 1700-1701. This attack con­
tinued throughout 1701 and 1702. They charged that Marseilles's 
merchants often paid for Levant goods with gold and silver rather 
than with French manufactures. They further accused the Mar­
seilles traders of overcharging for the Levant goods that they sold 
to businessmen from other parts of France. 
Finally, the deputies contended that such a monopoly was de­
structive of the general good. They argued that if all Frenchmen 
were permitted to trade directly with the Levant, they could do so 
more cheaply than they did through middlemen at Marseilles. 
French businessmen could thereby transport their manufactures, 
agricultural products, and fish directly to the eastern Mediter­
ranean and assure all French provinces of a market for their goods. 
The deputy of Marseilles, although greatly outnumbered in the 
council, answered these arguments with an impressive volley of 
evidence and invective. He deluged the ministers and the members 
of the council with countless memoirs and letters.79 He was aided, 
of course, by the financial inducements that he liberally proffered 
to all takers. 
Joseph Fabre contended that his city did not export an excessive 
amount of precious metals from France, but that it did export huge 
quantities of French manufactures. To back up this claim, Fabre 
and Intendant Lebret supplied the controller general with records 
of Marseilles's exports and imports.80 On several occasions Fabre 
lauded Colbert, whose wisdom had perceived that Marseilles's 
strategic location made it a natural center for the Levant trade.81 
As for the other deputies' demands that their cities be allowed to 
trade with the Near East, Fabre asserted that if this were done these 
cities would merely purchase Levant goods from England and 
Holland. It was to prevent such an occurrence that Colbert had 
established Marseilles's privileges in the first place. 
With telling effect Fabre also pointed out that if all French cities 
were freed from paying the 20 percent duty then the Dutch would 
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likewise be freed from it. According to article nine of the Treaty of 
Ryswick, Dutch traders were to be treated exactly the same as 
Frenchmen in French ports, and thus they had to pay only those 
duties that Frenchmen themselves paid. Although this provision 
was not in effect during the War of the Spanish Succession, it 
seemed likely that the Dutch would regain their old trading conces­
sions in any future peace treaty. To accede to the other deputies' 
demands would therefore, according to Fabre, be to put "the wolf 
in with the sheep."82 Dutch shippers could navigate much more 
economically than could Frenchmen, and they would be able to sell 
Levant goods in French ports at prices far lower than those offered 
by French merchants. 
Finally, the Marseilles deputy argued that the Levant trade was 
not large enough to warrant opening it up to all French cities. 
Already there was an oversupply of Levant goods sitting in Mar­
seilles waiting to be sold; if all French cities entered the trade, this 
glut would increase.83 
Joseph Fabre and the Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles de­
manded not only the preservation of the 20 percent surtax but the 
removal of all impingements on the free-port status of the city. 
Only by granting both of these requests, they claimed, could 
France come to dominate trade with the Grand Seigneur and the rest 
of the eastern Mediterranean. 
The crown considered the debate over Marseilles's privileges to 
be so important that on two occasions in 1701—23 June and 15 
September—Controller General Chamillart and Secretary of State 
Pontchartrain attended the Council of Commerce in person to dis­
cuss the issue.84 Amelot, who was known to be favorable to Mar­
seilles, was charged with conducting the affair. Because of a pro­
longed illness that struck Amelot in 1702, a decision was delayed 
for several months.85 
The entire question was settled by an arret issued on 10 July 
1703,86 which basically reaffirmed the edict of 1669. Goods enter­
ing Marseilles's port were freed from all taxes until they crossed the 
border into other French territories. The special entrepot on to­
bacco, coffee, and sugar was removed.87 The city's monopoly in 
the Levant was underscored: no other French Mediterranean port 
could enter this trade. All the Atlantic cities could once again trade 
directly with the Levant, but only upon payment of the 20 percent 
surtax—which meant that few Atlantic merchants would ever par­
ticipate in this trade. This 20 percent duty also had to be paid for 
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all Levant goods imported from England, Holland, and other non-
Levant nations. To ensure that this duty was paid, Marseilles won 
the right to employ a controleur in each of the Atlantic ports to 
supervise its collection by tax farmers. Finally, Marseilles and Pont-
de-Beauvoisin remained the only two cities where silk could enter 
France. The arret therefore was an overwhelming triumph for 
Marseilles.88 Indeed, Joseph Fabre had helped draft it.89 
Although the arret of July 1703 marked a tremendous victory for 
Marseilles, the city's privileges were somewhat compromised in 
succeeding years. This was partly because Marseilles's new deputy, 
Mathieu Fabre, was a less capable, though no less fervent, upholder 
of his city's cause. His hot temper and his strident defense of Mar-
seilles's local interests alienated even those in the Council of 
Commerce who were sympathetic to his city's views. But it also was 
evident that Marseilles's claims sometimes clearly contradicted the 
general good. 
Thus in 1704 the Council of Commerce and the royal ministers 
decided against Marseilles on the question of whether or not Le­
vant goods entering France in enemy prize ships had to pay a 20 
percent duty. Marseilles, wishing to protect its special position as a 
supplier of Levant goods, argued that the surtax had to be paid. 
But deputies from other cities pointed out that the survival of the 
French guerre de course depended on the sale of prize goods within 
France; Levant goods from prize ships therefore should not be 
subject to this added imposition. The latter argument prevailed, 
and French privateering got a much-needed stimulus at a crucial 
moment.90 
Marseilles also suffered another setback in 1704, this time at the 
hands of its sometime ally, Lyons. When Colbert established a Le­
vant trading company in 1670 to stimulate French trade with the 
Near East, one of the privileges that he gave it was a transit from 
Marseilles to Geneva, by way of the Rhone River and Lyons.91 
After the Levant Company expired a few years later, another com­
pany, under a Sieur Magy and associates, purchased the transit and 
retained it until 1704. By means of this transit, Marseilles found a 
rich market for its Levant goods in Switzerland and Germany. 
In 1704, however, Anisson, of Lyons, complained that this right 
of free passage cheated his city of the customs duties that it 
normally collected on all goods passing through its territory.92 
Lyons merchants, he expostulated, were already suffering from 
the decline of their fairs, and the Marseilles transit gave that city's 
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traders an even greater advantage over them. Before 1670 many of 
Lyons's merchants had participated in the sale of Levant goods, 
purchasing them in Marseilles and transporting them to Germany 
and to various French provinces. Since the establishment of the 
free passage, they had been unable to compete with Marseilles 
merchants in this trade. Furthermore, Anisson claimed, this transit 
caused the king to lose much money. Once Levant goods reached 
Geneva, he said, many of them were shipped fraudulently back 
into France, where they were sold. Anisson asserted that if Lyons 
merchants could enter this trade once again, they would transport 
the merchandise directly to the French provinces, paying many 
royal customs duties along the way. 
Mathieu Fabre argued vehemently that Marseilles needed the 
free passage in order to assure itself of the rich Genevan and 
German market for Levantine goods. Ultimately, however, his 
pleas were only partially successful. The arret issued on 15 October 
1704 abolished the Rhone transit?2* but Marseilles' shipments up 
the river to Geneva continued to be exempted from about half of 
the full amount of the tolls and duties ordinarily collected on the 
river and at Lyons. 
In addition to these mild defeats, in 1712 Marseilles lost a 
quarrel with the East India Company. In 1710 this company, along 
with some private individuals, had begun to bring coffee to France 
from Moka (Mocha, on the Red Sea, in present-day Yemen). This 
coffee was transported to Nantes and other ports by way of the 
ocean. The Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles was quick to decry 
this as a threat to the coffee that it imported from Egypt. Mathieu 
Fabre declared in the Council of Commerce that Moka was a part 
of the Levant and that therefore its coffee was subject to 20 percent 
duty. The other deputies retorted that Moka was not in the Levant 
but belonged properly to the trading concessions of the East India 
Company. The Council of Commerce at length decided in favor of 
the Atlantic ports, but it assured Marseilles that its interests would 
not be hurt.94 The Moka coffee would always be more expensive 
than that of Egypt, said the council, because of the high costs of 
shipping it around the continent of Africa. The council likewise 
stated that the Egyptian coffee was far superior in taste and would 
always be preferred by the vast majority of the public over the 
coffee brought by the East India Company. 
Marseilles had better luck in defending its interests in other areas 
during this period. It effectively rebuffed the repeated attempts of 
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Sete and Toulon to enter the Levant trade.95 Working with the 
deputy of Lyons, the Marseilles deputy similarly quashed proposals 
of the deputies from Bayonne, Saint-Malo, and Le Havre that their 
cities be granted free-port status. Marseilles and Lyons feared that 
any increase in the entrepot trade of these cities would hurt their 
own commerce and industries.96 
In 1714 Marseilles was able to avenge its 1712 defeat by the East 
India Company; this time the question concerned the importation 
by that company of silk thread from the Orient. Once again 
Mathieu Fabre allied with Jean Anisson in waging his fight. The 
entire episode was sparked in October 1713 when the Grand-
Dauphin, a ship belonging to the company, arrived in Saint-Malo 
from China with a cargo including more than 30,000 pounds of 
silk.97 Fabre and Anisson pointed to the various laws dating all the 
way back to 1669 that stipulated that silk could enter France only 
through Marseilles and Pont-de-Beauvoisin, from there to be 
transported through Lyons. According to Fabre and Anisson, these 
laws were well founded. The two deputies contended that by re­
stricting the importation of silk to two cities it was easier for duties 
to be collected on them and for frauds to be controlled, but their 
principal argument concerned the protection of Lyons's famed silk 
manufactures. Thanks largely to Colbert's encouragements, these 
manufactures had attained a high degree of perfection and great 
popularity, both within and without the country. In the eyes of the 
deputies of Lyons and Marseilles, they therefore merited special 
favors. These manufactures could not withstand competition from 
other areas that received raw silk from the Atlantic ports. Each 
quintal (100 kilograms) of raw silk going from Marseilles to Lyons 
was charged more than 93 livres in various internal duties, whereas 
silk entering Atlantic ports was charged on the average only 16 
livres per quintal before reaching the manufactures of Tours and 
other areas. The Lyons silk industry thus would not be able to 
compete and would soon be ruined. 
The East India Company obtained the support of most of the 
deputies and commissaires in the Council of Commerce. They felt 
that the company had the right to bring raw silk to France, and 
they also hoped that this would help silk manufacturers in areas 
such as Champagne and Tours hold their own against those in 
Lyons and Languedoc.98 
Controller General Desmaretz, however, sympathized with 
Lyons and Marseilles, and he vetoed the council's decision.99 In 
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part this was because Desmaretz was angered by the East India 
Company's attempt in 1713 to export French workers to China, 
where they could teach the Chinese to manufacture finished silks 
in the French manner. The company had hoped to sell these fin­
ished silks in France, but exporting a nation's workers and encour­
aging foreign industries were sacrilegious to mercantilist policies. 
When news of the company's plans reached Paris, the crown set up 
a huge manhunt, finally capturing the workers in Saint-Malo be­
fore they could embark. 10° At least one of the company's directors 
was imprisoned as a result of the affair. This episode, along with 
Anisson's arguments on behalf of Lyons's silk industry, led Des­
maretz to decide against the company. An arret issued on 13 March 
1714 reaffirmed the monopoly of Marseilles, Pont-de-Beauvoisin, 
and Lyons on the importation of silk into France.101 
OTHER LOCAL PRIVILEGES 
Although the conflicts that posed the Atlantic deputies against 
those of Marseilles and Lyons were the most prominent during this 
period in the Council of Commerce, there were others that were no 
less harsh. At regular intervals, for example, the cities of Dunkirk, 
Saint-Malo, and Bayonne requested the right to trade directly with 
the French West Indies. This subject had come up in the general 
memoirs of 1700-1701, and it remained a sticky issue throughout 
the eighteenth century. The only cities that could trade directly 
with the islands were Rouen, Dieppe, La Rochelle, Bordeaux, 
Nantes, and Marseilles. Merchants from other ports who wished to 
trade with the islands first had to ship their goods to one of these 
six cities. All returning ships likewise first had to put in at these 
ports, where their cargoes were examined and marked. The net 
result of this situation was that a few cities were able to monopolize 
the rich colonial trade. The crown had adopted this system in order 
to prevent fraud. Rouen, Dieppe, and La Rochelle were located 
within the cinq grossesfermes, and thus the farmers general could be 
sure to collect the necessary duties on goods entering France at. 
these points. Bordeaux, Nantes, and Marseilles were not in the cinq 
grosses fermes, but they were ringed by a tight network of farmers' 
bureaus, which made smuggling difficult. 
Although the deputies of Nantes, Bordeaux, and La Rochelle 
staunchly defended "liberty of trade" whenever their own cities 
stood to gain by it, they were quick to point up the necessity of 
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preserving their monopoly of trade with the Antilles. If all cities 
could deal directly with the islands, they warned, then the revenues 
of the king would surely suffer; the farmers general would not be 
able to guard the entire coastline of France to prevent the fraudu­
lent entry of goods into the country. This argument prevailed, and 
those cities excluded from the West Indies trade had to content 
themselves with other areas of commerce—at least for the period 
under review here.102 
Although the six cities that shared the Caribbean trade united in 
keeping other cities out of it, these cities themselves split over an­
other issue. The most profitable aspect of the West Indies trade 
was the sale of sugar, which was brought to France and refined in 
these six cities as well as in a few others.103 Every sugar refinery 
received certain favors, such as a remission of most export duties 
for refined sugar sold to other countries. But by the final decade of 
the seventeenth century, Bordeaux's refineries had clearly sur­
passed all others in France, and that city was able to obtain special 
privileges for its sugars. 
This naturally led other cities to be jealous. In December 1704 
the deputies of La Rochelle and Nantes began to complain about 
the arret of 11 August 1699. This arret permitted Bordeaux's sugar 
refiners to transport their product to Valence, Lyons, Franche-
Comte, and Alsace without paying the greater part of the internal 
tolls that normally would have been levied on them. La Rochelle 
and Nantes demanded that this privilege be extended to their 
sugars also. Despite the protests of Bordeaux's deputy, the Council 
of Commerce sided with the other deputies, and their request was 
granted in 1705.104 
In 1706 Mathieu Fabre insisted that Marseilles's sugar refinery 
also was suffering as a result of the extensive favors granted to the 
refineries in Bordeaux. An arret of 30 June 1671 had granted 
Bordeaux's refined sugar a virtually duty-free transit all the way to 
Marseilles, from which it could be transported to Italy and other 
points in the Mediterranean. Fabre contended that this was unfair 
competition for the relatively new and inexperienced refinery situ­
ated in Marseilles. Fe'nellon (Bordeaux) countered this by pointing 
out that Marseilles was already blessed with a tremendous geo­
graphical advantage. Early in 1707 the sugar refiners of Sete and 
Nimes joined Marseilles in arguing that at the very least the re­
fineries in these cities should share some of the tax exemptions 
enjoyed by those in Dieppe, Rouen, La Rochelle, and Bordeaux.l05 
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Passions rose so high over the issue that on 7 January 1707 
Fenellon and Mathieu Fabre very nearly came to blows over it. The 
pugnacious Fabre later described the incident in a letter to the 
Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles.106 He reported that Fenel­
lon, a man "vain and violent," had submitted to the council a 
memoir that spoke of "the ignorance of all the merchants of Mar­
seilles." Filled with "just resentment," Fabre rose to speak and de­
plored the selfish motives of the Bordeaux deputy. Turning to 
Fenellon, Fabre exclaimed: "The very least of our merchants is a 
more able man than you." He then declared that the only thing that 
Fenellon knew anything about was barrel staves, which were so 
essential for Bordeaux's wine industry. Fenellon thereupon cried 
out that his honor had been sullied, and the two men rushed upon 
each other. The other members of the council quickly separated 
them, and Daguesseau forced the two men to shake hands. Upset 
by this breach in the decorum of the council, Daguesseau ad­
journed the meeting. Fabre reported triumphantly to the chamber 
in Marseilles, however, that he succeeded in getting Fenellon's of­
fensive phrase scratched from the memoir. One can be sure that 
when Fenellon related this incident to his chamber of commerce it 
was he, not Fabre, who was the hero. In the long run, Bordeaux 
preserved her privileges but the Mediterranean refineries attained 
additional favors and also were able to prosper in the eighteenth 
century. 
There were numerous other conflicts between the cities repre­
sented in the council, but none of them was as violent or as recur­
rent as those mentioned above. As a general rule, deputies from 
agricultural or commercial areas (e.g., Bordeaux, La Rochelle, 
Saint-Malo) were less concerned about protecting French textiles 
than were deputies from areas with strong manufacturing interests 
(Rouen, Lyons, Languedoc). Deputies from areas not in the cinq 
grosses fermes (Nantes, Marseilles) opposed the efforts of other 
deputies (Anisson, Mesnager, Fenellon) to bring about an internal 
customs union.107 
Such disputes were not, of course, limited to the cities repre­
sented in the council. Other cities and regions voiced their opinions 
through memoirs that merchants, magistrates, and intendants sent 
to the council or to the royal ministers. Thus, for example, 
throughout the early years of the century Bordeaux carried on a 
debate with the provinces of Alsace, Normandy, and Champagne 
over the question of brandy production.l08 Bordeaux insisted on 
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upholding the various existing laws requiring that brandy be pro­
duced solely from wine. If these laws were not enforced, said 
Bordeaux's deputy, the reputation of French brandies would 
suffer both within France and abroad. Merchants from the other 
provinces maintained that equally good brandies could be ex­
tracted from such things as honey, apple cider, or grape skins (marc 
de raisin). The Council of Commerce upheld the bans against 
brandy made from apple cider and honey, but in 1712 and 1713 it 
granted permission for its manufacture from grape skins at 
Rheims, Besangon, and Metz. The council stipulated, however, that 
the brandy produced in these three areas had to be consumed 
entirely in the provinces of Champagne and Franche-Comte' and 
the territory of Metz.109 
Despite the recurrent lack of agreement among the deputies of 
trade, it would be wrong to portray the council as merely a soapbox 
for the airing of local grievances and the defense of regional privi­
leges. The issues on which the deputies quarreled were in a clear 
minority. Also, the deputies sometimes disagreed simply because 
they judged matters differently and not because they were defend­
ing opposing local interests. For the most part, they were able to 
conciliate private concerns with the general good, and on many 
occasions they sounded like Colbert as they rebuked those mer­
chants who were always out for their own selfish profit, regardless 
of le Men public.110 Even the local chambers of commerce and 
juridictions consulates were often on friendly terms with each other, 
exchanging information and addressing one another as "Messieurs 
nos chers confreres."111 
In this respect one might cite the way in which the deputies 
regarded Samuel Bernard, one of the two deputies from Paris. 
Bernard was a director of the tobacco and East India companies, as 
well as a director or partner in several other exclusive or privileged 
trading ventures. His commercial and financial interests made him 
a natural foe of many of the views of the other deputies, yet all 
available evidence shows that he was one of the hardest working 
and most respected among them. 
In November 1708 Bernard wished to retire from the council, 
claiming that it took too much time away from his other interests. 
As soon as the other deputies who were in Paris at that moment 
heard of this, they wrote to Controller General Desmaretz and 
asked him to persuade Bernard to remain on the council. Nothing 
could be worse for their plans to reestablish commerce, they said, 
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than Bernard's departure. They lauded him as a man of "prob­
ity, . . . exactitude, . . . disinterestedness, . . . firmness .  . . and cour-
age.'11- His experience, his talents, his reputation, and his inter­
national contacts made him indispensable, they affirmed. Whether 
Desmaretz actually interceded is not known, but Bernard did, 
however, remain on the council another twelve years. 
From all the above, one might conclude several things. To en­
sure the election of the deputies of trade and to guarantee that 
important commercial centers would have an influence on royal 
economic policies, the crown pushed for the establishment of local 
chambers of commerce. The war, local squabbles over rank, and 
other factors frequently prevented the quick formation of such 
bodies. Even so, by 1715a total of eight existed in France; later in 
the century, several more would be created. Although the crown 
exercised constant surveillance over the chambers as well as over 
the juridictions consulaires, these local institutions were nevertheless 
surprisingly active and independent. They maintained dose con­
nections with their deputies in Paris. To a greater extent than the 
government had wished, the cities represented in the Council of 
Commerce used that body to carry on regional rivalries rather than 
to pursue national goals, but to a large degree the crown did 
achieve its aim. It had broadened the decision-making machinery, 
both on the local and the national levels. It had found a way to 
coordinate, and sometimes to conciliate, the desires of businessmen 
from all over the country. And finally it had created a two-wav 
channel by which it could obtain the information it required to 
administer the economy and by which merchants could voice their 
needs and grievances. 
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PART TWO 
THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL 

ENEMY AND NEUTRAL TRADE 
The question of trade with enemy and neutral powers was the topic 
that occupied more time than any other in the Council of Com­
merce during the War of the Spanish Succession.l This subject has 
already received excellent treatment from Sir George Clark and J. 
S. Bromley,2 but both of these historians have left largely unex­
plored an important dimension of this question: namely, the devel­
opment of French trading policies during this period. Clark has 
concentrated mostly on English and Dutch policies, and Bromley 
has generally focused upon the impact that privateering had dur­
ing each war. This chapter therefore will deal with French policies 
and the role of the Council of Commerce in their formulation.3 
PREPARATIONS FOR A WAR ON TRADE 
If the War of the League of Augsburg can be described as a war 
against French trade,4 then the War of the Spanish Succession can 
be termed—from the French viewpoint—a war on allied trade. The 
Council of Commerce viewed this war as an opportunity to strike at 
the European and worldwide commerce of France's chief competi­
tors, England and Holland. In keeping with this aim, the council 
worked to establish proper guidelines for French economic rela­
tions with other nations. It also did all that it could to encourage the 
French guerre de course. 
Trade wars were not new to Europe,5 but two factors helped 
magnify their severity during this period. First of all, thefinal two 
wars of Louis XIV's reign witnessed the apogee of the guerre de 
course, which by definition was a war on enemy commerce. This was 
the "glorious" age of Jean Bart, Guay-Trouin, and a host of other 
freebooting buccaneers stationed in ports all over Europe. Second, 
the quest of European powers for colonies and for a larger share of 
international trade led almost inevitably to attacks on enemy com­
merce. 
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Trading with the adversary during wartime had been a long-
standing custom among European merchants. During the War of 
the League of Augsburg and the War of the Spanish Succession, 
however, the belligerent powers endeavored to cut off or severely 
limit this traffic. Each side also sought to limit the commerce of 
neutrals with the other camp. 
The policies that became clear during the succession war were 
adumbrated during its predecessor in the 1690s. In 1689 England 
and the Dutch Republic signed a series of four agreements, one of 
which called for a complete embargo on trade with France. It was 
to apply to neutrals as well as allies.6 This had been insisted on by 
Louis XIV's inveterate opponent William III. 
Neither the Dutch nor the Spanish nor the Scandinavian neu­
trals were happy with this interdiction. Merchants from all nations 
(including England) continued to deal with France throughout the 
war, often surreptitiously. Allied privateers tried to coerce Den­
mark and Sweden into obeying the convention, despite the vehe­
ment protests of these neutral powers, and hundreds of Scan­
dinavian vessels were brought to English and Dutch ports. The 
neutrals very nearly came to blows with the Atlantic powers over 
the issue.7 Gradually England and Holland gave in, and by 1693 
they admitted the right of neutrals to trade with France in anything 
but contraband.8 
In addition to these measures, the allies, of course, also attacked 
French trade directly. Clark has estimated that between 900 and 
1,000 French ships were captured by the enemy during the war. 
This was not enough to cripple French trade, but it was sufficient 
to inflict serious damage.9 As much as was possible, the allies tried 
to boycott French merchandise throughout the war.10 
The French policy at the beginning of this war was much less 
severe than that of its adversaries. Louis XIV did not atfirst wish to 
cut off all trade with the enemy, nor did he wish to press neutrals to 
do so. Only as the sea powers began to impinge on neutral com­
merce did France itself decide to cut off trade with the enemy and 
to attack illicit trade by neutrals. When France switched eventually 
from a guerre d'escadre to a guerre de course, French privateers pro­
ceeded to inflict heavy losses on allied shipping. It is possible that 
by the end of the war in 1697 French corsairs may have done more 
damage to allied commerce than was done to French trade by 
enemy ships.11 
In the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) and the subsequent tarift of 
1699, France and the United Provinces agreed to a modus vivendi. 
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The Dutch were guaranteed that their traders would receive all the 
same privileges in French ports that Frenchmen themselves re­
ceived, and the heavily protective tariff of 1667 was lowered for 
Dutch goods. France, in return, was able to reestablish contact with 
the Dutch carriers, on which it depended heavily for the export of 
many of its manufactures and agricultural products. The two na­
tions likewise agreed, in the event of future wars, to the principle of 
"free ship, free goods." This ensured the rights of neutral ships to 
trade with belligerents of either side. 
There was no such commercial agreement between France and 
England in 1697, and the two nations returned to the mutually 
hostile trade restrictions that had soured relations between them 
since the 1660s. Each side declared that its cross-channel competi­
tor had been the first to adopt a hostile trade posture.l2 
The situation was such that by 1700 a series of outright prohibi­
tions or exorbitant customs duties prevented English woolens and 
other manufactures from entering France. England, on the other 
hand, had outlawed the export of raw wool from any of the British 
Isles, not wishing to contribute to her competitor's manufactures. 
Furthermore, most French textiles were prohibited in England. 
What especially irked the French were the seemingly outrageous 
duties placed on their wine in England: by the year 1693 for a 
gallon imperial (about 4.5 liters) of Bordeaux one had to pay more 
than 19 shillings in duties, roughly twice as much as for wine from 
other countries. In addition, French goods could enter England 
only on English or neutral ships, and French merchants had to 
conduct all their business through English brokers13 
The need to correct this situation was clearly recognized in 
France. In 1699-1700 Louis XIV's ambassador to England, the 
comte de Tallard, worked feverishly, but unsuccessfully, to negoti­
ate a trade agreement with William III.14 Several of the deputies of 
commerce expressed the hope in their general memoirs that a 
treaty of commerce might be signed with England. 
But nothing of that sort came about. Soon after the Council of 
Commerce was created, the long-anticipated death of King Carlos 
II of Spain occurred. Although war was not officially declared until 
May 1702, the eighteen months that elapsed between the mon-
arch's death and the commencement of hostilities were filled with 
diplomatic and military maneuvering that foreshadowed the up­
coming struggle. That left little time or desire to think about trade 
agreements. 
There can be no doubt about the fact that the Council of Com­
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merce was the principal organ charged with determining French 
trade policies during this war. On a few occasions, as will be noted, 
the royal ministers departed from the council's advice. The crown 
neverthelsss relied chiefly on this body to examine French policies 
and to determine a proper course of action. 
When the war erupted, trade with every European nation was 
put on a different footing. The process of deciding which trades 
were permissible and which were not was complex. The council 
had to decide whether certain goods were needed in France (for 
manufactures or shipbuilding) and whether other goods could be 
permitted to leave France. It also had to decide what forms pass­
ports would take and to whom they would be granted.15 The thou­
sands of requests that poured into the government from foreign 
and native merchants to bring goods to France were generally for­
warded to the council for consideration.16 
The commissaries and deputies drew up lists {etats) enumerating 
all the goods that each nation was permitted to send to France. The 
controller general then ratified these etats, either by letter or by 
arret. No merchandise could be imported from abroad unless it was 
included on these lists. 
In addition to these lists, merchandise coming from enemy states 
likewise required a special permit or passport before entering 
France. Each passport for goods entering by sea had to be signed 
by three people: the admiral of France (the comte de Toulouse), 
the secretary of state for the navy, and the controller general.17 
The Council of Commerce also determined the policies that were 
followed for overland trade. In such cases the controller general 
merely wrote to the farmers general and informed them that a 
particular merchant had permission to import certain items into 
France through a specified customs bureau on the frontiers of the 
country.18 
TRADE WITH ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND IRELAND 
The Council of Commerce assumed an antagonistic position 
toward English trade even before the war began. On 6 September 
1701 the crown issued an arret that was openly hostile to English 
l9commerce.  It absolutely forbade the importation from England 
of all textile products of any kind, as well as alcoholic beverages, 
tin, lead, drugs, spices, and hardware products. In addition, import 
duties were sharply raised on thirteen other articles that England 
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often sent to France (alum, glass bottles, salted meat, coal, dried 
cod, and others). The arret struck at the English carrying trade by 
declaring that henceforth English merchants could bring to France 
only goods that were of English production or manufacture. Fi­
nally, all English merchants now had to go through French 
brokers. All these provisions applied equally to Scotland and 
Ireland also. 
Sir George Clark explains the provenance of this arret as follows: 
. . . Louis XIV prohibited the importation of British manufactured 
articles, not, it seems, with the intention of hastening the war, but in 
order to keep the English traders out of war by giving them a foretaste 
of what they might expect. His action had the contrary effect. It made 
English opinion more hostile.20 
Clark is certainly correct about the British reaction to the French 
arret, but along with others he has overlooked the role of the Coun­
cil of Commerce in formulating it. Late in June 1701 Louis XIV 
requested that the council examine the question of French-English 
21commerce.  He wanted to know how France should respond to 
the exorbitant duties and the prohibitions that England had im­
posed on French products. The matter was discussed briefly in the 
council and then referred to the deputies for further study. 
In the meeting of 8 July 1701, the deputies gave their re­
22sponse.  Of the eleven deputies present, all desired a treaty of 
commerce with England, but only four urged constraint on the 
part of France.23 These four argued that many English measures 
had been adopted only in reprisal against earlier French actions, 
and they suggested that France unilaterally reduce its tariffs on 
English goods, in the hope that England might do the same. In this 
more conciliatory atmosphere, they argued, a treaty of commerce 
would more likely be possible. The seven other deputies, however, 
pushed for even harsher regulations against English goods. They 
stubbornly insisted that only by assuming a hard line would France 
be able to force England into signing a treaty of commerce, and 
they recommended a prohibition against all English manufactures. 
The council accepted the majority view of the deputies, and the 
arret proclaiming this policy was, after a brief delay, issued on 6 
September. One knows from hindsight, of course, that the policy 
advocated by most of the deputies did not succeed. Rather than 
forcing England into submission, it only alienated British opinion. 
The new law remained the basis for French commercial relations 
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with England until the Eden Treaty of 1786 liberalized trade be­
tween the two nations. From 1701 until that date, such trade as 
there was between the two countries was mostly carried out ille­
gally. 
After war was officially proclaimed in May 1702, England pro­
hibited all trade with France. Anyone from England, Scotland, or 
Ireland who was caught trading with France was subject to the 
death penalty. England also endeavored to make its chief ally, the 
Dutch Republic, agree to cut off all trade with the enemy. Under 
strong urging from English ministers, the Dutch reluctantly agreed 
to such a ban. It went into effect on 1 June 1703 and lasted one 
year. Dutch merchants disliked it from the very beginning. Their 
carrying trade depended heavily on the voluminous quantity of 
goods that Dutch vessels normally transported to and from France, 
and their government therefore refused to renew the ban when it 
expired in 1704. Thereafter England was thus alone in its sever­
ance of trade with France.24 
These measures had their counterparts in France. On 11 April 
1702 the crown issued an arret that prohibited the entry into France 
of any manufactures from England, Scotland, and Ireland.25 In 
response to the Anglo-Dutch agreement of June 1703, France pro­
hibited all trade with enemy powers through an arret of 28 August 
1703.26 This marked a high point in the French attempt to wage an 
all-out war against its adversaries. 
Although the deputies of trade and commissaries had strongly 
supported the first of these two arrets, only reluctantly did they 
approve of the second.27 They realized that France was not self-
sufficient and depended on foreign trade. The Anglo-Dutch con­
vention of June 1703, however, finally spurred them to adopt a 
similarly harsh strategy. The new arret ended trade not only with 
England and its dependencies but with Holland and Germany as 
well. 
Soon after the arret was issued, its impracticality became clear: 
French privateers demanded the right to sell in France certain 
goods found on English prize ships.28 In order to promote tlys 
French guerre de course, the Council of Commerce therefore de­
cided to permit the entry into France of lead, tin, cod, and other 
nonmanufactured products found in English prize vessels. Any 
English manufactures, however, still had to be reshipped out of 
France. 
In other ways it also became clear that France could not do away 
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completely with trade with the enemy. For example, France had 
come to rely on Scotland and Ireland for various foodstuffs. The 
salted meat imported from Ireland was sent to feed colonists in the 
West Indies, and thousands of the menupeuple in France depended 
on the relatively inexpensive butter imported from both Scotland 
and Ireland. These reasons made trade with these two English 
dependencies a necessity. Also, there was the obvious political ad­
vantage of further weakening Scottish and Irish allegiance to 
England by encouraging them to break English law through trad­
ing with France. Lastly, both areas would provide an outlet for 
French products; French wines might even be able to enter 
England through these two channels. 
Because of these considerations, the Council of Commerce de­
cided that passports should be granted for trading with both 
Ireland and Scotland. In 1702 there had already begun a brisk 
trade with Ireland, despite the recent English prohibition of trade 
with France. The council had decided at that time to limit Irish 
imports to salted meat and butter.29 Notwithstanding the arret of 
28 August 1703, the council let it be known that it was willing to 
reopen trade with both of the English dependencies, and soon it 
was flooded with requests for passports from Frenchmen and from 
expatriate Irish and Scottish merchants residing in such ports as 
Rouen, Nantes, and Saint-Malo. 
The commissaires and deputies were especially sympathetic to 
Ireland. There were thousands of Irish refugees in French ports. 
These people were all Catholics, and, what is more, they supported 
the claims of the Pretender, James III, then residing in France.30 
At first the council was very selective about the Scottish and Irish 
articles that could enter France. It did not wish to permit mer­
chants from these two areas to send to France any products that it 
suspected came originally from England. Thus, for example, 
throughout the war it refused to permit the importation of lead 
from Ireland, for Ireland produced no lead.31 Beginning in 1705, 
however, the council did permit the entry of 360 tons of lead a year 
from Scotland. It judged that this was about how much exportable 
lead Scotland produced in a year; anything in excess of this prob­
ably would have come from England.32 
Because of the pinch of war, the list of'Scottish and Irish goods 
permitted in France was gradually expanded, but the council al­
ways insisted that the merchant or merchants who bought these 
goods be obligated to take out of France an amount of French 
114 The French Council of Commerce, 1700-1715 
goods of equal or greater value. This was part of the council's 
program of "equivalent," about which more will be said later. By 
1710 Ireland could export to France ten varieties of goods, includ­
ing butter, tallow, salted meat, wool, animal skins, leather, and 
cheese.33 Scotland by that time could bring lead, hobnails, wool, 
coal, and salted salmon.34 Although trade with these two countries 
was not up to prewar levels, nevertheless several hundred pass­
ports were granted to their vessels throughout the war.35 
Long before 1710 the Council of Commerce also found it neces­
sary to relent somewhat on its outright prohibition of trade with 
England. There were hundreds of English merchants and shippers 
willing to run the risks of trading illicitly with France, and France 
undeniably needed several English products. In the early years of 
the war, the Council of Commerce refused to grant passports to 
Englishmen themselves; wool and the few drugs used in preparing 
textiles whose importation was permitted had to enter in Irish and 
Scottish ships. But late in 1706 the council decided to permit direct 
contacts with Englishmen. In November of that year, Jerome de 
Pontchartrain forwarded to the council a letter from the inspector 
general of the navy at Bordeaux.36 The man who held this office, 
Lombard, had received a letter from a London merchant request­
ing a passport to bring some merchandise to France; in return the 
merchant proposed to take a cargo of wine back to England* The 
council debated the issue and decided that such passports should 
indeed be granted.37 
The council's decision, however, ran into the stiff opposition of 
the secretary of state for the navy, who opposed it on grounds of 
principle. He felt that the granting of passports to subjects of 
Queen Anne would be "an open recognition" of the legitimate rule 
of "the Princess of Denmark," as the French government called 
her.38 
Chamillart, on the other hand, supported the contention of the 
Council of Commerce that such passports to Englishmen could 
only be beneficial to France. The issue was bruited about for sev­
eral more months. Finally, in the spring of 1707, Pontchartrain 
relented, and limited numbers of such passports began to be 
issued.39 
From this time through 1710, English vessels were thus permit­
ted to bring to France wool and limited quantities of dyeing ma­
terials. English ships were especially encouraged to come to France 
empty, which they did in large numbers. In this way France did not 
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need to worry about the entry of prohibited goods, but it could 
send wines and other goods to England. English and Channel 
Islands vessels that returned French prisoners of war to their 
native country were also encouraged to take out French prod-
ucts.40 Eventually, lead and some spices were also permitted to 
enter from England. Of course, since England still prohibited com­
merce with France, these traders received harsh punishments from 
their own government if they were caught. 
In 1709 French Flanders requested permission to add coal to the 
list of goods permitted to enter from England. The Council of 
Commerce opposed the proposal. The deputies wished to maintain 
as hard a line as possible against England, and they argued that 
Flanders could obtain enough coal from elsewhere in France. 
Desmaretz, however, overrode the council's proposal. The harsh 
winter of 1709 had caused a depletion of wood supplies used in 
Flemish brasseries, and in order to keep workers occupied the con­
troller general decided to permit the importation of coal.41 
The French position on English trade was drastically liberalized 
in December 1710. Because this development was directly tied to 
French policies toward the Dutch, however, it is better to delay its 
discussion. 
TRADE WITH HOLLAND 
If the Council of Commerce wished to limit trade with England 
during the war, in the hope that somehow this would damage the 
English economy, it wished, literally, to destroy Dutch commerce 
and navigation. Its desire to humble les hollandois was so strong that 
it influenced French trade policies in general. 
As noted earlier, the deputies' general memoirs of 1700-1701 
reflected their jealousy of Dutch merchants. The French feared 
that the skillful, economical traders from the provinces of Holland 
and Zeeland would soon be the "sole masters" of all European 
seaborne commerce.42 Time and again during the War of the 
Spanish Succession, the deputies railed against the Dutch in a 
fashion that would have warmed Colbert's heart. Echoing Louis 
XIV's own sentiments, they frequently denounced the Dutch as ces 
republicains,^ a term that did not lose its derogatory connotation in 
France until much later in the eighteenth century. 
Although French enmity toward Dutch commerce remained 
constant during the war, the actual policy toward trade with 
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Holland shifted several times from 1702 to 1713. Throughout 
1702 and 1703 the Council of Commerce discussed possible stances 
to be taken with regard to the Dutch. Much of this discussion 
stemmed from a dispute that had been stirring since 1700 between 
the deputy of Nantes and the other deputies from Atlantic ports.44 
Although Descasaux du Hallay had railed against the "pernicious 
designs" of the Dutch in his general memoir, he soon after soft­
ened his tone.45 Nantes desperately needed Dutch vessels to carry 
its wine and other agricultural products to the North, and there­
fore it did not wish to alienate the little republic too much. The 
deputy feared that French shippers would never be able to oust the 
Dutch from French trade; they were much too economical and 
highly skilled as seamen, needing far smaller crews to man their 
ships than did Frenchmen. He complained that Dutch shippers 
"live on their ships with their wives and their children."46 Nearly 
every one of them was thereby born a natural sailor. 
Descasaux du Hallay did agree, however, that ships from Den­
mark, Sweden and Hamburg should be exempted from the 50-
sous-per-ton duty.47 This exemption would encourage vessels 
from these nations to seek French goods in France rather than in 
the great entrepot of Amsterdam. 
The other Atlantic deputies—led by Piecourt (Dunkirk) and 
Mesnager (Rouen)—argued for a harsher stand against the United 
Provinces.48 Dutch ships already controlled five-sixths of France's 
trade, they expostulated, and unless something was done soon, 
they would have all of it. The deputies contended not only that the 
exemption from the 50-sous duty should be extended to all nations 
and cities of the North, but that the Dutch should be prohibited 
from bringing to France anything that was not of their own culti­
vation or manufacture. This, they believed, would drive a nail right 
into the heart of the Dutch carrying trade. 
During the first year and a half of the war, the number of Dutch 
ships entering French ports certainly decreased from prewar 
levels; but decisions as to what merchandise they could bring were 
made on a purely ad hoc basis. In order to protect the French 
fishing industry and French manufactures, the Dutch were pro­
hibited from bringing such goods into the country.49 Otherwise, 
passports were granted to the Dutch on a fairly regular basis. 
There were, however, other forces pushing the Council of Com­
merce to adopt a harsher policy toward Holland. Many private 
individuals bombarded Chamillart and Jerome de Pontchartrain 
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with memoirs on ways to destroy the Dutch economy, and the royal 
ministers quickly forwarded these proposals to the council. The 
two chief exponents of this total-war strategy were Jean Pottier de 
la Hestroye50 and Denis Faulconnier.51 Both men were from 
Dunkirk, and both deplored the stranglehold that the Dutch had 
acquired over French commerce. Pottier de la Hestroye limited his 
proposals to ways in which Dutch imports into France and the 
Dutch carrying trade could be curtailed without discouraging 
Holland from taking out French wines and manufactures. 
Faulconnier, however, was a fanatic patriot whose memoirs vir­
tually dripped with venomous schemes for destroying the mer­
chant republic. Chamillart and Pontchartrain each showed interest 
in Faulconnier's ideas, and they encouraged the council to study 
them carefully. Faulconnier recommended, among other things, 
that all passports to the Dutch be revoked, that Spain be en­
couraged likewise to end all commerce with the republic, and that a 
host of favors be extended to neutral vessels to encourage them to 
come directly to France.52 
In May 1702 the deputies of commerce voiced objections to these 
plans.53 They considered them impracticable and even dangerous. 
There was no guarantee that Spain would go along with them, and 
it seemed unlikely that neutral vessels would be able, on such short 
notice, to muster enough ships to take out France's vast stores of 
wines, brandies, and other goods traditionally exported to north­
ern Europe. 
Chamillart and Pontchartrain, however, were clearly sympa­
thetic to Faulconnier's views, and at least two provincial intendants 
also agreed that drastic measures were imperative.54 The Anglo-
Dutch convention of 1 June 1703 provided the final push that was 
needed to convince the council to adopt a strong position against 
enemy trade, and it responded by drafting the arret of 28 August 
1703, already mentioned above. By its terms France vowed to end 
all commerce with enemy powers. Together with the Anglo-Dutch 
convention, the arret marked a significant escalation of the concept 
of warfare. Virtually every major war thereafter would include 
attempts to destroy not merely the armies of an enemy prince but 
entire national economies as well. 
Although concessions would later have to be granted to the 
Dutch, the arret nevertheless gave France a brief opportunity to 
end Holland's domination of the European carrying trade. The 
Council of Commerce sought to do this by promoting direct con­
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tacts between nonbelligerent nations and France. We must now 
therefore turn to the overtures that France made to neutral com­
merce. 
ENCOURAGEMENT TO NEUTRALS 
In their general memoirs, the deputies already had expressed 
the hope that direct commerce might be fostered between France 
and northern Europe. In these memoirs and in their discussions 
during the next couple of years, the deputies especially pushed for 
removal of the 50-sous-per-ton duty on merchandise entering in 
foreign ships.55 The Dutch were already exempted from this tax, 
and this gave their ships an unfair advantage over the ships of 
other nations. Most of the deputies likewise recommended that 
merchandise from the North be permitted to enter France only if it 
had not been entreposee anywhere else. In other words, the deputies 
wanted these countries to bring their goods directly to France, not 
to Amsterdam, whence they would be reshipped to France.56 In 
April 1702 Heron, of La Rochelle, even suggested that a special 
trading company be created for commerce with the Baltic lands, 
but nothing came of the proposal.57 
No decision was made concerning Swedish and Danish com­
merce until the summer of 1703—at the moment when the general 
prohibition of trade with the enemy was being deliberated. This 
prohibition was finally approved only because the council believed 
that neutral vessels could supply France with her needs and would 
be able to take out her excess wines, brandies, salt, and other mer­
chandise. Through the arret of 14 June 1703, the council estab­
lished a list of goods that Danish or Swedish ships could bring to 
France. This list included wood for building ships, barrel staves, 
tar, hemp, and copper. What is more, ships bringing these goods 
were exempted from paying the duty of 50 sous per ton. The list 
was expanded by the arrets of 19 June 1703, 1 September 1703, and 
4 March 1704.58 For those goods that France most desperately 
needed, the exemption from the 5(3-sous tax continued to be 
granted, although the other ordinary import duties had to be paid. 
Goods that were less urgently needed remained subject to the 50­
sous tax. These included such things as wool, amber, starch, cere­
als, azure, white lead {ceruse), comes a lanterne, animal skins, feath­
ers, salmon, and small hand tools. In the years after 1704, a few 
other items were added to the list permitted from these two coun­
tries. 
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The Council of Commerce was always careful to restrict this list 
to merchandise that it was sure were products of the North. Other­
wise it would have been easy for the Dutch to send things into 
France on Swedish and Danish ships.59 Upon arrival in France, all 
neutral vessels had to present certificates from their nations' port 
officials; these certificates listed the ships' cargoes and stipulated 
that the ships would not stop in Holland on their way to or from 
France. 
The Danish and Swedish ships that brought goods to France 
were always required to take out an amount of French products of 
equal or greater value. They could get this equivalent value of 
goods either in their port of entry or another French port. 
The favors bestowed on Danish and Swedish ships were not ex­
tended to those from Poland. This was due primarily to letters of 
reprisal that had been granted by Louis XIV to the abbe de 
Polignac in 1701 against all ships of Danzig. The origins of this 
affair went back to the mid 1690s, when Polignac had served as 
French ambassador to Poland. After the death of John Sobieski in 
1696, the two chief candidates for the throne of Poland were 
Augustus, duke of Saxony, and Louis XIV's cousin, the prince of 
Conti. Although Polignac succeeded in getting a majority of the 
Polish diet to choose the prince of Conti as king, the duke of 
Saxony invaded Poland and by force of arms and personal contacts 
with several Polish nobles succeeded in reversing the election. The 
Polish people swiftly gave their allegiance to the new king (Augus­
tus II). In June 1697 great numbers of people in Danzig went on a 
rampage against all Frenchmen in the city, arresting them and 
looting their homes. Although Polignac escaped without personal 
harm, a mob destroyed or stole all his possessions. He estimated his 
losses at 162,000 livres. At first the abbe received no solace from 
Louis XIV; for a period after 1698, in fact, he was in disgrace. While 
campaigning for the prince of Conti, he had made promises to the 
Poles that went far beyond his official instructions, and this had 
greatly irritated the king. By 1701, however, Polignac had returned 
to court, and Louis XIV granted him the letters of reprisal.60 
Of course, these letters directly contradicted the efforts of the 
Council of Commerce to stimulate contacts with northern neutrals. 
The council, along with French merchants, often complained of 
this obstruction to trade.61 The few Danzig ships that did enter 
France during the war were usually able to do so only with the 
special permission of Polignac.62 These exceptions were few in 
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number, though Danzig ships were given tacit permission to bring 
grains to France in 1709-10.63 
In 1708 the crown began to seek funds with which it itself could 
reimburse Polignac for his losses.64 Apparently a solution was 
eventually arrived at, for Polignac gave up his letters of reprisal 
(probably in 1710). In 1711 Danzig ships were welcomed in France 
on terms nearly as favorable as those extended to the ships of 
Denmark and Sweden.65 
The Council of Commerce also wished to promote trade with 
neutral Italian states—principally Venice and Genoa. France de­
pended on the silk thread and alum that it imported from Italy, 
and during the crisis of 1709-1710, it encouraged Italian ships to 
bring grains from the Levant to France. But French trade with the 
Italian neutrals never reached the scale attained by trade with 
Denmark and Sweden. 
The Council of Commerce, with good reason, suspected the 
Italians of violating their neutrality whenever it suited their pocket­
books. Italian merchants frequently carried on illegal trade with 
the enemy. They were suspected of supplying those Spanish forces 
under the Archduke Charles with munitions and of helping to 
provision and repair English and Dutch privateers.66 Italian trad­
ers were known to disguise their ships as French in order to benefit 
from the special privileges granted to Frenchmen in the lands of 
the Turkish sultan.67 
As a result of these activities, French privateers were constantly 
stopping Italian vessels to check on their cargoes and to discover 
their destination. The Italian cities responded by repeatedly com­
plaining to the French court of the unjust seizures of their vessels 
by French corsairs.68 In 1711 Genoa requested French passports 
for its vessels so that they would not be bothered by privateers, but 
the Council of Commerce rejected this demand.69 It said that 
neutrals did not require passports, no matter with whom their 
commerce was; and as long as they were engaging in legitimate 
neutral trade, they had nothing to fear from privateers. 
Louis XIV, nevertheless, bowed to Genoese demands, and th© 
passports were issued.70 It was not long, however, before this deci­
sion was regretted: as the Council of Commerce had feared, the 
Genoese proceeded to use their passports to protect their ships 
from French privateers while they engaged in illicit trade with the 
enemy. The council reminded the government that it had pre­
dicted this would happen, and no more such passports were 
issued.71 
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In addition to promoting trade with neutral states, the Council of 
Commerce helped determine exactly which countries and terri­
tories were to be considered neutral. There was, of course, no 
difficulty in acknowledging the neutrality of such states as Venice, 
Denmark, and Sweden, but there was a host of small islands and 
territories whose status was rather dubious. 
In 1705 the island of Ameland—off the coast of the Dutch prov­
ince of Friesland—petitioned to be considered neutral.72 The 
deputies of trade argued that Ameland was indisputably a Dutch 
territory and that the request was merely a ruse used by Holland in 
the hope of obtaining greater security for its own trade.73 The 
request was therefore rejected. 
On the other hand, however, the council in 1705 decided that 
ships from the tiny Adriatic republic of Ragusa (present-day 
Dubrovnik, in Yugoslavia) should be recognized as neutral.74 
Jerome de Pontchartrain had opposed this, arguing that Ragusa 
was under the sway of the emperor. But the council's views pre­
vailed, and Ragusa's small merchant fleet received the same rights 
as those of Venice, Genoa, and other neutrals. 
In 1705 the Hanseatic towns of Hamburg, Liibeck, and Bremen 
also requested the privilege of neutral status. These towns were 
admittedly a part of the empire, but they claimed to have no real 
allegiance to it and to be virtually independent states. At first the 
Council of Commerce argued that they should be granted the same 
rights as Denmark and Sweden,75 but only a few weeks later, on 26 
August 1705, the council reversed itself and decided that the cities 
really were enemy territory.76 It argued that if they were given 
extensive rights to trade with France, this would only provide the 
Dutch with ample opportunity to mask their own ships under the 
Hanseatic flags. Furthermore, the extensive granting of passports 
to ships from Hamburg, Liibeck, and Bremen would only serve to 
reduce the number of potential prizes for French privateers.77 
Throughout the first half of 1706, the question continued to be 
brought before the council. In July of that year, the deputies of 
trade decided to permit the Hanseatic vessels to obtain passports 
to come to France empty; this was done in order to guarantee that 
French goods (especially Bordeaux wines and the plentiful grains 
of that year's harvests) would find foreign markets.78 Because of 
the pleading of Pontchartrain and various French shippers, in 
November 1706 the council relented even further. It decided that 
henceforth ships from the three cities in question could bring 
about a dozen different types of articles to France—mostly timber 
122 The French Council of Commerce, 1700-1715 
and naval stores. But these ships would have to pay the duty of 50 
sous per ton and would be required to purchase at least an equiva­
lent value of French merchandise.79 As a result of the council's 
decision, trade with the Hanseatic cities almost immediately began 
to grow, and hundreds of their ships visited French ports through­
out the remainder of the war.80 
To protect the legitimate rights of neutral ships against French 
privateers during the war, the Council of Commerce helped for­
mulate the arret of 23 July 1704.81 This arret delineated and de­
fined in careful detail the nature of neutral commerce. It stated 
that Louis XIV wished to defend neutral rights, whereas England 
and Holland continued to violate them. A neutral vessel was de­
fined as one that was either built by a neutral or purchased from a 
belligerent power prior to the declaration of war.82 The ship's 
owner and the captain, as well as the owners of the cargo, likewise 
had to be natives of a neutral country, or to have been naturalized 
prior to the war. Sailors of enemy nationality could serve on 
neutral ships, but they could never comprise more than one-third 
of the total crew. 
Neutral ships were free to leave their own country, loaded with 
that country's products, and sail to any other nation—be it enemy, 
neutral, or ally; and they were likewise free to transport cargo from 
enemy states directly back to their own country. They could sail 
between neutral and allied ports, provided that they did not trans­
port merchandise grown or manufactured in enemy lands. If a 
neutral vessel was caught transporting enemy goods anywhere ex­
cept back to its own country, the ship and its entire cargo were a 
bonne prise. No neutral vessel leaving a French port with a conge 
(permission to depart) from an admiralty official could be stopped 
by French privateers unless there was strong evidence that it was 
breaking the rules outlined above. 
Finally, to guarantee all these rights, the arret stipulated that if a 
neutral vessel was seized unjustly by a French privateer, the vessel 
would not only be released, but the privateer would be forced to 
pay for any damages. 
This arret was a landmark in the history of neutral rights. It did 
not, of course, end all conflicts between neutrals and French 
corsairs. Italian vessels, as well as Danish and Swedish ships, were 
sometimes unjustly seized by the intrepid buccaneers from 
Dunkirk, Saint-Malo, Marseilles, and other ports. But the records 
of the French Prize Council reveal that it was commendablv 
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scrupulous in its judgment of captured ships. In more than three 
hundred cases, it forced privateers to release their prizes, and on 
many occasions it further ordered the privateers to recompense the 
owners for the interruption of their commerce.83 
It is impossible to gauge quantitatively the degree to which 
neutrals took advantage of these various inducements to come 
directly to France, thereby skipping the traditional Dutch middle­
men. Since neutral ships required no passports to enter French 
ports, the records of their comings and goings have not been as 
well preserved in the local admiralty archives. Certainly their ves­
sels made several thousand trips to France during the war. 
What one can say for sure is that the high point for commerce 
with the northern neutrals came during the years 1705-9. The arrets 
issued in 1703 and 1704 to encourage neutral trade had only minor 
impact until late 1705. Up to that time English and Dutch priva­
teers preyed upon their vessels, violating their neutrality, just as 
they had in the previous war.84 Once in port, the English and 
Dutch gave the neutrals a fair price for their goods and then per­
mitted the ships to leave. Late in 1705, however, they gave in to 
Danish and Swedish complaints, and from then on neutral vessels 
were relatively free to enter French ports. They proceeded to do so 
in increasing numbers until 1710, when the Northern War again 
interrupted trade in the Baltic. 
CONCESSIONS TO THE DUTCH 
Long before 1710, however, it had become clear that Denmark, 
Sweden, and other neutrals could not compensate for the loss of 
trade with Holland. The Council of Commerce had hoped to 
destroy Dutch trade by means of the neutrals, but the arret of 28 
August 1703 prohibiting trade with the enemy soon proved to be 
impracticable. Guienne, Saintonge, Brittany, and other provinces 
that traditionally depended on Dutch vessels to carry out their 
surplus goods could not afford to wait several years to build up a 
new clientele.85 Furthermore, French manufactures desperately 
needed the raw materials and semifinished goods traditionally im­
ported from Holland. 
In 1704 pressure began to mount for a modification of the 1703 
arret. The Council of Commerce reviewed dozens of requests by 
merchants and manufacturers to import various products from 
Holland. Controller general Chamillart was sympathetic to these 
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pleas, and the council was charged with reevaluating French policy 
with regard to the republic.86 The result was the arret of 11 Octo­
ber 1704,87 which permitted the importation from Holland of 
cheese, rabes (?), borax, box-wood (bois de buis), and tar. Soon mer­
chants from both countries were requesting hundreds of passports, 
and they wanted to expand the list of goods permitted from 
Holland. 
In brief, the war on Dutch trade envisioned by the Council of 
Commerce was soon reduced to a shambles. Once the government 
had reopened the sluices to Dutch trade, there was no way to pre­
vent a flood. From 1705 through 1710, the topic of trade with 
Holland far outweighed any other question discussed in the coun­
cil. During 1708 alone this subject came up in the council 121 
times.88 As they had done earlier, the deputies continued to ful­
minate against ces republicans, but again and again they had to 
recognize that France could not do without them. 
The attempt to restrict the types of merchandise that were al­
lowed to enter from Holland became a farce. Arrets were issued on 
24 March 1705 and 16 May 1705 expanding the list of permitted 
goods to include azure, glue, dyeing materials (bois de teinture, 
garance), barrel staves, and wild boar skins.89 These permissions 
only whetted the appetites of French traders and manufacturers 
even further, and one by one the Council of Commerce was forced, 
grudgingly, to add others to the list. Its decisions were always rati­
fied by the controller general, either in an arret or in an etat. He, in 
turn, sent copies of the lists of permitted goods to the farmers 
general, who were charged with checking all imports and exports 
in the ports and on the borders of the country. 
By 1708 the list of goods officially permitted from Holland num­
bered more than three dozen, and by 1710 more than 50.90 But 
this list was only a face-saving device. In 1705 the Council of Com­
merce had begun to build a second list, consisting of "nonpermit­
ted" merchandise, which nonetheless was permitted to enter.91 In 
order to import these goods, a merchant had to obtain a passeport de 
grace, and he had to pay an extra five percent ad valorem duty on 
them.92 These "nonpermitted" goods numbered more than fiftv, 
and they included steel, alum, quicksilver, ferrous sulphate 
(couperose), hemp, elephant teeth, tallow, and small hand tools. As 
was true for imports from all other countries, the ships bringing 
goods from Holland were compelled to take out French products 
of equal or greater value. 
The net result of all these special and not-so-special permissions 
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for importations from Holland was that thousands of Dutch vessels 
came to France during the war years. J. S. Bromley has tabulated 
the figures for Bayonne (and surrounding ports), Bordeaux, La 
Rochelle, Nantes, and Saint-Malo, and has shown that for the years 
1702-12 more than 4,000 Dutch ships came to these ports.93 
Bordeaux especially welcomed Dutch ships, which came to take out 
wine and brandy. In each of the years 1706-7, more than 500 such 
vessels entered its port. Dutch ships also frequented France's 
northern ports, but we do not as yet have statistics to document the 
volume of this traffic. Although historians may argue about the 
general state of the Dutch economy early in the eighteenth centurv, 
Dutch trade with France generally prospered, thanks to the myriad 
French passports.94 
The trade war against Holland was weakened in other ways as 
well. Throughout the war the tax farmers of the gabelles, as well as 
the directors of Asiento company and the tobacco company, occa­
sionally used Dutch vessels to transport their goods from one 
French port to another. This was done because French ships would 
easily have fallen prey to the English and Dutch privateers that 
plied the French coast. The Council of Commerce did not like the 
idea of using Dutch bottoms—because of the boost it gave to Dutch 
navigation—but it generally relented and approved the pass-
ports.95 
For similar reasons the council decided in 1710 to permit a few 
Dutch ships to go to Canada and buy beaver skins from the French 
Beaver Company,96 which was heavily in debt and needed an out­
let for its product. Threats from enemy corsairs made the journey 
too dangerous for French ships. 
The council, however, opposed the granting of passports to 
Dutch vessels to go to the French West Indies.97 Jerome de Pont­
chartrain was always concerned about the problem of supplying 
the colonists there with the food they needed; but enemy privateers 
made the crossing from France to the islands hazardous, and the 
poor harvests of 1709 made the export of provisions out of the 
question in that year and in the following one. Throughout the war 
numerous Dutch merchants requested the right to carry food to 
the French colonies. The Council of Commerce, however, seems to 
have preferred that the colonists starve rather than that foreign 
ships be permitted to trade with the French islands; but Pontchar­
train overrode this objection and granted several such passports to 
Dutch vessels.98 
The council also failed to prevent Dutch ships from sailing 
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to Marseilles. That city's deputy, Mathieu Fabre, argued that 
Marseilles's traders needed to acquire from Holland various raw 
materials for the manufactures of Provence as well as spices, cloths, 
and small manufactured goods that would then be traded in the 
Levant. The other deputies opposed this. If Dutch vessels received 
passports to go to Marseilles, they could stop to trade with Portu­
gal, the rebel Spanish provinces, and other parts of the Mediter­
ranean, and their passports would serve to protect them from 
French privateers. Marseilles's influence at court prevailed, how­
ever, and a handful of Dutch ships were permitted to go there 
from 1706 to 1708." 
Even after it had become obvious that France could not survive 
without Dutch trade, the Council of Commerce vainly sought to 
hurt the Dutch in other ways. After the fall of much of the Spanish 
Netherlands to the enemy in the summer of 1706, France declared 
the captured areas to be enemy territory and therefore subject to 
the same trade restrictions as was Holland.100 The council had 
hoped thereby to stamp out the illicit Franco-Dutch trade passing 
through Flanders. Even in peacetime that area always had been 
notorious as a nest for smugglers. 
In addition, the council eased trade restrictions with other 
enemy nations in the hope that their competition would cut into 
the Dutch share of the market. Beginning in 1706, the council 
decided to stimulate a limited amount of commerce with Germany 
and Portugal (which perforce had switched to the allied side in 
1703). Coming overland from Germany, such metal goods as awls, 
scythes, files, sword blades, and certain types of thread (such asfil 
de Cologne, fil d'or) were henceforth permitted to enter France.101 
Portuguese merchants were allowed to send certain fruits and oils, 
as well as goat skins, sumac, dyes, and a few other types of raw 
materials used in French manufactures.102 
As noted above, in 1706 the council also permitted trade with 
Ireland and Scotland, and early in 1707 it encouraged the granting 
of passports to Englishmen. Although the council wished to hurt 
England's trade just as much as Holland's, it would much rather 
have granted passports freely to English ships. Unfortunately, 
however, the English government officially forbade trade with 
France, whereas the merchant republic to the north encouraged it. 
The council's preference for England is easy to explain: the Eng­
lish, unlike ces republicans, did not appear to be trying to capture all 
the world's commerce for themselves. In addition, the English were 
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not afraid to pay a high price for the goods they bought in France 
"because they are less thrifty and perform trade more nobly than 
the Dutch."103 
Ironically, the Council of Commerce was accused in 1708 of 
being too soft on Holland. An anonymous memoir submitted to the 
council on 22 August 1708 charged not only that it had done noth­
ing to stimulate French trade but that it had in no way hurt the 
commerce of the Dutch.104 The memoir was referred to the depu­
ties, who on 14 September presented a memoir rebutting the 
charges.105 The deputies were clearly angered by what they con­
sidered groundless, irresponsible accusations. They pointed to the 
work the council had performed in reforming French tariffs and in 
facilitating the free flow of goods within the country, and they also 
mentioned the difficulties of stimulating trade during wartime. But 
they were particularly incensed by the charge that the council had 
done "no damage to Dutch trade." They noted the steps that the 
council had taken to promote trade with neutrals as well as with 
other enemy nations. All of this had been designed to hurt Dutch 
trade. The deputies noted further that they had supported the 
1703 cut-off of trade with Holland. It was not the council but 
rather French merchants who campaigned to reopen the com­
merce with the republic. The deputies charged that most French 
merchants were lazy: they preferred to purchase goods from 
"these bold republicans" rather than seek out the goods themselves 
in their places of origin. The deputies pointed out that at least the 
council had stood firm against permitting the entry of spices and 
fish from Holland—the two trades that occupied more than one-
third of Dutch citizens. By cutting these articles off from the 
French market, the deputies were confident that at least some sig­
nificant damage was being inflicted on that nation's economy. 
Despite this ringing defense of the council's actions, one gets the 
impression from reading the deputies' reply that they in part 
agreed with the anonymous memoir's allegation that the trade war 
against Holland was a complete failure. It was perhaps this realiza­
tion that spurred the council, and the government as a whole, in 
1709 to reconsider another cut-off of trade with Holland. The 
deputies of commerce had since 1705 consistently urged that trade 
with the Dutch be restrained to as narrow a limit as possible. It had 
been the commissaires who generally took a less doctrinaire position; 
they were concerned lest French manufacturers and wine pro­
ducers lack the raw materials or the markets that they needed.IOH 
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Late in 1709, however, the council as a whole seemed to agree that 
something was necessary to bring the Dutch to their knees. 
Perhaps the commissaires and deputies were infused by the hearty 
resolve that filled many of their countrymen that year. Several 
things occurred in 1709 to give Frenchmen pride and to instill in 
them a sense of daring. First of all, most of them had had to endure 
poor harvests and a fierce winter and yet had survived.107 Second, 
the crown had firmly rejected the humiliating peace terms pro­
posed by the Dutch in the peace preliminaries at The Hague in 
June 1709. Third, French armies had given excellent accounts of 
themselves in the battles of the Rhine (August) and Malplaquet 
(September). Finally, the Dutch showed "alarming signs of weak­
ness" late in 1709:l08 several provinces clamored for acceptance of 
French peace proposals. 
Whatever the reason, the council began, in August 1709, to con­
sider proposals to cut off all trade with Holland. The first such 
proposal was submitted by a man named Sossiondo, a French offi­
cial stationed in Amsterdam and charged with supervising the ex­
change of prisoners of war between France and Holland.109 
Sossiondo wrote to Pontchartrain in June 1709, recommending 
that either France cut off all trade with Holland or that the Dutch 
be compelled to permit French ships to enter their ports (through­
out the war Holland had insisted that all Franco-Dutch commerce 
take place in Dutch vessels). The deputies of commerce, to whom 
the letter had been submitted, replied on 9 August that the two 
alternatives were equally impossible.110 Concerning the first sug­
gestion, they noted how French merchants and manufacturers in 
1704 had overturned the earlier attempt to do without Dutch 
trade; and the deputies ruefully acknowledged that indeed the 
country did depend on Dutch navigation. As to the second pro­
posal, the deputies pointed out that even if the Dutch agreed to it, 
English privateers would seize French merchant ships before they 
could ever reach Holland. 
But the matter was not permitted to rest. In October 1709 
Duguay, intendant of the navy at Dunkirk, likewise proposed that 
all commerce with the Dutch be ruptured.m The Council of Com­
merce this time decided that the matter needed a complete review, 
and letters were sent to all provincial intendants in areas that 
traded heavily with Holland.'12 The council wished to know, with 
as much assurance as possible, whether the French economy could 
survive without the carrying trade of its northern neighbor. 
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During the first eight months of 1710, the council continued to 
study this question but was unable to come to a decision. It was 
concerned lest French manufactures starve for lack of raw materi­
als and agricultural regions suffocate under the weight of their 
unsold wine, brandy, honey, salt, and other products. The council 
also feared that any hostile French action against Dutch trade 
would lead Amsterdam bankers to cut off their money market to 
French bills of exchange. The commissaires and the deputies also 
examined the question of whether France could further liberalize 
trade regulations with other enemy powers and with neutrals, 
thereby compensating for the loss of Dutch trade. 
Throughout the months of debate on the issue, the council re­
versed itself on several occasions. Sometimes a majority favored the 
cut-off, sometimes not. If the council had been completely free to 
decide, it probably would not have elected to reestablish the pro­
hibition on trade with Holland. With the resumption of the North­
ern War in 1709, the number of Swedish and Danish ships coming 
to France had slowed to a dribble, and France seemed to need 
Dutch navigation more than ever. On 30 May 1710 the council 
once again rejected the notion of revoking all passports to the 
Dutch,113 but both the controller general and the secretary of state 
for the navy insisted that the council continue to reconsider this 
question. Jerome de Pontchartrain wished to give a boost to the 
French guerre de course by allowing privateers to feast on the thou­
sands of Dutch merchant vessels plying European coastal wa­
ters. 114 On 21 June 1710 Desmaretz informed Daguesseau that the 
Council of Finances had agreed that a total suppression of pass­
ports to the Dutch "could produce an effect all the more advan­
tageous in that by troubling its commerce it would make that 
Republic feel the inconveniences of war."115 
On 11 July 1710 the Council of Commerce therefore drew up a 
lengthy memoir on this issue to be submitted to the king.116 It 
listed several reasons why commerce with the Dutch should be 
discontinued. No other nation in the universe, said the memoir, 
would be hurt so much as Holland by loss of its commerce, which 
was for it "an absolute necessity." The revocation of passports to 
their ships would mean that the Dutch would have to resort to 
costly convoys to protect their trade from French privateers. Also, 
France did not need to worry so much at that time about how to 
send out its agricultural surpluses; after the poor harvests of 1709, 
there was little left of anything to be exported. The council fol­
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lowed these arguments by repeating the traditional argument for 
continuing trade with Holland, but it agreed that these factors now 
had to give way to the political and military imperative of bringing 
the Dutch into total submission. 
By the late summer of 1710, virtually all the commissaires and 
deputies had made up their minds to support once again a total 
ban on commerce with the republic.117 The crucial step was finally 
taken on 19 November 1710: the ordinance issued on that date 
stopped the issuance of all passports to the Dutch and severed all 
ties between that nation and France.118 It should be remarked that 
this ordinance was drafted by Daguesseau and several deputies of 
trade.119 
NEW FAVORS GRANTED TO OTHER NATIONS 
To compensate for the loss of Dutch ships, the council hoped to 
stimulate commerce with the rest of Europe, including both neu­
tral and enemy powers. From December 1710 to April 1711, it 
drafted a series oiarrets aimed at achieving that result. The chart in 
the Appendix clearly reveals how the question of trade with neutral 
and non-Dutch enemy powers came to occupy more and more of 
the council's time in 1711. 
France relied chiefly on the neutral states to make up for the loss 
of Dutch trade. To this effect the council helped draft the arret of 
30 December 1710, which was intended to encourage northern 
neutrals to send their ships to France.120 The list of goods that 
Denmark and Sweden could bring into France was enlarged to 
include nearly one hundred types of items.121 Also, Danish and 
Swedish ships were exempted from paying the 50-sous duty on any 
of these goods; formerly this tax had been removed only for cer­
tain products. What is more, all Danish and Swedish vessels were 
henceforth freed from the often troublesome obligation of taking 
out of France an equivalent value of French merchandise. 
The Italian neutral states were likewise invited to increase their 
trade with France. At the behest of Venice and Genoa, an arret was 
issued on 28 April 1711 declaring that the benefits of the arret of 30 
December 1710 applied to all neutral ships, not just those of the 
North.122 Italians were therefore exempted from the 50-sous tax 
and from taking out the irksome equivalent of goods entering 
France. Further, the list of goods that Italians could bring to 
France was extended to comprise eighteen other sorts of products, 
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all of which were produced in Italy. As always, Italian and other 
neutral ships were prohibited from stopping in enemy ports on 
their way either to or from France. 
In addition to encouraging neutral traffic, the council endeav­
ored to stimulate business with France's enemies as well—all in the 
hope of ruining Dutch trade. On 30 December 1710 it drew up a 
new etat of things permitted from England.123 As noted above, the 
council since 1707 had encouraged English ships to come to 
France; they were permitted to bring wool, coal, lead, and a few 
other items. The new etat, however, included more than ninety 
types of goods, including many that had been prohibited in the 
arret of 6 September 1701. In addition, the exorbitant import 
duties of the 1701 arret were set aside for the remainder of the war, 
and the English had to pay only the duties paid by most other 
nations. The English, however, still were obliged to pay the 50-
sous-per-ton duty and to take out an equivalent value of French 
goods. Furthermore, English manufactures continued to be 
banned in France. 
Despite the fact that their government still prohibited them from 
trading with France, English shippers increasingly braved the 
channel crossing in order to trade with the enemy. Franco-British 
trade grew even more after the Parliament in London, on 15 
March 1711, passed a bill permitting neutral vessels to bring 
French wines to England.124 These wines still were subject to the 
high import duties set up in the 1690s, but many Englishmen were 
becoming so tired of inferior—or at least unfamiliar—Portuguese, 
Spanish, and Italian wines that they were willing to pay the higher 
prices for the French product. 
In June 1711 the Council of Commerce decided that this step by 
the British Parliament was sufficiently friendly toward France to 
merit an equally favorable response. Once again the council com­
pared English traders favorably to the Dutch, noting that 
no nation in the world trades more nobly. That is a truth generally 
recognized in every place where the English go. They spend a lot of 
money, thereby causing prices of goods and merchandises to rise. They 
seek out the most expensive and the most perfect articles. This is just the 
opposite of the Dutch, who live very frugally, accustom themselves to 
thriftiness and pay less attention to good quality than to a low price.125 
The council therefore decided that neutral ships would henceforth 
be allowed to bring to France from England all the items that 
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English ships themselves were permitted to bring; these ships 
would still, however, have to take out an equivalent value of French 
goods. This was a breach in the arret of 23 July 1704, which had 
said that neutral vessels could come to France only from a neutral 
or an allied port. 
It soon proved to be a wise decision by the council, for there were 
many—perhaps hundreds—of Danish, Swedish, and Polish ships 
that were reluctant to return to their native lands, lest they be taken 
prize by one side or another in the Northern War. These ships 
were now able to partake in the growing Franco-English trade. 
The council did not actually expand the lists of things that Scot­
land, Ireland, Portugal, and Germany could send to France, but it 
did reaffirm the privileges that it had already granted to traders 
from these nations. In December 1710 the council drew up etats 
summarizing the types of merchandise from these nations for 
which passports would be granted.126 
Perhaps the most significant step taken by the council in 1711 in 
an effort to bypass the Dutch was the move to widen trade with the 
Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Liibeck. The outbreak 
of war in the North and the revocation of Dutch passports meant 
that Danish, Swedish, and Dutch ships would no longer be bringing 
to France the timber, naval stores, metals, and agricultural prod­
ucts that the country needed. France therefore hoped to get them 
from the Hanseatic ports. In December 1710 the council drew up 
an etat that expanded from about a dozen to more than ninety the 
items that these cities could bring to France.127 Although ships 
from these cities would still be required to obtain French passports, 
they were exempted from the 50-sous-per-toh duty and from the 
obligation of taking out an equivalent value of French goods. Strict 
regulations were established to ensure that ships or cargoes coming 
from these cities were not actually coming from Holland. 
The council also opened up a limited trade with other Baltic 
areas that formerly could not send ships to France.128 In part this 
was done because the Northern War prevented many Swedish and 
Danish vessels from coming to France. Areas that were formerly* 
regarded as belligerent were now declared to be neutral. Thus the 
Danish duchy of Holstein-Gottorp, technically a part of the empire, 
now received all the privileges accorded to Denmark itself. Other 
areas to which the council granted neutral status in 1711 included 
Danzig,129 Konigsberg, and Rostock.130 The latter two cities be­
Enemy and Neutral Trade 133 
longed, respectively, to the duke of Brandenburg and to the duke 
of Mecklenburg. 
This liberalization of trade with various European nations, 
coupled with the prohibition of trade with Holland, was not, how­
ever, a complete success from the French standpoint. Immediately 
following the publication of the ordinance of 19 November 1710, 
there were grumblings about it. Bordeaux merchants were quick to 
complain that without the Dutch they would never be able to sell all 
of their stocks of wines and brandy.131 The result was that in 1711 
and 1712 a limited number of passports were granted to Dutch 
ships to bring a small variety of goods to France. J. S. Bromley 
records that in 1711 a total of 103 Dutch ships entered the ports of 
Bordeaux, Nantes, and Saint-Malo, whereas only one entered in 
1712 (at Nantes.)132 The 1711 figure is misleading, however, for 
many of these ships came to France by virtue of passports issued 
prior to the ordinance of 19 November 1710. The 1712 figure, 
though accurate for the three ports mentioned here, does not in­
clude the handful of Dutch vessels that entered other ports during 
that year. 
Ironically enough, it was Jerome de Pontchartrain, the man who 
had campaigned hardest to prohibit trade with Holland, who was 
the first to dilute the interdiction. Late in November 1710, and at 
several other points during the next two years, he granted special 
passports to Dutch vessels to bring various naval stores to Roche­
fort and other French arsenals.133 
Pontchartrain's example was followed by others. In February 
1711 the royal tobacco monopoly complained that it would go 
bankrupt unless it could refurbish its supplies of the commodity. In 
that same month, the company obtained passports for three Dutch 
ships to bring tobacco to France.134 A few passports were likewise 
granted to bring small manufactured items, cloths, and metals 
from Holland for use in the African slave trade, but French port 
authorities took strong precautions to guarantee that none of these 
goods entered France.135 In 1711 a few individuals received per­
mission to import from Holland, by land, certain types of yarn 
needed for manufactures.136 
These permissions for trade with Holland made the trade em­
bargo less than absolute; but even though several dozen Dutch 
ships did come to France during this period, this was a sharp de­
cline from the thousands of Dutch ships that had crowded French 
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ports in previous years. There can be little doubt that the republic 
was hurt by the reversal of French policy. The frantic attempts of 
the Dutch in 1711 and 1712 to disguise their ships as Danish, 
Swedish, or Hanseatic testify to the impact that the ordinance of 
November 1710 had on their economy.137 
The influence that the trade embargo had on bringing the Dutch 
to the conference table has yet to be fully documented: historians 
of the peace negotiations have generally overlooked this question. 
The Council of Commerce, at any rate, worked hard to uphold the 
ban on trade with the republic. In December 1711, at the moment 
when the French plenipotentiaries were preparing to leave for 
Utrecht, the council reaffirmed its confidence in the fact that this 
ban had been decisive in compelling Holland to seek an end to 
hostilities.138 
The apparent success of the embargo on trade with the Dutch 
was probably one factor that led to the ban on trade with the 
empire in 1713-14. After the various treaties were signed at 
Utrecht in April 1713, the empire—having refused to participate 
in the peace congress—remained as France's sole enemy. Treaties 
between these two powers were signed in 1714 at Rastadt (March) 
and Baden (September). With the support of the Council of Com­
merce, France cut off all trade with the German states (except those 
considered to be neutral) from August 1713 to June 1714.139 
ENFORCEMENT OF TRADE POLICIES 
The bulk of this chapter has been devoted to an analysis of 
French commercial policy during the war and to the role of the 
Council of Commerce in shaping it, but the picture would be in­
complete without looking briefly at the means by which these poli­
cies were enforced. There were two basic ways of doing this: one 
was bureaucratic or legal; the other was military, by means of 
French privateers. 
Not only did the Council of Commerce decide what merchandise 
neutrals or enemies could bring to France, but it helped formulate 
all the other regulations concerning commerce during the war. 
The council, for example, helped establish the form of the pass­
ports needed for trade with the enemy. Merchants from hostile 
states had to go through a French partner or commissionnaire 
(broker), who formally requested the passport. To obtain one, the 
Frenchman had to sign a surety (soumission), obliging him to pay a 
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large fine if the foreign ship somehow violated the terms of its 
passport. Generally these sureties amounted to 3,000 livres per 100 
tons of vessel. Passports were usually valid for a period of five 
(sometimes six) months from date of issue. Thus a Dutch ship that 
had a passport dated 1 January usually had to arrive in France by 
1 May. The same passport would protect the ship on its return 
journey, with no time limits set for that. Each passport also speci­
fied the cargo that the ship would bring as well as the name of the 
French port of destination. 
If any of these and other conditions were violated, the surety had 
to be paid. More serious infractions could lead to confiscation of a 
ship by a French privateer. Such infractions might include the 
carrying of contraband or the use of a passport to carry on trade 
from one French port to another. 
Throughout the war the council deliberated hundreds of cases 
involving real or supposed violations by enemy ships of their pass­
ports. Often an enemy ship would not go to the French port listed 
in its passport. Poor weather or unfavorable winds could, for ex­
ample, force a ship to put in at La Rochelle rather than at 
Bordeaux. Another frequent violation involved ships bringing 
merchandises not listed in their passports and perhaps not even 
included on the list of goods permitted to enter from the ship's 
home country. In such cases the council had to decide whether an 
honest mistake had been made or if actual fraud had been in­
tended. 
The most frequent complaint against enemy (especially Dutch) 
ships was either that they arrived in France after the expiration 
date of their passports or that they failed to arrive in France at all. 
There could be several reasons for this: unavoidable delays in the 
outfitting of a ship in its port of departure, poor weather condi­
tions, loss of the ship at sea. What most concerned Pontchartrain, 
however, was that hundreds of Dutch vessels were obviously using 
their French passports to protect them while they traded with 
Baltic countries and with England; only later would they come to 
France—if at all. This illicit trade was depriving the French guerre 
de course of many of its prey. Technically, the French merchants 
who had put up the sureties for these enemy ships were obliged to 
pay them to the tresorier of the navy, but the merchants complained 
that if they were obliged to do so they would be forced into bank­
ruptcy. 
By 1707 there were literally hundreds of cases pending in the 
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admiralty courts concerning violations or inexecution of passports. 
In order to expedite the hearing of these disputes, an arret was 
issued on 6 August 1707 designating the commissaires of the Council 
of Commerce as the sole judges in all cases involving inexecution of 
passports.140 From that date to the end of the war, the council 
devoted a hefty portion of its time to deciding these suits. They are 
not generally recorded in its proces-verbaux, but other evidence 
testifies to the hard work of the council in this regard. We know, 
for example, that at one point Intendant of Commerce Amelot de 
Chaillou had as many as eighty such cases for which he was charged 
with leading the examination.141 
Generally the council tended to side with the French merchants. 
It often decided that they did not have to pay a surety if they were 
not part of the fraud devised by the Dutch traders who had ob­
tained the passports (or if legitimate reasons for the late arrival of a 
ship could be proven). With the interests of French privateers at 
heart, Jerome de Pontchartrain usually urged a harsher stand 
against all abuses of passports, but he abided by the council's deci­
sions. 142 
Another aspect of wartime trade with which the council was 
intimately involved was the system of the equivalent. As has been 
mentioned before, every neutral or enemy ship entering France 
during the war was obliged to take out an amount of French goods 
equal to, or greater in value than, the goods it brought into the 
country. Although this practice had been enforced somewhat in 
the War of the League of Augsburg,143 the Council of Commerce 
defended it with relentless insistence. In their general memoirs of 
1700-1701, the deputies had already expressed their concern for 
establishing a balance of commerce, which would prevent gold and 
silver from escaping the country. The outbreak of hostilities gave 
them a perfect opportunity to put it into practice. 
In the early years of the war, the system was rather flexible. If a 
foreign ship could not find enough French goods in the port where 
it entered, it could return at a later date to obtain them or it could 
go to another port to purchase them. Many times it was physically 
impossible to send out the equivalent on the same ship. French 
exports were often bulk items (agricultural products) that required 
more space than an equivalent value of incoming goods. Whereas 
one ship might bring a cargo of wool, cheese, and dyes to France, 
two ships (or one larger ship) might be needed to take out an equal 
value of French wine, salt, and grains. In such cases a second ship 
was permitted to carry out all or part of the equivalent. 
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As a guarantee that the equivalent went out, the ship's captain 
signed a surety agreement obliging him to take out the equivalent 
within a certain time limit (usually three months). This system was, 
however, open to many abuses. The ships that went from one port 
to another to obtain the equivalent frequently ended up transport­
ing French goods from port to port. As has been noted above, this 
practice was illegal because of its detrimental impact on small 
French coastal shippers. When a ship delayed taking out the 
equivalent until a later date or when it went to another port to get 
it, this caused a large amount of paperwork. The confusion that 
often ensued made it impossible to check to see that the equivalent 
eventually did go out. 
The council was aware of these abuses, and in October 1708 it 
acted to stop them.144 A majority of deputies agreed that hence­
forth all foreign traders should be obliged to take out the equiva­
lent in the same ship and from the same port. The deputies from 
Rouen, Dunkirk, and Paris, however, vehemently opposed this 
proposal.145 These cities imported great quantities of raw materials 
for their manufactures, but they had relatively fewer things to 
export. Thus these cities always had great difficulty in fulfilling the 
equivalency requirements, and they generally sent foreign ships to 
other ports to obtain all or part of their cargoes of French goods. 
But the other deputies supported the measure—in particular the 
deputies from Nantes, La Rochelle, and Bordeaux. Having rich 
agricultural hinterlands, these ports never had any trouble in send­
ing out the equivalent. They argued that the same-ship, same-port 
requirement was the only way to stem the abuses committed by 
both enemy and neutral ships. The latter argument held sway in 
the council, and the controller general ordered the farmers general 
to enforce the new measure.146 
Economic and political necessities, however, compelled the 
council to modify the equivalency system later in the war. After the 
disastrous harvests of 1709, the council waived the equivalency 
requirement for all grains that foreign ships brought to France.147 
When the council acted, late in 1710, to revive its trade war against 
Holland, it decided to exempt neutral ships altogether from the 
obligation of taking out the equivalent. The arrets of 30 December 
1710 and 28 April 1711 included this exemption along with the 
other above-mentioned inducements to neutral nations. 
It is interesting to note that throughout the war the council 
vigorously defended its restrictive bullionist position on the "equiv­
alent" question, despite the complaints agaiaiL it by foreign ship­
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pers and the immense problems involved in enforcing it. Only the 
disastrous harvests of 1709 and the French desire to wreck the 
Dutch economy finally persuaded the government to sacrifice, 
temporarily, its desire to establish a favorable balance of com­
merce. 
The French guerre de course was the second means by which the 
government enforced its trade policies. The arrets, etats, and other 
regulations that, on the one hand, defined the limits of neutral and 
enemy commerce had the obverse effect of outlining the rights of 
the French privateers. 
Thanks to the work of J. S. Bromley, we now know that the 
French guerre de course had a far greater impact on allied commerce 
than had heretofore been realized.148 During the war the daring 
corsairs from Dunkirk, Saint-Malo, and other ports captured 
nearly seven thousand enemy and neutral vessels.149 The depre­
dations that these privateers inflicted on English shipping were so 
great that London merchants nearly rioted in 1707, and virtually 
forced the Parliament in that year to issue the Cruisers and Convoy 
Act.150 Among other things, this law declared that henceforth no 
fewer than forty-three English ships of war were at all times to 
cruise along the English coast in order to ward off French priva­
teers. 
The point to be made here is that virtually all the laws and 
regulations issued by the crown to regulate or encourage the guerre 
de course were first deliberated in the Council of Commerce. There 
were two basic issues involved in the effort to aid privateers. The 
first surrounded the question of what constituted a valid prize ship. 
By the arret of 23 July 1704, the council defined the nature and the 
rights of neutral ships. If any ships from neutral nations violated 
the provisions of this arret, they forfeited their rights. French pri­
vateers therefore confiscated several hundred such vessels during 
the war. All enemy ships were valid prizes, unless, of course, they 
carried French or Spanish passports, but even these ships could be 
seized if in some way they violated their passports. 
A second question concerned the sale of prize goods in France. Jf 
the French armateurs were to profit from their investments, they 
needed a ready market for the merchandise brought to France in 
captured ships. But the interests of privateers clashed with two 
other cherished aims of the Council of Commerce: protection of 
French manufactures from foreign competition and an end to 
dependence on goods from enemy nations. The council's solution 
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to this conflict of goals was not easily achieved. Throughout the 
war it struggled to satisfy both sides. 
Due to the insistent urging of Jerome de Pontchartrain, the 
council drafted several arrets that facilitated the sale of prize goods. 
The arret of 20 June 1702 established the basic policy of the crown 
in this regard.151 All foreign textiles and other manufactures as 
well as tobacco that entered on prize ships could be sold, but gen­
erally on the condition that they be exported out of the country. If 
necessary, such goods received a complete tax exemption for their 
passage overland through France on their way to their foreign 
destination. With regard to goods for which entry and consump­
tion in France were permitted, import duties were reduced. 
English goods entering on prize ships therefore did not have to pay 
the elevated duties called for in the arret of 6 September 1701. The 
arret of 20 June 1702 also established the principle that whatever 
items a foreign nation could export to France during the war could 
also enter France on prize ships. The list of goods that could enter 
on prize ships thus fluctuated as commercial policies with respect to 
enemy and neutral nations changed in the course of the war. 
The arrets of 24 March 1703, 25 November 1705, 9 July 1709, 
and 29 April 1710152 reaffirmed or broadened the advantages 
given to privateers by the 1702 arret. The arret of 9 July 1709 was 
especially important in this regard: it declared that many foreign 
textiles that entered on prize ships could now for the first time be 
sold and used in France, paying reduced import duties. The only 
textiles whose sale was still prohibited in France were expensive 
luxury fabrics as well as silks and printed cottons from the Far East 
and the Levant. 
This chapter has endeavored to illustrate the role of the Council 
of Commerce in directing French commercial policies during the 
War of the Spanish Succession, but it has not tried to assess the 
ultimate success of any of these policies. To do that would require 
years of research on the trade of every nation in Europe. Nor has it 
discussed the changes made in France's wartime policies during the 
commercial and peace negotiations of 1712-14; these will be 
touched upon briefly in a later chapter. 
The council, and the government as a whole, viewed this war as 
an opportunity to damage the commerce of France's adversaries. 
The deputies, who in 1700 had spoken eloquently of the need for 
reciprocal, unlimited international trade, became the strongest 
advocates of a trade war against England and the Dutch Republic. 
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18. Communication with the farmers general was usually done through the di­
rector of commerce (Daguesseau or Amelot). Consult the "Etats des expeditions 
concernant le commerce et les manufactures" (see Chapter 2, n. 56) and AN, F12 
122-25A. 
19. A copy is in AN, F12 694. 
20. Clark, "War Trade and Trade War, 1701-1713," p. 268. 
21. AN, F12 51, fols. 50-50v. 
22. Ibid., fols. 52v-53. 
23. The names of the deputies who were in each faction are not provided. 
24. See Douglas Coombs, The Conduct of the Dutch: British Opinion and the Dutch 
Alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession, pp. 41-84; G. N. Clark, "War Trade 
and Trade War" pp. 271-73. 
25. A copy is in AN, F12 1933A; also see BN, MSS. fr., 21776, fols. 159-60. 
26. A copy can be found in AN, F12 1924. 
27. See AN, F12 1921, "Avis de Mrs les deputez du commerce sur la proposition 
su Sr Gordon banquier a Paris pour la continuation du commerce en Angleterre, 
Ecosse, Irlande et Hollande pendant la guerre," 23 August 1702; F  u 51, fols. 168­
69. 
28. See the arret of 24 March 1703, articles 2-A, in Sylvain Lebeau (ed.), Nouveau 
code des Prises, 1:268-69. 
29. See AN, F12 51, fols. 137-38; Mar., B2 162, fols. 318v-321, Pontchartrain to 
Chamillart, 2 August 1702; ibid., fols. 398-98v, Pontchartrain to Fenellon, 9 August 
1702; B3 119, fol. 209, Chamillart to Pontchartrain, 3 August 1702. 
30. Concerning the many Irish immigrants residing in French ports, see 
Ragnhild Hatton, Louis XIV and His World, p. 94; J. S. Bromley, "The Jacobite 
Privateers in the Nine Years War"; Claude Nordmann, "Louis XIV and the 
Jacobites," in Hatton, Louis XIV and Europe, p. 95. 
31. AN, F12 54, fols. 178-79; F12 55, fol. 41v. 
32. AN, F12 51, fols. 338, 349-49v 432-32v; F12 55, fol. 4; F12 121, fol. 73v, 
Chamillart to Pontchartrain, 26 September 1705. 
33. AN, F12 51, fols. 462-64; F12 1903, "Etat des marchandises qui pourront etre 
apporte'es en France d'Angleterre, Ecosse, Irelande, Hambourg et autres ennemis 
qui ont recu les avocatoires de l'Empereur, de Portugal, et par terre en vertu des 
passeports qui seront accorde's par la Roy;" AN, G7 1687, piece 167, etats of goods 
permitted from various countries; G7 1692, fol. 259, avis of deputies; G7 1695, piece 
287, "Estat des marchandises d'Irlande." 
34. AN, F12 1903, "Etat des marchandises qui pourront etre apportees en 
France"; G7 1687, piece 167; G7 1695, piece 288, "Estat des marchandises d'Ecosse." 
35. J. S. Bromley has tabulated some Figures concerning this traffic ("Le Com­
merce de la France de l'ouest," p. 64 n. 68). For the years 1707-10, Irish ships with 
passports entered three French ports in the following numbers: 174 (Bordeaux), 
164 (La Rochelle), 164 (Nantes). From 1702 to 1712, 387 Irish and 109 Scotush 
ships entered Bordeaux with passports. 
36. Meeting of 19 November 1706, AN, F  u 51, fol. 464v. 
37. Meeting of 26 November 1706, AN, F  " 51, fols. 465v-66. 
38. Mar., B1 196, pp. 864-65, Pontchartrain to Daguesseau, 19 February 1707. 
39. BN, MSS. fr., 14294, fols. 80-82, "Sentiment des deputez au conseil de com­
merce, sur les passeports demandez par des negocians anglois;" AN, F1* 54, fols. 
8v-l 1, 38v-39v, 279-79v; Huetz de Lemps, Geographic du commerce, pp. 116 ft.. 174, 
179, 188, 200, and passim. 
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40. AN, F12 1903, de la Bucaille to Pontchartrain, undated; ibid., avis of deputies, 
23 July 1706. 
41. AN, F12 1921, "Les Deputez au conseil de commerce sur la demande que fait 
le Sr Jacobus Janssen de Dunkerque;" Mar., B3 175, fols. 105-6, Desmaretz to 
Pontchartrain, 19 April 1709; B7 507, fol. 40, Lescalopier to Pontchartrain, 20 April 
1709. 
42. AN, F12 51, fol. 39. 
43. See, for example, BN, MSS. fr., 14294, fol. 82, "Sentiment des deputez au 
conseil de commerce sur les passeports demandez par des negocians anglois," 28 
March 1707. AN, F12 54, fols. 38v, 277; F12 55, fol. 232v; AN, G7 1695, piece 274, 
Piecourt to Desmaretz, 2 November 1710; G7 1695, piece 303, a summary of 
memoirs presented by Mesnager to Desmaretz, prepared by premier commis de la 
Garde. 
44. This dispute is summarized in Henri See and Leon Vignols, "Quelques 
documents sur les relations commerciales entre la France et la Hollande au debut du 
XVIIie siecle." 
45. See AD, Loire-Atlantique, C 754, piece 1, "Memoire du Sieur Descaseaux (sic) 
du Hallay depute de Nantes pour justifier qu'il est important de laisser vaisseaux 
estrangers nous aporter leurs marchandises en France pour leur propre compte et 
par leurs propres navires, sans nous piquer de les aller chercher chez eux par nos 
vaisseaux"; piece 33, "Reflexions du Sieur des Caseaux depute de Nantes au conseil 
de commerce sur la proposition faitte par Mrs. Mesnager et Piecourt." 
46. Ibid., piece 1. 
47. Beginning in 1659 a tax of 50 sous per tonneau was collected on all foreign 
ships entering French ports. In nautical terms a tonneau, or ton, is a measure of 
volume, not weight; it is equivalent to 2.83 m.3 or about 50 cubic feet. By terms of 
the Franco-Dutch tariff of 1699, Dutch ships were exempted from paying this duty. 
The arret of 6 September 1701 raised it from 50 sous to 3 livres 10 sous for English 
ships. 
48. See See and Vignols, "Quelques documents." 
49. AN, F12 51, fol. 151v, 15 December 1702; fols. 161, 162v, 9 February 1703; 
fol. 218v, 12 March 1704. 
50. On Pottier de la Hestroye, see above p. 9. Throughout the war years, he 
presented to the crown several revised versions of his original set of memoirs. See 
also AN, G7 1687, piece 33, Pottier de la Hestroye to Chamillart, 9 September 1704; 
also piece 34, "Me'moire de M. de la Hestroye touchant le commerce." 
51. Faulconnier's memoirs include AN, F12 1903, "Proposition touchant la navi­
gation des estrangers pour la paix;" F12 693, "Memoire pour diminuer le commerce 
et la navigation en Hollande et les augmenter tres considerablement en France," 
and "Explication du memoire donne par le soussigne' pour l'establissement de la 
navigation en France"; AN, G7 1686, piece 140, "Me'moire sur la guerre pre'sente"; 
G7 696, Pour entreprendre l'exe'cution du projet presente par le soussigne' a Mgr. de 
Chamillart pour ruiner le commerce et la navigation des hollandois." 
52. See AN, F12 693, Faulconnier to Chamillart, 2 April 1702; ibid., same to same, 
13 April 1702 and 15 April 1702. Mar., B2 171, fols. 327v-28, Pontchartrain to 
Valossiere, 3 May 1702 (Valossiere's copy of this letter is in F " 693); B2 168, fol. 
58-58v, Pontchartrain to Amelot, 4 April 1703, and fol. 62, same to same, 12 April 
1703. See also AN, G7 1686, piece 136, "Reponse a un me'moire touchant le com­
merce, qui m'a este addresse par Monseigneur de Chamillart," 16 August 1702. 
53. AN, Fia 693, "Avis des de'putez du commerce sur la proposition du Sr. 
Faulconnier de diminuer le commerce et la navigation des hollandois, et de les 
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If Colbert had been alive, very probably he would have warmly 
applauded the policies advocated by the council. 
1. See the chart in the Appendix. 
2. Their many works on this topic are listed in the Bibliography. 
3. French trading policies during the war are discussed very briefly and some­
times erroneously in Henri See, "Notes sur le commerce des ennemis en France 
pendant la guerre de la succession d'Espagne." 
4. See Sir George N. Clark, The Dutch Alliance and the War against French Trade, 
1688-1697. 
5. For an introduction to this subject, see Gaston Zeller, "Le Commerce inter­
national en temps de guerre sous l'ancien regime," reprinted in Gaston Zeller, 
Aspects de la politique franqaise sous l'ancien regime, pp. 185-96. 
6. Clark, Dutch Alliance, pp. 22 ff. 
7. Ibid., pp. 92 ff; Ragnhild Hatton, "Gratifications and Foreign Policy," p. 85. 
8. Contraband was normally defined as military supplies or equipment of any 
sort, as well as timber and naval stores. Neutral ships were always prohibited from 
going port to port in a belligerent country. Thus, for example, a Swedish ship going 
from London to Bristol or from Nantes to Saint-Malo was subject to seizure by the 
privateers of one side or the other. Such port-to-port traffic, if permitted, would 
have enabled a country to transport its own goods from province to province with­
out danger of enemy attack. In order to prevent France from importing needed 
food supplies, the Atlantic powers added grains to the list of contraband items in 
1693-94 and 1709-10. 
9. Clark, Dutch Alliance, p. 62. 
10. Jonathan Webster, "The Merchants of Bordeaux in Trade to the French 
West Indies, 1664-1717," pp. 279 ff. 
11. Clark estimates that the English and the Dutch together lost about the same 
number of ships to privateers as did France—between 900 and 1,000. He insists, 
however, that the commerce of the allied powers suffered much less from the guerre 
de course than did that of France. He calculates that the total value of French prizes 
captured by Dutch and English privateers was approximately £543,000 (£100,000 
for the Dutch and £443,000 for the English). The English pound at that time was 
worth approximately 18 French livres. Multiplying 543,000 by 18, one arrives at 
9,774,000 livres. Clark's figures, in ships and in money, are probably much too low 
{Dutch Alliance, pp. 61-62, 128). Symcox evaluates the role of French privateers 
much more favorably, though he is quick to point out the limitations of the guerre de 
course. He estimates that the total value of prize ships taken by French corsairs mav 
have exceeded 100 million livres {The Crisis of French Sea Power, pp. 222-26). Like­
wise, David Ogg cites figures which show that French privateers did more damaRe 
to allied shipping than their English and Dutch counterparts did to that of France 
{England in the Reigns of James II and William III, pp. 296-99). On French trade 
policies during the war, see Webster, "The Merchants of Bordeaux," pp. 279-342; 
Rambert, Histoire du commerce de Marseille, 7:658; AN, F11 125, fol. 49v, Daguesseau 
to Desmaretz, 30 August 1708. 
12. On Franco-English commercial relations late in the seventeenth century, see 
Clement, Histoire du systeme protecteur, pp. 47-49; Cole, French Mercantilism, 1683­
1700, pp. 12-14; Webster, "The Merchants of Bordeaux," pp. 283 ft.; Viviane 
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Barrie, "La Prohibition du commerce avec la France dans la politique anglaise a la 
fin du XVIIe siecle"; AN, F12 125, fol. 49v, Daguesseau to Desmaretz, 30 August 
1708; Mar., B7 500, fols. 43-67, various memoirs on this subject. 
13. The figures on English trade kept by England's inspector general of com­
merce reveal how small the volume of Anglo-French trade actually was. From 
Michaelmas (29 September) of 1697 to Michaelmas 1698, England's exports to, and 
its imports from, France were worth £61,441 and £48,806 respectively. Correspond­
ing figures for some other countries follow: Germany (£694,349 and £525,734); 
Holland (£1,507,177 and £649,348); Spain (£580,499 and £354,164); Spanish 
Flanders (£547,033 and £81,741); see Newberry Library, Case, Manuscript 
H 7045.372, "An Abstract of the Inspect.1" Gen. l l  s accounts of import.s and ex-
port.8 from Mich.s 1697 to Mich.s 1698." Of course, there was much illicit Anglo-
French trade, but it would be impossible to estimate its extent. Despite official 
proscriptions, many Englishmen smuggled raw wool from their country to France. 
Many Frenchmen, on the other hand, secretly conveyed wines, brandies, silks, and 
other goods into England. On this subject see Henri See, "Apercu sur la contre­
bande en Bretagne au XVIIIe siecle," in Hayem, Memoires et documents, 9:227 ff. 
14. See, for example, AN, G7 1686, Tallard to Chamillart, 28 April 1700. 
15. Neutral ships did not require passports, but they had to follow the rules set 
down by the council (these will be described below). All enemy ships had to obtain 
passports before coming to France. 
16. The correspondence concerning all these affairs can be found in AN, G7 
1686-1704 and Mar., series B2 and B3, passim. Many of the original placets by 
French merchants for trade with the enemy or neutrals can be found in AN, F12 646, 
799A, 1903, 1908, 1910, 1920-24, 1933A. Only a small minority of these requests 
receive special mention in the proces-verbaux of the Council of Commerce. 
17. The process of issuing passports was rather complex. After the Council of 
Commerce had determined a policy concerning trade with another state, mer­
chants' requests that fell within this policy did not need to go to the council for 
approval. Rather, the controller general usually sent them directly to the premier 
commis in his ministry who was charged with supervising their expedition. Under 
both Chamillart and Desmaretz, this man was de la Garde. He worked closely with 
the Council of Commerce, and he could quickly approve a passport if it was within 
the guidelines already set down by the council. He recorded every such passport in a 
register (which, unfortunately, has not been preserved). Once de la Garde recorded 
a passport, he sent it to the premier commis in the naval ministry who was charged 
with drawing up the final copy. Until 1710 this man was Des Haguais; on him see 
Chapter 2, n. 24. In 1710 Des Haguais retired and was succeeded by Fontanieu. 
Sometimes passport requests were sent directly to Des Haguais or Fontanieu, who 
also worked closely with the Council of Commerce. They had each passport signed 
by Jerome de Pontchartrain and the comte de Toulouse. They then sent it back to 
de la Garde, who had the controller general initial it. Finally, the passports were 
returned to the naval secretary, who dispatched them to the person or persons who 
had requested them. For some illustrations of de la Garde's activities, see AN, G7 
1692, piece 123, Desmaretz to de la Garde, 13 May 1711; piece 124, de la Garde to 
Desmaretz, 23 May 1711; piece 258, Anisson to Desmaretz, 26 October 1711. On 
Des Haguais see Mar., B7 506, "M. de Richebourg, contestation entre le secre'taire 
d'e'tat de la marine, et le controlleur gene'ral des finances au sujet des passeports," 
dated 10 December 1710; B1 191, fol. 292, Pontchartrain to Fenellon, 15 Septem­
ber 1706; B2 199, p. 743, Pontchartrain to Des Haguais, 16 November 1707. 
Daguesseau's importance in the decisions as to what was permitted to enter bv 
passport is reflected in his letters to Pontchartrain and the farmers general, which 
are preserved in AN, F'\ 121-22. 
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augmenter en France," 3 May 1702. Also see AN, F  u 51, fof. 115v, 28 April 1702; 
fol. 121v, 26 May 1702; fol. 126v., 30 June 1702. 
54. AN, F12 644, piece 284, avis of Barentin, dated 9 August 1703; F  " 646, piece 
193, memoir by de Bagnols, dated 21 July 1702. 
55. See AN, G7 1686, piece 91, "Memoire sur la supression du droit de 50 sous 
per tonneau," a copy of which can also be found in AN, F  " 644, piece 186. Also F" 
51, fols. 25v, 28v, 37, 43-43v, 69v, 127v, 129v, 143, I79v, 217, 232-32v, 244v. 
56. AN, F12 51, fols. 37, 43, 50. 
57. Ibid., fols. 1 lv, 115. 
58. All these arrets were reaffirmed by the general arret of 18 August 1705, which 
summarized current policies concerning trade with Denmark, Sweden, and 
Holland. A copy of this arret can be found in AN, AD XI, 9. 
59. English and Dutch merchants did, nevertheless, trade with France by means 
of the Scandinavian neutrals. They either disguised their own ships as Danish or 
Swedish or they secretly transported their goods to neutral ports, whence they were 
shipped to France. See Huetz de Lemps, Geographie du commerce, p. 90; J. S. 
Bromley, "The North Sea in Wartime (1688-1713)," pp. 278, 286. 
60. Recueil des instructions donnees aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France, Vol. 4, 
Pologne, pp. 209-43; Pierre Paul, Le Cardinal Melchior de Polignac (1661-1741), pp. 
23-85; Levy, Capitalistes et pouvoir, pp. 72-75; AN, G7 544, dossier 17, "Memoire 
pour Mr l'abbe de Polignac." 
61. AN, F12 51, fols. 102, I77v; F12 54, fol. 20. 
62. Mar., B2 168, fol. 820-20v, Pontchartrain to Fenellon, 27 June 1703; B2 169, 
fol. 54v, same to same, 4 July 1703. 
63. See Mar., B3 175, fol. 115, Desmaretz to Pontchartrain, 1 June 1709; and fols. 
163-64, same to same, 6 September 1709; Shelby McCloy, Government Assistance in 
Eighteenth-Century France, p. 14. 
64. AN, G7 544, "Memoire pour Mr l'abbe de Polignac." 
65. See "Le Commerce des ennemis," p. 108. 
66. See, for example, AAE, Correspondance politique, Venise, 160, fols. 50-54, 
Pontchartrain to Torcy, 3 April 1709; Bromley, "The French Privateering War," p. 
225; Mar., B3 132, fols. 8-9, Torcy to Pontchartrain, 5 February 1705; AN, F12 54, 
fols. 199-200. 
67. Mar., B7 507, fols. 55-57, Machault to Pontchartrain, 23 October 1709; ibid., 
fols. 66-68, same to same, 8 November 1709; B7 508, fols. 146-53, same to same, 20 
February 1712, with two accompanying memoirs. 
68. AN, F12 51, fols. 301v-3, 309v, 318v, 356; F12 54, fol. 14; F12 55, fols. 275-76, 
289v-90v, 299, 304-5v. 
69. AN, F12 55, fols. 288v-90v (24 June 1711), 320v-21 (11 September 1711). 
70. Ibid., fols. 331-32v, 10 October 1711. 
71. AN, F12 58, fols. 19v-20v, 19 February 1712. 
72. AN, F12 54, fol. 137, 2 March 1705. 
73. Ibid., fols. 144 (9 March 1705), 21 lv( 15 June 1705). This question was raised 
again in 1708: see Mar., B2 206, pp. 690-92, Pontchartrain to Daguesseau, 29 
February 1708. 
74. AN, F12 51, fol. 335, 10 June 1705. 
75. AN, F12 51, fols. 325, 333v, 6 May and 10 June 1705. 
76. Ibid., fol. 35 lv. 
77. See Mar., B1 181, fols. 510v-l lv, Pontchartrain to Daguesseau, 13 May 1705. 
78. AN, F» 51, fols. 396, 425v-27. 
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79. Ibid., fols. 436,460v-61v; F12 123, fols. 11, 75, Chamillart to Pontchartrain, 6 
November 1706, 4 January 1707. 
80. See, for example, the monthly records of ships entering and leaving 
Bordeaux in 1709 in AN, G7 1694, pieces 682-86; Huetz de Lemps, Geographie du 
commerce, pp. 69-70 and passim. 
81. See AN, F12 51, fols. 267-68v, 18 June 1704. The arretis reprinted in Lebeau, 
Nouveau code des prises, 1:283-89. It makes specific mention of the work of the 
deputies of commerce in helping to draw it up. 
82. At the behest of Denmark, Louis XIV in January 1705 extended this to 
include all ships purchased from the enemy up to 23 November 1704, provided that 
these recently purchased vessels were used solely in trade with France (see Lebeau, 
Nouveau code des prises, 1:290-91, Louis XIV to comte de Toulouse, 28 January 1705. 
83. J. S. Bromley reports that 312 ships were released by the conseil des prises 
during the war ("The French Privateering War," p. 213). 
84. See Clark, "Neutral Commerce in the War of the Spanish Succession," pp. 
72-76; Bromley, "Le Commerce de la France de l'ouest," pp. 53-54. Zeeland 
privateers continued to harass neutral shipping throughout the war, to the con­
sternation of the other Dutch provinces and England. This is discussed in Bromley, 
"Les Corsaires zelandois." Also consult Bromley, "The North Sea." 
85. For a graphic illustration of Bordeaux's dependence on the Dutch to carry 
out its wine, see the map in Boutruche et al., Bordeaux de 1453 a 1715, p. 462. 
86. AN, F12 51, fols. 236, 237v, 241v, 248v. 
87. A rough draft of the arret prepared in the Council of Commerce can be 
found in AN, F12 1903. 
88. See the chart in the Appendix. As noted there, the council's proces-verbaux do 
not specifically mention every matter discussed at each meeting. The figure 121 
probably is slightly below the true number. 
89. The arrets of 11 October 1704, 24 March 1705, and 16 May 1705 were all 
summarized and reaffirmed by the arret of 18 August 1705, a copy of which is in 
AN, AD XI, 9. 
90. For merchandise added to it from 1705 to 1708, see AN, F12 54, fols. 265v­
67v, 31 August 1708. For items added after 1708, see F12 1903, "Etat des marchan­
dises qui pourront etre apportees en France." 
91. See AN, F12 799A, "Etat des marchandises pour lesquelles il a este accorde des 
passeports pour les faire venir d'hollande, outre celles comprises dans les arrests en 
payant les droits extraordinaires de cinq pour cent de la valeur"; also F12 1903, "Etat 
et estimation des marchandises venant d'hollande pour lesquelles il sera accorde des 
passeports, en payant le droit extraordinaire de cinq pour cent de la valeur," dated 9 
May 1707. 
92. It should be noted that during the war Dutch merchants did not enjoy the 
privileges granted to them in the 1699 Franco-Dutch tariff agreement. Instead they 
had to pay the same duties that applied to goods from other nations, including the 
1667 tariff schedule as well as the subsequent additions to it. 
93. Bromley presents a yearly breakdown for each of these ports in "Le Com­
merce de la France de l'ouest," p. 66. By adding up these figures, one arrives at a 
total of 4,069; but since there are some gaps in the records, it is certain that the 
actual number of Dutch ships entering these ports was slightly higher than this. 
94. Evidence for this is presented in "Le Commerce de la France de 1'ouest," and 
also in Bromley, "The French Privateering War," p. 231. 
95. For example, Mar., B2 221, p. 537, Pontchartrain to Amelot, 3 April 1710; Ba 
223, p. 472, Pontchartrain to Desmaretz, 19 November 1710. 
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REGULATION OF MANUFACTURES 
Next to the question of determining commercial policies concern­
ing enemy and neutral trade, the topic that most often occupied 
the Council of Commerce during the years 1700-1715 was the 
regulation and encouragement of French manufactures. In par­
ticular the council concerned itself with textiles, which constituted 
by far the largest industrial sector in the French economy through­
out the entire early modern period. 
This chapter will demonstrate two basic points. First, it will show 
that the Council of Commerce was thoroughly Colbertian in its 
policies, using government intervention whenever it was felt to be 
necessary and employing all the modes of encouraging industry 
that had been used by Colbert and his immediate successors. 
Second, it will argue that these royal policies concerning manufac­
tures were far more enlightened than most historians have taken 
them to be. 
The concern here chiefly will be with the regulation and encour­
agement of manufactures, not with manufactures themselves or 
their growth or decline during this period. This regulation had two 
chief components: the royal statutes in which royal policies were 
embodied and the inspectors of manufactures charged with en­
forcing the statutes. The government (with the aid of the Council 
of Commerce) also used other means to encourage manufactures, 
and these are treated elsewhere in this book. It should be clear 
from the previous chapter, for example, that the crown took ad­
vantage of the war to exclude foreign manufactures while en­
couraging the importation of raw materials. A later chapter will 
discuss tariff policies, which were also essential to the government's 
promotion of native textile production. 
There can be no doubt that the Council of Commerce had a 
major voice in formulating and promulgating royal policies con­
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cerning manufactures during this period. The council helped draft 
virtually every important arret or ordinance on the subject. Fur­
thermore, the official who was charged by the controller general 
with administering French manufactures—the director of com-
merce—was a leading member of this council. As noted earlier, this 
position was held by Michel Amelot (1699-1705 and 1709-24) and 
Henri Daguesseau (1705-9).l Fortunately for the historian, several 
of the letter books of Amelot and Daguesseau have been preserved 
in the Archives Nationales.2 From them one can get a firm grasp of 
how the machinery of bureaucratic controls operated. The director 
of commerce supervised the work of the provincial intendants on 
matters concerning manufactures, and he appointed and directed 
the work of the inspectors of manufactures.3 Often the director 
mentioned the work of the Council of Commerce in his letters, and 
it is clear that many of the guidelines or decisions that he handed 
down were drawn up in the council. 
As is true with any of the subjects discussed in the Council of 
Commerce, it is impossible to ascertain in precise numbers or per­
centages the full importance of the council on manufacturing is­
sues. Not every matter that the council discussed is represented in 
its proces-verbaux, and frequently individual members worked on 
problems outside the council on the direct command of the con­
troller general. It is clear that the council did not participate in the 
day-to-day administration of manufactures. This was the work of 
the provincial intendants, the inspectors of manufactures, and the 
director of commerce. But the council was, invariably, called upon 
to deliberate important matters involving the issuance of new regu­
lations, the granting of privileges to new or to established manufac­
tures, and the execution of royal laws. The presence of the director 
of commerce on the council helped ensure that the council's advice 
would be acted on. 
MANUFACTURING REGULATIONS 
Turning directly to the questions of royal regulation of manufac-. 
tures, one can say that, as a general rule, historians have allowed 
their liberal biases to slant their views on the subject. They argue 
that strict control of manufactures, with few exceptions, limited the 
freedom and cramped the initiative that workers needed to de­
velop their crafts. The prolific nineteenth-century historian Pierre 
Cle'ment, who was favorable to Colbert in most ways, nevertheless 
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decried what he called "this mania for regulating and tormenting 
industry."4 Twentieth-century historians have largely agreed with 
this view. Alfred Cobban has asserted that "French industry had in 
fact been put into a strait-jacket by Colbert just at the time when a 
continual stream of new technical inventions was to call for the 
greatest flexibility and liberty."5 Eli Heckscher devoted a large 
section of his influential Mercantilism to a comparison of industrial 
policies in England and France.6 He concluded that a lesser degree 
of regulation in England was an important factor in helping manu­
factures there develop faster than they did in France in the eight­
eenth century. 
Although historians grudgingly admit that several of Colbert's 
measures were necessary, Colbert's successors are uniformly de­
picted as unimaginative emulators who enlarged Colbert's heavy-
handed bureaucracy and increased the number of irksome laws 
controlling every phase of the manufacturing process. A number 
of authorities have dutifully recorded Pierre Clement's assertion 
that during Colbert's administration some forty-four royal laws 
were issued to regulate manufactures, whereas from 1683 to 1739 
the number jumped to 230.7 Thus, as noted earlier, historians 
have come to describe the policies of Le Peletier, Seignelay, Lou­
vois, and Louis de Pontchartrain as Colbertisme a outrance, protec­
tionisme a outrance, or Colbertisme exagere.8 
If the standard interpretation of the Council of Commerce were 
correct, then one would expect it to have clamored loudly against 
this supposed strangulation of French industry. Such was not the 
case. In their general memoirs of 1700-1701, not one of the depu­
ties of commerce complained about any overregulation of manu­
factures. Virtually all of them mentioned the need to protect and 
encourage industry, and some of them spoke admiringly of regu­
lations initiated by Colbert.9 Examination of the council's records 
for the next fifteen years confirms this impression. The council— 
with the full support of the deputies—worked to consolidate the 
system of regulation instituted by Colbert. 
Prior to the 1660s textile regulations had largely been under the 
authority of local guilds. What Colbert did was to rationalize and 
bring uniformity to these controls. With some justification, he be­
lieved that a major reason why Dutch and English cloths were 
outselling French-produced ones on the world market was that a 
great many defects had crept into the latter, and he therefore set 
about to correct these abuses. Beginning in the late 1660s, his 
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ministry issued a long series of statutes that covered, in minute 
detail, every stage of the manufacturing process for all types of 
cloths. For example, the great ordinance of 1669 for woolens, con­
sisting of 59 articles, ordered that each variety of woolen cloth— 
whether it be high-quality ratines or low-quality serges—have the 
same length, width, number of threads, quality of wool, and type of 
dye, no matter where it was produced in France.10 
Colbert's successors, it is true, did multiply the number of laws 
over textiles and make the regulations much more detailed. Ac­
cordingly, they have been accused of exaggerating the Colbertian 
system in what amounts to an esprit de reglementation. Charles 
Woolsey Cole speaks for many historians when he claims that after 
Colbert "there was a tendency to make the regulations more 
numerous, more meticulous, more detailed, and more rigid. There 
was less willingness to make exceptions or to grant or use discre-
tion."11 Thus, whereas Colbert's regulations for woolens being 
produced for the Levant had specified only two general types of 
cloth, the arret of 22 October 1697 further divided these basic types 
into londrines premieres larges, londrines secondes, londres larges, londres, 
mahous, seizans, and abouchokous, with specific requirements for each 
kind.12 
Although the regulatory system established in France in the 
second half of the seventeenth century may strike the modern 
reader as burdensome and inhibitive, some qualifications are 
necessary. Although textile regulations did tend to become longer 
after 1683, some of Colbert's own laws were among the lengthiest 
ever issued; one might cite, in particular, his compendious 1669 
ordinance on dyeing, which included fully 317 articles.13 To label 
the policies of Colbert's successors as Colbertisme a outrance is unfair. 
Although his successors did multiply the number of industrial 
statutes, they had good reason for doing so. Colbert's laws were for 
the most part intended to cover the entire nation. Furthermore, his 
laws spoke only of a few dozen basic types of textiles. But these laws 
were clearly impracticable. Many cities in France were accustomed, 
from time immemorial, to producing their own special variations, 
of the standard types of cloths, and these products had, over the 
years, acquired a loyal clientele, whether in France or abroad. To 
have forced all these cities and individuals to conform to the new 
national norms would have wrecked their businesses. In addition, 
Colbert's laws left no room for changing styles and new varieties of 
cloths, and late in the seventeenth century dozens of new cloths 
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were devised. Amiens, for example, was producing more than sixty 
types of fabrics by the early eighteenth century.l4 To accomodate 
these new innovations and local variations, Colbert's successors is­
sued new laws exempting these manufactures from certain aspects 
of the ordinances of the 1660s and specifying new standards for 
these particular fabrics. Thus the process was not so much one of 
increasing the heavy hand of government on the individual fabri­
cant as of substituting regional statutes for national ones. Colbert 
himself had granted numerous exceptions to his general regula-
tions,15 and his successors should not be blamed for continuing to 
do so. 
Both Colbert and his successors urged severe penalties for those 
guilty of abuses. The punishment for a first offense was the con­
fiscation of the defective goods and the exposure of the goods on a 
pillory in front of the guild hall. Also the worker was fined any­
where from a few to several hundred livres, which were divided 
among the accuser, the guild, the king, and sometimes the local 
hospital. For a second offense, the guilty party suffered all the 
above and in addition was reprimanded in a public meeting of his 
guild. For a third offense, the malefactor paid a fine and was 
pilloried for several hours standing beside his confiscated goods.16 
Most historians have decried this entire system as detrimental to 
the public good. Emile Levasseur has termed the above-mentioned 
punishments as a "sad example of the excesses of a despotic 
power,"17 but the main charge against this regulatory program is 
simply that it hurt rather than helped textile production. Certainly 
there is evidence to support this claim. Manufactures in some re­
gions of France did decline in the latter part of Louis XIV's reign, 
and there are many examples of French merchants or manufac­
turers either violating or protesting against what they believed to 
be unfair or overly harsh regulations. Historians such as Levasseur 
and Martin have made ample use of this evidence.18 
There is also evidence to support an opposite conclusion. At least 
two historians have noted the utility of many of these rules. Charles 
Woolsey Cole, though critical of many of the controls, nevertheless 
admits that they were a first step in the way of much-needed con­
sumer protection.19 Tihomir J. Markovitch goes even further. 
Markovitch has extensively studied the French woolens industry of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,20 and his conclusion has 
been that the system of controls generally had a beneficial impact 
on industrial growth. 
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To the twentieth-century reader, a lengthy manufacturing regle­
ment might seem like bureaucratic nonsense intended for the sole 
purpose of vexing poor, illiterate peasants and artisans. The guilds, 
however, had actually had such regulations for centuries. Fur­
thermore, the artisans following these rules were—in theory at any 
rate—experienced in their crafts and had been trained either at 
home or through apprenticeship in a guild. Thus the lengthy re­
glements to which seventeenth-century craftsmen had to conform 
were really no more complicated than the blueprints that many 
twentieth-century factory workers have to follow. 
Our principal concern here is not whether French manufactures 
were or were not helped by royal intervention,21 but rather how 
contemporaries viewed the situation. Although there was opposi­
tion to various aspects of royal regulation, there is just as much, if 
not more, evidence of businessmen supporting the program of 
central control. As noted in Chapter One, the central government 
had a long tradition of consultations with the merchant community 
on business matters. One can affirm categorically that neither 
Colbert nor any of his successors ever issued an arret or ordinance 
concerning manufactures without first getting the advice of traders 
and manufacturers.22 Colbert encouraged the calling of local 
assemblies des manufactures, in which fabricants and municipal of­
ficials met with royal representatives to discuss ways to encourage 
manufactures.23 
The papers of the controller general and the letter books of 
Daguesseau and Amelot reveal dozens of instances in which mer­
chants or guilds complained about abuses and even requested 
tighter government controls. In August 1713, for example, mer­
chants in Bayonne complained that the cloths they were receiving 
from other provinces were so defective that Bayonne's commerce 
was "almost entirely lost."24 
The best evidence of popular support for the Colbertian regula­
tions, however, lies in the Council of Commerce. Not once during 
the years under consideration here did the commissaires or the 
deputies urge a relaxation of the Colbertian regulatory system.2b* 
The deputies frequently deplored the many abuses that were 
perpetrated by artisans and merchants, and they urged the issu­
ance of new regulations whenever they felt it to be necessary. The 
proces-verbaux mention thirty-eight specific cases involving manu­
facturing abuses that were discussed in the council from 1700 to 
1715, but it is clear that this is only a small fraction of the total 
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number of cases with which the council as a whole or the deputies 
dealt. One could provide numerous examples of cases not reported 
in the proces-verbaux. In May 1714, for example, the deputies ex­
horted the intendant at Rouen to prevent workers there from ex­
cessively stretching their woolen cloths on tenter frames; the extra 
length that the cloths gained in this manner disappeared once they 
were washed by their purchasers. After condemning this abuse, the 
deputies bemoaned the fact that despite all the precautions that 
they and the government took to perfect and encourage manufac­
tures, some workers would always be eager for "a sordid gain."26 
In order to prevent such abuses, to clarify existing rules, and to 
make way for new fabrics, the Council of Commerce helped draft 
approximately two hundred new reglements of various types during 
this fifteen-year period.27 To keep track of all such laws issued 
before and after 1700, the council maintained an up-to-date Recueil 
des reglemens concernant les manufactures.,28 
THE INSPECTORS OF MANUFACTURES 
It is impossible, however, to speak of royal regulation of industry 
without speaking of the machinery by which these laws were en­
forced. Traditionally this job was performed by the local artisanal 
guilds. Every piece of cloth had to undergo from four to six in­
spections, at different stages of the manufacturing process, before 
it could be sold. The job of inspecting belonged primarily to the 
guild wardens (called jures, syndics, or gardes), and they were re­
sponsible for punishing any infractors. All disputes were taken 
before the juges des manufactures, who were the city magistrates.29 
This system of regulation worked fine in theory, but in practice it 
was extremely faulty. In many areas of the country, there were no 
guilds, and thus no guild regulations; and even where there were 
guilds, the wardens were frequently negligent or corrupt, per­
mitting defective goods to be put on the market. Colbert neverthe­
less retained this system of regulation. He fostered the growth of 
new guilds and buttressed the power of old ones. As a result these 
corporations grew in number and in power during the latter part 
of the seventeenth century; and despite harsh criticism of them by 
the philosophes and Turgot, they wielded a major force in the 
national economy up to the Revolution.30 
In 1669 Colbert superimposed over this method of control a 
network of royal inspectors of manufactures.^1 Like the intend­
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ants, these inspectors held commissions rather than venal offices. 
At first there were fourteen of them; by 1683 their number had 
expanded to twenty-four. They worked under the authority of the 
provincial intendants, and they themselves supervised the work of 
the guild wardens. They were each assigned a department, and they 
were expected to visit every center of manufactures within it one or 
more times each year. Periodically they sent reports on the textiles 
in their departments to the controller general. 
From 1683 to 1700 Colbert's successors strove to consolidate and 
improve the corps of inspectors, and they increased their number 
to more than thirty. An arret of 8 November 1687, for example, 
declared that in the future no foreign cloths could enter the coun­
try except through the customs offices at Calais and Saint-Valery-
sur-Somme.32 To guarantee that such cloths were properly 
marked, a new inspector was appointed to work in each of these 
two cities. An arret of 1 September 1693 established an inspector at 
Marseilles to check all French cloths destined for the Levant.33 
But despite the work of Colbert and his successors, it is clear that 
the inspectors failed miserably in living up to the expectations of 
the government. They were unable to compel reluctant guild offi­
cials to cooperate with them, and several of the inspectors them­
selves were guilty of negligence or incompetence. On numerous 
occasions during the 1690s, Controller General Louis de Pontchar­
train bemoaned the fact that the inspectors were not properly ful­
filling their duties.34 
Therefore, when the Council of Commerce was established in 
1700 much remained to be done in the way of putting teeth into 
the Colbertian system of regulation. That the council reacted with 
vigor to this situation cannot be doubted. The number of archival 
documents pertaining to the inspectors of manufactures balloons 
markedly for the years after 1700. 
The same bureaucratic impulse that contributed to the forma­
tion of the Council of Commerce likewise led to the formation of a 
better system of control over the inspectors of manufactures. Prior 
to 1700 the inspectors had been little more than a neglected ap­
pendage of the central government. The royal ministers who had 
control of the inspectors (Colbert, Louvois, and Louis de Pontchar­
train) each had charge of more than one governmental ministry. 
Weighed down as they were with the problems of finance, the 
army, and the navy, these ministers had little time to direct the 
day-to-day activities of the inspectors. In the 1690s Henri Dagues­
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seau was charged with supervising them, but this improved the 
situation little, since Daguesseau was expected, single-handedly, to 
administer all internal commerce and industry. This came in addi­
tion to his work in numerous government councils and commis­
sions. 
As noted earlier, Daguesseau resigned the direction of com­
merce in 1699 in favor of his nephew Amelot. Amelot, as director 
of commerce, and Daguesseau, as president of the newly formed 
Council of Commerce, thereafter shared control over the inspec­
tors of manufactures. Although Amelot and Daguesseau person­
ally directed the appointment of, and correspondence with, the 
inspectors, they depended on the council for advice on general 
problems and particular disputes. They were assisted in particular 
by Amelot's personal secretary, de la Vigne,35 and by the council's 
secretary, Valossiere. De la Vigne was influential in the appoint­
ment and control of inspectors, and Valossiere drew up commis­
sions for new inspectors.36 Each also helped in the drafting of 
letters and the preservation of records. 
The letter books of Amelot and Daguesseau for the years after 
1700 reveal that now, for the first time, the government could keep 
a close eye on the daily operation of the inspectors. The director of 
commerce continually urged individual inspectors to perform their 
duties with energy and thoroughness. Amelot and Daguesseau 
often shifted inspectors from one department to another in order 
to prevent them from establishing "strong connections" with local 
favorites.37 They were quick to dismiss inspectors who were found 
to be wanting due to old age, negligence, or corruption. Thus in 
October 1714 Daguesseau decided that Inspector Duplessis, whose 
department included part of Auvergne, Limousin, and La Ro­
chelle, had become "so fat and so slow" that he could no longer 
perform his duties; a replacement was therefore named to take his 
place.38 Intendants were reminded of their duty to support inspec­
tors against any possible opposition. When the inspector in Mon­
tauban was late in submitting his semiannual etat to the government 
in March 1701, Amelot was quick to write to him and to the provin­
cial intendant to see what was wrong.39 
Lest one get the impression that the regime under which the 
inspectors worked was overly harsh, it should be noted that Amelot 
and Daguesseau also were swift to compliment inspectors for jobs 
well done;40 and the director of commerce often reminded inspec­
tors that, though they were to work steadfastly to wipe out abuses, 
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they were, nevertheless, to use discretion and to avoid "fatiguing" 
manufacturers.41 
In the opening years of the eighteenth century, the Council of 
Commerce strove to consolidate the work of the past and to get a 
better grip on the network of inspectors. Amazing as it may seem, it 
was not until sometime after 1700 that the crown, through the 
Council of Commerce, endeavored to establish a list of all the in­
spectors and their departments and to find out how, and if, they 
were paid. In this respect a document located in the controller 
general's papers in the Archives Nationales proves to be highly 
instructive. The document is entitled "Etat des appointements des 
inspecteurs des manufactures pour l'annee 1701."42 This etat lists 
the names of fourteen inspectors who were to be paid various sums 
from the tresor royal, ranging from a few special grants of 300 to 
500 livres to full salaries of 1,800 to 2,000 livres. This document is 
extremely valuable for two reasons. First, it contradicts what virtu­
ally every historian has heretofore written concerning the mode of 
payment of the inspectors. Colbert had determined that inspectors 
should be paid from the product of a one-sous duty collected on 
each piece of cloth examined. Bacquie—and those who have relied 
on his account—assumed that this had always remained the case.43 
The fact is, however, that only the inspectors of woolen cloths were 
to be remunerated in this fashion. After 1683 other types of inspec­
tors were created, and these new inspectors were paid directly by 
the crown. The second reason for the importance of this document 
is that it tells us who these new inspectors were. Included among 
them were the two men posted at Calais and Saint-Valery, who 
have already been mentioned. In addition, there were two inspec­
tors posted in Brittany for the purpose of guaranteeing that no 
foreign (i.e., English and Dutch) textiles entered there in fraud. 
There were also two inspectors in Paris charged with examining all 
cloths entering the city. Finally, there were six inspectors appointed 
to examine all toiles44 manufactured in France.45 These six men 
were assigned to the three areas where toiles were chiefly produced: 
the Lyonnais, Brittany, and Normandy. The existence of these sk 
inspectors at least as early as 1701 corrects the assertion of Hayem 
and Markovitch that there were no inspectors of toiles until 1727.46 
In addition to the inspectors named in this list, there were 
twenty-three or twenty-four inspectors of woolens at the turn of 
the century. The earliest list of all the inspectors that I have un­
covered dates from November 1704.47 
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The total number of inspectors increased slightly in the early 
years of the century. Up until 1701, for example, one man had 
been responsible for inspecting all the toiles produced in the gener­
alites of Caen and Alencon. Amelot decided that this area was too 
large for one person; he therefore divided that department into 
two and appointed a second man.48 In 1706 the deputies of trade 
concluded that two men were not sufficient to eradicate all the 
defects appearing in Languedoc and appointed a third man to 
cover it.49 
Generally, however, the Council of Commerce was reluctant to 
create any new inspectors and preferred instead to increase the 
diligence and effectiveness of the inspectors already in existence. 
New inspectors might cause more delays in the production process, 
and, in addition, new inspectors would have to be paid—either by 
the crown or by the workers themselves. Thus the council turned 
down several proposals for new inspectorships—usually submitted 
by individuals hoping to profit from them.50 
By far the greatest achievement of the council in its early years 
concerning French manufactures occurred in 1704. It came as a 
result of a decision made by the crown to transform the inspectors' 
posts into venal offices. One of the devices that the crown used to 
stave off bankruptcy during the last two wars of the reign was the 
creation and sale of dozens of types of such positions. It was there­
fore not extraordinary when, by the edict of October 1704, it de­
cided to transform its inspectors of manufactures from holders of 
commissions into owners of hereditary offices.51 This edict pro­
claimed the establishment of two inspectors general in each gener­
alite; it also created special commissaires-controleurs et visiteurs and 
concierges-gardes in each place of manufacture. The latter two types 
of offices were to replace guild wardens in the task of inspecting. 
Since there were thirty-two generalites in all, this meant that sixty-
four inspectors general would be created. The new offices of con­
trollers and warehouse guards would have numbered in the hun­
dreds. The crown hoped that the sale of these offices would bring 
in more than three million livres.52 
Almost immediately merchants and manufacturers from 
throughout France raised an outcry against the new creations, and 
the deputies of trade spearheaded a drive to repeal the October 
edict.53 The deputies had two main objections to the new creations. 
First, the army of new inspectors was to be paid from new duties 
collected on textiles, and this would drive prices so high that 
160 The French Council of Commerce, 1700-1715 
neither Frenchmen nor foreigners would be able to afford them. 
Second, the deputies feared that these new officials would cause 
"continual trouble and infinite damage, because if these persons 
become fixed in their places by the acquisition of venal offices they 
will become more concerned with their own particular interests 
than with the good of manufactures."54 The deputies preferred to 
maintain the present system of inspectors and guild wardens. The 
inspectors held mere commissions, and they were frequently 
moved from place to place; they could be dismissed if they did not 
do a good job. Similarly, the guild wardens served for only limited 
periods and thus did not enjoy the security of hereditary offices. 
The deputies were supported in all their claims by Amelot. He 
wrote several lengthy memoirs against the project, and in the hall­
ways and antechambers of Versailles, he lobbied doggedly for its 
annulment.55 Amelot's work in this regard led Thevenin, the man 
who had contracted to sell the new offices, to hold a special grudge 
against him56 
The deputies and Amelot were soon victorious: a declaration of 
30 December 1704 abolished the recently created offices and re­
instituted the regular inspectors and guild wardens.57 The declara­
tion made special mention of the work of the Council of Commerce 
in influencing its decision. 
In order that the king be indemnified for the loss of revenue 
from the sale of the offices, the government accepted a plan pro­
posed by the Council of Commerce. The deputies had suggested 
that the merchant guilds in the major commercial and manufactur­
ing cities of France join together to pay the king 1,200,000 livres 
for the repurchase and dissolution of the venal offices. In 1705 and 
1706 a series of arrets finalized this plan.58 The total sum was 
divided among approximately twenty-five generalites,b9 the mer­
chants of which had to pay anywhere from 4,000 to 150,000 livres. 
A glance at the distribution of the 1,200,000 livres reveals an in­
dustrial hierarchy among French generalites. Rouen and Lyons had 
to pay the most: 150,000 livres each. Next came Amiens (80,000 
livres), Rheims, Caen, Toulouse, Montpellier, Montauban, and 
Bordeaux (50,000 livres each). The generalite of Paris (including 
Beauvais) was charged 37,000 livres, whereas the generalise of 
Soissons had to pay only 10,000 livres.60 
The repeal of the October edict was a tremendous victory for the 
Council of Commerce and for Amelot personally.61 It was Amelot, 
working with his secretary, de la Vigne, who drew up the declara­
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tion of 30 December 1704.62 This episode proved to be a mild 
political setback for Nicolas Desmaretz. As a director of finances, 
Desmaretz had supported the sale of the new offices, and he had 
been skeptical of the plan to have merchants put up 1,200,000 
livres to repurchase the new offices.63 He noted dryly in a letter to 
Amelot: "I do not notice that merchants in the provinces are 
generally disposed to pay what is asked of them."64 
As it turned out, Desmaretz was partially correct on this point. 
The 1,200,000-livre debt was scheduled to have been paid off by 
the end of 1706. But merchants continually bickered among them­
selves, complaining that one group or one city was being forced to 
pay more than its fair share, and evidence reveals that as late as 
1710 the debt had not been liquidated.65 
Under the controller generalship of Desmaretz, royal concern 
for the inspection of manufactures increased markedly. Soon after 
assuming that office, he commanded each of the inspectors to draw 
up a detailed description of his department, listing all the places of 
manufacture and giving figures concerning the amount of produc-
tion.66 The resulting survey was then compiled into a single vol­
ume, and it remains today a precious index of the French economy 
in the early eighteenth century.67 
Also in 1708 Desmaretz created the six intendants of commerce, 
in an effort to facilitate the work of the Council of Commerce.68 As 
noted earlier, each intendant was charged with a fixed department, 
consisting of several generalites. The intendants received and 
analyzed the semiannual reports submitted by each of the inspec-
tors.69 After 1708 these reports began to include not only data but 
also small samples of the cloths being inspected.70 These samples, 
several of which were attached to a single piece of paper, enabled 
the members of the Council of Commerce to decide for themselves 
whether or not the fabrics were of the prescribed quality. 
The actual number of inspectors likewise increased after 1708. A 
list drawn up in 1714 reveals that the total number of inspectors 
had risen to thirty-nine. There were twenty-seven inspectors for 
woolens, eight for toiles, four for incoming foreign manufactures, 
and two special inspectors charged with examining all cloths sold in 
Paris.71 
Throughout the War of the Spanish Succession, the area of 
manufactures to which the Council of Commerce devoted the most 
attention was the high-quality woolens destined for the Levant. In 
the course of the seventeenth century, England and the United 
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Provinces had gradually won over a large share of this market, 
despite the fact that Languedoc's numerous producers and Mar-
seilles's geographical proximity seemed to ensure that the Eastern 
Mediterranean trade belonged to France. Thus during this fifteen-
year period, the Council of Commerce was repeatedly concerned 
with the Levant question, and it watched the inspectors of manu­
factures in Languedoc more closely than any of the others. At the 
first sign of defect in Languedoc woolens or of a complaint against 
one of the inspectors there, the council was quick to write to the 
intendant (Basville) for an accounting. 
When news arrived in 1707 that many Levant customers were 
dissatisfied with the quality of some of the cloths being shipped 
from France, the council set about to rectify the situation. 
Throughout 1708 it worked—in consultation with Basville and 
local businessmen—on a new reglement for Languedoc's cloths. 
Many of the area's manufacturers themselves requested a new 
statute that would help protect the good name of their products.72 
The result was the arret of 20 November 1708, which laid out 
specifications for cloths destined for the Levant.73 It contained 
thirty-four articles, and was as detailed as any regulation issued by 
Colbert and his immediate successors. 
When even this new statute failed to eradicate all abuses commit­
ted by unscrupulous manufacturers, Intendant Basville suggested 
that another inspector be appointed in Languedoc to examine all 
woolens destined for the Levant.74 The Council of Commerce 
agreed, and an arret issued on 7 May 1714 established a new in­
spector in Montpellier.75 Thereafter every piece of cloth produced 
in Languedoc had to be transported to Montpellier to be scruti­
nized and to receive the seal of the inspector there. This new in­
spection came in addition to the other ones already in place for 
such woolens: those of the various guild wardens, the regular in­
spectors in Languedoc, and the inspector in Marseilles. 
PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT 
The above-mentioned difficulties in preventing abuses in 
Languedoc's woolen manufactures points up a general question 
involving the crown's entire regulatory system: How well were the 
manufacturing statutes actually enforced? Although the controller 
general and the Council of Commerce worked steadfastly to im­
prove the network of controls, the results were, at best, mixed. 
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Financial difficulties, problems of communication, and local op­
position helped ensure that many things would fall through the net 
of regulation. 
The question of how the inspectors of manufactures were to be 
paid is illustrative of this entire situation. From their creation in 
1669 until the Revolution, the inspectors continually faced the 
problem of lack of payment, and the government seems not to have 
been able to rectify that situation.76 The plight of the inspectors of 
woolens was particularly acute. It should be recalled that these 
inspectors were paid from the duty of one sou, collected by the 
guild wardens, on each piece of cloth inspected. The problem was 
that the wardens often pocketed the money themselves or neg­
lected to collect it in the first place, and the inspectors were thus in 
the delicate situation of having their salaries depend on the very 
people whom they were charged with supervising and possibly 
even punishing. Several inspectors therefore found their positions 
compromised; in order for the guilds to pay them, they had to put 
their stamp of approval on defective goods. Even before 1700 pro­
vincial intendants had been charged with making sure that such 
difficulties did not arise for the inspectors, but most intendants 
were already overworked and could spare little time for the inspec­
tors of manufactures. 
The inspectors who were paid by the royal treasury77 were no 
better off. They often found that the etats for their payment had 
not been drawn up or that the special fund they were to be paid 
from had disappeared. 
This general problem grew even worse in time of war. From 
1700 to 1715 virtually all the inspectors encountered financial dif­
ficulties at one time or another. Their letters to the controller 
general or to the Council of Commerce were often desperate. In 
April 1711, for example, Bore', the inspector of toiles in Alencon, 
wrote to Desmaretz bemoaning the fact that he had not been paid 
his salary since 1708. He complained that his creditors were press­
ing him and that he would not be able to continue his work if his 
financial plight got any worse.78 
This inspector, however, was not alone. By 1713 Desmaretz had 
received so many complaints that he charged one of his premiers 
commis, de la Garde, with finding out the names of all the inspectors 
and how they were paid.79 Since the controller general did not 
even know the names of the inspectors, it is not surprising that he 
often neglected to have them paid.80 
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In carrying out his mission, de la Garde worked closely with the 
members of the Council of Commerce. Daguesseau had already 
complained of the penury of most of the inspectors, and he pro­
vided the information that was needed.81 As a result of de la 
Garde's inquiry, etats were drawn up in 1714 ordering that the 
tresor royal pay all special inspectors and inspectors of toiles for years 
1709 through 1714.82 Another result was that de la Garde drew up 
a large register of approximately three hundred pages in which he 
listed the names of all the inspectors and described in careful detail 
each of their departments.83 This register remains our best source 
of information concerning the composition of the corps of inspec­
tors and the makeup of their departments at that time. 
The inference to be drawn from all of this is that the inspectors 
could not be fully effective if they were continually hampered by 
financial problems. Even when they were paid, their salaries (usu­
ally 1,500 to 2,000 livres per year) were far from munificent. Out 
of this they had to maintain a residence and cover the expenses 
they encountered in traveling from place to place throughout the 
year. Bore, in Alencon, lamented that even when his salary was 
paid he could not afford to visit all the places where he was ex­
pected to go.84 It goes without saying, therefore, that when the 
inspectors were not paid they cut even more corners and neglected 
to make the required number of tours in their departments each 
year. 
The inspectors faced many other problems as well. The very size 
of their departments made it physically impossible for some of 
them to execute their duties to the fullest extent. The inspectors of 
woolens in Amiens and Rouen had to visit only about twelve to 
fifteen different towns in their departments each year; but the 
inspectors in Orleans and Champagne each had more than thirty 
places to visit, and the unfortunate inspector in Montauban had 
more than seventy.85 Since most of the inspectors were forbidden 
to have subinspectors, this meant that the burden of visiting each of 
these manufacturing centers several times a year fell on a single 
86 man.
The network of inspection was further weakened by the fact that 
the entire structure was superimposed over the existing guild sys­
tem. The inspector's job was to supervise the work of guild wardens 
and to scrutinize the bureaux de visite to which guild workers 
brought their goods for examination by the wardens. An inspector 
could not properly perform his functions in areas where there 
were no guilds, and Colbert therefore had intended for every city 
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and every craft to have its own guild or guilds. Even though the 
number of such bodies did increase in the decades after Colbert, 
however, the process was never finally completed. A survey of 
guilds taken in 1708, for example, revealed that in Poitiers only 
thirty-five of sixty-five trades were organized in guilds. The pro­
vinces of Roussillon, Berry, and La Rochelle had few guilds, and 
Beam had none at all.87 
What was worse, many manufacturers were moving their trades, 
heavy looms and all, to the countryside, where they could escape 
the bothersome regulations of the urban guilds. This ruralization 
of manufactures, sometimes referred to as the usine dispersee, made 
the inspection of manufactures increasingly difficult. Noette, in­
spector in Beauvais, complained to the controller general in 1713 
that weaving looms {metiers) were "scattered in diverse villages in 
secret places, sometimes in a barn and sometimes in a loft, and 
often they are moved from place to place in order to hide the 
fraud."88 It is virtually impossible to estimate the percentage of 
total production that escaped inspection in this manner.89 
Another problem faced by the inspectors of manufactures was 
the resistance or, at times, outright hostility with which local mer­
chants and manufacturers greeted them. The inspectors constantly 
had to beware of attempted frauds by local businessmen, and there 
were also at least a half-dozen open revolts against inspectors in 
various towns or villages during the period under study here.90 
Whenever Amelot or Daguesseau received a report of such an 
incident, he ordered the local interidant to imprison the leaders of 
the revolt for several days.91 
In addition, the inspectors'jobs were frequently made more dif­
ficult by the very people who were supposed to help them; that is, 
the guild wardens and local juges de police. The wardens and city 
magistrates often proved reluctant to enforce regulations that 
might offend or cause hardships for their relatives and neighbors. 
Wardens therefore were prone to marking defective cloths, and 
both the wardens and the juges frequently neglected to levy the 
fines that were called for by law as a punishment for various 
abuses. During the years 1700 to 1715, the government received 
scores of complaints from inspectors or intendants against guild 
wardens or city magistrates.92 The Council of Commerce and the 
controller general invariably cautioned these recalcitrant officials 
that unless they performed their duties better they would face 
possible fines or dismissal from office. 
On several occasions during this period, some of the inspectors 
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of manufactures also ran into problems with the parlements. These 
sovereign courts, acting on appeals, occasionally revoked decisions 
made by the inspectors. The inspector in Toulouse complained, for 
example, in 1708 that many of his confiscations of defective goods 
were appealed to the Parlement of Toulouse, which more often 
than not voted for the release of the goods that had been seized.93 
Bertrand exclaimed that under such circumstances it was impossi­
ble for him to enforce the law. 
Invariably, the controller general, with the firm backing of the 
Council of Commerce, acted to support the power of the central 
government against the local-minded parlements. Either the 
courts' decisions were annulled by royal arrets, or the cases were 
evoked to the provincial intendants or to the king's council.94 
Although it is true that the amount of local resistance to the 
inspectors of manufactures was far from negligible, there is reason 
nevertheless to believe that historians have tended to exaggerate its 
extent.95 Like the proverbial squeaky hinge, conflicts and quarrels 
always seem to get the most attention. One can argue, however, 
that this open or clandestine resistance was the exception rather 
than the rule. The overwhelming majority of letters and reports 
submitted by the inspectors to the controller general mention no 
opposition or upheavals. This has led at least one historian to con­
clude that the system of inspection "functioned very well for over a 
century."96 
There is also other evidence to indicate that the inspectors were 
well received in many quarters. First of all, the deputies in the 
Council of Commerce, who represented business interests and who 
themselves were businessmen, wholeheartedly supported the up­
holding of royal laws by the inspectors. Local merchants and 
manufacturers likewise made known their support for the inspec­
tors. Although the papers of the controller general, of Amelot, and 
of Daguesseau present many examples of opposition to the inspec­
tors, they present many more instances of local businessmen plead­
ing for better enforcement of textile regulations. Businessmen 
realized how important it was to protect the good name of a city's 
or a province's products. The letter books of Amelot and Da­
guesseau contain dozens of references to marchands or fabricants 
complaining about inspectors of manufactures—complaining not 
that the inspectors were trying to enforce the laws but that they 
were not working hard enough to enforce them. The businessmen 
wanted more, not less, government intervention.97 
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Their dissatisfaction with inspectors covered a wide spectrum of 
offenses: laziness, negligence, incompetence, favoritism, dishon-
esty.98 The intendant in Provence, Lebret, reported in May 1713, 
for example, that Cauviere, the inspector in Marseilles, was sus­
pected by many honest merchants of receiving bribes from certain 
negotiants and fabricants in return for permitting defective cloths to 
be shipped to the Levant." The inspector in Carcassonne, de la 
Marque, was accused of being too severe on some manufacturers 
while being overly lenient to his friends and family. 10° 
Amelot and Daguesseau generally responded to such allegations 
by having the intendant in the area study the matter. If an inspec­
tor was indeed remiss, he was either reprimanded or fired. More 
often than not, however, the inspectors were not personally at 
fault. Barolet, inspector in Champagne, responded to charges 
against him in April 1713 by arguing that his department was too 
big for one man; he also noted that he was not paid enough—when 
he was paid at all—to cover all his expenses.101 But the inspectors 
who, for one reason or another, were felt to be doing an inferior 
job were in the minority. The government and the greater part of 
the business community seem to have been convinced that most of 
them were doing as well as could be expected. 
Up to this point this chapter has dealt with the work of the 
Council of Commerce in issuing new manufacturing regulations 
and in helping to supervise the inspection of manufactures. Also, 
the discussion has been limited solely to the textile industry because 
textile output was far more important to both the internal and 
external markets than all other industries combined. It was there­
fore natural that the Council of Commerce should concentrate 
overwhelmingly on this sector of the economy. The inspectors of 
manufactures likewise were charged almost exclusively with the 
examination of finished cloths of various types.102 
This is not to say that other industries were neglected. The 
Council of Commerce was also active in issuing new, or revising 
old, regulations concerning the manufacture of hosiery, blankets, 
soap, leather goods, paper, and glass, and concerning the mining 
and processing of coal, tin plate, iron ore, and other such pro­
ducts. l03 The inspectors of manufactures were expected to keep an 
eye on these industries in a general fashion. Occasionally their 
letters and reports to the controller general contain detailed in­
formation regarding them. The guild wardens, the juges des manu­
factures, and the provincial intendants were also charged with 
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supervising the work and enforcing quality standards in the non-
textile sectors. In some cases there were special officials appointed 
to do work similar to that of the inspectors of manufactures. For 
example, all mining in France was under the surveillance of the 
grand-maitre des mines, minieres, et substances terrestres.104 
ENCOURAGEMENT OF MANUFACTURES 
In addition to regulation by statute and by means of inspectors, 
the central government employed yet other means by which it ad­
ministered and promoted French manufactures. These included 
the granting of privileges, the protection of established industries 
from newly introduced ones, and the protection of the supply of 
raw materials.105 Every industry—not merely textiles—benefited 
from these kinds of encouragement. 
The granting of privileges of one sort or another by the French 
crown to manufacturers went back to at least the fifteenth century, 
but the practice became regular only under Henry IV and reached 
its climax with Colbert. There were basically four types of manu­
facturing enterprises in France.106 First, there were the manufac­
tures du roi, which the government owned and administered and 
whose chief customers were the king and his court. These estab­
lishments thus included the renowned tapestry and carpet fac-
tories—Gobelins, Beauvais, Savonnerie—and the various artisans 
who had workshops at the Louvre or who followed the court. 
Second, there were the manufactures royales, which were privately 
owned but which the crown had recognized by means of brevets or 
lettres patentes. These manufactures had fairly extensive privileges, 
often including the exclusive right to produce a particular item. 
Next came the manufactures privilegiees, which were also privately 
owned and had royal charters. The privileges granted to these 
companies were usually less generous than those bestowed on the 
manufactures royales.107 The fourth group comprised those enter­
prises which the crown never officially recognized. They were 
generally small shops with insignificant amounts of production, 
and royal officials, already overworked, tended to tolerate their 
existence. It was with the manufactures of the second and third 
types that the Council of Commerce principally dealt.108 
Colbert often showed his favor to the inventor of a new manufac­
turing process or to a gifted entrepreneur by granting him the 
exclusive right to manufacture a particular item. Sometimes this 
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monopoly extended to the whole country, but most often it ex­
tended only to a single province or area (usually a radius of three to 
ten leagues from a particular town). Financial subsidies or exemp­
tions of various types generally accompanied such an exclusive 
privilege. 
In their general memoirs of 1700-1701, most of the deputies of 
commerce denounced the notion of monopoly of any sort, and 
from this one would have expected them to oppose unalterably the 
granting of such exclusive privileges. Such was not the case in 
practice, however. From 1700 to 1715 the Council of Commerce 
supported the granting of thirteen exclusive privileges to various 
enterprises.109 This number admittedly is relatively small when 
compared with the number of monopolistic privileges granted by 
Colbert. Charles Woolsey Cole, however, has asserted that as early 
as the 1680s the crown itself was already decreasing the number of 
exclusive privileges awarded to entrepreneurs.110 
The point to be made here, however, is that the council did not 
in principle oppose giving an individual the exclusive right to 
produce an article in his town or province if the situation war­
ranted it. Thus in 1701 the council agreed that the individuals who 
had devised a new way to make oil (used in preparing textiles and 
in paints) should be the only ones permitted to use the new 
method.11l In 1709 Daguesseau recommended to Desmaretz that a 
man named Saint-Etienne be granted a nationwide exclusive privi­
lege for the manufacture of porcelain by means of a new process he 
had invented; the monopoly would run fifteen years, however, and 
not twenty as Saint-Etienne had wished.112 
In March 1715 two brothers, Jacques and Thomas Bourdon, 
requested authorization to establish at Andelys, in Normandy, a 
plant for the manufacture of fine English-style woolens. They 
asked for the exclusive right to make these goods in all the territory 
within three leagues of Andelys for the next twenty years. Not only 
did the Council of Commerce grant this local monopoly but it 
exempted the Bourdons and all their workers from quartering 
troops, from paying the taille and from numerous other charges, 
including the milice, guet, tutelle, and curatelle. In addition, the cloths 
sent from this factory to Italy or Spain were freed from several 
internal customs duties. Finally, the new business was designated 
the manufacture royale des Andelys.lvi 
Although one might cite other examples of exclusive privileges 
accorded on the advice of the Council of Commerce, one must 
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admit that the council turned down most of the requests it received 
for such national or local monopolies. It always did this in cases 
where an exclusive privilege granted to one manufacturer would 
have hurt other manufacturers already engaged in making the 
same product. If a man could not offer a new product or tech­
nique, or if he could not prove that his own enterprise would be the 
first of its kind in a particular area, then he was not likely to receive 
an exclusive privilege. Therefore, the council in 1703 rejected a 
request by some individuals that they be the only ones in France 
permitted to manufacture glue in the English fashion.114 These 
persons had claimed that their new product would save Frenchmen 
from needing to purchase such glue from England. The council 
decided, however, that their new product was very similar to the 
ordinary glue already made in France and that an exclusive privi­
lege might therefore drive many French workers out of business. 
For the same reason the council in 1705 turned down the request 
of a Marseilles businessman for the sole right to produce starch 
(amidon) in Provence; there were already many workers producing 
starch in the province, and such a monopoly would have thrown 
them out of work.115 
If the council was rather hesitant about the granting of new 
exclusive privileges, it showed no reluctance when it came to re­
affirming the exclusive privileges that had been originally granted 
by Colbert and others prior to 1700. Almost invariably the council 
voted to renew such monopolies whenever the terms of the original 
grants were about to expire. The council, for example, gave strong 
support to the manufacture royale des glaces, which continued to hold 
its virtual monopoly over all high-quality plate glass and mirrors 
throughout the eighteenth century.116 
Another manufacture royale that had been founded by Colbert 
and that received the warm backing of the Council of Commerce 
was the van Robais firm in Abbeville. Colbert had lured the Pro­
testant Josse van Robais from Holland in 1665 with promises of 
lavish royal patronage. In return for producing woolens of the 
highest quality, van Robais was granted an exclusive privilege in 
the Abbeville area. In addition, he received huge government loans 
and subsidies. By the early eighteenth century, the van Robais firm 
had more than 1,200 employees.117 
The Council of Commerce had numerous opportunities to dis­
play its favor for this particular enterprise. In 1708 the van Robais 
family requested that all their workers be exempted from personal 
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taxes and that throughout the remainder of the war their woolens 
be able to pass into Spain without any internal or export duties; 
both requests were granted.118 In October 1710 van Robais's ex­
clusive privilege for the production of high-quality woolen cloths 
within a ten-mile radius of Abbeville was renewed. 
All was nearly lost in 1711, however, when the van Robais family 
was rocked by a scandal. The founder of the company, Josse van 
Robais, had left behind two sons, Josse and Isaac. Isaac, however, 
died in 1703 and thus the lettres patentes of October 1710 that re­
newed all the privileges of the company named as directors Josse 
and his sister-in-law Marie, the widow of Isaac. About this same 
time, however, Marie married the valet of her dead husband, a 
man named Vasseur. Josse van Robais and the children of Marie 
felt disgraced by "this shameful mesalliance" since Vasseur was 
"without education, without experience and without money."119 
The affair climaxed in 1711 when it was discovered that Vasseur, a 
former Huguenot, had relapsed to Protestantism. 12° He was com­
pelled to flee to Holland, and Marie soon followed, taking many of 
her valuables with her. The van Robais family was shaken by this 
scandal, and their entire enterprise seemed about to founder. Josse 
van Robais asked that the recently issued lettres patentes be revised so 
as to exclude Marie van Robais from any ownership of the family 
business. 
The whole affair was sent to the Council of Commerce. The 
council set to work at once to determine all the holdings of the van 
Robais factory and to draw up new plans for the administration of 
the company. Arrets were issued on 12 May 1711 and 28 June 1712 
naming Josse van Robais and two of his nephews (the two eldest 
sons of Marie) as directors and dividing up Marie's interest in the 
enterprise among her children.121 Although this affair was some­
what unusual, it accurately reflects the care with which the council 
treated most of the established manufactures royales. 
The bulk of French manufactures, of course, were on a scale 
much smaller than that of the van Robais family. Except for the 
very small enterprises, all of these manufactures were required, at 
least officially, to purchase royal charters. Hundreds of these estab­
lishments were in return granted nonexclusive privileges—hence 
the name manufactures privilegiees. These privileges often included 
exemption from billeting troops and from payment of the taille, or 
freedom from the milice, guet, curatelle, and tutelle. Frequently the 
government also presented new and promising entrepreneurs with 
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gifts of money or loans at favorable rates of interest. Finally, the 
crown often favored manufacturers by allowing them to pay lower 
import duties on raw materials needed for their goods or lower 
export duties on the finished products being sold abroad. 
Both Levasseur and Cole argue that government support for 
new manufacturers declined after Colbert's death. As proof they 
assert that the number of privileged manufactures created after 
1683 dropped sharply. Levasseur says, in fact, that only twenty 
such enterprises were established between 1683 and 1715.122 
Neither Cole nor Levasseur cites any quantitative evidence, either 
from Colbert's period or later. To answer this question conclu­
sively, one would have to uncover all the relevant lettres patentes 
issued from the 1660s to 1715—a task of formidable dimensions. 
If one looks at the records of the Council of Commerce, how­
ever, one comes to a conclusion at odds with that of Cole and 
Levasseur. Certainly the government had less money to hand out 
to prospective entrepreneurs during the final two wars of the 
reign, but it continued eagerly to grant privileges of other sorts to 
newly created manufactures. From 1700 to 1715 the proces-verbaux 
mention specifically more than forty cases where the Council of 
Commerce discussed the formation of enterprises endowed with 
privileges ordinaires.123 It is certain that the number of such under­
takings actually created during this period far exceeds this num­
ber. A typical example of these sorts of privileges occurred in May 
1712 when the council approved the creation of two new bottle-
making plants, one in Vivier (near Folembray) and the other in 
Ozouer-la-Ferriere (near Paris). The owner and employees at each 
establishment were to receive exemptions from the taille, curatelle, 
tutelle, and from quartering troops.124 
Another type of favor granted to manufacturers was payment of 
a gratification to the entrepreneur for each piece of cloth pro­
duced. This acted as an incentive for production and generally 
applied to cloths destined for the foreign markets. Thus it hap­
pened that one of the encouragements given in 1714 to a merchant 
named Jacques Lefevre to establish a woolens factory in Aries jvas 
that the king would give him three livres for each piece of cloth he 
produced for the Levant.125 In Languedoc it had been the prac-
tice—begun probably under the prodding of Colbert—tor the pro­
vincial estates to give each manufacture royale in the province one 
pistolle (approximately ten livres) for each bolt of cloth dispatched 
to the Levant. At least three different times during the first fifteen 
years of the eighteenth century, the estates asked to be relieved of 
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this obligation.i26 The deputies of commerce vigorously criticized 
this proposal, arguing that French manufacturers needed all the 
help they could get at a time when they had a chance to drive the 
English and Dutch out of the Levant market. The commissaires 
agreed with the deputies, and the estates were told to continue the 
gratification, which they did.127 
In addition to bestowing such privileges as these on hundreds of 
businessmen, the crown sought to protect old, established indus­
tries from new products and techniques. It may be argued that in 
so doing the monarchy was impeding progress, but this policy had 
great popular support, including that given it by the Council of 
Commerce. 
The policy of protecting older industries from new ones had 
originated early in the seventeenth century, but its practice grew 
apace under Colbert and his successors. The use of indigo in dye­
ing cloths, for example, had long been restricted so as not to com­
pete with woad. In 1664 the making of half-beaver hats was pro­
hibited in order to protect the sale of hats made entirely of beaver. 
This ban was lifted by an arret of 10 August 1700 when the gov­
ernment realized that the freedom to mix beaver hair with other 
types of hair or wool might actually increase the consumption of 
beaver. The government likewise sought to protect button-makers 
from new competition. Traditionally, buttons had been made of 
metal, silk, or the horns of animals, and each type was made by a 
particular guild. In the 1690s, however, a new kind of button be­
gan to be made by tailors and haberdashers. The new buttons were 
made of the same material as the garment to which they were 
attached (wool, linen, etc.). The makers of old-style buttons pro­
tested vociferously against this innovation, and the crown re­
sponded by issuing a declaration on 25 September 1694 outlawing 
the new buttons. The new law proved to be difficult to enforce, but 
the government did its best to see that it was observed. One could 
cite several other similar cases where the crown sought to protect 
workers from new industries.128 
This general policy was firmly supported by the Council of 
Commerce, chiefly in three areas. The first of these, the manufac­
ture of brandy, has already been mentioned.l29 The council sought 
to protect the traditional wine and brandy industries from newly 
introduced brandies made from grape skins, apple cider, or honey. 
The new brandies were permitted to be made and consumed in 
only a few cities and provinces. 
A second area in which the Council of Commerce was deeply 
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involved was the manufacture of woolen stockings. Since early in 
the seventeenth century, silk stockings had been made on stocking 
looms or frames, but woolen stockings continued to be knitted by 
hand. Countless thousands of workers—usually peasant women or 
the sick and poor confined to hospitals—depended on their knit­
ting for their livelihoods. Beginning in the 1660s, however, 
workers in Lyons devised a method that also made possible the 
manufacture of woolen stockings on frames. One worker using a 
stocking frame could produce stockings faster and more economi­
cally than several persons toiling by hand. This practice grew de­
spite a crescendo of opposition from hand-knitters and the mer­
chants who sold their goods. The traditionalists won a victory in 
1684 when the government issued an arret ordering that one-half 
of all frames had to be used exclusively for silk hosiery,130 but the 
battle of hand-knitters (making bas au tricot) against modern ma­
chinery (bas au metier) continued. Finally the government issued an 
arret on 30 March 1700 that severely restricted stocking production 
on frames: the new arret henceforth limited stocking frames to 
eighteen cities.131 Owners of stocking frames in other areas would 
have to move them to these cities. 
After the Council of Commerce was established, it gave its fer­
vent support to this arret. The deputies of trade, who in 1700 called 
for liberte and who represented business interests, were the most 
vocal opponents of the free enterprise of the owners of stocking 
frames. During the years studied here, the council rejected numer­
ous requests by workers to set up, or to continue to operate, stock­
ing frames in cities other than those listed in the 1700 arret.152 By 
about 1713, however, it had become clear that the policy of restric­
tion was losing the battle: stocking frames were continuing to 
spread. Begrudgingly, therefore, the Council of Commerce had to 
make concessions. One by one, new cities were added to the origi­
nal list of eighteen. In 1714 and 1715 the cities of Falaise, Bayeux, 
and Valence won the right to have stocking frames, and this trend 
increased its pace in the years after 1715.133 
The third, and most famous, area in which the Council of 
Commerce participated in an attempt to prevent the growth of a 
new industry concerned the importation into France of cottons 
from the East, especially India. By the mid-seventeenth century, 
these cottons were becoming highly fashionable all over Europe. 
They were roughly of two types: white cottons and cottons of vari­
ous colors and designs. There were many varieties of the latter 
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type, though they were all generally referred to in France as toiles 
peintes or indiennes and in England as calicos. Beginning in the 
1660s, French workers began to imitate the toiles peintes. But 
whereas the original, Indian-made cloths actually had designs 
painted onto them with feathers or brushes, the French models 
had designs printed (imprimees) on them by means of a crude sys­
tem of wooden blocks. The French cloths were inferior in design 
and in color, and their colors tended to mix or to fade quickly. 
Nevertheless, the French imitations soon also came to be termed 
toiles peintes or indiennes, and by the 1670s their production was 
thriving in France. 
These new fabrics posed a deadly threat to the more traditional 
French cloths: woolens, silks, and linens. Workers from all over 
France virtually flooded the government with protests against the 
new cottons. The chief culprit was the East India Company, whose 
ships brought back more and more of the goods each year. By an 
arret of 26 October 1686, the crown at last decided to prohibit the 
sale of toiles peintes from the East and to forbid their manufacture in 
France.134 
From the very beginning, the new policy of prohibition faced 
rough going. The government was forced at several points to come 
to the rescue of the East India Company by allowing it to sell the 
Indies cottons in France. Marseilles, as a free port, also claimed the 
right to sell and use toiles peintes within its own borders. Worst of all, 
calicos were smuggled into the country in huge quantities, and they 
continued to be the rage among French nobles and bourgeois, 
especially the women. 
The story of toiles peintes in France—and the role played in it by 
the Council of Commerce—has been told at length elsewhere135 
and need not be described in detail here. Far from championing 
freedom of trade, the council became, in the words of Edgard 
Depitre, a "fierce partisan of the prohibition."136 During the 
period 1700-1715, the council drafted over a dozen arrets aimed at 
driving the new cloths out of the country. It successfully ended the 
rights of the East India Company to sell toiles peintes in France, 
although it failed to get the cloths banned from Marseilles.137 The 
council reinforced or stiffened the penalties for breaking the law. 
Any merchant found handling the prohibited fabrics was subject to 
a fine of 3,000 livres and banishment from the profession for life. 
Two-thirds of all fines were to go the denonciateurs who made 
known the crime. Any royal officials or employees of the tax farms 
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who were discovered permitting the commerce of toiles peintes were 
to be put in the galleys for nine years. All captured goods were to 
be confiscated; half were to be burned, and the other half were to 
be sold, on condition that they be exported from the country. 
The almost rabid hatred of the deputies of trade for the toiles 
peintes is, at least on the face of it, somewhat surprising. Only a 
minority of them were from manufacturing areas that would have 
been seriously hurt by the new fabrics (Lyons, Languedoc, Rouen). 
Most of the other deputies were from major commercial cities that 
would have benefited from the trade in toiles peintes. The fact that 
virtually all of them supported the policy of prohibition is perhaps 
a sign that the crown had been at least partially successful in getting 
the deputies to consider "the general good" above purely local 
interests. 
So it was that throughout this period the deputies repeatedly 
deplored "the prodigious consumption" of toiles peintes in France, 
which was estimated to value twelve million livres a year.138 They 
condemned the East India Company because, instead of bringing 
drugs and spices to France, it desired to bring products that caused 
"a considerable prejudice to manufactures and to all the trade of 
the kingdom."139 On several occasions the deputies bitterly criti­
cized "this degrading taste"140 of "the ladies of the court," who 
dared to wear Indian cottons in the palace of the king himself.141 
The effort to prevent the entry and use of printed or painted 
cottons was doomed to failure. As Depitre has explained, "That 
which, in the beginning, was just an affair of taste became a 
fashion, and fashion made it a necessity."142 The more legislation 
that the government issued against toiles peintes, the more that peo­
ple wanted them. In the years after 1715, the Council (later 
Bureau) of Commerce continued to legislate against them, with 
little more success. By the 1750s French workers had pirated from 
England the secret for using dyes on cotton, and this led the crown, 
in 1759, finally to repeal all prohibitions against the import or 
manufacture of toiles peintes in France.143 
An obvious lesson to be learned from all the above examples 
concerning toiles peintes, stocking frames, brandy, and other items is 
that one cannot prevent innovation or dictate taste by means of 
legislation. In every instance where this was attempted, it failed. It 
might, in fact, be argued that such restrictions actually damaged 
the economic development of the nation. There can be no doubt of 
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the fact that the strictures against toiles peintes hindered the de­
velopment of the French cotton industry. 
But, more important to our purpose here, two other points 
should be made. First of all, in each of these cases the crown acted 
out of a humanitarian impulse. Royal ministers and intendants 
repeatedly expressed their concern lest les pauvres or le menu peuple 
lose their jobs as a result of changing styles or techniques. Second, 
in each instance, at least in the early stages, the crown had wide 
popular support for its policies. When businessmen finally were 
given a voice in the formulation of royal programs, through the 
Council of Commerce, their deputies supported the same basic 
policies already espoused by the crown. 
One final method by which the government, aided by the Coun­
cil of Commerce, sought to help manufactures was through the 
conservation of raw materials. In Chapter Five it has already been 
noted how the council encouraged neutral and enemy countries to 
bring such goods to France. Similarly, the council strove to ensure 
that France's own natural resources were at the full disposal of its 
workers. This was done by controlling their use within the country 
and, if necessary, by prohibiting their export. 
Since woolens were the single most important type of cloth made 
in France, it was only natural that the Council of Commerce be 
concerned about the production of wool in France and about the 
well-being of France's sheep. The council supported the govern-
ment's policy of prohibiting the export of raw wool to France's 
competitors;144 and when, in 1714, some French merchants made 
known their intention to export sheep to Spain, the crown, at the 
behest of the deputies of trade, issued an arret prohibiting such 
export.145 Moreover, the council was always solicitous of the health 
and reproductivity of the nation's sheep. There were three to four 
million more sheep than people in France,146 and the council 
wished to ensure that this situation would not change. At the first 
sign of an epidemic among sheep or a decrease in their numbers 
due to some other cause, the council drafted arrets prohibiting the 
killing of sheep in one province or in the nation as a whole. These 
prohibitions lasted from several months to a year. At least six such 
arrets were issued from 1700 to 1715. Stiff fines were imposed on 
butchers, tavern owners, and other individuals who violated these 
laws. A more lasting solution to the problem was brought by an 
arret of 5 November 1710 and a declaration of 16 February 
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1712.147 These statutes forbade the slaughter of any lambs or 
sheep between Easter and Pentecost of each year. Since meat con­
sumption was already down during Lent, this meant that France's 
twenty-four million sheep were—at least in theory—protected 
from mutton-loving Frenchmen for about one-third of each year. 
The council also took other steps to protect or build up France's 
supply of raw materials. On numerous occasions it drafted arrets 
that temporarily prohibited the export of thistles, linseed, resin, 
and other articles used in the preparation of textiles.148 The 
council likewise proposed measures to conserve and augment the 
nation's dwindling timber supply.149 Similarly, the council urged 
the adoption of tax incentives and other inducements to get people 
to plant mulberry trees, in the hope that France could grow 
enough silkworms on its own so that it would not need to import 
raw silk from Italy and the Levant.150 
THE STATE OF FRENCH MANUFACTURES 
This chapter has concentrated on the government's program of 
regulation and encouragement of French manufactures. One 
matter that has generally been avoided is the question of whether, 
in actuality, this regulatory system helped or hurt French manufac­
tures. This question has not been posed basically because the at­
tempt here has been to study the administration of manufactures 
rather than the manufactures themselves. Nevertheless, the ques­
tion of the relationship between governmental control and eco­
nomic growth—during early modern times or any other period—is 
of vital importance. 
As a general rule, historians have assumed that royal interven­
tion must have had a deleterious effect on the economy. Biollay, 
for instance, has avowed that the only inspectors of manufactures 
who helped the economy were the ones who were too lazy to do 
their jobs and therefore let things run themselves.151 The under­
lying assumption beneath this historiographical aversion to the 
mercantilist program of regulation has been that French manufac­
tures declined in inverse proportion to the growth of state controls. 
The classic portrait that historians have drawn of French com­
merce and industry late in the reign of Louis XIV is therefore one 
of gloom: entire cities whose industries were destroyed, plummet­
ing trade figures, and decline in virtually every area of manufac­
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tures.152 Of course, many factors are believed to have been re­
sponsible for this: the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, wars, 
famines, royal monetary manipulations, epidemics, and tariff poli­
cies, among others. But historians have assumed uniformly that the 
"economic statism" or mercantilisme a outrance of Colbert's succes­
sors was a major element in this decline. 
Three responses might be made to this interpretation. First of 
all, no one as of yet has systematically endeavored to test the hy­
pothesis that government intervention must automatically hurt 
economic growth. John U. Nef, it is true, studied the relationship 
between industry and government in France for an earlier 
period153 and concluded that royal regulation had a damaging 
impact on industrial development. His conclusions are severely 
weakened, however, by his violent parti pris. He was writing in 
1940—at a time when democracy seemed to be endangered—and 
he tended to equate Louis XIV with Hitler. We therefore desper­
ately need a new analysis of the effect that royal controls had on 
manufactures.154 
Second, the mournful portrait of the French economy late in the 
reign of Louis XIV has been overdrawn. Several recent studies 
have shown that many areas of French commerce and industry did 
rather well late in the reign. Languedoc's production of woolens 
for the Levant increased gradually throughout the War of the 
Spanish Succession and then soared spectacularly in 1713, continu­
ing to rise until the 1780s.155 J. S. Bromley has likewise demon­
strated that the trade of several Atlantic ports increased during the 
war years.156 Pierre Deyon has argued that Amiens's manufactures 
experienced a growth cycle that began in 1680 and extended 
throughout the remainder of the reign.157 Markovitch has shown 
that the woolens industry grew in many regions (Toulouse, 
Alencon, Sedan, Montpellier, Poitiers, and others) between 1692 
and 1708.158 This fact is confirmed by two circular letters written 
to the inspectors of manufactures by Daguesseau—on behalf of 
Desmaretz—in September 1708. Desmaretz declared that he was 
"happy to be informed of the present state of all the manufactures" 
and then went on to encourage the inspectors to do their jobs well. 
In addition, he requested them to take a general survey of all the 
manufactures in their departments and to submit the results to 
him.159 Although some manufactures did decline late in Louis 
XIV's reign, others grew. Indeed, much recent research in French 
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demographic, industrial, agricultural, and commercial history is 
posing a sharp challenge to the traditional image of the economy at 
that time.160 
A third, and final, reply to the usual evaluation of royal regula­
tion of industrial growth is the message that this chapter has striven 
to convey. Royal statutes were born not of an overwrought esprit de 
reglementation within the royal ministries but out of a cooperative 
effort between the government and the business community. 
There was opposition to many of the regulations by unscrupulous, 
and even by honest, merchants and manufacturers, but there were 
probably even more who upheld the crown's efforts to regulate and 
promote native industries. The Council of Commerce in particular 
believed in the salubrious effects of royal intervention. Whatever 
the long-range impact of the crown's policies on the economy 
might therefore have been, it is clear that during the years under 
study here they had much popular support.161 
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9. See Chapter 3, nn. 71-79. Also, Mar., B7 507, fol. 59v, Machault to Pont­
chartrain, 25 October 1709. 
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dustrie. . . Louis XIV, pt. 2, chaps. 4 and 10; Auguste Dubois, Precis, p. 215; Emile 
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25. On a few occasions, extenuating circumstances did prompt the council to 
relax certain rules for particular individuals. In 1709 the council urged that, be­
cause of that year's economic disaster, fines levied for infractions be lowered (see 
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50. AN, FU 51, fols. 114, 283-86, 402v, 433v-35; F12 54, fols. 62-64, 87-88v. 
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1704; also piece 180, directors of the Chamber of Commerce of Lyons to 
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1704. 
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130.) 
59. Areas with little or no manufactures were not asked to pay. French Flanders 
(with important textile centers such as Lille) was also not included. I have not, as yet, 
been able to determine the reasons for this exemption. 
60. See AN, F12 750, dossier entitled "Etats de repartition des sommes auxquelles 
ont e'te' taxees les generalites de Poitiers, Pau, Moulins, La Rochelle, Auvergne, 
Tours, Orleans, Paris, Rouen, Chalons, Toulouse, Montpellier, Alencon, Caen, et 
de la Bretagne"; and "Etat des villes dont les corps de marchans doivent estre taxes." 
61. Unfortunately, some historians have seen the edict of October and have not 
realized that it was soon after revoked. Thus Charles Woolsey Cole {French Mer­
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62. A draft of the declaration can be found in AN, G7 1688, piece 103. Also see 
G7 867-881, de la Vigne to de la Garde, 28 January and 30 January 1705. 
63. Actually, merchants were not to pay directly toward this reimbursement. The 
money was to be raised indirectly, through small duties collected on all cloths pro­
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65. For example, AN, G7 1689, piece 82, La Cour de Beauval to Le Gendre, 16 
December 1710; piece 86, Fouille de Martangis to Desmaretz, 3 March 1710. 
66. Desmaretz's circular letter to the intendants, dated 11 September 1708, is 
reprinted in Boislisle, Correspondance des controleurs generaux, 3:11. Also see AN, G7 
1708, piece 242, "Expeditions concernant le commerce et les manufactures du 10 
septembre 1708." 
67. This survey is contained in BN, MSS. fr., 8037. This was the fourth such 
survey taken in France. Similar ones had been commissioned in 1664 (by Colbert), 
in 1692 (by Louis de Pontchartrain), and in 1703. The origins of the latter survey 
are not clear. Colbert's survey has not been preserved, but those of 1692 and 1703 
have been (in AN, G7 1685 and 1688 respectively). The surveys of 1692 and 1703 
are analyzed in Fontvieille, "Les premieres enquetes industrielles de la France." 
Markovitch discusses all four of these surveys in the various works of his that have 
already been cited. The 1692 survey is also discussed in Cole, Colbert and a Century of 
French Mercantilism, 2:573-88. 
68. See above, pp. 23, 45 n. 63. 
69. Although these semiannual reports were submitted regularly by the inspec­
tors of manufactures from 1700 on, very few of them have been preserved for the 
period to 1715. Markovitch errs, however, in concluding from this that the re­
quirement of submitting a detailed report every six months was not enforced until 
after 1715 (Markovitch, Histoire des industries francaises: les industries lainieres de Colbert 
a la Revolution, p. 475). The weekly lists of materials submitted by the controller 
general to the Council of Commerce (see above, Chapter 2, n. 64) and die letter 
books of Amelot and Daguesseau (F12 114-15, 122-25A) make clear mention of 
these reports. Several inspectors, in fact, submitted e'tats more often than twice a 
year. 
70. In 1691 Controller General Pontchartrain had requested that inspectors in­
clude such echantillons with their reports, but this does not seem to have taken effect 
(see Boislisle, Correspondance des controleurs-generaux, 1:560). On the council studying 
these samples, see AN, G7 1697, piece 23, Valossiere to [de la Garde?] 12 February 
1712. Many of these samples of cloth have been preserved in various cartons of 
series F12 at the Archives Nationales. For example, F12 649 contains pieces of serges, 
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71. Two of the inspectors of toiles doubled as inspectors of woolens, thus making 
the total 39, not 41. The departments of the inspectors did not necessarily cor­
respond to generalites. The following departments each had one inspector ef 
woolens: Beauvais, Aumale, Amiens, Rouen, Alencon, Caen, Nantes, Saint-Malo, 
Tours, Crevecoeur-Granvilliers, Berry, Orle'ans, Poitou, Bordeaux, Montauban. 
Brionde (parts of Auvergne, Montpellier, Quercy, and Rouergue), Auvergne-
Limousin-Xaintonges, Toulouse, Montpellier, Carcassonne, Nimes, Castres-Saint-
Pons, Dauphine, Dijon, Troyes-Chalons, Rheims, and Sedan. There were two in­
spectors in Paris, one at the bureau de la douane and one at the halle aux drafts. The 
departments of the inspectors oftoiles were Rouen, Caen, Alencon, Brittany, l-aval, 
and Lyonnais-Beaujolais. Of the four inspectors of incoming foreign manufactures, 
two were in Calais and Saint-Valery. The other two, who also served as inspectors of 
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prevent the entry of foreign textiles. In addition to these inspectors, special inspec­
tors were appointed from time to time for particular missions or projects; there 
were never more than one or two of these at a time. See AN, G7 1702, piece 187, 
"Etat general des inspecteurs des manufactures"; piece 188, "Me'moire"; piece 189, 
Etat for payment of inspectors from the tresor royal, 1711; G7 1703, piece 253, 
untitled register. 
72. That complaints from the Levant arose before 1707 can be seen in AN, F12 
115, fols. 79v, 100; F  " 122, fols. 177v-80; F12 123, fols. 21-22v, 113. On the prepa­
ration of the new regulation, see F  u 123, fol. 113; F  " 124, fols. 86-87, 153-54; F  u 
125, fol. 118-18v; AN, G7 1692, piece 54; G7 1704, piece 8; Boislisle, Correspondance 
des controleurs generaux, 3:17, Desmaretz to Le Bret and Cauriere [Cauviere], 12 
April 1708. 
73. A copy can be found in AN, AD XI, 42. 
74. AN, G7 1702, fols. 128v-32v, "Memoire sur le commerce des draps du 
Levant," by Basville, dated 22 January 1714. Also see AN, F  u 58, fols. 270-71, 
308v-9v, 313-13v, 320v-21 v. 
75. A copy is located in AN, AD XI, 42. 
76. Cole, French Mercantilism, 1683—1700, p. 154; Bacquie, Les Inspecteurs des 
manufactures, pp. 256-65. 
77. That is, the inspectors of toiles, the inspectors of foreign manufactures, the 
inspectors stationed in Paris, and die inspectors who were occasionally appointed 
for special purposes. 
78. AN, G7 1696, piece 95, Bore' to Desmaretz, 18 April 1711. 
79. AN, G7 1701, piece 214, Desmaretz to de la Garde, 24 November 1713. 
80. Bacquie (Les Inspecteurs des manufactures, pp. 100, 181) discusses this episode 
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appointed by some provincial estates. Bacquie's reasoning is that Desmaretz cer­
tainly must have known the names of the royal inspectors, since it was he who 
selected and supervised them. But it is clear from die letters written on this matter 
by Desmaretz, de la Garde, Daguesseau, and Valossiere that Desmaretz was indeed 
referring to the royal inspectors (see Boislisle, Correspondance des controleurs 
generaux, 3:516, circular letter from Desmaretz to intendants, 3 December 1713). 
There are two possible explanations for Desmaretz's ignorance on this point. First 
of all, the supervision of the inspectors was something diat the controller general 
usually delegated to the director of commerce and the Council of Commerce. 
Second, to expect diat anyone in the finance ministry should automatically have a 
list of all its functionaries, widi descriptions of their departments, is to place 
twentieth-century bureaucratic standards back into die early modern period. 
81. De la Garde labored to clarify the administration of the inspectors through­
out 1714 (see AN, G7 1703, piece 6, Valossiere to de la Garde, 10 July 1714; piece 
28B, Daguesseau to Desmaretz, 14 September 1714; and various other letters and 
documents in this carton). 
82. AN, G7 1702, pieces 159, 186-99. 
83. AN, G7 1702, piece 200, Desmaretz to de la Garde, 19 June 1714. The 
register itself is also in the same carton. 
84. AN, G7 1694, piece 293, Bore to Desmaretz, 17 August 1709. 
85. These figures are based on the reports of the inspectors in AN, G7 1685, 
1688. The generalite of Amiens actually produced many more woolens than did 
Montauban, but in the latter the production was dispersed over a wider area (see 
Markovitch, Histoire des industries francaises: les industries lainieres de Colbert a la Rn'otu-
tion, chaps. 4, 12). 
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86. Throughout the greater part of the reign of Louis XIV, no inspector was 
allowed to have an assistant. Late in the reign, however, the government gave tacit 
permission for a few of them—in especially large or busy departments—to appoint 
subinspectors (see AN, F12 114, fol. 1 lOv, Chamillart to David, 18 November 1700). 
Bacquie is correct in stating that subinspectors were not regularly created until 
about 1740 (Les Inspecteurs des manufactures, p. 108). Even then they remained few in 
number. 
87. See Cole, French Mercantilism, 1683-1700, p. 187; Levasseur, Histoire des classes 
ouvrieres, 2:224-25. The subdelegue of the intendant in Beam reported: "In this little 
department we do not have any corporations of craftsmen or merchants, since each 
trader or artisan carries out his affairs freely and independently, as at Nay and 
Bruges, where bavettes and cadis are made without any regulations; at Oloron, stock­
ings, cordeillats, bures and serges are made; . . .  " (Boislisle, Correspondance des con­
troleurs generaux, 3:6). 
88. AN, F12 1362A, Noette to Desmaretz, 19 April 1713. 
89. Markovitch argues repeatedly that most rural manufactures were eventually 
inspected, either sur place or when they were brought to town to be sold. Although 
he admits the possibilities of fraud, he affirms that only about five percent of total 
production escaped inspection in this manner. Other historians, without attempting 
to give percentages, argue that a far greater amount escaped inspection. See 
Heckscher, Mercantilism, 1:203-12; Deyon, Amiens, pp. 199-200; Pierre Goubert, 
Beauvais et le Beauvaisis de 1600 a, 1730, 1:127-32. Also consult E. Tarle, L'Industrie 
dans les campagnes en France au XVIIIe siecle; William M. Reddy, "The Textile Trade 
and the Language of the Crowd at Rouen 1752-1871," pp. 66-67; the January 1979 
issue of the Revue du Nord deals extensively with this subject. 
90. For example, AN, Fu 122, fol. 161, Chamillart to intendant of Paris, 21 
September 1706; AN, G7 1689, piece 4, undated and unsigned letter to Desmaretz; 
AN, F12 1891, Vallery to Desmaretz, 1 June 1713. Also see Boislisle, Correspondance 
des controleurs generaux, 3:28; Heckscher, Mercantilism, 1:140; Goubert, Beauvais et le 
Beauvaisis, 1:128; Leon and Labrousse, in Braudel and Labrousse, Histoire econo­
mique et sociale, 2:225-26, 355; James N. Hood, "Patterns of Popular Protest in the 
French Revolution: The Conceptual Contribution of the Gard," pp. 265-66. 
91. See AN, F  u 121, fol. 152v, Chamillart to Bignon, 12 January 1706. 
92. See Bacquie', Les Inspecteurs des manufactures, pp. 327-33; Levasseur, Histoire 
des classes ouvrieres, 2:340-41; Deyon, Amiens, p. 188; Heckscher, Mercantilism, 1:168; 
AN, F  u 115, fols. 63, 66, 77, 78, 83v; Fa 123, fols. 175v-77, 180v; F  u 55, fols. 
257v-58; F12 58, fols. 86-86v, 88v; AN, G7 1694, piece 95, de la Marque to Des­
maretz, 3 December 1708. 
93. AN, G7 1692, piece 125, Bertrand to Desmaretz, 19 December 1708. 
94. For example, AN, G7 1694, pieces 349-50, concerning the annulment of an 
arret of the Parlement of Metz in 1709; AN, F12 115, fol. 185v; F  u 123, fols. 13v-14. 
95. Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrieres, 2:213-214; Martin, La grand* indus­
trie . . . Louis XV, pp. 95-96; Goubert, Beauvais et le Beauvaisis, 1:127-32,307; Deyon, 
Amiens, pp. 199-200. 
96. Markovitch, "Le triple tricentennaire," p. 321. Bacquie's Les Inspecteurs des 
manufactures presents the strongest defense of the inspectors. Indeed, Bacquie him­
self was an inspector of manufactures early in the twentieth century, and his ad­
miration for his predecessors at times leads him to be overly apologetic. Heckscher. 
though not liking what the inspectors were doing, admits that they were often very 
effective in performing their jobs (see Mercantilism, 1:154-55, 169). 
97. Many examples are contained in AN, F11 730, as well as in other cartons in 
series Fia and G\ See F11 121, fols. 155v, 157; F11 122, fol. 159v; GT 1693, piece 60; 
Bonnassieux, Les Assemblies, pp. 14-15, 22. 
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98. Some historians have stressed the ignorance or incapacity of many of the 
inspectors (Martin, La grande Industrie... Louis XV, pp. 97-99; Biollay, Etudes 
economiques, pp. 455-60). Bacquie' and Markovitch, on the other hand, note that the 
government generally sought men experienced in manufactures. Oftentimes a man 
had to pass a test before being appointed (see Bacquie, Les Inspecteurs des manufac­
tures, pp. 142-57, 282-97; Markovitch, "Le triple tricentennaire," p. 320). During 
the period under consideration here, Daguesseau and Amelot were extremely 
scrupulous in their search for competent administrators. I have discovered only one 
instance where an appointment went to a man primarily because of court patron­
age. In this case a relative oiz.fem.me de chambre of" Mme de Maintenon was chosen as 
inspector of Orleans (see Boislisle, Correspondance des controleurs generaux, 3:57, 
Desmaretz to de Bouville, 30 September 1708). 
99. AN, F  u 730, Le Bret to Desmaretz, 3 May 1713. 
100. AN, F  u 123, fols. 64v-65, Chamillart to Basville, 28 December 1706. 
101. AN, F  u 730, Barolet to Desmaretz, 22 April 1713. Plessart, inspector in 
Amiens, defended himself in the same manner two years later (see ibid., Plessart to 
Desmaretz, 18 June 1715). 
102. The cotton and silk industries largely escaped inspection. French cotton 
production was relatively unimportant in this period and did not grow significantly 
until the second half of the eighteenth century. Lyons, the chief center for silk 
production, had bargained with the government and successfully defended its right 
to inspect silk itself (chiefly through the guilds). 
103. The statutes concerning these industries, as well as for textiles, can be found 
principally in the Recueil des reglemens and in the Collection Rondonneau (AN, series 
AD XI). 
104. Bacquie, Les Inspecteurs des manufactures, p. 195. 
105. As noted earlier, there were also two other means of helping manufactures. 
One, the exclusion of foreign manufactures, is described in Chapter 5. The other, 
tariff policies, is discussed in Chapter 7. 
106. See Warren C. Scoville, Capitalism and French Glassmaking, 1640-1789, p. 
125; and Parker, The Bureau of Commerce, p. 53. 
107. Although manufactures royales tended to be larger than manufactures privi­
legiees and to have greater privileges, often there was no significant difference 
between individual enterprises in the two groups. 
108. The council did, however, occasionally deal with the manufactures du roi—in 
particular with the tapestry factory at Beauvais. This establishment was experienc­
ing severe financial problems during this period. See, for example, AN, G7 1693, 
piece 13, letters and memoirs referred by Desmaretz to the Council of Commerce, 
22 February 1709; G7 1695, piece 113, d'Orsay to Desmaretz, 30 May 1710. 
109. The number 13 is probably too low. Others may have been accorded on the 
advice of the council without being mentioned in the proces-verbaux. 
110. Cole, French Mercantilism, 1683-1700, p. 116. 
111. AN, F  " 115, fols. 134-34v, "Memoire sur la proposition concernant une 
huille nouvelle." 
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FISCAL PROBLEMS 
Although its duties related primarily to trade and industry, the 
Council of Commerce often dealt with issues pertaining to the 
king's revenues. In particular it concerned itself with the questions 
of taxes and customs duties, for these directly influenced com­
merce and manufactures. As noted earlier, two farmers general 
were appointed in 1700 to sit on the council. These men, Charles 
de Poyrel de Grandval and Jean-Remy Henault, attended the coun­
cil whenever matters directly pertained to the tax farms or to the 
king's revenues. It appears that this generally occurred in from 
fifteen to twenty meetings a year.1 
Before going any further, a word should be said about the 
farmers general and the fiscal organization of France. Going back 
at least as far as the fourteenth century, the French crown had 
found itself incapable of directing and carrying out all the tasks 
incumbent on it. The practice therefore arose of leasing out to 
private businessmen various functions that we today normally con­
sider to be tasks of the government. As the country grew in size and 
as the central authority expanded its power, so also the private 
contractors who performed public services increased in number. 
By the seventeenth century these individuals were known by sev­
eral names: gens d'affaires, partisans (from the partis, or syndicates, 
into which they grouped themselves), and traitants (from the traites 
they signed with the government). These individuals or groups 
carried out a host of functions, such as supplying the army and 
navy, selling government offices, and managing the postal and 
transportation networks. 
These enterprisers also frequently became involved in state fi­
nances; hence they were called financiers. By definition these were 
men who were charged, in one capacity or another, with either the 
collection or the expenditure of royal funds.2 Broadly speaking, 
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financiers can be divided into two groups. First, there were those 
who held a venal office of some sort and who were a part of the 
bureaucratic machinery at work under the controller general of 
finances. These men held the posts of gardes du tresor royal, tresoriers 
generaux, payeurs des rentes, and receveurs generaux, among others. In 
theory they were royal servants, but their ownership of the posi­
tions they held made them relatively independent of any strict 
control from above. Although these officeholders were compelled 
to lend large amounts of money to the crown (in the form of notes 
based on future revenues), many of them were able to amass huge 
fortunes by using royal funds in their personal business ventures. 
For the most part, these financiers regarded their royal offices as 
only one part of their larger schemes of private investment and 
speculation. 
A second group of financiers were the tax farmers. The French 
crown had long before discovered that it could not manage the 
cumbersome job of collecting the myriad indirect taxes that were 
placed on the movement of goods involved in internal and foreign 
trade.3 Therefore it had become accustomed to farming them out 
to individuals, who signed leases valid for a certain number of years 
and took it upon themselves to collect them. Whatever money these 
tax farmers collected above the lease price was their own personal 
profit. As a result of this arrangement, the crown guaranteed itself 
a definite income without having to worry about the uncertainties 
and headaches arising from the task of collection. By the seven­
teenth century, the number of different tax farms was in the 
hundreds. 
Colbert sought to simplify this complex system by consolidating 
many of the local customs duties and by replacing the host of small 
tax farms with a few larger ones. His greatest step in this direction 
occurred in 1680, when he created the fermes generates unies. Into 
these general farms were placed most of the indirect taxes collected 
in the entire country. These impositions had dozens of names, but 
they can roughly be divided into the following categories: the 
gabelles (salt tax); the aides (excise duties, mostly on wine and other 
alcoholic beverages); the domaines (taxes from the king's lands or 
old prerogatives); the traites or douanes (customs duties); and the 
octrois (duties collected on goods passing into or out of certain 
towns).4 
The collection of these taxes was leased to a group of men called 
the farmers general. These men (who at First numbered forty and 
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later sixty) formed the most important group of tax farmers in 
France from 1680 until the Revolution.5 Their headquarters was 
in Paris, but they had clerks (commis) and inspectors all over the 
country. Their employees numbered perhaps 35,000, of whom 
15,000 served in armed brigades that constantly patrolled the 
countryside searching for smugglers. The 20,000 others manned 
bureaus and collection points in more than 1,000 places in France; 
more than half of these were located in the interior of the king­
dom. At regular intervals (usually every six years), the Company of 
the General Farms renegotiated the terms of its contract and 
signed a new lease with the government. As was true with finan­
ciers in general, the crown relied heavily on the farmers general as 
a source of short-term credit; in this manner the government could 
spend money that would not be collected for one or more years in 
the future. In order to guarantee that they would make a good 
profit from the lease they held, the directors of the company made 
sure that their entire operation worked as efficiently as possible. 
The cool determination of their commis in the provinces to collect 
all that was due to them made the farmers general, and tax farmers 
as a whole, a favorite target for discontented subjects throughout 
the eighteenth century. 
In their general memoirs of 1700-1701, several of the deputies 
of trade attacked various abuses being committed by the employees 
of the farmers general. They also criticized the existing system of 
French tariffs and internal tolls. Judging from this one would have 
expected the deputies to become ardent crusaders against the tax 
farmers and the tax system. Indeed, several historians have as­
sumed that there must have been a basic antipathy between the two 
sides.6 
Such was not the case. To be sure, the deputies often bitterly 
disagreed with the farmers general on major questions, but just as 
often they sided with them. The remainder of this chapter will 
explore the ways in which the deputies, and the council as a whole, 
cooperated with, or tried to reform, the French fiscal system. 
BALANCE OF TRADE 
One question on which all members of the Council of Commerce, 
including the farmers general, agreed was the need to establish a 
favorable balance of trade. Only by doing this could France guar­
antee healthy markets for its manufactures and agricultural goods 
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and conserve its supplies of gold and silver. Several of the deputies 
mentioned this in their general memoirs of 1700-1701. The entire 
system of the "equivalent"7 that the council enforced throughout 
most of the war was part of an effort to ensure that France sold 
more than it bought from other countries. 
It is hardly surprising to learn that plans for a favorable balance 
of trade were not new in 1700. The bullionist element of mercan­
tilism naturally required that a government seek to have one. Thus 
in 1664 Colbert ordered the tax farmers charged with customs 
duties to draw up and submit to him alphabetized tables of all 
exports and imports.8 Armed with this information, he hoped to 
be better able to determine if France was buying more than it was 
selling abroad. Nothing much resulted from this project, however, 
and in 1692 Daguesseau, director of commerce, tried to resurrect 
it. Working with de Lagny, Daguesseau ordered the commis posted 
on all French borders and in all ports to submit periodic, detailed 
reports on all exports and imports. In 1693 Daguesseau wrote to 
Controller General Louis de Pontchartrain that 
there is nothing so necessary, Monsieur, for administering trade than 
having exact records of all the imports and exports of the kingdom and 
to compare these two sets of figures every year.9 
The controller general approved this plan. Sometime late in the 
1690s, he appointed one of the farmers general, Henault, to com­
pile records of imports and exports for the entire kingdom.10 The 
reglement of September 1699 that distinguished the commercial 
responsibilities of the controller general from those of the secretary 
of state for the navy included among the former's duties the tabula­
tion of France's foreign trade statistics. *l 
Despite all these initiatives, however, the program never really 
worked. The commis in the provinces were often either too over­
worked or too irresponsible to send in the reports and Figures 
requested of them. The disruption produced by the final two wars 
of the reign also helped undermine the project. 
Nevertheless, after the Council of Commerce was erected, a 
majority of its members adamantly insisted that France needed 
reliable trade statistics. Without such figures the government could 
not determine a proper tariff posture, they affirmed, since it would 
not know whether too many or too few foreign goods were enter­
ing the country. These considerations led the deputies to clamor 
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repeatedly for better records on French foreign trade. They were 
seconded by Amelot and Daguesseau, who, as directors of com­
merce, had direct contacts with the farmers general and their 
commis. On several occasions these two men reminded the commis of 
their obligation to send in trimestral reports listing all goods pass­
ing through their bureaus.12 Amelot's secretary, de la Vigne, re­
corded all the figures that were submitted.13 Imperfect as these 
data were, they formed the basis for much of the commercial legis­
lation of the period. 
But despite these actions, few concrete results were achieved. In 
April 1710 Mesnager announced to Desmaretz that a new project 
for obtaining accurate trade statistics had been worked out with the 
farmers general.14 Daguesseau was to present this plan to the con­
troller general in person sometime soon thereafter, but once again 
the project languished. The Council of Commerce and the farmers 
general continued to work on the plan for a few months afterward, 
but then it was dropped.15 
Not until 1713 was the government finally prompted to act de­
cisively on the notion of firmly establishing a balance of trade. The 
reason for its sudden haste was the treaty of commerce signed with 
Great Britain at Utrecht in April of that year. This treaty made it 
seem probable that trade barriers between the two nations would 
be significantly lowered. During the negotiations at Utrecht, it had 
become clear that the English representatives were well informed 
on their country's trade and were thus in a position to know what 
demands they should make and what concessions they could afford 
to grant. The basis for their self-assurance was the commercial 
statistics that had been kept regularly since 1697 by the inspector 
general of imports and exports.16 
The French delegates at Utrecht, however, had no such stock of 
commercial figures to guide them in their decisions. It became 
clear that the French envoys who were going to travel to England 
later that year to iron out the final details of a trade agreement 
would be at a tremendous disadvantage if they did not have ac­
curate statistics on their nation's foreign commerce.17 It was in 
order to provide them with this information that the crown created 
a bureau de la balance du commerce on 18 April 1713.18 This bureau 
was headed by Grandval, one of the two farmers general in the 
Council of Commerce. He was assisted by a handful of specially 
appointed commis who were posted in several of the major cities of 
the country. These commis gathered data from the ordinary commis 
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situated on the frontiers. All this information was then forwarded 
to Grandval, who constructed tables each year showing the general 
picture of French trade. In return for this work, Grandval and his 
commis were granted a small subsidy from the royal treasury.19 
The bureau de la balance du commerce functioned from 1713 until 
1791.20 The figures that it furnished often were incomplete, but 
they nevertheless provided an approximate estimate of the state of 
French trade. They were the basis for much of France's economic 
planning in the eighteenth century. 
TARIFFS 
The standard view of the Council of Commerce leads one to 
expect it to have been a staunch proponent of lower tariffs21 and 
an unremitting foe of tax farmers. These latter, according to the 
popular consensus, defended high customs duties at every avail­
able opportunity. The evidence afforded by the deputies' general 
memoirs of 1700-1701 is not conclusive on these points. To be 
sure, the deputies decried what they considered to be extravagant 
taxes imposed on trade, and they excoriated the abuses perpe­
trated by many commis of the various tax farmers. As noted earlier, 
however, they did not attack the system of tax-farming itself, and 
they did not oppose the idea of protective tariffs.22 
The testimony of the next fifteen years is likewise mixed. On 
dozens of occasions, the Council of Commerce helped establish 
new, or revise old, tariff agreements and customs duties. In general 
the council did endeavor to moderate what it judged to be exces­
sively high impositions; but in a significant number of cases, it 
either refused to lower, or it actually raised, tariffs. Furthermore, 
there was a much higher degree of cooperation and basic agree­
ment between the deputies and the farmers general than might 
have been anticipated. 
It is impossible here to mention every incident relating to this 
subject, so only a few of the more representative cases will be dis­
cussed. We have already seen, in Chapter 5, that the Council «f 
Commerce helped formulate the arret of 6 September 1701. The 
arret drastically raised import duties on many articles coming from 
England, Scotland, and Ireland. In addition, the council agreed 
that during the war years the Franco-Dutch tariff of 1699 was void. 
Dutch mechandise entering the country therefore had to pay the 
same, higher duties imposed on goods from other nations. 
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After the accession of Philip V to the throne of Spain, everyone 
agreed that closer commercial ties were needed between that 
country and France. The first step in this direction was the negoti­
ation of a new tariff agreement between Spanish and French 
Flanders. During the War of the League of Augsburg, trade be­
tween these two areas had been severely restricted; and because of 
high customs duties, the situation had improved little since the 
conclusion of the war in 1697.23 In an effort to lower these tariff 
barriers, the two nations began commercial negotiations in Brussels 
sometime late in 1701. France was represented by the intendant of 
maritime Flanders, Dugue de Bagnols, and by the farmer general 
Grandval. The Spanish delegation was led by the treasurer general 
of Spanish Flanders, the comte de Bergeyck. Although both sides 
agreed in principle, they became bogged down over details. As a 
result, the discussions dragged on for nearly two years. The French 
attributed the delay to what they considered the traditional Spanish 
lethargy. In December 1701 Amelot wrote to Grandval, "It is true 
that one needs patience in any kind of neogotiation, and I see by 
that which you wrote to me that the Spanish phlegm has been 
transmitted to the ministers in Brussels.24 Throughout the ensuing 
months of discussions, the Council of Commerce remained in close 
contact with the French delegation.25 The opinions of the deputies 
were, as a rule, quickly forwarded to Brussels. Although the depu­
ties agreed that some moderation of tariffs was necessary, they 
were unwilling to go as far as the Spanish desired. 
The comte de Bergeyck favored an across-the-board lowering of 
duties by both sides. As the situation was at present, he declared, 
Spanish Flanders purchased 21 million livres worth of goods from 
France each year; but French tariffs prevented it from selling more 
than 6 million livres worth of goods in return.26 What Bergeyck 
especially desired was that textiles from his territory have easy 
access to the entire French market. 
The Council of Commerce, however, balked at the notion of 
reducing the tariff wall protecting French manufactures. The 
deputies further noted that the king's revenues would suffer if 
import duties were lowered too much.27 But the chief concern the 
deputies had was that the government of Spanish Flanders was not 
doing enough to decrease its trade with the Dutch. They insisted 
that Bergeyck sever all trade with the enemy. They feared that 
unless this was done the Dutch would take advantage of any low­
ered tariffs and freely pass their goods into France via Spanish 
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Flanders. France, the deputies claimed, could supply the territory 
with all that it needed. Piecourt, of Dunkirk, went so far as to say 
that the question of whether the Flemish really needed goods from 
Holland was superfluous. He said that this was wartime and that 
the defeat of the Dutch—not the welfare of Spanish Flanders—was 
the only thing that mattered.28 
The deputies were so stubborn on these points that French of­
ficials were forced to disagree with them. Intendant Bagnols ad­
mitted that Spanish Flanders was heavily dependent on supplies 
from Holland; to demand that the territory cut off all trade with 
the republic was totally unrealistic.29 Even Farmer General Grand-
val voiced his support for lower French customs duties. He had 
fewer fears than did the deputies that France would be inundated 
with Dutch goods, and he argued that at times lower tariffs can 
increase trade and, in so doing, augment royal revenues. Thus, for 
example, Grandval argued that France should reduce the newly 
imposed taxes levied on coal entering France from Spanish 
Hainaut and on lime leaving French Flanders for the Spanish ter­
ritory. He explained that new taxes such as these often have un­
foreseen, harmful consequences and cause more inconveniences 
than they are worth.30 In several other instances, Grandval took a 
similarly flexible position. The highly ironical situation therefore 
arose in which a tax farmer favored a lower tariff in the interest of 
trade, but merchants (that is, the deputies) supported a higher 
tariff in the interests of royal revenues and protection of native 
manufactures. 
An accord was finally reached on 15 March 1703 when Bagnols 
and Bergeyck signed a new tariff agreement.31 The document 
provided a compromise solution to nearly every question. Duties 
were lowered on oils, hats, clothing, salt, glass, books, and a hand­
ful of other items entering Spanish Flanders from France. The 
latter reciprocated by lowering import duties on several types of 
articles coming from Spanish Flanders, including books, charcoal, 
coal, tapestries, and a few types of cloth. But whereas these goods 
could now enter French Flanders fairly easily, they were still sub­
ject to pay relatively high duties when passing into France's central 
provinces (the cinq grosses fermes). The Council of Commerce thus 
had succeeded in protecting the bulk of the country from foreign 
competition. The 1703 agreement did, however, grant free passage 
for the remainder of the war to manufactured goods passing 
through France from Spanish Flanders to either Italy or Spain. 
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The tariff of 15 March 1703 was satisfactory to neither side. The 
comte de Bergeyck and merchants in his territory complained that 
France got the best of the arrangement, and they persistently asked 
that France lower its import duties even further. The Council of 
Commerce, on the other hand, charged that the authorities in 
Brussels were not actively discouraging Flemish-Dutch trade. The 
deputies deplored the fact that les republicans were able to smuggle 
many of their goods into France through the "Flemish connection." 
After 1706 the tariff became basically a moot question. Most of the 
Spanish territory was captured by the allied armies in the summer 
of 1706, and the areas that remained under the control of the 
comte de Bergeyck had few goods to exchange with France. Fol­
lowing the conclusion of the war, a new tariff had to be negotiated 
with what had become the Austrian Netherlands. 
Other examples might also be cited to show that the deputies or 
the other members of the council were not always enthusiastic 
about lowering customs duties. For example, in 1708 the council 
rejected a proposal to reduce import duties on foreign tin.32 Dur­
ing and even after the war, the council also argued in favor of 
maintaining the high taxes imposed on English products by the 
arret of 6 September 1701.33 
But on nearly two dozen occasions during this period, the coun­
cil supported—and obtained—a reduction of various duties. In 
1701, for instance, the council drafted an arret abolishing the droit 
de marque on all hats made in France.34 Several times the council 
was instrumental in moderating import duties on butter and cheese 
coming from Holland, Ireland, and Scotland.35 It likewise helped 
decrease tariff impositions on foreign merchandise brought to 
France in prize vessels.36 In 1708 the deputies, working with the 
farmers general, thwarted a plan to raise export duties on French 
wines and brandies.37 This added tax would have forced up the 
prices of these products and thereby damaged their sale abroad. 
It should be mentioned that in a majority of cases where the 
council either lowered taxes or opposed their increase it had the 
complete support of the farmers general. The company's two rep­
resentatives in the council, Grandval and He'nault, usually agreed 
with the deputies that the needs of commerce or the good of the 
state demanded the lower rates. They likewise agreed that lower 
taxes did not necessarily decrease the king's revenues, for if the 
level of trade rose, then too would the number of taxable transac­
tions. But as will be demonstrated below, relations between the 
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farmers general and the other members of the council were not 
always harmonious. 
TARIFF REFORM 
The previous section has shown that the Council of Commerce 
did occasionally act to change individual parts of the French tariff 
system. Of much greater importance during this period, however, 
was a movement within the council to reform the entire tariff struc­
ture. By the late seventeenth century, the French customs network 
had become so complicated that it virtually defies a clear explana-
tion.38 Export and import duties were collected not only on the 
borders of the country but also at hundreds of points within. These 
duties, which went by various names, were a medieval heritage, 
dating back to the time when France consisted of dozens of autono­
mous or semi-autonomous principalities and fiefs. The taxes that 
were levied at the borders of these territories remained in effect 
even after the lands themselves were incorporated into France 
proper. Numerous examples of these duties could be cited. Every 
article passing through the territory of Lyons had to pay the douane 
de Lyon. A traite foraine was collected on virtually all goods passing 
into or out of Provence, Languedoc, and Dauphine. If a merchant 
wished to transport merchandise by land across France, he most 
likely had to pay several such export and import duties.39 
The one exception to this rule was the area of France known as 
the cinq grosses fermes. This area received its name from the fact that 
most of the indirect taxes collected within it were at one time leased 
out to five large companies of tax farmers. The cinq grosses fermes 
were formed in the fourteenth century and included most of the 
provinces in the northern half of the country.40 Together they 
constituted a large free trade area. Merchandise traveling from 
Rheims to Rouen, for instance, did not have to acquit any customs 
dues along the route. 
The cinq grosses fermes constituted one of three basic customs 
regions within France. The other two were the provinces reptUees 
etrangeres and the provinces de Vetranger effectif To pass from one of 
these three areas into another was very nearly like entering another 
country insofar as tariffs went. The subdivision of France into 
these three regions was largely due to the failure of one of Colbert's 
plans. Colbert had hoped to unite France into a single customs 
union. His vehicle for achieving this was the tariff of 1664. He had 
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intended for the new import and export dues of this tariff—col-
lected on the frontiers of the country—to replace all internal cus­
toms duties. Unfortunately for Colbert, however, the plan en­
countered fierce opposition among many French provinces, who 
feared royal encroachment and the loss of their various particular 
fiscal privileges. In the end Colbert managed to get his tariff ac­
cepted only by the provinces of the cinq grosses fermes. The new 
tariff wall that now surrounded this area set it even further apart 
from the rest of France. Items entering the cinq grosses fermes were 
subject to the same uniform duties, whether they came from an­
other country or from another part of France. 
In an effort to protect all French manufactures from foreign 
competition, Colbert established a second, higher tariff in 1667. 
This tariff was truly national, for it encompassed the cinq grosses 
fermes as well as most of the remainder of France (the provinces 
reputees etrangeres).41 A few scattered areas remained outside this 
tariff wall, and they were therefore truly foreign territories insofar 
as tariffs were concerned.42 
At first the 1667 tariff had applied to only fifty-seven foreign 
products and to four French products; these were primarily manu­
factures that the crown did not want to enter France and raw 
materials that it did not want to leave. From 1667 to 1700 a large 
number of other items were added to this tariff. These additions 
came to be known as the nouveaux droits. Together with the 1667 
tariff, they were referred to as the droits uniformes—from the fact 
that each type of article was subject to the same duty regardless of 
where it entered the country. 
It was these droits uniformes that aroused the ire of most of the 
deputies of trade. In their general memoirs, they complained that 
many of these tariff duties were excessively high. As a result, they 
claimed, foreign merchants directed their business away from 
France, and other nations erected high tariff walls against French 
products. The new, higher duties also caused internal problems. 
They added to the perplexing array of customs duties that had to 
be paid on goods passing through the country. Many unscrupulous 
commis of the farmers general took advantage of the confusion to 
levy whatever taxes they wished, and unsuspecting merchants were 
therefore frequently overcharged. 
The government was aware of all these problems before the 
Council of Commerce brought them to its attention. Late in the 
1690s Controller General Pontchartrain established an informal 
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commission to study ways of reforming the nation's tariff structure. 
The individuals involved in it included Daguesseau, Amelot, de 
Lagny, Grandval, Henault, Anisson, and several Parisian mer-
chants.43 The group met regularly in the homes of Amelot and the 
farmers general. It accumulated a large inventory of recommenda­
tions, and it worked to reconcile differences between the needs of 
the tax farms and the needs of trade. Although nothing definite 
resulted from these meetings, at least a start had been made toward 
a genuine reevaluation of the customs system. 
When the Council of Commerce was created in 1700, it contin­
ued where this commission had left off. The question of tariff 
reform remained of crucial importance during the first ten years of 
the council's existence. The projet du nouveau tarif, as it was called, 
was mentioned specifically in the proces-verbaux seventy-seven times 
from 1701 to 1710,44 but this reflects only a small part of its gen­
eral importance. It was also the subject of regular meetings held 
outside the council proper. These meetings were held in the homes 
of Amelot, Anisson, d'Ernothon (one of the maitres des requetes in 
the council), and Valossiere. De la Vigne helped collect informa­
tion needed for the study, and he preserved all the relevant data.40 
The quest for a new customs system was much broader than the 
"single duty project" described by John Bosher. It also involved an 
attempt to lower, or at least to readjust, both export and import 
duties. The most salient episode in this regard took place from 
1701 to 1703. In the meeting of 10 June 1701, the council ap­
pointed a three-man committee to study ways of altering the 1664 
tariff so as to help French manufactures.46 This committee con­
sisted of Anisson, Mesnager, and Peletyer. They did not take long 
in reporting back to the council. They suggested first that higher 
duties plus some prohibitions be placed on English manufactures. 
This proposition aroused the opposition of a few of the other 
deputies, but the issue was quickly settled. The result was the arret 
of 6 September 1701. A second set of proposals recommended that 
export duties either be reduced or abolished on six basic kinds of 
French manufactures: cloths made of silk or of silver or gpld 
thread; cloths made of wool or wool mixed with either silk or hair; 
hats (in particular those made of beaver from Canada); paper and 
playing cards; linens; and cotton cloths.47 The council agreed to 
lower export duties on these commodities, and an arret to that 
effect was issued on 24 December 1701.48 
The farmers general were quick to voice their displeasure with 
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this arret,49 claiming that the tax farms would lose more than 
400,000 livres a year.50 They further argued that the arret was a 
breach of the contract they had for the tax farms and that they 
would have to be idemnified by the crown for any losses they suf­
fered. 
Horrified by the prospect of being further indebted to the Com­
pany of General Farms, the crown capitulated and issued the arrets 
of 2 April and 3 October 1702.51 The first of these nullified or 
watered down the tariff reductions announced in the arret of 24 
December 1701. The second declared that many internal customs 
duties still had to be paid, both on goods destined for abroad and 
on those traveling from one part of France to another. 
Despite this setback the deputies continued in succeeding years 
to campaign for various reductions in the French tariffs. A memoir 
drawn up sometime after 1707 lists 116 types of goods for which 
they believed that export duties should be lowered.52 For reasons 
that will be discussed below, few of these recommendations were 
ever enacted; but lest one assume that the farmers general were 
always the ones responsible for defeating proposals for lower 
tariffs, one should note that frequently the deputies themselves 
were divided on the question. A debate that took place in 1703 
concerning a moderation of import duties on foreign manufac­
tures illustrates this point. The deputies of Nantes, Saint-Malo, and 
Bordeaux attacked the 1667 tariff and the nouveaux droits. These 
high customs dues drove foreign merchants away from France and 
made it difficult for Brittany and Guienne to sell their wines and 
other products abroad. These deputies therefore desired that for­
eign manufactures be able to enter everywhere, not just through 
Calais and Saint-Valery. They further demanded that import 
duties on foreign manufactures be reduced to ten percent of value, 
attacking those deputies who supported import duties as high as 
thirty or forty percent.53 
Other deputies, chiefly those from the more industrialized prov­
inces, fervently supported the high tariff wall that protected 
French manufactures. They explained that if this barrier was 
lowered, then English and Dutch textiles would sell more cheaply 
than those produced within the country and France would soon be 
deluged with foreign goods. These deputies finally exclaimed that 
their adversaries in the council, "the partisans of the vineyard," 
were filled with "a blind passion" to sell their wine, no matter the 
cost to the general good.54 
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Interspersed with these discussions about raising or lowering 
customs duties was the ongoing examination of what Bosher has 
aptly termed the "single duty project."55 This plan aimed at creat­
ing a uniform tariff wall around all of France, thereby eliminating 
all internal customs dues. Its goal therefore was to erase the tariffs 
that separated one province from another and that set the cinq 
grosses fermes apart from the provinces reputees etrangeres and the 
provinces de Vetranger effectif. 
The primary crusader for the droit unique was Jean Anisson, 
deputy from Lyons. His chief allies were Mesnager (Rouen) and 
the various deputies from Paris and Languedoc. These men were 
generally supported by the two chief members of the council, 
Daguesseau and Amelot. Over a period of several years, Anisson 
wrote numerous memoirs in which he enumerated the benefits 
that his project would bring.56 By reducing all customs levies to a 
single export or import duty paid on the frontiers of the country, 
French goods would be subject to fewer taxes; they could therefore 
be sold abroad at lower prices and be better able to compete on the 
international market. They could also be sold more cheaply on the 
domestic market, thereby eliminating much foreign competition. 
By making France into a single customs area, one could bolster the 
political and economic unity of the kingdom. Finally, Anisson 
countered possible objections by positing that the king's revenues 
would not be damaged by the proposal. Because trade would be 
increased, the tax farms would actually benefit from the change. 
He likewise noted that Colbert himself had had the original idea 
for abolishing all internal tariff barriers,57and thus the project 
could not, according to Anisson, be labeled a dangerous innova­
tion. 
The general reformation of French tariffs, of which the single 
duty project was but a part, failed for a number of reasons. The 
farmers general heatedly criticized it. They remonstrated that the 
decrease or abolition of various customs duties would do irrepar­
able harm to the royal treasury—and thus to their own also. It 
would be unfair, however, to accuse the farmers general of being 
hidebound doctrinaires opposed to any changes in the tax farms. 
As noted above, they frequently supported the moderation of dif­
ferent taxes. The deputies had great respect for Grandval and 
He'nault and had a good working relationship with them.58 
One must take into consideration the dire straits into which the 
general farms as a whole were thrown during the latter part of 
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Louis XIV's reign. The Wars of the League of Augsburg and the 
Spanish Succession were no less disastrous for the farmers general 
than they were for the king's revenues. The leases signed by the 
Company of General Farms in 1691, 1697, 1703, and 1706 steadily 
decreased in value.59 This meant that the company had to pay the 
government less for the right to collect the taxes, but the receipts 
from these farms also plunged dramatically during these years. 
The farmers general therefore were losing money themselves, and 
the government found it to be increasingly more difficult to find 
groups of financiers willing to take over the enterprise. In 1709 the 
crown finally had to put the general farms in regie.60 Not until 1714 
could the government persuade the company to take over the 
farms again. 
The farmers general, who were after all businessmen, should not 
be too severely blamed if they did not wish to jeopardize further 
their position by accepting a potentially costly reformation of the 
tariff system. Grandval and Henault agreed that the reforms pro­
posed by Anisson and others would in the long run be beneficial 
for trade and for the king's revenues, but they argued that such 
changes would be unprofitable in the short run.61 The genuine 
sympathy that the farmers general had for the reform plan was 
demonstrated by later developments. In the 1720s, when the 
country's economic and financial situation was somewhat brighter, 
the farmers general were numbered among the most ardent back­
ers of the single-duty project.62 
The Company of the General Farms was far from being the only 
opponent of this project during the War of the Spanish Succession: 
the crown itself also was leery of it. Even if the government did 
believe that in the long run a reduction of customs duties would 
help the royal treasury, it could not afford to sacrifice part of its 
income for several years while waiting for this to occur. Both 
Chamillart and Desmaretz realized this fact, and they made clear to 
the Council of Commerce that no such plan was feasible at that 
moment.63 
If the troubled state of royal finances during wartime helped 
prevent adoption of the single-duty project, there were yet more 
profound factors militating against it. These obstacles arose, ironi­
cally enough, within the Council of Commerce itself. The plain fact 
is that most of the deputies of trade, and the majority of French 
merchants as a whole, were not ready for such a change. The 
mutual jealousies and the sensitivity about regional privileges that 
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made themselves known on other issues likewise thwarted the im­
plementation of the droit unique. 
Throughout the nine years when the subject was debated in the 
council, the deputies constantly bickered among themselves con­
cerning just how much the customs duties should be reduced. As 
noted earlier, deputies from manufacturing regions wished to re­
tain a high tariff wall around French textiles, whereas those from 
agricultural regions wanted to lower these impositions. Deputies 
from the Atlantic ports attempted to slip into the draft of a new 
tariff plan a clause abolishing the 20 percent duty collected on 
Levant goods that did not pass through Marseilles. That city's 
deputy noticed the article and fulminated against the treachery of 
those who wished to destroy his city.64 Similarly, Anisson uncov­
ered a plan by other deputies to insert a clause in the new tariff that 
would have removed Lyons's monopoly on the silk trade.65 He 
listed numerous reasons as to why "the good of the general trade of 
the kingdom" required that his city's privilege be maintained. 
The most vehement adversaries of the single-duty project were 
the deputies of Nantes, Saint-Malo, Bordeaux, and La Rochelle.66 
With the exception of the latter, all these cities were in the provinces 
reputees etrangeres. Thus, it was much easier for them to trade with 
other countries than with the rest of France. The duties imposed 
on goods entering and leaving their ports were in many cases lower 
than the taxes that would have been chargd if the goods traveled 
inland to the cinq grosses fermes. If a new tariff wall were placed 
around the borders of the country, it would limit the foreign trade 
of these cities and compel them to seek markets within France. 
Such a move, according to these deputies, would severely disrupt 
the customary business patterns of their cities, thereby seriously 
damaging their economies. In some cases the possibilities for in­
creased trade with the interior of the country were slim. Nantes's 
trade with the central provinces was sorely handicapped by a long 
line of privately and publicly owned tolls {peages) along the Loire 
River.67 Saint-Malo lacked both a river and a rich hinterland with 
which to trade. Bordeaux's neighboring provinces had little nee<j 
of that city's wines and brandies, since they were already well 
stocked with these goods. The deputies from these cities also 
claimed that if Brittany and Guienne lost their ancient fiscal privi­
leges, the "natural constitution" of these provinces would be de-
stroyed.68 
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One might also ask if the other deputies were truly prepared to 
make France into a huge free-trade area. The manner in which 
they treated France's northern provinces leads one to wonder. 
French Flanders, Hainaut, Cambresis, and Artois were all provinces 
reputees etrangeres. Goods passing between them and the cinq grosses 
femes were subject to duties set down in a special tariff issued in 
1671. Throughout the period under study here, merchants in 
these territories continually requested a moderation of the tariff 
barrier between their cities and the rest of France. After the tariff 
of 1703 was signed between France and Spanish Flanders, mer­
chants in Lille and other northern French towns protested that it 
was now easier for foreigners to trade with France than it was for 
them.69 Despite the justice of some of these claims, the Council of 
Commerce was very reluctant to reduce the tariff between these 
provinces and the rest of the nation. Merchants and manufacturers 
in other provinces feared competition from the well-developed 
textile industries in French Flanders and Artois. Therefore, most 
of the requests for low duties were rejected. The council also 
feared, during the war years, that the Dutch would fraudulently 
pass many of their own goods into France through French 
Flanders. When the city of Lille was captured by the allies in 1708, 
its merchants were literally shut off from the French market. At the 
same time the Council of Commerce abrogated the privilege of 
free passage across France for all Flemish textiles destined for 
Spain.70 
Even after the conclusion of the war, the deputies retained their 
inflexible posture toward French Flanders. In 1716 they opposed a 
suggestion by the farmers general that the 1671 tariff be lowered in 
the interests of trade.71 The deputy of Lille described the devastat­
ing impact of the war on his city's industries, and he beseeched the 
council to make it easier for Flemish textiles to reach markets in the 
interior of the country.72 The other deputies, however, stridently 
defended the existing tariff barriers. If one were to lower the exist­
ing customs duties on Lille's manufactures, they argued, "one 
should be resolved to see collapse the greater part of the manufac­
tures of the interior of the kingdom."73 
The general reformation of tariffs therefore had little chance to 
succeed early in the eighteenth century. The subject was not for­
mally debated in the Council of Commerce after 1710.74 Some 
discussion concerning it did arise in 1714, when a new lease on the 
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General Farms was negotiated;75 but for all practical purposes, the 
project had reached a standstill. It was revived at several points 
later in the century, but that is not part of our story here. 
THE DEPUTIES AND THE FARMERS GENERAL 
It should be clear by now that there was no unbridgeable wall of 
hostility between the deputies and the farmers general who sat on 
the Council of Commerce. Indeed, Grandval and Henault proved 
at times to be more flexible than the deputies on questions of tax 
reform. Nonetheless, the deputies did speak harshly of the tax 
farms in their general memoirs of 1700-1701, and it would be 
wrong to mitigate the importance of the merchant-tax farmer con­
flicts during this period. 
A memoir written sometime about 1708 describes as one of the 
most important functions of the Council of Commerce the settling 
of disputes between marchands and the commis of the farmers 
general and other tax farmers.76 These disputes usually arose 
when commis seized goods that were thought to be entering or 
leaving the country illegally or when merchants thought that the 
commis were arbitrarily collecting more money than was stipulated 
by law. Perhaps as much as 25 percent of the entire agenda of the 
council resulted from such quarrels. The council, however, usually 
treated these incidents under the heading of larger questions, such 
as the regulation of neutral and enemy trade during the war or the 
reformation of tariffs. In the chart in the appendix, most of these 
cases have therefore been placed in categories other than that of 
"conflicts between merchants and tax farmers." 
Out of the hundreds of disputes that were brought before the 
council during this period, the commissaires and deputies decided in 
favor of the farmers general and their commis well over 60 percent 
of the time. In other words, the council agreed that the tax officials 
had only been doing their jobs and that it was the merchants who 
were at fault. In May 1708, for example, a Rouen merchant named 
Gide'on Vincent demanded the release of forty-three bales of cow 
and goat hair that had been seized by a customs official in that <?ty 
upon their arrival in a Dutch ship because these goods were not on 
the list of items permitted from the United Provinces. Further­
more, Vincent evidently knew this, since he had tried to hide them 
under a pile of other goods that were permitted to enter France. 
The deputies decided that the employee of the farmers general 
had been correct in seizing the merchandises. Since this was Vin­
Fiscal Problems 209 
cent's first offense, he was treated leniently: he was granted the 
release of the goods in question, on the condition that they be 
returned to Holland.77 Scores of other similar cases could be cited. 
In the great majority of instances, merchants had made honest 
mistakes, due to oversight or ignorance of the law, and had not 
intended to commit any frauds. 
On many occasions, however, the commissaires and the deputies 
decided that it was the farmers general or their employees who 
were in the wrong. Several times the council discovered that the 
farmers had been collecting taxes at rates higher than those pre­
scribed by law.78 Most frequently the council uncovered incidents 
where the commis, not the farmers general themselves, were at 
fault. This usually involved cases in which the commis had unjustly 
confiscated goods that were legally entering or leaving the country. 
A substantial number of commis were found guilty of negligence or 
outright corruption for frequently demanding gifts or bribes from 
innocent merchants. Many were accused of treating businessmen 
with contempt and of needlessly interfering with the flow of trade. 
In these cases the commissaires and the deputies generally re­
quested that the farmers general take the necessary steps to dismiss 
or reprove their employees. 
Although it would be virtually impossible to prove, it seems that 
the Council of Commerce was instrumental in at least partially 
improving relations between the merchant community and the 
farmers general early in the eighteenth century. With only a few 
exceptions, the deputies of trade were on cordial terms with the 
two representatives of the general farms who sat on the council.79 
For their part the farmers general willingly participated in the 
attempts to eradicate all the sources of friction between their em­
ployees and the general public. Action was taken in this regard as 
early as February 1701. In that month Amelot met with Grandval 
and He'nault, and together they drew up a new code of behavior 
for the commis in the provinces.80 In 1705 the deputies admitted 
that on every occasion when they had brought to the council com­
plaints by merchants against the commis they had obtained from the 
farmers general "all the justice which they had requested of 
them."81 Indeed, the farmers general had cooperated "with in­
finite courtesy and all the diligence that could be desired." This 
had led, according to the deputies, to a reduction in the number of 
legal suits brought by merchants against the commis before the juges 
des traites. 
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Of course, the farmers general and the other tax farmers were 
still disliked by the great majority of Frenchmen. Perhaps the most 
that one can say is that the spirit of conciliation engendered in the 
Council of Commerce during these years helped delay the more 
virulent popular outcries against the farmers general that began 
around the middle of the century.82 
MONETARY PROBLEMS 
The worrisome state of royal finances during the last twenty-five 
years of Louis XI V's reign has been too well documented to require 
description here.83 The controllers general of the period all strug­
gled valiantly to obtain money and credit for the state through a 
variety of fiscal expedients. Nonetheless, the crown became more 
and more indebted as each year passed. By the time that the king 
died, the government had already spent money that would not be 
collected for several years in the future. 
Occasionally the Council of Commerce was asked to give its ad­
vice on financial matters. Needless to say, the question of tariff 
reform and other issues surrounding trade and industry had al­
ready involved the council in matters that pertained indirectly to 
the king's revenues. But at several points from 1700 to 1715 the 
council helped determine policies that immediately concerned 
royal finances. 
One of the first subjects to which the council turned its attention 
after it was founded was royal monetary manipulations. In order to 
understand this, one must know the basic elements of the French 
monetary system. All goods and services in the country were evalu­
ated in livres, which formed the money of account.84 But livres did 
not circulate; instead, French currency consisted of a variety of 
coins {especes) the most important of which were the louis d'or (as its 
name implies, made of gold) and the silver ecu. The government 
assigned to these coins a value in livres. The problem was that, 
beginning in 1689, the controllers general of finances began in­
creasingly to tinker with the value of these coins, raising or lower­
ing their value with respect to the livre. The crown had various 
reasons for doing this. If it was expecting to receive a large pay­
ment, it was to its advantage to lower the value of the coinage 
(called diminution des especes). In this way relatively more coins 
would have to be paid to the government in order to equal the 
amount of livres that was owed. On the other hand, when the 
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government paid out money, it was to its advantage to raise the 
value of the currency, so that it would have to pay out fewer coins 
(an augmentation des especes). From 1689 to 1715 the crown per­
formed these two operations more than forty times. During this 
period the value of the louis d'or fluctuated between the low of 11 
livres 10 sous and a high of 20 livres, and the ecu between 3 livres 
and 5 livres.85 
Both contemporaries and historians have agreed that this tinker­
ing with the currency had a debilitating impact on the economy.86 
In their general memoirs of 1700-1701 and in subsequent writings, 
the deputies of trade were quick to catalog these evils. The basic 
result was that there was complete monetary instability. Not only 
was internal trade disrupted but many foreign merchants were 
reluctant to trade with France. What was worse, many Frenchmen 
deposited or invested their money abroad, where they could be 
sure of its value. 
This general problem was submitted to the Council of Com­
merce for discussion in 1701, and for the next three years, the 
members discussed it on several occasions. All the deputies were 
united on two points: first, that the monetary fluctuations must be 
brought to an end; second, that Frenchmen should be discouraged 
from sending their money abroad. Unfortunately for the govern­
ment, however, that was as far as any agreement went. From 1701 
to 1704 the deputies, commissaires, and farmers general wrote 
numerous memoirs on this subject.87 In these memoirs they dwelt 
on matters that seem arcane to the twentieth-century reader. They 
discussed, in minute detail, the metallic composition of French and 
foreign coins, and they pondered the exchange rates then in effect 
between the various European currencies. A debate that occurred 
in 1701 between several of the deputies reflects the general tone of 
all these memoirs and discussions. Descasaux du Hallay argued in 
favor of a diminution that would reduce the value of the louis d'or to 
11 livres and the ecu to 3 livres.88 He noted that these were the 
values that had existed under Colbert and up to the late 1680s, and 
by returning to these old, traditional standards, he averred, faith 
would be restored in the currency. This would encourage for­
eigners to increase their trade with France. It would also raise the 
value of French lettres de change on the international money market 
in Amsterdam, which in turn would mean that less money would 
leave the country. Opposed to this position were Samuel Bernard, 
Joseph Fabre, and several other deputies. They favored maintain­
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ing the louis d'or and ecu at a higher level— 12 livres and 3 livres 5 
sous respectively.89 They argued that if French coinage were 
valued at a fairly high rate, then Frenchmen would prefer to keep 
it within the country. In addition, foreigners would also be more 
willing to send their own coins into France, where they would be 
able to purchase relatively more French goods. In between these 
two positions, the deputies of Bordeaux and Lyons favored placing 
the louis d'or at 11 livres 5 sous and the ecu at 3 livres 2 sous.90 
Although the deputies used numerous "obscure reasonings" in 
examining this "abstract matter," they were unable to arrive at a 
solution satisfactory to all of them.91 Perhaps that is why the gov­
ernment no longer asked the council to discuss the subject after 
1704. 
In later years the council became involved in two other financial 
affairs that were of crucial importance to the crown. The first of 
these concerned the ill-fated billets de monnaie that the government 
began to issue in 1702.92 At first these treasury notes were ac­
cepted well by the public, for the crown promised to redeem them 
for currency to anyone bringing them to a hotel des monnaies. In 
1703 there were only 6.7 million livres worth of them in existence. 
But as the crown's financial plight deteriorated, it issued more and 
more of them, until by 1706 there were over 180 million livres 
worth of them circulating. Their value declined correspondingly, 
and by the end of 1706 they were worth only fifty-six pecent of 
their face value.93 Up until this time the billets circulated only in the 
area around Paris; and by an arret of 12 April 1707, Controller 
General Chamillart decreed that they should be accepted all over 
the kingdom. Henceforth one could use billets de monnaie to pay up 
to one-third of one's debts to the government or to other indi­
viduals. Merchants throughout the country immediately protested 
against this move. No one liked the idea of being paid in dis­
credited paper notes, nor would foreign merchants willingly accept 
this paper in return for merchandise they sold in France. The 
deputies of trade made all these objections known to the controller 
general.94 As a result of this popular outcry, the crown issued-a 
second arret on 10 May 1707 that once again restricted the circula­
tion of these notes to Paris and its environs.95 
The second affair in which the council was involved concerned 
plans for the establishment of a state bank in France. Several proj­
ects for such an institution were brought before the government 
during these years.96 Without a national bank, France lacked the 
Fiscal Problems 213 
credit facilities and the monetary stability that state banks had 
brought to Venice, England and the United Provinces. The most 
serious—and perhaps the only tenable—project for a royal bank 
during this period came from Samuel Bernard and his associates in 
1709. Despite the promising aspects of this plan, it possessed a fatal 
defect: the chief assets of the bank would be in paper (mostly billets 
de monnaie), not in gold and silver. Controller General Desmaretz 
neverthelsss considered Bernard's plan carefully, and he had 
several of the deputies of trade study it.97 In a memoir written late 
in 1709, the deputies mockingly compared the proposed French 
bank to the one in Holland: 
This image, true and sincere as it is, clearly shows that the Bank of 
Paris could resemble the Bank of Amsterdam in name only. The funds 
of the latter are composed entirely of gold and silver. One proposes to 
form the funds of the former with a material that is doubtful and 
discredited in the marketplace, that is to say paper bills which suffer a 
loss of 50 to 60 percent. One is therefore shocked to see that there are 
plans for erecting an edifice for credit and confidence on such a shaky 
foundation. Things being thus, what comparison can one make between 
the trade of France and Holland?98 
Desmaretz already had his own misgivings about the plan, and 
many financiers (especially Bernard's enemies) opposed it. It seems 
safe to assume that the doubts expressed by the deputies also had 
some bearing on the government's decision to reject the proposal. 
Another question relating to royal finances in which the Council 
of Commerce became involved was venality of office. The creation 
and sale of government offices was one of the expedients to which 
the hard-pressed crown increasingly turned during this period. 
Although historians have perhaps exaggerated the extent of this 
development, it is nevertheless true that during the last three 
decades of the reign dozens of new types of venal positions were 
established.99 Many of these were directly related to trade and 
industry—for example, examiners or guild officials of various 
sorts. Although the Council of Commerce never attacked venality 
of office per se, it did seek to limit its impact on the business com­
munity. New venal officers usually meant more inspections, more 
delays in the transportation of goods, and more fees to be paid. 
Although it was not always successful, on more than a dozen occa­
sions during this period the council did help defeat plans for the 
establishment of new venal positions. The most important such 
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episode, involving the creation in 1704 of inspectors general of 
commerce, has already been described.100 In other cases the 
council rebuffed a recommendation for sixty special cloth meas­
urers in Paris and a proposal to set up saffron examiners through­
out the country (saffron, or crocus, was used in dyeing textiles).101 
The council even had to reject a plan for making into a venal office 
the post of secretary in the Council of Commerce and in the cham­
bers of commerce.102 
It should be obvious from what has been said in this chapter—as 
well as in previous ones—that during this period the council clung 
to a staunchly bullionist position on most fiscal questions. The sys­
tem of the "equivalent," the drive to establish a favorable balance of 
commerce, the attempt to discourage individuals and companies 
from exporting gold and silver, all exemplified the traditional view 
of precious metals. This is not to say that the council viewed gold 
and silver alone to be a proper gauge of a nation's wealth. In their 
general memoirs of 1700-1701, several of the deputies acknowl­
edged that the country's prosperity was also based on its large and 
industrious population, its size, its natural resources, and its geo­
graphical location. Nevertheless, in these memoirs and in subse­
quent writings, the deputies repeatedly exhorted the government 
to do everything possible to build up its supplies of the precious 
metals.103 They pointed to the pitiful fate of Spain, which had 
permitted its huge hordes of gold and silver to escape to other 
lands. The deputies said that this example should make France 
"tremble," lest the same thing happen to her.104 The apparent 
shortage of metallic currency in France during the War of the 
Spanish Succession only reaffirmed the deputies' worst fears.105 
This fervent attachment to precious metals led the council to dis­
trust all forms of paper money and contributed to the deputies 
opposition to a royal bank. 
In summary, one can see that during this period the Council of 
Commerce offered invaluable aid to the crown on a wide range of 
matters relating to tariffs and royal finances. The council did not 
always win acceptance for its views, most notably in the case .of 
general tariff reform. But it did help establish a bureau for the 
collection of trade statistics, and it did achieve some moderation of 
customs duties. In addition, it acted as a conduit through which the 
interests of trade could be reconciled—at least partially—with the 
financial needs of the state. The policies that the council advocated 
were almost invariably of a traditional, mercantilist nature. 
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1. It is impossible to say precisely how often the farmers general attended the 
Council of Commerce. Sometimes the proces-verbaux state that they were present, 
but other evidence shows that they occasionally attended meetings and yet were not 
mentioned in the proces-verbaux. During the period 1701-8, the two directors of 
finances, who each sat on the council, often assumed the task of safeguarding the 
king's financial interests. 
2. On French finances and financiers, see J. F. Bosher, French Finances, 1770­
1795: From Business to Bureaucracy; Julien Dent, Crisis in Finance: Crown, Financiers, 
and Society in Seventeenth-Century France; Guy Chaussinand-Nogart, Les Financiers de 
Languedoc au XVIIIe siecle. 
3. The crown kept the collection of direct taxes under closer control. These 
taxes included the taille, capitation, dixieme, and vingtieme. The persons charged with 
collecting these taxes were the receveurs generaux, ordinary receveurs, and a number 
of other officials. For a general desription of the various taxes, direct or indirect, see 
Francois Hinckner, Les Frangais devant Vimpot sous Vancien regime. 
4. Any revenue farm that covered most of the country was called a ferme 
generate. The consolidated national company discussed here was the company of the 
fermes generates unies. But often it was simply called the fermes generates, and its 
directors were virtually always referred to as fermiers generaux. The taxes that the 
fermes generates unies included changed at different points from 1680 to 1789. From 
1680 to 1697 and again after 1730, for example, the royal tobacco monopoly was a 
part of them. On this, consult Jacob Price, France and the Chesapeake, 1:37-38, 52, 
and passim. For a brief description of the fermes generates unies, see George T. 
Matthews, The Royal General Farms in Eighteenth-Century France. Yves Durand studies 
the social and economic backgrounds of the farmers general in Les Fermiers generaux 
au XVIII siecle. Unfortunately for the present work, this book concentrates on the 
period after 1715. 
5. There remained numerous other tax farms, although none could compare in 
size and scope with the General Farms. Other tax farmers included those charged 
with the posts, the domaine d'occident, and the domaines of Flanders and Metz. 
6. For example, Bosher, The Single Duty Project, p. 29. 
7. See Chapter 5. 
8. Biollay, Etudes economiques, p. 485. 
9. AN, G7 1685, Daguesseau to Pontchartrain, 24 August, 1693. 
10. Mar., B7 499, fols. 380-81, de Lagny to Jerome de Pontchartrain, 12 Decem­
ber 1699. 
11. Mar., A2 XXXI, p. 162; reprinted in Neuville, Etat sommaire, p. 247. 
12. AN, F12 115, fols. 213-18, letters from Chamillart to various farmers general, 
30 December 1701; F12 124, fols. 138v-39, Desmaretz to farmers general, 27 March 
1708; F12 125A, fol. 64-64v, Desmaretz to various intendants, 18 September 1708. 
13. At times he was referred to as the "secretaire du commerce et des manufac­
tures de France" (see Pierre Goubert, Families marchandes sous Vancien regime: les 
Danse et les Motte de Beauvais, pp. 111-12, 120). 
14. AN, G7 1695, piece 70, Mesnager to Desmaretz, 7 April 1710. 
15. Ibid., pieces 104 and 107, Mesnager to Desmaretz, 20 and 28 May 1710. 
16. See Chapter 5, n. 13. Also see G. N. Clark, Guide to English Commercial Statis­
tics, 1696-1782; Ian Kenneth Steele, Politics of Colonial Policy: The Board of Trade in 
Colonial Administration, 1696-1720. On the French deputies' high opinion of the 
English statistics, see AN, G7 1704, "Memoire sur la ne'gociation . . .  " by Anisson. 
17. On these commercial negotiations with England, see Chapter 8. 
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18. The order of the king's council that created the bureau on 18 April 1713 was 
confirmed by an arret of 16 June 1716. Many of the records from the bureau are 
preserved in series F12 in the Archives Nationales. The fundamental work on the 
bureau is Ambroise Arnould, De la balance du commerce et des relations exterkures de la 
France. Also see Biollay, Etudes economiques, pp. 485 ff. 
19. In 1713 they received a total of 4,900 livres. In 1716 this was raised to an 
annual sum of 6,000 livres. Later in the century the bureau received as much as 
15,000 livres per year. See AN, F12 1834A, "Memoire sur la balance du commerce." 
20. In 1781 the bureau was transferred from the farmers general to the con­
troller general's office. See Michel Beaud, "Le Bureau de la balance du commerce 
(1781-1791)." On the bureau's performance throughout the century, see Leon, in 
Braudel and Labrousse, Histoire economique et sociale, 2:407 ff.; Pierre H. Boulle, 
"The French Colonies and the Reform of Their Administration during and follow­
ing the Seven Years' War," 1:234-35; 2:569. 
21. The word "tariff (ton/) was used in a variety of ways in the Old Regime (see 
Marcel Marion, Dictionnaire des institutions de la France aux XVHe et XVIIIe siecles, p. 
532). Here it is used in its most common sense, to denote a schedule of customs 
duties. The most famous examples were Colbert's tariffs of 1664 and 1667. As will 
be noted below, the Council of Commerce referred to its proposed revision of 
customs duties as the projet du nouveau tarif. The various taxes that were collected as 
part of a tariff were referred to in general as customs duties (traites, douanes). In 
practice, however the individual customs duties collected all over France went by a 
host of different names {Hard du baron, douane de Lyon, table de mer, traiteforaine, etc.). 
Customs duties were collected not only on the frontiers of the kingdom, but also at 
many regional borders located in the interior. Thus it is very easy to confuse the 
customs duties with the peages (internal tolls), and the octrois (taxes collected on 
merchandise entering or leaving certain towns), and the aides (excise taxes). Bosher 
explains that in general these latter types of impositions were mere taxes, whereas 
customs duties sometimes served to favor certain kinds of trade, or the trade of 
certain merchants, or certain areas, at the expense of others (see Bosher, The Single 
Duty Project, pp. 3-5). 
22. See Chapter 2. 
23. On commercial relations between France and Spanish Flanders prior to 1700, 
see AN, F12 662-70, "Traite' des marchandises de la flandre espagnolle par terre," 
no date. 
24. AN, F12 115, fol. 200v, Chamillart (i.e., Amelot) to Grandval, 9 December 
1701. 
25. Grandval did not remain continuously in Brussels. As a farmer general and 
as a member of the Council of Commerce, he had many affairs that called him back 
to Paris. Bagnols therefore became the chief French spokesman at the discussions. 
The bulk of the correspondence and memoirs concerning these negotiations is in 
AN, F12 646. Also see F12 51, fols. 78, 80v, 83v, 84, 128, 129v-30, 131—3 Iv. 
26. AN, F12 646, piece 178, Bergeyck to Chamillart, May 1704. 
27. Ibid., piece 19, "M. le depute de Lion sur la prevention des marchands deja 
ilandre espagnolle," 7 July 1702. 
28. Ibid., piece 210, memoir dated 14 November 1702. 
29. Ibid., piece 200, memoir dated 22 September 1702. 
30. Ibid., piece 13, "Me'moire du Sieur de Grandval touchant le droit de cinq sols 
ordonne' estre leve' sur le charbon venant du Hainaut espagnol.. . ," 21 July 1702; 
ibid., piece 22, "Me'moire du Sieur de Grandval sur I'introduction dans le Royaume 
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31. A copy can be found in ibid., piece 88. 
32. AN, F12 54, fols. 172, 173v. 
33. AN, F12 58, fol. 206-6v. 
34. AN, F12 51, fol. 69v. 
35. Ibid., fols. 365-65v; F12 54, fols. 216v-17; F12 55, fol. 116; F12 58, fols. 303-3v, 
383. 
36. See above, pp. 138-39. 
37. AN, G7 1692, piece 259, fols. 338v-^0, "Memoire des deputez au conseil de 
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des fermiers generaux." 
38. A concise description of it can be found in Bosher, The Single Duty Project, 
chap. 1. 
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octrois, and aides, among other taxes. 
40. See Cole, Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism, 1:416-23. The provinces 
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Chantoceaux, Dombes. 
41. On the tariffs of 1664 and 1667, see Elzinga, "Le Tarif de Colbert." The 
provinces reputees etrangeres included Angoumois, Artois, Auvergne, Beam, Brittany, 
Cambresis, Dauphine, Flanders, Foix, Forez, Franche Comte, Gascony, Guienne, 
Hainaut, Ile-de-Rhe, He d'Oleron, Languedoc, Limousin, Lyonnais, Marche, lower 
Navarre, Provence, Roussillon, Rouergue, Saintonge, and Vivarais. The duties 
specified in the 1667 tariff and in later arrets were not collected in Brittany and 
Guienne until 1692. See AN, F12 1910, memoirs by the deputies of Nantes, La 
Rochelle, and Bordeaux, all dated 25 March 1703. 
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Verdun), Lorraine (after it became French), the county of Venaissin, and the free 
ports of Marseilles and Dunkirk. These areas remained outside the royal customs 
system either because of their late annexation to France or because they wished to 
retain their relatively open trade with other nations. 
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mission's work, see AN, F12 114, fol. 58, Chamillart to Grandval and He'nault, 4 July 
1700; ibid., fols. 84v-85, circular letter to Chamillart to intendants, 4 September 
1700; AN, KK 1340, p. 509; AN G7 532, Anisson to Chamillart, 20 November 1699; 
AN, F12 51, fols. 312-13v; Bosher, The Single Duty Project, pp. 26-27. 
44. Bosher (The Single Duty Project, p. 29 n. 1) counts only 62 references to the 
project during this period. In addition to those instances where the prochain bail des 
fermes or le projet du nouveau tarif is directly referred to, I have included those cases 
where discussions immediately pertained to the reformation of the tariff system. 
This has produced a figure slightly higher than Bosher's. 
45. De la Vigne received 3,000 livres a year for the work he performed in this 
regard. This sum was usually included in the same hats as the salaries of those 
inspectors of manufactures who were paid by the royal treasury. (See AN, G7 1702, 
pieces 193-97.) 
46. AN, F1* 51, fol. 42v. 
47. Most of the documents relating to this entire episode are in AN, F" 1903, 
1910. See especially F12 1910, "Estat des marchandises sur lesquelles Mrs. les 
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deputes du commerce suplient d'accorder une diminution de droits d'entree et de 
sortie," 12 July 1701. A copy may also be found in Mar., B7 500, fols. 201-3v. 
48. A copy is in AN, F12 1910. 
49. Ibid., "Reponse des fermiers ge'neraux," 19 August 1701 (also in Mar., B7 
500, fols. 204-8); AN, F12 1903, farmers general to Chamillart, 3 January 1702. 
50. AN, F12 1903, "Etat de ce a quoi monte la totalite des droits des marchandises 
enoncees dans l'arrest du conseil du 24 decembre 1701"; ibid., "Estat pour justifier 
la perte que sufrira la ferme"; ibid., "Memoire sur l'arrest des six especes"; ibid., 
"Memoire du M. Chartier." The farmers general declared that in an average year 
the droits de sortie on these six types of goods amounted to 713,000 livres, but would 
plummet to about 300,000 livres if the arret of 24 December 1701 took effect. 
51. Copies are in AN, Fl2 1910. On these arrets see Bosher, The Single Duty Project, 
pp. 29-3 U 
52. AN, F12 1910, "Marchandises sur lesquelles Mrs les deputes estiment qu'il y a 
lieu de faire quelques changemens pour les droits de sortie." On the frontispiece the 
year 1702 is written, but a later page contains a reference to an arret issued in 1707. 
53. AN, F12 1910, "Mr. le depute de Bordeaux sur le projet du nouveau tarif," 25 
March 1703; ibid., "Mrs. les deputez de Nantes et de Saint-Malo sur le projet du 
nouveau tarif," 25 March 1703; ibid., "Sentimens d'une partie des 
deputes . . . ," 11 July 1703. The deputies from La Rochelle and Lille were also 
sympathetic to the arguments of the deputies from Brittany and Guienne (see ibid., 
"Mr. le depute' de la Rochelle sur la projet du nouveau tariff," 25 March 1703 and 
"Re'flexions de Mr. Taviel sur le projet cy-joint," undated). 
54. Ibid., "Reponse au memoire par lequel on demande l'entree des manufac­
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55. Bosher, The Single Duty Project, especially pp. 25-36. Most of the documents 
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56. Bosher, The Single Duty Project, pp. 31-33. 
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4069, p. 262). On other officials and private citizens who favored the measure, see 
Bosher, The Single Duty Project, p. 34. 
58. See the final passages of the "Memoire sur la reformation du tarif des cinq 
grosses fermes," written by several of the deputies in May 1705. It can be found in 
AN, G7 1687, piece 138, and F12 1910. 
59. Matthews, The Royal General Farms, pp. 54-58. 
60. Taxes were either farmed out or they were in regie. Taxes in regie were 
administered by officials within the controller general's office. 
61. AN, F12 1910, "Reponse des fermiers generaux au memoire par lequel on 
propose la decharge des droits de sortie sur six especes de marchandises," 19 
August 1701. 
62. Bosher, The Single Duty Project, pp. 44-52. 
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grosses fermes," 20 May 1705 (also in AN, F11 1910). The Council of Commerce 
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(see K11 51, fol. 237v). 
64. AN, F11 1910, "Mr. le depute' de Marseille sur le projet du nouveau tarif," 25 
March 1703. 
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FOREIGN RELATIONS AND 
OTHER EXTERNAL PROBLEMS 
The Council of Commerce helped shape French policies on mat­
ters that extended beyond the country's borders, and I shall 
demonstrate in this chapter the important ways in which it did so. 
These matters included Franco-Spanish relations, privileged trad­
ing companies, colonies, commercial negotiations, the French fish­
ing industry, and the spread of plagues. Because most of these 
subjects have received extensive treatment from other historians, 
there is no need to dwell on them at length here. I hope merely to 
call attention to an aspect of these topics that has been overlooked 
by most authorities: namely, the role of the Council of Commerce. 
FRANCO-SPANISH RELATIONS 
During the War of the Spanish Succession, French influence in 
the Iberian peninsula reached a height that it had never seen be­
fore or would ever see again—except perhaps under Napoleon. 
Acting as a loving grandfather and as a concerned ally, Louis XIV 
sent to Madrid a large number of officials and advisers to counsel 
the youthful and inexperienced Philip V. These individuals helped 
direct the Spanish war effort and sought to bind France and Spain 
together economically.l 
The highpoint of French involvement in peninsular affairs came 
in the period 1705-9. This was so mainly because of the work of 
two members of the French Council of Commerce: Michel Amelot 
and Nicolas Mesnager. From May 1705 to September 1709, Amelot 
served as French ambassador to the Spanish court.2 Thanks to his 
ingratiating personality, undisputed abilities, and unquestioned 
integrity, he was able to work with Spanish nobles and officials as 
none of his predecessors had been able to do. His power was so 
great that he functioned virtually as a royal minister. He sat on the 
224 The French Council of Commerce, 1700-1715 
Council of State (the despacho). From there he advised the king, 
appointed Spanish officials, and began to reform the government 
along French lines. His achievements were so remarkable that one 
historian has hailed him as "the Colbert of Spain."3 
Amelot's activities in Spain have been amply documented by 
various scholars,4 but Mesnager's work in Madrid has received 
much less attention.5 The Rouen deputy made two separate jour­
neys to Spain, remaining there from December 1704 to April 1706 
and from May to July 1708. Although Amelot, as ambassador, 
dealt with all manner of affairs, Mesnager's expeditions were 
purely commercial in aim. He was sent to Madrid by Controller 
General Chamillart to work with Spanish officials toward estab­
lishing closer commercial ties between the two countries. Along 
with Ambroise Daubenton, an agent of Jerome de Pontchartrain,6 
Mesnager for a time sat on the Spanish junta of commerce. His 
chief goal was the formation of a "union" of Franco-Spanish 
commerce that would have given Frenchmen greater privileges in 
the profitable Spanish colonial trade. Although he won many 
Spanish officials over to his project, little ever came of it. 
In addition to the work of two of its members in Spain, the 
Council of Commerce itself participated actively in advising the 
French government concerning trade relations with its ally. Only a 
small fraction of this activity is reported in the proces-verbaux of its 
meetings,7 but other evidence demonstrates clearly the important 
role that the council played. Jerome de Pontchartrain in particular 
seems to have relied heavily on it. I have discovered in the naval 
archives more than 250 letters relating to Spanish affairs from 
Pontchartrain to various members of the council for the period 
1700-1715.8 Evidence in the financial archives likewise testifies to 
the constant contact that Chamillart and Desmaretz had with the 
council on Spanish matters. Because Franco-Spanish relations were 
considered to be matters of state, and therefore secret, the minis­
ters preferred to consult with the individual commissaires and depu­
ties rather than have an open debate in a council. This fact is often 
mentioned in ministerial correspondence. Pontchartrain fre­
quently asked Daguesseau to discuss delicate matters with those 
"deputies who are the most knowledgeable and capable," in whom 
one could "have confidence."9 On a question involving French and 
Spanish privateering, Desmaretz wrote to Pontchartrain in March 
1711 that he had obtained the views of Daguesseau and Amelot; 
the controller general added that in such matters he never hesi­
tated in following their advice.10 
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Undoubtedly the most important question involving Franco-
Spanish relations during this period concerned the latter country's 
colonies in the New World. Indeed, both Louis XIV and Queen 
Anne of England avowed that the fate of Spanish America was the 
most important issue at stake in the entire war.11 Officially, the 
Spanish government had always prohibited its colonies from trad­
ing with anyone but the mother country. Foreigners wishing to 
participate in this trade had to take their goods to Cadiz and work 
through Spanish commissioners. Twice each year a fleet left Cadiz. 
Upon reaching the Caribbean, some of the ships went to Mexico 
and others to Central and South America. Although Spain jeal­
ously guarded her colonies, the increasingly weaker government of 
the late seventeenth century was unable to prevent ships of foreign 
nations from trading illegally with her empire. By the year 1700, 
the richest part of this empire was Peru, whose vast silver mines 
provided the money to keep the Spanish monarchy afloat. The 
Pacific waters off Peru and Chile were called the mer du Sud (South 
Sea). 
Throughout the seventeenth century, Frenchmen had often 
traded illegally with Mexico and the Spanish West Indies. Late in 
the 1690s, French ships began to traverse the Magellan straits and 
penetrate to the mer du Sud. The Spanish monarchy protested 
bitterly against these intrusions, but it was unable to make even its 
own colonial officials uphold the ban on commerce with other 
nations. French encroachments in the mer du Sud remained a con­
stant source of friction between the two states during the succession 
war. On the one hand, France did not want to irritate its ally, nor 
did it wish for England and the United Provinces to fear that it was 
working to capture the entire Spanish Empire for itself. On the 
other hand, the Spanish colonists were in dire need of European 
food supplies and manufactured goods, and they could afford to 
pay for them with silver coins and plate. Perhaps as many as 175 
French ships ventured to the mer du Sud from 1700 to 1715, bring­
ing back as much as 400 million livres worth of silver.12 
Officially the French government always prohibited trade with 
the Spanish colonies in the mer du Sud, but unofficially it oscillated 
between at least a dozen different positions throughout the war. At 
times it earnestly endeavored to prevent Frenchmen from par­
taking in this illicit trade, but at other times it allowed French 
vessels to go there, under the pretext that they were on "voyages of 
discovery." At still other times the government merely closed its 
eyes to this traffic and made little effort to prevent it. 
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Jerome de Pontchartrain reversed his position on this whole 
problem so often that historians have called him weak and vacillat­
ing. 13 The truth is, however, that Pontchartrain's personal position 
remained fairly constant throughout this period. He opposed the 
illicit trade with Spanish colonies for three reasons: first, it created 
much ill feeling between France and Spain; second, it deprived the 
French navy of many able-bodied seamen;14 third, it diverted the 
attention of French merchants and led them to neglect France's 
own colonies, especially the fledgling settlement in Louisiana.15 
But Pontchartrain had to contend with other forces. Controllers 
General Chamillart and Desmaretz steadfastly supported French 
trade in the mer du Sud because of the huge supplies of silver that it 
brought to France. They frequently worked behind Pontchar-
train's back by ordering local officials to tolerate illegal trade and 
by persuading the king to adopt a more lenient attitude toward 
it.16 The Council of Commerce also generally supported French 
merchants and worked to win approval for their "voyages of dis­
covery." Several of the deputies themselves were actively involved 
in this trade.17 In 1705 the council drew up plans that greatly 
increased the amount of tacit permissions that merchants were 
granted for their expeditions.18 
The council was also busy in other ways concerning the mer du 
Sud. It frequently acted as an arbitrator of disputes that arose be­
tween investors in the various expeditions destined for Peru.19 It 
served as final judge in all legal suits in which the government 
prosecuted merchants who had sent vessels there illegally.20 The 
council also helped regulate the number of ships departing on 
"voyages of discovery" in the Pacific; it did not want the South 
American market to be glutted with an oversupply of European 
goods.21 In January 1712, when the government finally decided in 
earnest to stop this trade, it fell to the Council of Commerce to 
draft the ordinance that embodied the new policy.22 
In addition to the mer du Sud question, the wartime alliance be­
tween France and Spain brought other opportunities and problems 
relating to trade.23 The Council of Commerce fully supported»the 
French effort to have Spain cut off all trade with the enemy.24 
France claimed that she herself would be able to supply her ally 
with everything' that she needed. Although this effort to make 
Spain totally dependent on France failed, the Spanish market for 
French goods did increase noticeably during the war.25 The 
Council of Commerce encouraged French artisans to imitate the 
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Dutch and English textiles that were so well liked in Spain, and it 
worked diligently to guarantee the high .quality of every article 
exported across the Pyrenees.26 The council also helped develop 
the entrepot trade of Bayonne: the city was granted numerous tax 
exemptions for goods that it received from other parts of France 
and from Holland for transshipment to Spain.27 The council had 
less success in its efforts to win for France a monopoly of the highly 
prized Spanish wools. Although Spain did reduce export duties on 
a limited amount of wool going to France, she refused to prohibit 
its export to England and Holland.28 
PRIVILEGED TRADING COMPANIES 
The Council of Commerce played no role in administering the 
chartered trading companies. That job belonged primarily to the 
secretary of state for the navy, although the controller general had 
to give his consent to the various privileges that each company was 
granted. But because the Council of Commerce played a major role 
in determining French trade policies in general, it was inevitable 
that many of its decisions should have a direct bearing on these 
companies. 
When the council was established in 1700, there existed seven 
great trading companies. These were the East India Company, the 
Senegal Company, the Guinea Company,29 the China Company, 
the North Africa Company, the Company of Saint-Domingue, and 
the Company of the mer du Sud.30 To these might also be added the 
royal tobacco monopoly, which at that time belonged to a group of 
financiers headed by Samuel Bernard.31 Each of these companies 
possessed exclusive trading rights with the area of the world or in 
the commodity listed in its charter. Each one also enjoyed a variety 
of privileges and tax exemptions. 
Despite these advantages, however, every one of these com-
panies—with the possible exception of the tobacco monopoly—was 
in dire straits throughout the period under consideration here. 
They were all in debt and being hounded by their creditors and 
stockholders. A number of factors contributed to their problems. 
These included the hazards of wartime, stiff competition from 
English and Dutch traders, and general mismanagement. The 
Company of the mer du Sud, which was founded only in 1698, was 
formally prohibited from trading with the area of its concession for 
most of the period after 1700. Several of the companies quarreled 
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among themselves, charging one another with violating their re­
spective trading monopolies, and these quarrels led to long and 
costly legal suits. By 1715 all these companies had either ceased to 
function actively or had leased their privileges to private indi­
viduals. 
As was noted in an earlier chapter, most of the deputies of trade 
criticized these companies in their general memoirs of 1700-1701; 
but at the same time, the deputies recognized the potential value of 
such chartered enterprises.32 They chiefly objected to the real or 
supposed abuses of which some of the companies were guilty. 
Several of the deputies in fact were members of one or more of the 
companies—either at the time when they served on the Council of 
Commerce or later.33 Although on more than one occasion from 
1700 to 1715 the deputies deplored the existence of trading 
monopolies, in actuality they were anything but hardened foes of 
the companies. 
The rather evenhanded approach that the Council of Commerce 
adopted toward the companies is demonstrated by the fact that the 
government generally relied on its members to judge the legal suits 
in which the trading enterprises often became embroiled. The 
naval and financial archives reveal scores of instances in which 
either commissaires or deputies were charged with investigating the 
affairs of the privileged companies. It is not surprising that the 
government should rely on the commissaires. As conseillers d'etat and 
maitres des requetes, they were already involved in many of these 
cases in various ministerial bureaus and in the conseil d'etat prive. 
But it is rather remarkable that the crown also frequently called on 
the deputies to perform this service. In order for legal squabbles to 
be taken out of the ordinary law courts and brought before the 
Council of Commerce or some of its members, both parties in the 
confrontation had to consent to it. The trading companies would 
never have done this if the council's members were known to be 
indomitable critics of such bodies. As it was, however, virtually all 
the members of the council participated in examining and judging 
disputes in which the companies were involved. For example, in 
1707 Fenellon, Anisson, and Mesnager were charged by Pontchar­
train with examining the financial problems of the Senegal Com­
pany in an effort to see what could be done to protect it from its 
creditors.34 These same deputies as well as Laurencin, Piou, 
Moreau, Vilain, and others worked at different times on the af­
fairs of the China, Guinea, and East India companies.35 More 
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often the commissaires alone met and sat as judges in cases involving 
the companies.36 Occasionally the council as a whole assembled to 
arbitrate disputes. In September 1706, for instance, it decided that 
the Company of the mer du Sud should be paid 220,000 livres by 
Noel Danycan (a wealthy Saint-Malo merchant) and the China 
Company. The latter two parties had amassed huge profits as a 
result of their trade with Peru.37 
The undogmatic, flexible approach that the council took with 
regard to the companies is perhaps best illustrated in the case of 
the East India Company. Throughout this period the council and 
the deputies frequently attacked the company for its practice of 
exporting precious metals and importing Indian toiles peintes. By 
1715 the council succeeded in totally prohibiting the company 
from transporting to France any sort of printed cottons and mus-
lins.38 In thus limiting the rights of the company, the council acted 
more out of a program to protect French bullion supplies and 
French manufactures than out of a desire to cripple the company. 
In fact, the council acknowledged that the company deserved most 
of its exclusive privileges, in order that it be recompensed for the 
heavy expenses incurred in establishing trade with the Orient. The 
council wanted the company to work harder at exporting French 
manufactures and at importing things that France really did 
need—especially drugs and spices.39 On several occasions the 
council decided issues in favor of the company. In 1713 it de­
fended the company's right to import coffee from Moka;40 and in 
1714 it agreed that the company should be able to import raw silk 
from the Far East, but, as noted earlier, Controller General Des­
maretz chose instead to protect the traditional silk-importing privi­
leges of the city of Lyons.41 
The Guinea Company was the only one whose actual charter was 
directly influenced by the Council of Commerce. Traditionally that 
company had an exclusive privilege over the African slave trade 
from the Sierra Leone River south to the Cape of Good Hope. In 
the fall of 1701, the company was reorganized and its privileges 
were renegotiated. The deputies of trade insistently demanded 
that the new company not retain that exclusive privilege. The old 
company had never been able to supply the French West Indies 
with enough slaves, and the colonies were suffering as a result of 
this lack of workers. The deputies therefore clamored for a com­
plete opening of the slave trade to all individuals. The new Guinea 
Company did maintain its monopoly, but, as a result of the depu­
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ties' remonstrances, the government ordered it to grant permis­
sions free of charge to any merchant who wished to enter that 
trade.42 During the next twelve years, the Council of Commerce 
made sure that the company obeyed this rule. The council was 
quick to complain to the government whenever it heard that the 
company was refusing to issue permits or was trying to make mer­
chants pay for them.43 In November 1713 the company was re­
organized once again, and this time the council succeeded in com­
pletely abolishing its monopoly. Henceforth the Guinea slave trade 
was open to anyone wishing to engage in it.44 
The trading company for which the council had the least sym­
pathy was the royal tobacco monopoly. The deputies45 charged 
that Saint-Domingue and other French colonies were languishing 
because the monopolists refused to pay them a fair price for their 
product. What was worse, the company often sent money from 
France in order to purchase tobacco in Holland.46 But one should 
not make too much of this opposition to the tobacco monopoly. In 
the fifteen-year period under study here, this company was dis­
cussed by the council on fewer than ten occasions. During the war 
years the major complaint against it was not that it was a monopoly 
but that it traded too freely with the Dutch and that it occasionally 
used Dutch ships in preference to French ones.47 
COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS 
Although diplomatic relations with other countries were chiefly 
in the department of the secretary of state for foreign affairs, the 
controller general and the secretary of state for the navy retained 
extensive rights in this area in matters relating to trade. It is there­
fore not surprising to learn that the Council of Commerce or its 
individual members also were quite influential in determining 
French trade agreements. Despite the fact that the commissures and 
deputies clung to a basically protectionist position, they did never­
theless help promote friendlier commercial contacts with virtually 
all of Europe. The pages that follow will first briefly discuss tra4e 
with Muscovy and Persia and then will treat the series of negotia­
tions that were connected with the peace treaties signed at Utrecht 
in 1713. 
Throughout the period under review, the Council of Commerce 
worked earnestly to establish better trade relations with Muscovy. 
In April 1701 the great Rouen banker Thomas Le Gendre pro­
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posed to Controller General Chamillart that France sign a trade 
agreement with the tsar,48 and the Council of Commerce, to which 
this matter was referred, heartily concurred.49 Muscovy could 
supply France with a host of raw materials, including hemp, furs, 
hides, and tallow; and it could provide a great market for French 
wines, brandies, sugar, woolens, and other items. As the situation 
then stood, however, there was virtually no direct trade between 
the two nations. Instead, the Dutch middlemen had become the 
"sole masters" of this commerce; they sent two fleets each year to 
Archangel. The deputies of trade urged that an agreement be 
signed in which the tsar would grant Frenchmen the same privi­
leges enjoyed by English and Dutch shippers. 
Nothing came of this proposal. The succession war and the war 
between Sweden and Muscovy were largely to blame. In the succes­
sion war Dunkirk privateers captured several Russian vessels, and, 
to the consternation of the tsar, French admiralty courts judged 
them to be valid prizes.50 What was worse, France refused to give 
up its traditional alliance with Muscovy's enemy, Sweden. Although 
Louis XIV and Peter the Great exchanged diplomatic envoys dur­
ing the war, no commercial accord was reached,51 and Franco-
Russian trade therefore continued for the most part to be chan­
neled through the Dutch.52 
After the war the prospects for a commercial treaty improved. In 
the summer of 1713, the tsar sent an envoy to Paris to negotiate the 
terms of such an agreement.53 Various members of the Council of 
Commerce set to work, in secret, to help bring this matter to a 
successful conclusion. Once again the project became snagged on 
several items, and the discussions dragged on into 1715. The tsar 
refused to lower import duties on French wines and brandies; he 
was at that moment trying to promote Russian viniculture, and he 
did not want it to be crushed in its infancy by foreign competition. 
Also at that particular juncture the French government was irri­
tated that the tsar had endeavored, unsuccessfully, to lure some 
French artisans to leave their country and come to Moscow.54 But 
the major obstacle to a settlement lay elsewhere. France secretly 
agreed that Peter the Great should be permitted to retain Saint 
Petersburg, his cherished port on the Baltic. The trouble was that 
this port recently had been won at the expense of Sweden. France 
could not sign any official treaty with Muscovy without alienating 
its old Scandinavian ally. For the time being no formal convention 
was signed between the two states,55 but the Council of Commerce 
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did encourage Frenchmen to go directly to Russia, even though 
they would not enjoy the special privileges that a treaty would have 
brought. In 1714 a company in Saint-Malo began to send ships to 
Archangel and Saint Petersburg, and by 1715 there were hopes of 
even greater direct links between the two nations.56 
French contacts with Persia were even more modest during this 
period. In 1708 a treaty of commerce was signed by the king of 
Persia and a French envoy to that country (one Sieur Michel).57 
This treaty established direct tariff regulations, and it catalogued 
the rights and obligations of all Frenchmen trading in Persia. De­
spite this encouraging opening of commercial relations, however, 
virtually no direct contacts were made between the two countries in 
ensuing years. There were two reasons for this. First, the English 
and the Dutch dominated the Arabian Sea during the war years, 
and their ships would have prevented any French vessels from 
trading with Persia. Second, French merchants complained that 
several articles in the treaty were either unfavorable to France or 
ambiguous.They claimed that England and Holland had received 
much better terms from the Persian government. Under such con­
ditions as these, no Frenchmen were willing to risk huge sums of 
money to open trade with that distant country. 
In February 1715 a Persian ambassador arrived at Versailles, 
and he opened negotiations for a revision of the 1708 treaty.58 One 
member of the Council of Commerce (Landivisiau) met with the 
ambassador in person on several occasions to discuss this issue. 
Several of the deputies also were asked by Pontchartrain and 
Desmaretz to give their advice. Landivisiau worked out a series of 
compromises with the ambassador, and he hoped that a new treaty 
would be signed.59 But the members of the Council of Commerce 
were sharply split into three mutually contradictory positions. First, 
the deputy of Marseilles objected to any treaty with Persia, on the 
grounds that it would ruin the trade of his city.60 Traditionally 
France obtained Persian goods indirectly, purchasing them from 
merchants in the Levant. As we have seen, Marseilles held a virtual 
monopoly over this trade. It did not want to lose it by seeing 
Frenchmen from other cities trade directly with Persia (which 
Marseilles considered to be a part of the Levant). The deputies of 
Lyons and Languedoc (Anisson and Gilly) championed a second 
position. They argued in favor of caravans across Turkey and 
Armenia that would establish direct links with Persia. They further 
believed that Persian merchants should be allowed personally to 
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bring their merchandise to Marseilles and other ports and receive 
all the privileges usually accorded to foreign businessmen residing 
in France.61 A third position was supported by Moreau (deputy of 
Saint-Malo) and Antoine Crozat (the financier and merchant who 
in 1712 had acquired a lease on all the privileges of the East India 
Company). They argued that all the trade with Persia rightly be­
longed to that trading company.62 Therefore this commerce 
should not go through the Mediterranean, but rather it should 
travel by means of the ocean. This would have the effect of giving 
the Persian trade to the Atlantic ports. The deputies of Lyons, 
Marseilles, and Languedoc joined together to refute this position. 
They pointed out that a Mediterranean route would save both 
money and time. They also noted that the privilege would be of no 
use to the company. The chief article imported from Persia was 
silk, and the arret of 13 March 1714 had already reaffirmed the 
exclusive right that Lyons, Marseilles, and Pont-de-Beauvoisin had 
over the entry of that merchandise into France. Eventually the 
government decided in favor of the Mediterranean deputies. More 
Frenchmen did begin to venture to Persia, but the privileges of 
Marseilles in the Eastern Mediterranean trade were preserved. 
This story really extends beyond 1715. What is important here is 
that the Council of Commerce was instrumental in negotiating a 
treaty with a foreign prince. 
The council—and especially its individual members—played an 
even greater role in the commercial and diplomatic negotiations 
that preceded and accompanied the conclusion of the War of the 
Spanish Succession.63 The search for peace began long before the 
Congress of Utrecht actually assembled in 1712. As early as 1706, 
Louis XIV sent out peace feelers to various member of the enemy 
coalition. Foreign Minister Colbert de Torcy employed a variety of 
individuals in these diplomatic forays, but none was more im­
portant than Nicolas Mesnager, deputy of trade from Rouen. In 
his Memoires Torcy himself explains how he first came to use 
Mesnager.64 Throughout the latter part of 1706 and in 1707, 
Mesnager wrote a series of memoirs for Chamillart and Pontchar­
train concerning trade with Spain and the Spanish colonies. 
Mesnager's intelligence and his firsthand experience in Madrid 
made him the acknowledged expert on Spanish affairs. At the 
same moment, the Dutch Republic was intensely suspicious of 
French aims in the Spanish empire. The Dutch feared that France 
was endeavoring to win a trading monopoly with this empire for 
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itself. Torcy therefore tells us that Mesnager was the natural choice 
to be envoy to the United Provinces. Mesnager was already plan­
ning a trip to Holland on private business, and this would serve as 
an ideal ruse to camouflage his mission so that Holland's allies 
would not learn of it. In December 1707 Torcy therefore dis­
patched Mesnager to meet with representatives of the Dutch Re­
public in Rotterdam. He was instructed to discuss commercial af­
fairs only. His chief goal was to work out a plan by which France, 
the United Provinces, and Spain would share the latter's colonial 
trade—to the exclusion of England and other countries. During 
the months of January and February 1708, Mesnager conferred 
with a series of Dutch representatives, including Grand Pensionary 
Antonie Heinsius. Mesnager was able to win approval of most of 
his commercial propositions, but the Dutch insisted on discussing 
political topics. In particular they demanded the cession of terri­
tories in Flanders (for the "barrier" that they so much desired). 
They also repeated their demands that Philip V abandon the 
Spanish throne. Louis XIV was not yet prepared to discuss these 
issues, and so Torcy recalled Mesnager to France early in March.65 
Although this expedition to Holland had largely failed, Mes­
nager himself had displayed a keen grasp of the issues and a 
shrewd bargaining style. On two other occasions, therefore, Torcy 
used him on similar missions. The first of these occurred early in 
1709. Mesnager set out in January of that year for Holland, but he 
never got beyond Ypres. The States-General in Amsterdam was 
feeling especially truculent and suspicious of France at that mo­
ment, and it refused to grant Mesnager a passport to enter its 
territory. The Dutch claimed, somewhat petulantly, that if France 
was really negotiating "in good faith," then it would send "persons 
of character" to treat with them.66 Consequently Mesnager was 
forced to return to Paris, and, in order to placate the Dutch, 
Foreign Minister Torcy himself journeyed to Holland late in the 
spring of 1709. He worked out a set of peace proposals known as 
the Preliminaries of the Hague, but because the Dutch demanded 
that Louis XIV send French troops to Madrid to remove Philip V 
from the Spanish throne, France was forced to reject this agree­
ment. 
By 1711 a series of domestic and international events led Eng­
land to make known its desire for peace. That country's new Tory 
ministry tired of the uncompromisingly belligerent attitude of its 
Dutch ally. In the spring and summer of 1711, the English gov­
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ernment initiated a series of secret discussions at London and Paris 
concerning a possible Anglo-French rapprochement. In August, 
Torcy decided that the negotiations required the presence in Lon­
don of an official French envoy. The man chosen for this mission 
was Nicolas Mesnager. From August to October 1711, Mesnager 
negotiated a general peace settlement with Bolingbroke and other 
Tory ministers. The Preliminaries of London, signed by Mesnager 
on 8 October, laid the basis for the political and commercial 
agreements worked out at Utrecht in 1712 and 1713. When Mes­
nager returned to France late in October, the king received him 
personally at Versailles and lauded him for his achievements. In 
December 1711 Mesnager was further rewarded when Louis XIV 
appointed him to serve as one of the three French plenipotentiaries 
at the upcoming peace conference at Utrecht.67 
Mesnager served in Holland and England as the personal agent 
of Torcy, and the Council of Commerce was not directly involved 
in any of these negotiations. The situation at Utrecht, however, was 
vastly different. The three French plenipotentiaries there (Mes­
nager, the marshal d'Huxelles, and the abbe de Polignac) were 
officially under Torcy, but they also received advice and instruc­
tions from Desmaretz and Jerome de Pontchartrain.68 Through 
these latter two ministers, the Council of Commerce likewise came 
to play a significant role in the peace talks. 
The Congress of Utrecht opened in January 1712 and did not 
complete its work until 1715. On 11 April 1713, however, the 
French delegates signed seven treaties with representatives of 
foreign nations. These included treaties of peace with Portugal, 
Savoy, Prussia, the United Provinces, and Great Britain. In addi­
tion treaties of commerce were signed with the last two nations.69 
Throughout the months of consultations and bargaining at 
Utrecht, the Council of Commerce was always kept informed of the 
progress that was being made. Because tariffs and commercial 
agreements lay chiefly in his department, Desmaretz was constantly 
in contact with the French plenipotentiaries, especially Mesnager; 
and the evidence clearly reveals that Desmaretz relied heavily on 
the Council of Commerce for the instructions that he sent to 
Utrecht.70 Because the negotiations were confidential and ex­
tremely delicate, the council did not usually discuss them in its 
regular meetings.71 Instead, a special bureau was set up to deal 
with matters on which Desmaretz needed assistance. This bureau 
met at the home of Daguesseau, and in addition to him it consisted 
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of Amelot, de Nointel (one of the commissaires), and several of 
the deputies. Of the latter, Anisson and Fenellon attended most 
often. Desmaretz also requested memoirs from individual mem­
bers of the council. Anisson in fact drew up the initial set of instruc­
tions that Desmaretz presented to the plenipotentiaries before they 
left Paris.72 One would probably not be too far from the truth in 
saying that the commercial clauses of the treaties signed at Utrecht 
were largely the work of the French Council of Commerce. 
The articles concerning trade in the peace treaties can be quickly 
summarized. Although Savoy had joined the coalition against 
France in 1703, economic relations between the two nations had 
remained fairly unchanged throughout the war. Article 10 of the 
Franco-Savoyard treaty therefore merely affirmed that trade be­
tween the two states would continue to be based on the various 
tariffs and conventions that had been agreed to in the 1680s and 
1690s.73 
Commerce with Portugal, however, had been severely restricted 
ever since that country had signed the Methuen Treaty in 1703 and 
thereby joined the allied cause.74 Articles 5 through 13 of the 
treaty signed at Utrecht related to trade.75 By the terms of these 
articles, trade between the two countries basically returned to its 
status quo ante helium. A few problems remained (such as a Portu­
guese prohibition on the import of French brandies), but these 
were to be worked out in later negotiations. The treaty also settled 
questions concerning the border between French Guiana and 
Portuguese Brazil. In addition, France promised not to permit its 
merchants or missionaries to enter the Portuguese colony. 
Throughout the early months of 1713, the French and Prussian 
plenipotentiaries worked feverishly to conclude a treaty of com­
merce. Its details could not be completed by the time when the 
general peace treaty was signed on 11 April, so the diplomats reas­
sembled in May to continue work on it. Each side was eager to 
achieve a formal accord, but the discussions were immediately 
hung up over a series of technicalities. The Prussians objected to 
what they considered to be overly burdensome sanitary regulations 
that had recently been established in French ports as a safeguard 
against the plague, which was then spreading through parts of 
Germany. In addition, Frederick William I demanded that his 
newly acquired territory of Neuchatel receive the same privileges 
in its trade with France that were granted to most of the Swiss 
cantons. These and other problems doomed the negotiations to 
failure, and in July the assembly broke up.76 
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Prussian-French trade throughout the remainder of the eight­
eenth century was based on a rather ambiguous clause in Article 1 
of the peace treaty signed on 11 April. This clause was interpreted 
by both sides to mean "reciprocal freedom of trade, both on sea 
and on land,"77 which meant that there would be no restrictions on 
what each country could export to the other. Although the French 
government would have preferred a formal commercial agree­
ment, it was not unhappy with the situation that resulted from the 
lack of one. Trade with Prussia began to grow in 1713 and con­
tinued to increase modestly throughout most of the century.78 
France did not have any fears about being inundated with Prussian 
manufactured goods: Daguesseau, Mesnager, and Desmaretz all 
agreed in February 1713 that Prussia had virtually no industries.79 
The treaty of commerce signed by French and Dutch diplomats 
on 11 April 1713 was almost literally a carbon copy of the Treaty of 
Ryswick.80 Furthermore, an arret issued on 30 May 1713 reinstated 
the 1699 Franco-Dutch tariff.81 Thus les hollandois succeeded in 
reacquiring all the trading privileges that they had held in France 
prior to the war. 
Throughout 1712 and early 1713, the question of a treaty of 
commerce with Great Britain was perhaps the single most im­
portant topic in the minds of Desmaretz and the members of the 
Council of Commerce. Ever since 1700 the commissaires and depu­
ties had espoused the hope that a trade agreement of some sort 
might be signed with France's cross-channel neighbor. Only with 
such a convention could one begin to dismantle the extravagant 
customs barriers that had been erected between the two nations. 
Yet, despite the sincere efforts of Louis XIV and the Tory minis­
ters in England, no such treaty every emerged. The treaty of 
commerce that was signed at Utrecht on 11 April 171382 needed to 
be ratified by the English Parliament, but the Parliament refused to 
do this. The chief stumbling blocks were Articles 8 and 9 of the 
treaty. Article 8 declared that each country would accord most-
favored-nation status to the other. Article 9 proclaimed that each 
nation would reduce its import duties on goods from the other to 
the rates that had existed in 1664, but it specified that woolen 
cloths, sugar, salted fish, and whale products were to be exempted 
from this stipulation. France feared (probably correctly) that if it 
lowered its import duties on these four articles, they would then 
pour into the country from England, ruining French industries 
and fishing. 
This is not the place to describe in detail the lengthy negotiations 
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that took place toward working out a trade agreement. The main 
point to be stressed here is the role of the Council of Commerce. 
Late in 1712 Desmaretz decided to send two deputies of trade to 
London to negotiate secretly with Bolingbroke and the other Tory 
ministers. He chose for this task Anisson, of Lyons, and Fenellon, 
of Bordeaux. In January 1713 they left for England with the new 
French ambassador to that country, the due d'Aumont. From 
January to July of that year, they worked alongside English repre­
sentatives to hammer out an acceptable treaty. Their mission 
proved fruitless, however, and they returned to France empty-
handed. Desmaretz sent them to London a second time in 1714, 
and they continued their work from February to September of that 
year. Once again, however, they failed to achieve any results.83 
Throughout both of these missions, they remained in close con­
tact with Desmaretz. The controller general, in turn, relied almost 
exclusively on the members of the Council of Commerce for ad­
vice. The bureau that had assembled at Daguesseau's home 
throughout the Utrecht conference continued to meet during the 
negotiations with England. Desmaretz also sought help from in­
dividual members—Daguesseau and Mesnager in particular.84 
The negotiations with England failed for several reasons. The 
French were divided among themselves concerning what conces­
sions could be made. Anisson and Desmaretz wished to protect 
French manufactures and fishing; therefore they refused to grant 
the relatively low 1664 tariff to England for the four articles men­
tioned above. Fenellon, however, was less interested in protecting 
French manufactures. His main goal was the lowering of English 
duties on French wines—especially those of his native Bordeaux— 
and, consequently, he was more willing to make compromises with 
the English.85 In this he seems to have had the support of foreign 
minister Torcy.86 
The domestic political situation in England was perhaps even 
more to blame for the failure of the negotiations. The Whig party 
lambasted the Tories, then in power, for not having won enough 
concessions from the French and Spanish at Utrecht. They 
charged that the same mistake would be repeated if the proposed 
treaty of commerce was signed. The Whigs contended, perhaps 
falsely, that France possessed a favorable balance of commerce with 
England, and that the French advantage would increase even more 
if England lowered most of its customs duties on French goods.87 
The Tories were unable to win a majority vote on the issue in 
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Parliament, and when the Whigs returned to power under the new 
king, George I, Anisson and Fenellon were recalled to France for 
the final time. Legal trade between the two nations therefore re­
mained at a fairly low level until a treaty of commerce was finally 
signed in 1786. Both French and British merchants continued, of 
course, to smuggle goods back and forth throughout the century. 
No peace treaty was signed at Utrecht between Louis XIV and 
the emperor,88 but in 1713 a trade agreement was worked out in 
that city between France and the Austrian (formerly Spanish) 
Netherlands. To negotiate this treaty, Desmaretz sent to Utrecht a 
merchant named Vaultier and a deputy of trade (Piecourt, of Dun­
kirk). These two men worked with Austrian representatives from 
July through December 1713. The bureau that met at the home of 
Daguesseau once again was the source of most of the instructions 
sent to the French delegates.89 The major topics of the discussions 
were the tariffs of 1670 and 1680, which had regulated trade be­
tween the Spanish Netherlands and France. The Austrians de­
manded that the parts of those tariffs favorable to Flemish exports 
into France be reinstated and that the relatively high import duties 
on French goods remain intact. The resulting tariff of 27 January 
171490 was largely a compromise, although the French made more 
concessions than they would have liked. French duties on woolens, 
silk fabrics, and other goods coming from the Austrian Nether­
lands were lowered. On the other hand, duties on French wines, 
vinegars, and other products entering the Austrian dependency 
remained rather steep. But Desmaretz and the Council of Com­
merce decided that these irritations were small compared with the 
potential benefits to be gained from amicable trade relations with 
Brussels and its surrounding territory. 
Another series of commercial negotiations in which the Council 
of Commerce became involved concerned the Hanseatic cities of 
Hamburg, Bremen, and Liibeck. In the summer of 1713, these 
cities each sent deptuies to Paris to request a treaty of commerce 
with France.91 These negotiations continued, off and on, through 
the next two years. Je'rome de Pontchartrain seems to have taken 
control of these discussions, even though commercial treaties and 
tariffs were more properly in the department of the controller 
general.92 Under Pontchartrain's aegis the Council of Commerce 
held a series of "extraordinary assemblies" to examine the matter 
in June and July of 1715.93 In these meetings the Hanseatic repre­
sentatives and the French deputies of trade drafted a mutually 
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acceptable treaty of commerce. This convention granted to 
Hanseatic ships and merchants the same privileges and tariff rates 
that the Dutch enjoyed in France. Furthermore, it guaranteed 
Hanseatic vessels the status of neutrality in the event of future 
wars. In return Frenchmen were to receive all the same advantages 
enjoyed by English and Dutch traders in Hanseatic ports. Although 
the final details of this treaty were worked out in the fall of 1715, it 
was not formally signed until 28 September 1716.94 
One final area should be mentioned with regard to the role of 
the Council of Commerce in foreign diplomacy. In 1712 a long-
simmering feud between the county of Venaissin and the city of 
Lyons erupted into acrimonious debate.95 The papal enclave of 
Venaissin, whose capital was Avignon, had always enjoyed prefer­
ential treatment in the French customs system, even though it was, 
technically, a foreign territory. Through a series of understandings 
dating back to the sixteenth century, silks produced in Avignon 
had been exempted from having to pass through Lyons before 
entering other parts of France. In addition, Avignon's textiles were 
subject to relatively low tariff duties upon entering French terri­
tory. The provinces of Languedoc, Lyons, and Dauphine com­
plained that Avignonese products were underselling their own 
textiles. The deputies of trade, led by Anisson, therefore de­
manded that Avignon's special privileges be revoked.96 Controller 
General Desmaretz and the farmers general, on the other hand, 
generally sided with Avignon. They thought that its textiles were 
subject to enough duties and that forcing its silks to pass through 
Lyons would be an unnecessary disruption of the normal flow of 
trade.97 
The debate continued, however, and since Avignon belonged to 
the papacy, it was inevitable that this question should become 
enmeshed in the Franco-Roman controversy concerning the papal 
bull Unigenitus. Issued late in 1713, this bull condemned many of 
the theological tenets of French Jansenism. Originally Louis XIV 
had requested that the Pope officially censure this religious move­
ment, but when the bull was finally issued, most Frenchmen de­
cried it as a violation of the liberties of the Gallican church. In 
December 1714 Louis XIV appointed Michel Amelot to serve as 
special minister in Rome.98 Amelot's major task was to win accept­
ance for a French episcopal council that would be free to regulate 
the practices and dogmas of the French church. He was also 
charged with finding a solution to the Avignon question, and on at 
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least one occasion, he spoke personally with Clement XI concern­
ing the matter." But Amelot's mission was probably doomed from 
the start. The Pope refused to tolerate anything resembling con­
ciliarism. It seems also that he refused to countenance any modifi­
cation of Avignon's trading privileges in France. 
ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS 
At first glance it appears that the Council of Commerce played a 
minor role in administering the trade and industry of the French 
colonies. The council's proces-verbaux mention the colonies only 
rarely.100 It is clear that Jerome de Pontchartrain wished for 
Canada, Louisiana, the French West Indies, and other such de­
pendencies to be run by himself and a few specially chosen premiers 
commis.101 
Nevertheless, the Council of Commerce constantly made deci­
sions that either indirectly or directly affected French overseas ter­
ritories. Several examples of this have already been cited. For in­
stance, the council protected the monopoly that La Rochelle, 
Nantes, Bordeaux, Dieppe, and Marseilles had on trade with the 
West Indies, thereby excluding other cities from that commerce.102 
The commissaires and the deputies also decided many questions 
concerning the privileges of the trading companies, and several of 
these organizations had the responsibility of supplying the colonies 
with slaves, food, and other commodities. Also, as noted above, the 
council helped end the exclusive monopoly of the Guinea Com­
pany, enabling private individuals to start supplying the Caribbean 
islands with the slaves they needed. The council's actions with re­
gard to tariffs and general trading policies likewise had an inevita­
ble impact on the French colonies. For example, many of the per­
missions that it granted for trade with Holland concerned Dutch 
merchandise that was needed in the African slave trade. Finally, 
the French islanders would have starved if the council during the 
war had not permitted Irish salted meat to enter France, thence to 
be reshipped to the Caribbean. 
In general the commissaires and deputies supported the standard 
mercantilist tenet which held that colonies existed only to serve the 
mother country. Thus the deputies wanted to restrict severely the 
growth of sugar refineries in the West Indies, lest they compete 
with refineries at home.103 Throughout this period the council also 
steadfastly refused to allow colonists to trade freely with foreigners. 
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Only ships possessing valid passports issued in cities permitted to 
trade with the colonies were supposed to be received by colonial 
port officials. Although on a few occasions during the war Jerome 
de Pontchartrain allowed foreign (mostly Dutch) vessels to trans­
port food supplies to the Caribbean islands, he was on all other 
occasions in complete agreement with the council's views on this 
matter.104 
During these years Pontchartrain frequently consulted individ­
ual members of the council on a wide variety of problems relating 
to the colonies. In the spring of 1709, for instance, Nicolas Mes­
nager cautioned the secretary of state not to accept a proposal 
offered by some individuals for establishing an exclusive company 
to trade with Louisiana. He thought that the plan lacked sufficient 
financial backing. Also he feared that the company might bring 
attention to the fledgling colony and lead England to demand its 
cession at a future peace conference.105 On another occasion Pont­
chartrain requested that the council as a whole examine the prob­
lems caused by French sailors who were deserting merchant ships 
that stopped in Martinique.106 
Most often the Council of Commerce became involved in co­
lonial matters as an examiner and arbitrator of disputes. This was 
particularly true in the case of Canada. Throughout the period 
under review here, the Canadian beaver trade was in the hands of a 
private company (the Compagnie de castor). Colonists had to sell all 
their beaver pelts to this company, and only the company's beaver 
could be sold in France. Despite these and other advantages, how­
ever, the company failed to prosper. It was obligated to purchase 
(at fixed prices) all the pelts that French Canadians brought to it, 
but the market for its product was declining in France. Many 
French artisans smuggled cheaper pelts into France from England 
and Holland. They also substituted other furs for beaver, creating 
half-beaver hats. Compounding these problems was the fact that 
the company had expended huge sums in establishing its trade. It 
also was embroiled in difficulties with the administrators of the 
domaine d'occident (the tax farm whose principal responsibility was 
the collection of import duties on goods coming from the West 
Indies). These officials had operated the beaver trade from 1675 
until they sold it to the company in 1700. The company was unable 
to pay off its debts to the tax farmers, and by 1705 it owed over 
1,600,000 livres to them and other creditors.l07 
These and other problems led Jerome de Pontchartrain to rely 
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on various members of the Council of Commerce for help in solv­
ing the company's problems. He often asked Daguesseau or 
Amelot to examine the company's records in order to ascertain the 
extent of its liabilities, and on several occasions these two men 
helped work out compromises between the company and its credi­
tors. They also obtained additional tax exemptions for the com­
 108 pany.
On a few occasions, the council as a group considered the prob­
lems of the Beaver Company. In November 1707 the directors of 
the enterprise asked for permission to import a shipment of whale 
oil from Holland,109 claiming that they needed this oil for the 
finishing process used on their pelts. The deputies of trade, how­
ever, rejected this request, declaring that it would only serve to 
help the Dutch fishing industry. Cod fish oil was generally used on 
beavers, they said, and there was much of that in France.110 In 
1709 and 1710, however, the council did help the company, even 
when this meant going against its own principles. Early in 1709 the 
company's directors beseeched the government to allow a few 
Dutch ships to go to Canada in order to purchase beavers, which 
would then be sold in Holland. They claimed that this would help 
decrease the glut of unsold pelts accumulating in its warehouse in 
Quebec and in France, and the profit from the sale would help 
them honor bills of exchange whose terms were about to expire. 
Despite misgivings about permitting foreign vessels to trade openly 
with French colonies, Pontchartrain and the Council of Commerce 
approved a few such passports during the next two years. These 
were granted on the condition that the ships leave Holland empty 
and that they purchase no Canadian goods other than beaver.111 
Another external problem to which the Council of Commerce 
devoted its attention during this period was the French fishing 
industry. The deputies and commissaires moved in a number of ways 
to upgrade and protect this vital sector of the economy. Perhaps 
the most significant action taken was the prohibition on the import 
of fish caught by the enemy during the war. Even before hostilities 
began, the council virtually prohibited the entry of English fish and 
whale products into the country. The arret of 6 September 1701 
placed unprecedentedly high customs duties on these and other 
English exports, and the arret of 28 August 1703 forbade the im­
port of fish and all other merchandise from enemy powers. Al­
though France did begin as early as 1704 to lift some interdictions 
on trade with its adversaries, the deputies continually rejected all 
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requests for the importation of enemy-caught fish. The only ex­
ception to this was salted salmon, which was permitted to enter 
from Scotland. Even though the depredations inflicted by enemy 
privateers prevented French fleets from supplying the country 
with all the fish that it needed, the commissaires and deputies did not 
want Frenchmen to adopt the habit of purchasing supplies from 
other countries. The deputies further pointed out that fishing was 
an essential industry in England and the United Provinces and that 
by forbidding the import of their catches into France irreparable 
harm would be done to their economies. Time and again from 
1702 to 1713, the council therefore refused to permit enemy fish 
or fish oil to enter France, and it counseled vigilance lest these 
enemy goods be smuggled in via Spain, Venice, or other chan-
nels.112 
At the behest of Secretary of State Pontchartrain, the council in 
1708 helped formulate a fishing treaty that was signed with Eng-
land.113 This accord applied strictly to the home fisheries—that is, 
the fishing that was done off of the coasts of each nation. Hun­
dreds of small boats participated in this trade, and during the war 
enemy privateers repeatedly confiscated them or forced their 
owners to pay ransom. Both countries agreed that most of the small 
boats that plied coastal waters belonged to "the unfortunate poor" 
and that their business was of no consequence to the outcome of 
the war. l  14 The two governments therefore pledged that hence­
forth their privateers would no longer harass these small fishing 
vessels. The larger ships that participated in cod fishing off the 
Newfoundland coast and whaling near Greenland, however, were 
still fair game for the corsairs of both sides. In ensuing years each 
nation occasionally complained of infractions committed by ships 
of the other,115 but by and large the treaty was a success. 
From 1708 to the end of the war, the council also contributed to 
negotiations concerning a similar fishing convention with the 
United Provinces. Late in 1707 a verbal agreement had been made 
between the intendant of Dunkirk and a Dutch representative 
from Zeeland.'l6 By the terms of this accord, the coastal fishing qf 
these two provinces was to be respected by privateers of both 
nations. After the Dutch heard of the Anglo-French treaty, they 
demanded a similar one—one that would protect the coastal ship­
ping of all the Dutch provinces. In return they promised not to 
interfere with French fishing boats, and they even offered to 
guarantee the security of French vessels sailing to Newfoundland. 
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The Council of Commerce had two objections to such a treaty with 
the Dutch. First, the promise of security for French cod fishing in 
the Atlantic was useless, since French ships still could have been 
captured by English privateers. Second, the deputies argued that 
France must do nothing to help Dutch fishing. The industry was a 
"gold mine" for the republic, employing twelve to thirteen thou­
sand sailors. The deputies also rejected Dutch requests that the 
Frisian island of Texel be included in the 1707 agreement, and 
they heatedly rebutted all proposals for extending Dutch privileges 
to the rich herring fisheries of the Dogger Bank in the North Sea. 
No broadening of the 1707 agreement therefore came about.117 
In other ways as well, the council aided and regulated the French 
fishing industry. In 1702 it drafted an arret that outlawed many 
fishing preserves along the coasts of Normandy and Brittany.118 
On another occasion it deliberated the legality of using certain 
types of dredges in coastal fishing.119 Throughout these years the 
council firmly upheld the arret of 24 March 1687, which forbade 
any fishing for herring after 31 December each year. From 
January through the spring, herring spawned in the channel and 
North Sea waters, and they were judged to be of poor quality 
during this period. In order to protect the good reputation of 
French-caught fish, the deputies therefore rejected all requests for 
a permit to fish for herring during this part of the year. 12° 
Throughout the peace negotiations at Utrecht, various members 
of the council worked, along with Jerome de Pontchartrain, to 
protect French fishing interests in the New World. Thanks to their 
efforts, France managed to hold on to a good amount of its North 
American empire. It ceded Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the 
Hudson Bay territory to England; but it retained New France 
(Que'bec), Cape Breton Island, a shore on Newfoundland, and the 
fisheries off the Newfoundland coast. 
One final extraterritorial problem in which the Council of 
Commerce played an important part was the series of plagues 
(affecting both humans and animals) that ravaged many areas of 
Europe—especially Eastern Europe, Germany, and Scandinavia— 
from 1712 through 1715. Ever since the Black Death of the four­
teenth century, Europe had from time to time been subjected to 
epidemics of varying intensity. Whenever news of a plague reached 
a country or a territory, elaborate safety precautions were erected 
at all border crossings and ports in order to prevent the pestc from 
entering. With the creation of the Council of Commerce, France 
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now had a central agency to organize its sanitary regulations. That 
the task should fall upon this council was understandable: the most 
common transmitters of plague were merchants, sailors, and the 
goods that they transported. 
In 1712, therefore, Desmaretz and Pontchartrain began to for­
ward to the council all information that they received concerning 
the extent of the various epidemics. During the next three years, 
the commissaires and deputies drafted a series of ordinances that 
restricted trade with countries and cities suspected of being in­
fected. These measures included a total severance of trade with 
some cities for certain periods of time, along with regulations for 
quarantine procedures. Ships arriving from areas suspected of 
having the plague were usually forced to stay anchored out in 
French harbors for a forty-day waiting period. Even after trade was 
reopened with formerly infected cities, the council forbade the 
importation of certain goods for long periods of time. Wools, furs, 
and several other materials were known to be good carriers of the 
maladie contagieuse, and therefore they could not enter France until 
all danger of infection had passed. Desmaretz and Pontchartrain 
did not always agree with the council's decisions. At times they 
thought that it was being too rigorous and at other times too lax. 
Nevertheless, they generally followed the guidelines it laid 
down.121 
This chapter has endeavored to point up the crucial role that the 
Council of Commerce exercised in affairs stretching beyond the 
country's borders. Its members served the government in a variety 
of ways: as advisers, as arbitrators, and as diplomats. Just as this 
body helped give central direction to internal economic programs, 
so also it helped coordinate French foreign policy. Because the 
commissaires and deputies were involved in virtually every area of 
trade and industry, they were able to approach problems from a 
wide perspective. Even though they clung to a bullionist, protec­
tionist view of foreign commerce, they also realized that trade must 
be reciprocal and of benefit to all parties concerned. If France's 
economic ties with other nations were friendlier in 1715 than the^ y 
had been in 1700, one can attribute much of this development to 
the work of this body. 
The council's involvement in external issues also posed difficul­
ties. Even before 1700 the royal ministers had occasionally quar­
reled among themselves concerning jurisdiction over certain 
matters involving relations with other countries. Nominally this was 
Foreign Relations and Other External Problems 247 
the province of the secretary of state for foreign affairs, but as we 
have seen in this chapter, the secretary of state for the navy and the 
controller general of finances also possessed extensive rights in this 
field. Foreign Minister Colbert de Torcy frequently relied on vari­
ous members of the Council of Commerce for advice or personal 
service, but the council was used even more by Jerome de Pont­
chartrain, Michel Chamillart, and Nicolas Desmaretz when they 
intervened in foreign affairs. Torcy was bitterly irritated by what 
he considered to be undue interference in matters belonging to his 
department, but the other ministers could point to royal sanction 
of their activities in that realm.122 Thus although the Council of 
Commerce marked a great step forward in the administration of 
trade and industry, it also helped aggravate a nagging defect in 
another area of the Old Regime's bureaucracy. 
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far too high. For the Spanish point of view on this subject, see Geoffrey J. Walker, 
Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700-1789, pp. 19-63. 
13. Dahlgren, Les Relations commercials, pp. 195, 280, 338, 355, 493; Dahlgren, 
"Le Comte Jerome de Pontchartrain et les armateurs de Saint-Malo (1712-1715)," 
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21. AN, F12 55, fols. 80v-81v, 19 July 1709. 
22. Ordinance of 18 January 1712. A copy is in Mar., A2 23, pp. 22-23. As so 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The study of the Council of Commerce demonstrates clearly that 
this body rendered an invaluable service to the royal government 
early in the eighteenth century. Far from being the product of 
opposition to the monarchy, the council actively and eagerly par­
ticipated in the government's administration of trade and industry. 
The monarchy had consulted with the business community on a 
regular basis throughout the seventeenth century, and this council 
merely marked the culmination and consolidation of this practice. 
An examination of the personnel and the functioning of the 
council reveals plainly that it was much more than a mere decora­
tive advisory panel. The commissaires who sat on it included several 
of the most powerful and most respected officers in the upper 
echelons of the bureaucracy. Through their personal and official 
contacts with royal ministers, they ensured that the council's opin­
ions were not only listened to but also generally followed. The 
council—or its individual members—became involved in virtually 
every important issue surrounding trade or manufactures during 
this period. 
The factor that gave the council its uniqueness was the presence 
on it of merchant representatives from several of the leading com­
mercial cities in the kingdom. These deputies were nearly always 
chosen from among the most knowledgeable and competent mem­
bers of their communities and were thus well equipped to transmit 
to the government the needs and aspirations of their regions. In 
their general memoirs written in 1700 and 1701, the deputies were 
given a rare opportunity to express themselves on a wide range of 
topics relating to commerce and industry. Although most histor­
ians have seen in these memoirs much evidence of a general attack 
on traditional mercantilist policies, a close analysis of them reveals 
that the deputies actually had few real disagreements with the 
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Colbertian legacy. They repeatedly called for "liberty of trade," but 
this "liberty" was far from our contemporary conception of the 
word. Often the deputies employed this phrase in a distinctly 
medieval fashion, wherein "liberty" signified a vested privilege or a 
right. Furthermore, the idea of freedom—meaning a lessening of 
restrictions—was by no means alien to Colbert and other practi­
tioners or theorists of mecantilism. 
Just as the royal government established the Council of Com­
merce, so also it endeavored to create chambers of commerce in 
those cities represented in the Parisian body. Despite constant royal 
prodding, however, most cities dragged their feet in setting up 
such bodies. There were several reasons for the delays encoun­
tered: lack of money; disputes concerning the composition of the 
chambers; satisfaction with traditional modes of discussing local 
economic problems and presenting grievances to the central gov­
ernment; fear of royal encroachments on local privileges; and the 
distraction of war. Nevertheless, by the year 1715 there were a total 
of eight chambers of commerce in the country. Contrary to the 
designs of the monarchy, these chambers tended to become 
staunch defenders of regional interests, unmindful of the general 
good. At the behest of their constituents, the deputies in Paris 
therefore were compelled to devote a large part of their time to the 
defense of local privileges, which frequently resulted in bitter feuds 
between deputies upholding the conflicting claims of two or more 
competing cities or provinces. Notwithstanding these shortcom­
ings, however, the chambers of commerce did provide valuable 
service by supplying the government with expert advice and infor­
mation concerning local trade and manufactures. In addition, the 
deputies of trade often were able to subsume their regional loyal­
ties when these loyalties markedly contradicted the general good. 
The question of wartime trade with enemy and neutral powers 
was the subject that recurred most frequently in the Council of 
Commerce during this period. Although in their general memoirs 
the deputies had propounded the benefits of "liberty of trade" and 
of reduced barriers and restrictions on international commerce* 
they performed an abrupt volte-face after the outbreak of war. 
From 1702 through 1713 the Council of Commerce relentlessly 
taxed, restricted, proscribed, or otherwise intervened in all areas of 
foreign trade in an effort to protect and encourage French trade 
and shipping. Its trade policies fell generally into two parts. The 
first was directed against enemy nations. Early in the war, the 
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council prohibited all trade with France's adversaries. The chief 
targets of this measure were England and the United Provinces. 
The council especially wished to wreck the carrying trade of the 
Dutch; again and again the deputies fulminated against "ces 
republicans," who had managed to become the masters of many 
areas of Europe's commerce. The impracticality of this trade ban 
soon became apparent, and little by little the council had to expand 
the limits on trade with hostile powers. Thousands of passports 
were reluctantly granted to Dutch vessels bringing Dutch, German, 
and Scandinavian goods to France. The second aspect of the coun-
cil's policies involved neutral trade. The council was responsible for 
defining and determining the legitimate rights of neutral shipping. 
In addition, it granted a host of privileges to neutral vessels in 
order to induce them to trade directly with France. As a means of 
enforcing all these trade policies, the council helped broaden— 
within limits—the rights of French privateers. 
The regulation and encouragement of manufactures was second 
in importance—in terms of frequency of discussion—among mat­
ters dealt with by the council during these years. Far from rejecting 
the multifarious reglements, ordonnances, and arrets that controlled 
all aspects of textile production, the council reaffirmed them and 
increased their number. In an effort to ensure that these laws were 
enforced, the council expanded the number of inspectors of manu­
factures and encouraged their work. Although this policing of 
manufactures brought only a very qualified success, one must point 
out that the regulations and the inspectors had far more popular 
support than many historians would have us believe. The council 
strove to encourage manufactures in other ways as well. It granted 
subsidies and monopolies to individual entrepreneurs, and it af­
forded French products some measure of protection from foreign 
competition by means of outright prohibitions or elevated tariffs. 
The members of the council also became involved in a wide 
variety of matters related to royal finances. The council was in 
large part responsible for establishing the bureau de la balance du 
commerce in 1713. By means of this agency, the commissaires and 
deputies hoped to guarantee that France would always have a 
favorable balance of trade, thereby conserving the nation's stocks 
of gold and silver. The council's work concerning tariffs was rather 
mixed. Although virtually all of its members supported the princi­
ple of lower tariff walls and of amicable trading relations with other 
nations, the council followed no set pattern in its proposals in this 
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area. Although it helped lower several import and export duties, it 
raised, or refused to lower, perhaps just as many other ones. In 
general, the council worked to facilitate the import of raw materials 
and the export of manufactures, wine, and other goods. On the 
other hand, it supported rather high duties imposed on foreign 
manufactures. Despite the fact that the council was the center of 
discussion for the "single duty project," several commissaires and 
deputies opposed this measure. Thus the possibility of tariff re­
form was never very great. With regard to the farmers general, one 
must conclude that on the whole the council had a good—though 
not warm—working relationship with them. In a number of ways, 
the farmers general were more flexible and open to change than 
were several of the deputies and commissaires. Almost without ex­
ception the monetary policies advocated by the council were con­
servative and bullionist. Thus the council clamored for a stable 
currency and deplored the frequent currency manipulations to 
which the crown resorted. The council likewise helped defeat the 
rather risky plans for establishing a state bank and for extending 
the use of billets de monnaie to the entire kingdom. 
Finally, the council (or its individual members) played a signifi­
cant role in foreign relations and other areas relating to external 
trade. The council helped formulate virtually all policies pertaining 
to trade with Spain and with the mer du Sud. Although the council 
itself did not administer the chartered trading companies, its mem­
bers were continually involved in judging disputes concerning the 
debts or the privileges of these bodies. Far from being hardened 
foes of the trading companies, the commissaires and deputies 
adopted a rather undogmatic approach toward them. In many 
instances they defended the rights of the companies, provided that 
the latter carried out their obligations. The council as a whole (or 
its individual members) also participated in virtually all the diplo­
matic negotiations that accompanied the close of the War of the 
Spanish Succession. In large measure, France's new trading pos­
tures toward other European nations were the work of the mem­
bers of the Council of Commerce. The council was active in other 
areas as well, including the French colonies and the fishing in­
dustry. With regard to the colonies, the council pursued a policy of 
regulating the trade and industry of French dependencies in a way 
that would be advantageous for the mother country; and the 
council considered the native fishing industry to be so important 
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that it expended much time in regulating it and protecting it from 
foreign competition. 
The fact that the Council of Commerce was thoroughly mercan-
tilist—in the sense of favoring strong regulation of all aspects of the 
economy—did not go unnoticed by contemporaries. For an illus­
tration of this, one could cite an anonymous memoir preserved in 
the foreign affairs archives.l Written in 1730, the memoir gives a 
brief description of the administration of trade and industry from 
1660 to 1730. It praises Colbert and his immediate successors, as­
serting that they realized the necessity of some individual freedom 
in such matters. The author declares, however, that the creation of 
the Council of Commerce undid much of the good work accom­
plished prior to 1700. The deputies, he claims, spent all their time 
defending the privileges of the particular regions. In addition, the 
council strove to perfect French manufactures, but in so doing it 
issued many "nouveaux reglemens" that destroyed an infinity of 
private enterprises. Although this memoir is overly biased against 
the council, it does demonstrate that contemporaries judged the 
council to be thoroughly traditional—possibly even too traditional. 
Perhaps one would be most accurate in viewing the council as 
part of the ongoing process of bureaucratization that was at work 
in most of the European countries throughout the early modern 
era. During the last third of the seventeenth century and the first 
third of the eighteenth, special bodies dealing with commercial 
matters were created or revived in England, Sweden, Denmark, 
Muscovy, Prussia, Spain, Austria, Portugal, the Dutch Republic, 
and perhaps other states. These institutions were remarkably simi­
lar to one another, although they went by different names (council, 
college, board, junta). Like the French Council of Commerce, they 
were all mostly consultative rather than administrative in function. 
Louis XIV therefore was not alone in seeking the advice of eco­
nomic experts and in creating a special body to deal with the prob­
lems of commerce and manufactures, but he was noticeably pro­
gressive and in advance of other rulers in two respects. The French 
council seems to have had a wider scope of interests and to have 
been more active than any of the other bodies; and, with the possi­
ble exception of the trade commission in Muscovy,2 the French 
council was alone in giving such a prominent role to private busi­
nessmen. Indeed, the study of the Council of Commerce reveals 
that there was a much higher degree of cooperation between the 
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crown and the merchant community in the Old Regime than here­
tofore has been recognized. 
1. AAE, Mem. et Doc, France, 1990, fols. 163-68, "Comparison de ce qui sest 
passe pour l'administration du commerce de France depuis 1660." 
2. See AN, G7 1704, piece 341, "Objets principaux des convenances de la France 
sur le commerce de Moscovie." 
APPENDIX A 
THE "COMMISSAIRES" IN THE COUNCIL OF 
COMMERCE 
Controller general of finances 
Michel Chamillart, 1700-1708 
Nicolas Desmaretz, 1708-15 
Secretary of state for the navy 
Jerome Phelypeaux, comte de Pontchartrain, 1700-1715 
Ordinary commissaires 
Henri Daguesseau, 1700-1716 
Michel Jean Amelot de Gournay, 1700-1724 
Francois-Joseph d'Ernothon, 1700-1708 (His position was 
abolished when the intendants of commerce were created in 
1708.) 
Nicolas-Prosper Bauyn d'Angervilliers, 1700-1702 (He was re­
placed by Etienne-Hyacinthe-Antoine Foulle de Martangis, 
1702-8; this position was also abolished in 1708.) 
Marc-Rene de Voyer de Palmy, marquis d'Argenson, 1705-20 
Louis Be'chameil de Nointel, 1708-18 
Jean-Baptiste Desmaretz de Vaubourg, 1715 
Director of finances 
Hilaire Rouille du Coudray, 1701-3, 1716-18 (During the 
regency he attended as a representative from the Council of 
Finances; in 1703 he was replaced by Nicolas Desmaretz, 
1703-8.) 
Joseph-Jean-Baptiste Fleuriau d'Armenonville, 1701-8 
(These offices were suppressed in 1708.) 
Intendants of commerce 
Denis-Jean Amelot de Chaillou, 1708-15 
Louis-Francois Lefevre de Caumartin de Boissy, 1708-15 
Louis-Charles de Machault, 1708-50 (After 1715 he was an 
ordinary commissaire.) 
Jean Rouille de Fontaine, 1708-15 
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Charles Boucher d'Orsay, 1708-11 (replaced by Noel Danycan 
de Landivisiau, 1711-15) 
Cesar-Charles Lescalopier, 1707-11, 1713-14(For part of 1711­
12 he was replaced by Samuel Bernard; in 1714 his depart­
ment was given to another intendant of commerce, Caumartin 
de Boissy.) 
APPENDIX B 
THE DEPUTIES IN THE COUNCIL OF COMMERCE 
Bayonne 
Leon de Rol, 1700-1702

Vacancy, 1703-11

Gerard Heusch de Janvry, 1711-18

Bordeaux 
Jean-Baptiste Fenellon, 1700-1718 
Dunkirk 
Noel Pie'court, 1700-1715 
Languedoc 
(?) Mourgues, 1700-1701 
Vacancy, 1701-3

Syndics generaux 
Pierre Roux de Montbel, 1703-4

Andre de Joubert, 1704-5

(?) de Boyer d'Odars, 1705-6

Jean-Antoine du Vidal de Montferrier, 1706-7

Andre' de Joubert, 1707-8

Jean-Jacques de Boyer, flls, 1708-9

Vacancy, 1709-13

Simon Gilly, 1713-32

Lille 
Francois-Eustache Taviel, 1700-1702 
Vacancy, 1709-13

Michel Vandercruysen, 1715-17

Lyons 
Jean Anisson, 1700-1722 
Marseilles 
Joseph Fabre, 1700-1704 
Mathieu Fabre, 1704-14

Francois Philip, 1714-17

Nantes 
Joachim Descasaux du Hallay, 1700-1702 
Germain Laurencin, flls, 1702-5

Jean Piou, 1705-19
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Paris 
Samuel Bernard, 1700-1720 
Antoine Peletyer, 1700-1702 
Denis Rousseau, 1702-3 
Claude Vilain, 1703-8 
Leonard Chauvin, 1708-19 
La Rochelle 
Antoine Heron, 1700-1712 
Vacancy, 1712-15 
Frangois Mouchard, 1715-19 
Rouen 
Nicolas Mesnager, 1700-1712 
David Le Baillif, 1712-15 
Georges Godeheu, 1715-20 
Saint-Malo 
Alain de La Motte-Gaillard, 1700-1702 
Charles de Grandville-Locquet, 1702-6 
Rene Moreau de Maupertuis, 1706-46 
APPENDIX C

THE AGENDA OF THE COUNCIL

The table that follows is based on the proces-verbaux of the 
council. It lists the general categories of topics studied in the coun­
cil and the frequency with which they were discussed. A glance at it 
reveals, for example, that the question that recurred most often 
was that of France's trade with enemy and neutral powers during 
the War of the Spanish Succession. Other topics that lead the list 
include the regulation of manufactures, tariff policies, and rela­
tions with Spain. 
The difficulties encountered in coding each item into a single 
category make it impossible to give the chart total precision. In 
many instances an individual item overlapped several categories. 
In creating the chart, I therefore sometimes counted one particular 
case under two or, in a few occasions, three categories. Even those 
questions that were assigned to only one category were usually 
intimately related to others. For example, the council judged every 
request by a French merchant to import merchandise from an­
other country by several criteria: Was this article needed by French 
manufactures? Was it needed for French trade with the Levant? 
With Spain? With French colonies? Would this trade in some way 
help Dutch commerce, thereby hurting French traders? Was this 
merchandise to be paid for by gold and silver (which was undesir­
able) or by the export of French manufactures and other products 
(which was encouraged)? 
Although the chart does indicate the variety of things reported 
in the proces-verbaux, these minutes themselves fail to present a 
complete account of the council's work. The secretary did not re­
cord the reports and debates in toto, but rather gave brief sum­
maries. What is even less satisfactory about the proces-verbaux is that 
they do not mention all the affairs that external evidence reveals 
were discussed in the council. Frequently, at the end of the record 
of a meeting the secretary wrote that "diverses autres choses" also 
had been examined. Fortunately, one can discover what most of 
these "other things" were by consulting the financial and naval 
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archives. Many of the issues that the council discussed were of a 
trivial and a repetitive nature, and explicit mention of them was 
unnecessary; but in a handful of instances, extremely important 
matters discussed in the council were not reported in the proces­
verbaux. One example is the affair of 1704 concerning the creation 
and sale of offices of inspectors general and collectors-visitors of 
woolens and linens. The Council of Commerce, responding to pro­
tests by merchant-manufacturers from all over France, was instru­
mental in getting these offices abolished (see Chapter 6). Yet, in­
explicably, the proces-verbaux do not mention this episode. 
Despite its shortcomings, however, the chart does represent in a 
general way the concerns of the council and (by implication) the 
concerns of the government and the business community. 
Table 2 
Subjects Reported in the Proces-Verbaux by Year 
1700­
1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 
The deputies' gen­
eral memoirs of 
1700-1701 14  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Regulation and en­
couragement of 
manufactures 27 39 37 14 14 16 28 15 35 18 20 22 30 33 35 
General problems 
concerning com­
merce with enemy 
and neutral na­
tions 16 2 6 1 4 5 12 51 17 42 5 4 2 1 1 
Trade with the 
Dutch 10 13 14 9 34 20 34 121 62 42 9 11 26 16 6 
Trade with 
England, Scot­
land and Ireland 
Trade wirfi Den­
mark and Sweden 
5 
5 
19 
13 
5 
12 
3 
6 
15 
20 
31 
25 
17 
13 
33 
26 
28 
16 
10 
9 
20 
20 
23 
14 
22 
4 
12 
0 
4 
0 f 
Trade with Muscovy 3 0 0 0 4 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Trade with Germany 
(including Han­
seatic cities) 1 2 0 4 7 9 0 10 11 12 60 51 29 8 2 Oi 
<O 
Table 2 (continued) 
1700­
1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 
Trade with other 
enemy and neutral 
nations 1 6 5 3 7 5 6 6 12 8 20 11 9 2 2 
Tariffs and inter­
nal customs duties 46 51 46 14 32 21 15 19 20 21 11 6 7 7 6 
Relations with 
Spain (including 
French commerce 
in Spanish Amer­
ica) 10 13 9 2 6 10 6 18 6 9 15 6 2 5 4 
French privateering 0 3 4 4 6 26 10 9 12 9 13 7 2 1 0 
French and Spanish 
Flanders 4 3 12 3 7 11 6 7 10 12 14 5 14 1 0 
French fishing in­
dustry 9 6 3 5 1 2 1 19 4 5 3 4 3 1 0 
Conflicts between 
merchants and tax 
farmers 16 6 6 3 3 7 6 6 4 1 4 1 2 2 0 
Disputes over Mar-
seilles's privileges 10 7 11 9 3 2 7 2 2 2 1 2 2 4 7 
Establishment and 
organization of 
chambers of com­
merce 22 
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Table 2 {continued) 
1700­
1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 
The French West In­
dies and Louisiana 8 8 1 3 1 1 0 6 6 3 1 2 0 3 4 
Privileged trading 
companies 2 1 10 4 5 0 3 1 5 5 3 2 2 5 3 3 
French currency, fi­
nancial problems 12 11 9 3 0 0 0 7 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 
Threats of plagues 
entering France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 10 6 1 
Powers of juridic­
tions cansulaires 4 3 6 9 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 6 
Relations between 
businessmen (legal 
suits, lettres de 
change, marine in­
surance, etc.) 3 13 13 13 3 0 1 2 1 3 0 0 5 9 
Shortages of wood 
in France 5 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Diplomatic negotia­
tions concerning 
trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
$ 
Creation of venal of­
fices affecting trade 
or manufactures 2 0 4 8 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Table 2 (continued) 
1700­
1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 
The grain trade, 
grain shortages 0 3 0 1 0 2 1 15 15 2 2 2 1 0 0 
Importation of for­
eign silks 3 0 4 2 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Importation of Indi­
an cottons 5 5 0 0 4 2 1 4 5 5 0 0 1 3 3 
Honoring trade and 
industry 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Protection of French 
trade from enemy 
privateers 0 2 0 0 0 2 5 15 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 
French livestock (es­
pecially sheep) 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Canada 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Quality of French 
brandies 
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APPENDIX D 
THE COUNCIL OF COMMERCE AFTER 1715 
A study of the Council of Commerce for the period from 1715 to 
its abolition in 1791 would be different in several ways from this 
one. As the problems facing French trade and industry changed 
through the century, so also did the major concerns of this council. 
An even greater difference would arise from the fact that the 
council itself was transformed after the death of Louis XIV. From 
1715 until its dissolution during the Revolution, the council under­
went numerous alterations, and never again does it seem to have 
wielded quite as much authority as it did under Louis XIV.1 On 
the death of the king, the council and the intendants of commerce 
were abolished; this was part of the bureaucratic reshuffling that 
accompanied the beginning of the regency. In November 1715 a 
reorganized Council of Commerce began to meet. It became one of 
the seven councils that replaced the secretaries of state at that time. 
Although most of the ordinary commissaires remained on it (includ­
ing Daguesseau and Amelot), the titular heads of the new council 
were Marshal Villeroy and the due de Noailles. The merchant 
deputies attended meetings, but the intendants of commerce con­
tinued to be suppressed. Their departments were divided among 
the other commissaires. After the death of Daguesseau in 1716, 
Amelot became the de facto leader of the group; he reported its 
affairs to the Council of the Regency. 
Early in 1722 the Council of Commerce was disbanded, as were 
all the others. Later in the same year, however, it was reestablished, 
but its name was changed to Bureau of Commerce. Its new title was 
more in keeping with its functions, but the titular demotion also 
probably signified a real loss of influence. One historian has sug­
gested that the new controller general, Le Pelletier de la Houssaye, 
gave it the name bureau to signify that henceforth he would keep 
more control over economic planning within his own ministry2 
The bureau had basically the same organization as the council cre­
ated in 1700. In 1724 four newly reinstituted intendants of com­
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merce were added to it. From 1724 to the 1780s, the bureau wit­
nessed only minor changes. 
In 1730, however, a new Council of Commerce was formed. This 
council bore absolutely no relation to the council that has been the 
focus of the present work. It consisted solely of royal ministers and 
councillors and was intended to issue laws and to administer trade 
and industry in much the same way that the Council of Finances 
acted on financial matters. The new council met rarely, however; 
and although the Almanack royal always listed it alongside the other 
royal councils, it was never more than a decoration. The examina­
tion and administration of economic matters continued to be per­
formed in the Bureau of Commerce and in the finance and naval 
ministries.3 Many historians who have written about mid- or late 
eighteenth-century French history have confused the new, rela­
tively unimportant Council of Commerce with the still active 
Bureau of Commerce. Although it continued to be influential, the 
bureau seems to have suffered a severe curtailment of its power in 
1744. Up to that date the president of the council (or bureau) had 
always held simultaneously the post of director of commerce in the 
finance ministry. On the death of the bureau's president in 1744 
the two positions were separated.4 Thereafter the man appointed 
president of the bureau was always a conseiller d'etat, but he did not 
have the administrative control over intendants, inspectors of 
manufactures, and the farmers general that his predecessors had 
enjoyed. After 1744 the direction of commerce was assigned to an 
intendant of finances—Daniel-Charles Trudaine (1744-69) and 
then his son Jean-Charles-Philibert Trudaine de Montigny (1769­
77). The bureau remained active under the supervision of the di­
rector of commerce, although it appears to have been used less 
than heretofore had been true. Under Louis XIV the council had 
assembled, on the average, more than forty times each year; be­
ginning in the 1740s the number for the bureau fell to about 
thirty.5 
One reason for this decline in authority may have been the 
strong mercantilist bias of the bureau. Throughout the eighteenth 
century, it continued to advocate protectionist, heavily regulatorv 
policies. At the same time, however, several royal ministers and 
other officials began to adopt more flexible, "liberal" views. This 
led them to rely less on the bureau and even, on occasion, to avoid 
consulting it. This development became more noticeable in the 
1750s, when Jacques-Claude-Marie Vincent de Gournay became 
an intendant of commerce and a close collaborator of the 
Trudaines. Gournay was a proponent of laissez-faire, laissez-passei\ 
and he was put off by the heavy-handed regulatory system de­
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fended by the Bureau of Commerce. He therefore tended to dis­
regard that body's advice whenever it did not suit him.6 
The bureau's influence deteriorated even more in the 1770s, 
when Gournay's friend Turgot assumed the controller general­
ship. This tendency climaxed in the 1780s, when the intendants of 
commerce began to meet in a comite apart from the bureau. They 
often bypassed the bureau completely when studying important 
issues. 
These remarks concerning the council (or bureau) for the years 
after 1715 are not based on exhaustive research. Thus they must be 
considered tentative until further research is made into the later 
history of this institution. 
1. This statement is in direct contrast to the thesis of Jacqueline-Lucienne Lafon, 
who contends that only after 1715 did the council (or bureau) become important 
(Les Deputes du commerce, passim). 
2. Bosher, The Single Duty Project, pp. 43-44. 
3. Bonnassieux and Lelong, pp. xiii-xiv; Antoine, Le Conseil du roi, pp. 138-39. 
4. Louis Fagon became president in 1724 after the death of Amelot and served 
until his own death in 1744. 
5. On the period after 1715, see Bonnassieux and Lelong, Conseil de commerce, pp. 
xi-xviii. 
6. Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii, 1; G. Scelle, Vincent de Gournay (Paris, 1897), passim. In his 
private papers, Pierre Bonnassieux refers to a work published in 1761, in which the 
marquis de Mirabeau bitterly criticizes the regulatory excesses of the Bureau of 
Commerce (AN, AB XIX, 368). Throughout the eighteenth century, many busi­
nessmen continued to oppose free trade and to support the government's regula­
tory policies. For some illustrations see the works cited in Chapter 6, n. 161 above. 
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157, 160, 182 n. 45, 195, 202 
Law, John, 51 
Le Peletier, Claude (controller general), 
11, 65, 151 
Levant, the, 51, 120, 139, 178; Com­
pany of, 51, 91; French manufactures 
for, 152, 156, 161-62, 167, 172-73, 
179; privileges of Marseilles in trade 
with, 57-58, 61, 77, 88-94, 206, 232­
33; trade with French ports besides 
Marseilles, 57-58, 88-94 passim, 
102 n. 76. See also under England; 
Dutch Republic 
Levasseur, Emile (historian), 153, 172 
Le'vy, Claude-Frederic (historian), 54 
Lille, 73, 74, 79-80, 207 
Loire River, 57, 62, 206 
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vidual nations or cities 
Nimes, 58, 79, 95 
Normandy, 96-97, 158, 245. See also Le 
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and plagues, 29, 246; and privateer­
ing, 30, 129, 136; and Spanish colo­
nies, 226, 233; work of, with Council 
of Commerce, 21, 23, 33, 34-35, 36, 
37, 38, 40, 90, 116, 224. See also Naval 
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